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
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



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MOUNTAIN WARFARE

ILLUSTRATED BY THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799
IN SWITZERLAND.

BEING

A TRANSLATION OF THE SWISS NARRATIVE, COMPILED FROM
THE WORKS OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES, JOMINI,
AND OTHERS.

*ALSO OF NOTES BY GENERAL H. DUFOUR, ON THE
CAMPAIGN IN THE VALTELLINE IN 1635.*

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SHADWELL, C.B.

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
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1875

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PREFATORY REMARKS.

THIS attempt to offer in English shape a concise narrative of that portion of the memorable contest of 1799, of which Switzerland was the scene, originated in the interest awakened in my mind by occasional tours in that country.

The guide-books of the day make frequent allusions to passages in the war of 1799, and the attention of the traveller is from time to time arrested by the relation of some incident connected with this remarkable struggle, conducted, for the most part, in the vicinity, and sometimes on the very crest of barren and wellnigh impracticable mountains, and under every phase of the changeable climate common to all such regions.

It occurred to me that a separate critical narrative of these particular operations might possibly be of use to the younger members of my profession; for although the works of the Archduke Charles, Jomini and others, contain admirable and detailed accounts of them, they are by those writers mixed up with the other portions of the comprehensive struggle of 1799, which was being conducted in the valleys of the Danube and the Po simultaneously with the events, which were passing in Switzerland.

This, therefore, must be regarded as my excuse for again treading such well-known ground; for, with the exception of the turning manœuvre of the Grimsel on the 14th August,
b 5

1799, given in Appendix No. I. to this volume, there is nothing original in the work. Even this, as will be seen by reference to the Appendix, has been compiled principally from the interesting account published in 1838 by Herr R. Lobhauer, Professor of Military Science in the University of Berne.

It is not likely that the general reader will be much interested in this work, but it may be that, apart from military men, some lovers of Switzerland and its mountains, in visiting its peaks and passes, may avail themselves of the opportunity of ascertaining in a concise, yet critical form, how warfare was conducted on a large scale in a country so intersected and difficult.

When, too, it is considered what the frontiers of our Indian possessions are; how they are bounded, for the most part, by some of the most extensive mountain ranges in the world; and how great is the necessity of keeping a watchful eye over our Trans-Indus territories, as proved by the numerous expeditions already undertaken on so many occasions, since the conquest of the Punjaub in 1849, against the turbulent and warlike tribes bordering on our north-west frontier; the method of conducting warfare, as illustrated by historical examples, will not, it is hoped, be deemed unworthy the attention of those especially, who at any moment may be called upon to share in expeditions involving operations in mountainous regions.

The military student, who is acquainted with the works of the Archduke Charles and Jomini, will readily recognise in this translation many passages from those authors. The compiler of the "Swiss Narrative" has borrowed largely from them, whilst in some places he has quoted from the Memoirs of Marshal Masséna, as well as from those of Marshal Soult.

The greater part of the original manuscript appeared in the early numbers of the *Swiss Military Review*, the publica-

tion of which at Lausanne began in May 1856. It is from this source that this translation has been taken.

As an Appendix to the "Narrative," will be found the translation of a very interesting document, entitled "Critical Account of the March of Suwarow's Army from Italy into Switzerland," also extracted from the *Swiss Military Review*. The original was written at Chur by one of the officers of Suwarow's staff, and who, according to Masséna's Memoirs,* is supposed to have been General Schweikowski, as it is stated that he led the right column of attack against the St Gothard.

The autograph is in the possession of General Dufour, and was read by him before the Military Society of Geneva some years ago, with some valuable notes, which are reproduced in the Appendix. The same document, attributed to an "eyewitness," is given almost in its entirety by Jomini in the form of a *pièce justificatif*, No. VII. p. 455, vol. xii. of his work *Histoire de Guerres de la Révolution*, Paris, 1822.

Most of the ground mentioned in this narrative I have myself examined during different visits to Switzerland. As I found, however, that the French rendering of many of the names differed much from the German ones, and might possibly lead to confusion, and as not a few are given incorrectly in the original, I have verified them, as far as possible, from the topographical map of Switzerland (General Dufour's) in twenty-five sheets.

If within his reach, the military student is recommended to use this beautiful map when studying the Swiss portion of the campaign of 1799.

The general map of the territory which formed the theatre of the war, as well as the plans of the action at Feldkirch, the combat of Tauffers, and of the first and second battles of Zürich, have been reproduced from the original ones issued

* *Mémoires de Masséna par le General Koch*, tome iii. p. 378, Paris, 1849.

with the Archduke Charles's work, *Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1799*, Wien, 1819.*

It should be borne in mind by the reader of this narrative, that at the period of this campaign, and until within a few years ago, no road existed between Brunnen at the foot of the bay of Uri and Flüelen at the head of the Lake of Luzern, known in Switzerland as "the Lake of the Four Forest Cantons;" further, that the roads generally at that time were far inferior to, and much less well cared for, than those of the present day.

Such remarks as occur in the narrative regarding the political conduct of England during this campaign must be regarded as merely expressing the opinion of the compiler of the narrative. Should the reader desire a nearer insight into the motives which at that period actuated the Ministers of England and Austria, he will be amply repaid by a careful perusal of the "Life and Correspondence of Sir Gilbert Elliot, first Lord Minto," recently published.

Of all the minor operations of war, none are so interesting, certainly none so difficult, as those conducted in mountainous countries. The rugged nature of the ground, the severity of the climate, and the paucity of communications confine the movement of anything like large bodies of troops to a few well-defined lines; while the difficulty of transport, on which all supplies, whether of *matériel* or subsistence, depend, demands foresight and intelligence on the part of the commander, and courage and physical endurance on the part of the troops.

The first requisite at the outset of a campaign is accurate information regarding the country, in which the operations are to be conducted. The configuration of the ground, the

* A discrepancy will be found to exist between the spelling of some of the names given in the special maps and of those in the text. This will be found to be the case especially in the plans of the first and second battles of Zürich, but it was considered advisable to adhere, as far as the text was concerned, to the orthography given in the Swiss topographical map.

watersheds, the direction of the principal valleys determined by the course of the rivers, the roads, the passes, and lateral communications, are matters, amongst many others, which must engage the serious attention of the commander.

To this end an intimate acquaintance with the geographical features of the country is necessary to enable him to draw conclusions, on which he can base his plans of action, whether offensive or defensive. In all countries this is of paramount importance ; for without a clear idea of the ground, in which he is to operate, a commander will be groping in the dark. More especially requisite is this in mountainous regions, where the conformation of the ground produces so many geographical phenomena, which exercise a direct and influential bearing on the posting and movement of troops, and on the general operations of the campaign.

As a salient instance of this, take the great central block in Switzerland formed by the St Gothard, the Furka, and the Grimsel. At this point, speaking in a general sense, the four principal chains of the Swiss Alps meet. Here are to be found the sources of the Reuss, the Aare, the Ticino, the Rhone, and the Vorder Rhine, the valleys of which form, in the direction of the four points of the compass, the main communications between Switzerland on the one hand, and France, Germany, and Italy on the other.* No wonder, then, that this point played such an important, though not decisive part, and was so warmly contested by the belligerents in the struggle of 1799.

One more point may be noticed in connection with this subject. The Engadine and the Valtelline, or valleys of the Inn and the Adda, are contiguous and parallel, or nearly so, to each other ; but their rivers flow in opposite directions—the Inn in a north-easterly direction to join the

* For an excellent description of this ground see *Précis des Evénemens Militaires* M. Dumas), vol. i. p. 302, Paris, 1817.

Danube, which empties itself into the Black Sea; the Adda in a south-westerly direction till it enters the Lake of Como, whence it proceeds to join the Po, which flows into the Adriatic. It will be seen from the "Swiss Narrative," that in 1799 Lecourbe descended the Engadine, whilst Dessolles simultaneously ascended the Valtelline, with the object of co-operating in the successful attempt to force the Austrians out of the Grisons.

On the choice of an able commander success in mountain warfare principally depends. He should possess what Napoleon considered the first quality of a general, "a cool intellect." With this should be combined physical energy, indomitable perseverance, great circumspection, as well as courage to act independently when the occasion arises. He should possess the faculty of weighing reports and arriving at just conclusions, often on the spur of the moment, for in mountains events change rapidly. Finally, he should be conversant with war on a large scale, should appreciate the character of mountain warfare, and possess what Clausewitz terms "*Ortsinn*," or "power of quickly forming a geometrical idea of a portion of country, and of consequently being able to find one's place in it exactly at any time."

Several important lessons were taught by the events of 1799. In this campaign too much importance was placed on the possession of the mountains, whilst the real key of the theatre of war, viz., the valley of the Danube, was neglected. The old theory, now exploded, viz., *Maître des sources est maître des bouches*, governed the minds of those who directed the operations of the respective belligerents. It must be remembered that the decisive blow fell at Zürich in the lowlands.

On this subject Napoleon expressed himself as follows:—"The campaign in the Engadine (1799) was planned at Paris by men who had no real knowledge of war. Mountains

depend on the plains, and have no more influence in commanding the plains than the position they afford for guns. . . . Your enemy has large towns, fertile provinces, a capital to protect ; make straight for these. The art of war is simple and practical, and requires good sense, not ideology."*

In the year 1800 we find Lecourbe, who by his ability in the campaign of the previous year had established a considerable reputation for knowledge of mountain warfare, giving his opinion to the French Minister of War as follows :—

"It is in the valleys that the mountains must be defended. This reflection will perhaps appear surprising to those who have not made war in the mountains ; but should you have strong reserves at the outlets of a mountain, throw them on the enemy, at the moment when, having just had seven or eight leagues of ascending and descending, he is overcome with fatigue, and in such a case it is pretty certain that he will not reascend, but will be taken prisoner. I could cite many examples of it."†

As a general rule, in any war in which a mountainous country forms only a section of its theatre, the decisive blow will not be struck in the high mountains, and for this reason it is unnecessary to employ a large force in defence of them.

In opposition to this principle, the Austrians in 1799 adopted the old-established and erroneous plan of defending a great extent of mountain frontier with a long line of posts, and by the occupation of the numerous defiles and passages leading across the mountains. The result was the employment of the so-called cordon system, necessitating an undue proportion of troops scattered over a vast extent of territory, thereby deducting from the otherwise preponderating force,

* *Commentaires de Napoleon*, vol. iii. pp. 464, 465 ; reviewed in the *Times*.

† *Précis des Evénemens Militaires* (M. Dumas), vol. iv. pp. 208, 209 ; quoted by Lallemand.

with which the Archduke Charles might have struck a decisive blow, either in the plains of Germany, or in the lowlands of Switzerland.

Whether in strategy or tactics, it is alike incumbent on the general to prevent his troops occupying too great an extent of ground. Clausewitz lays it down that "a general who allows himself to be beaten in an extended mountainous position deserves to be brought before a court-martial."

The true principle, therefore, of waging war in mountains is to keep the main body of the forces in the principal valley, concentrated on the most important theatre of operations. Even Lecourbe found that in attempting to cover by Masséna's order the Grisons in April 1799 against Bellegarde's superior forces, his position in the neighbourhood of Remüs was too much advanced, and that it exposed his flanks, his rear, and his communications to dangers and difficulties, from which it required no ordinary skill to extricate himself.

The Duke de Rohan's campaign in the Valtelline in 1635 furnishes a very instructive example of how to conduct war with success in high mountains. It is quoted by the Archduke Charles and other military writers in such terms of praise, that I have given, together with this narrative of the campaign of 1799, a translation of a very interesting account of this campaign, entitled "Notes on the Campaign in the Valtelline in 1635," from the able pen of General Dufour, who for many years was the respected head of the Swiss army, and who contributed this paper to the *Swiss Military Review*.

The object of the Duke de Rohan was, by seizing a central position in the Valtelline, to prevent the passage of a force, which the Emperor of Austria was sending through the Tyrol, to join the Spaniards in the Duchy of Milan, at that time belonging to Spain, and at war with France.

For this purpose he guarded the outlets from the Tyrol with outposts of inconsiderable strength, but concentrated his main body at the central point of Tirano, in the valley of the Adda, whence he sallied forth to meet and defeat in turn the Austrians and Spaniards, each of whose force was superior to his own. As soon as he had repulsed one of his adversaries, he retired to his old position to turn from thence on the other, repeating the process, until they both gave up the attempt in despair, and finally withdrew from the mountains.*

Another remarkable instance of the successful defence of a mountainous region is to be found in the operations of the Spanish general Ricardos, who in 1793 defended the Eastern Pyrenees against the French. This campaign is also cited by the Archduke Charles to illustrate the method of resisting the invasion of a mountainous country, by taking up a defensive position in front of the mountains, and from thence acting on the offensive.

After forcing back the French upon Perpignan, Ricardos withdrew to Boulou, where he established an entrenched camp. From thence he defied the efforts of the French, whose numbers by this time were greatly superior to his own, and by a masterly combination of defensive-offensive measures, succeeded in capturing the French maritime fortresses of Fort St Elme, Collioure, and Port Vendres, and finally compelled the French to retreat a second time to Perpignan;—a striking proof that the defence should never be absolute, but should always be supported by offensive strokes.

The superiority of the attack over the defence in the mountains is very decided.

In no instance was it more apparent than in the campaign

* *Mémoires et Lettres de Henri Duc de Rohan sur la guerre de Valtelline, par M. le Baron Zur-Luben*, Genève, 1758. It is from this source that General Dufour's notes have evidently been taken.

of 1799; but to ensure success, the assailant must prepare the road to victory by seizing the initiative, and infusing vigour and pertinacity into his operations, always taking care that he has his force well in hand, that his flanks and communications are secured, and that the measures adopted for the supply of his troops are suitable to the object in view.

Napier, in the course of his observations on the campaign in the Pyrenees and the South of France in 1813-14, remarks that "war in rough mountains is generally a series of errors." *

Of this there are numerous examples in ancient and modern history.

Going back to an early period, we find no less a commander than Alexander the Great baffled in an attempt to enter the mountains separating Susiana from Persia, in consequence of the neglect of an obvious precaution.

The pass at that time known as the *Pylæ Persidæ* was occupied by Ariobarzanes; he allowed Alexander, who had neglected to crown the heights, to advance into the defile, and when his force was sufficiently compromised, it was suddenly attacked with discharges from slings and with volleys of stones, obliging the Macedonians to beat a retreat into the plains.

Alexander then selected one of his prisoners, who had a knowledge of the country, and ascertaining from him that it was possible to turn the position, he executed a manœuvre with a detachment led by himself, which brought him in rear of his antagonist's position. The result was quite successful, and eventually led to the defeat of Ariobarzanes and his army.

During the invasion of the Tyrol in 1703 by the Elector of Bavaria, a body of French dragoons and Bavarian grenadiers entered the defile of the Inn between Landeck and Prutz. They omitted the precaution of sending forward an advanced

* Napier's "Peninsular War," vol. vi. p. 238.

guard, and further neglected to crown the heights on either side with flanking parties. The heights were held by the peasantry of the surrounding districts, and as the column approached the bridge of Pontlatz, it was overwhelmed by an avalanche of stones and wooden beams, poured upon it from the heights on either side ; such of the party as escaped destruction in the pass were captured by the armed peasantry of Landeck.

Similarly in 1809 a mixed column of French and Bavarians, proceeding from Landeck through the Vintschgau towards Meran, neglected to crown the heights and clear the way for the main body in the defile, and met with an almost identical fate.

A perusal of the "Swiss Narrative" will satisfy the reader that Lecourbe was the leader of troops in the campaign of 1799, who displayed the greatest genius for conducting warfare in the mountains, and that, under every circumstance, he showed himself equal to the occasion. True he committed some faults—what general does not?—but he appears to have possessed that precious gift, "presence of mind," which never deserted him on the most trying occasions. Active, intrepid, never sparing himself when it was necessary to set a personal example, he won the confidence of his troops and of his chief, and rightly asserted his claim to be regarded by posterity as the true type of a mountain warrior. His reports to Masséna, who reposed the greatest confidence in him, are written in a clear and unpretending style, and prove him to have been as modest as he was able. In those days of revolutionary excess, it is refreshing to find what a strict disciplinarian he was, and how he exerted himself to render the presence of his troops as little irksome as possible to the inhabitants of the occupied country. But for the jealousy of Napoleon, who forced him to retire into private life, in consequence of his loyalty to Moreau, his former chief, it is pretty

certain that he would have added largely to his renown, and would have occupied a conspicuous position amongst the illustrious soldiers, who contributed to the glory of France under the First Empire. Certain it is that the Archduke Charles, whom Clausewitz designates as "a good historical writer, a good critic, and above all a good general," together with Jomini and other military historians, are unanimous in acknowledging Lecourbe's genius and remarkable capacity for war in mountainous regions.

The reader should notice the judgment he displayed, in retiring from a false position before Bellegarde's superior forces in the Engadine, at the end of April and beginning of May 1799, and the able manner in which, after inflicting great loss on the Austrians, he effected his retreat on Ponte, "without leaving a single wounded man or carriage in the enemy's hands."

Then, again, his masterly combination, in order to drive the Austrians from the valley of the Reuss, the Grimsel, and the St Gothard, in August of the same year, proves what an accurate knowledge of the country he possessed; and if it should be objected that Lecourbe distributed his forces over too great an extent of country, instead of concentrating them previously to the attack, the answer is, that his dispositions were such, that at every important point he could and did bring superior numbers to bear on his adversary, and that while he caused Gudin to operate by turns on the Grimsel and the Furka, he knew how to multiply himself with his reserve, with which he engaged Jellachich and Simbschen in succession.

Even when, by an act of imprudence, Lecourbe found himself caught in a trap in the valley of Urseren, between Suwarow on the St Gothard, and Rosenberg, as he descended from the Ober Alp, his presence of mind did not desert him. Many men of ordinary capacity would probably, under similar circum-

stances, have lost their heads and laid down their arms. Lecourbe having an accurate knowledge of the country, and knowing his men, who reciprocally confided in him, resorted to the extreme measure of flinging his guns into the Reuss, and dispersed his troops, with orders to cross the steep heights separating the valley of Urseren from that of Geschenen, and rally below the Devil's Bridge, where his reserve was in readiness to resist the Russians as they emerged the next morning from the Urner-loch. Only troops accustomed to mountain warfare, under a consummate leader, could have performed such a desperate movement with success.

The history of our rule in India furnishes many examples of operations conducted in mountainous regions.

The invasion of the Nepaulese territory, which commenced in October 1814, was the first campaign conducted on a large scale by the forces of British India in a mountainous territory, and is very instructive, as showing how much was learned from even a semi-barbarous enemy, to remedy errors committed at the outset of operations by most of the leaders of the British columns, owing to their ignorance of the peculiar style of warfare required in the mountains.

The conformation of the ground in that theatre of war was varied, but in many cases the chains of hills ran parallel to each other, were of no great extent, and were frequently terminated by narrow ridges affording access to the intermediate valleys, and admitting of the turning manœuvre.

On the peaks of these hills the Ghoorkas erected stockades, which they defended with great obstinacy. But we learn from the historian* that "they were abundantly satisfied with repulsing an attack and cutting off an outpost. They never pushed their success beyond this, and were indeed too de-

* "History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-23," by Henry T. Prinsep, of the Bengal Civil Service, 1825.

ficient in military science, as well as in physical means, to assume a superiority in the campaign, or to act offensively against any one of our divisions. Their tactics were purely defensive."

The outset of operations was marked by several failures, notably by the repulse of an attack by the column under Sir R. Gillespie on the stockade of Kalunga or Nalapanee in the Dehra Doon, in which that officer lost his life. A subsequent attack failed likewise, but on mortars being used against it, the place fell under perpendicular fire. It is lamentable to reflect what a loss of life and time might have been saved, had this measure been adopted in the first instance.

"Little advance was made in the campaign until we had learned a lesson from the Ghoorikas. We adopted from them the plan of stockading the posts, which the nature of the campaign frequently rendered it necessary to place beyond the limit of prompt support.

"Sir David Ochterlony had the merit of having first resorted to this plan, and of having adopted it, too, as a resource of prudence which occurred to his own mind, not taught him by the experience of disasters, as was the case with others."

The establishment of these stockaded posts, together with a judicious use of the turning manœuvre, enabled us to act upon the flank and rear of the enemy, who, relying upon the absolute defensive, eventually succumbed and came to terms.

In perusing the history of the war in Affghanistan, it is refreshing as well as instructive to pass from the tragical events, arising out of the insurrection in November 1841, to the triumphant advance to the capital of Pollock's, Sale's, and Nott's columns in the following spring, and to note the comparative ease with which they defeated the enemy in the formidable defiles of the Khyber, Jugdulluck, Tezeen, and Mydan passes, owing to the simple but necessary precaution of crowning and

clearing the heights, before the main bodies entered the gorges. Yet we are told that on the return march of the British force this precaution, "though systematically taken by Pollock," was not always adopted by the centre and the rear divisions, and that in passing through the Khyber, M'Caskill's rear-guard, under Brigadier Wild, was attacked and suffered some loss.*

Since that period many expeditions have been made against the hill-tribes bordering our Trans-Indus territories. That undertaken by Sir Charles Napier against the predatory tribes in the Cutchee Hills is pronounced by the biographer of Sir William Napier to have been "one of the most extraordinary achievements on record, and to be well worthy of the careful study of the military student." †

A most interesting account of this very remarkable operation is given by Sir William Napier in his narrative of Sir Charles Napier's administration of Scinde. After giving a detailed account of the measures adopted by Sir Charles Napier "to chastise the robbers of the hills," he sums up his brother's actions as follows :—

"Sir Charles Napier had crossed a desert of more than eighty miles, had surprised the enemy's first line of forts and watering-places, had seized their strongest passes without a stroke, had baffled all their counter-schemes, and in fifty-four days subdued tribes having four times his number of fighting men, without giving them the opportunity of delivering battle in an advantageous post. He had starved them where they thought to starve him, and by fine combinations and unexampled rapidity overreached them in their own peculiar warfare, and in a country more than 140 miles long from 80 to 120 broad, and of such desolate strength and intricacy, as can scarcely be equalled in the world—chasing them

* "History of the War in Afghanistan," by John William Kaye. London, 1851.

† "Life of General Sir W. Napier, K.C.B.," vol. ii. p. 220. London, 1864.

amidst crags and defiles, where a single error would have caused the total destruction of his army, merely by the casting of stones down on the column.*

In February 1850, the Kohat Pass was successfully forced by a small but well-equipped column led by Lord Clyde, then commanding the brigade at Peshawur, under the personal direction of Sir Charles Napier, at that time commander-in-chief in India.

In the autumn of 1851, Lord Clyde carried out some interesting operations for the defence of our territory against the incursions of the Mohmund tribes to the north-west of Peshawur, and in the spring of 1852 with a flying column he prosecuted a successful raid against the Othman-Khail tribe and the valley of Ranizaie, proving himself to be an able leader of troops in this kind of border warfare. Few passages in his professional career afforded him more pleasurable reflections, as is abundantly proved by his frequent reference to these operations both in conversation and in the papers which he left behind him.

Lord Clyde strongly maintained the opinion, that this portion of our Peshawur frontier would be best protected by the establishment of "a strong cordon, reinforced at times, if necessary, but refraining from attempts to penetrate the hills, where the mountaineers have such advantages of numbers, of knowledge, of ground and personal activity, to meet which we can alone trust to our very best troops, and where artillery cannot be brought into play."

But the most serious operation, as yet conducted on our Peshawur frontier, was the expedition under Sir Neville Chamberlain in 1863 to force the Umbeylah Pass, with the object of destroying Mulka, the stronghold of the Sitana

* "History of Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde and Campaign in the Cutchee Hills," by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Napier, K.C.B., 1854.

fanatics, situated on the northern side of the Mahabun mountain.

Making a feint with a small body in the direction of the Durrun Pass, by which Sir S. Cotton had approached the other side of the Mahabun for the purpose of chastising the same fanatics and destroying Sitana in 1858, Sir Neville Chamberlain entered the Umbeylah Pass on the 20th October with a force consisting of about 5000 men, one-fourth of whom were Europeans, and eleven guns.

Advancing along a difficult track to within two miles of the mouth of the pass leading into the Chumla valley, Sir Neville Chamberlain halted for his guns, stores, and baggage, the whole of which took four days to reach him.

In the meantime, he found that he had to deal with other than the Sitana fanatics, the original object of the expedition. The Bonairs and other tribes having joined common cause with the former, he arrived at the conclusion that it would be dangerous to advance through the Chumla valley, as his left flank would be exposed to the attack of these powerful and warlike tribes.

Sending back his sick and baggage to the plain, he took up a defensive position on the gorge of the pass, until such time as reinforcements, which he demanded, should enable him to advance.

Here the force had to resist repeated attacks of a most determined nature. Some of our more exposed posts and pickets were several times taken and retaken, thereby causing a considerable loss in officers and men.

Finding his left flank too much exposed, Sir Neville Chamberlain contracted his position by concentrating his force on the right of the Umbeylah Pass. This was a delicate operation in the presence of so enterprising a foe, and involved the loss of the Umbeylah route to the plains; but the

apparent inconvenience had been obviated by the construction of a new road.

Time wore on, and matters on the frontier assumed so threatening an aspect, that it was in contemplation by the Government to withdraw the force. This idea was strenuously resisted by Lord Strathnairn, the then commander-in-chief. In the meantime, Lord Elgin, the Governor-General, died, his office being assumed *ad interim* by Sir William Denison, the Governor of Madras. On the arrival of the latter at Calcutta, he induced the Council to forego the proposition of withdrawing the force. The necessary reinforcements were pressed forward, and on their arrival, General Garvock, who had succeeded to the command of the Umbeylah force, in consequence of Sir Neville Chamberlain having been wounded, sallied forth from the defensive position, so long held by our troops, on the 15th December, broke through the enemy on the right front of our works, and descending into the valley of Chumla, completed the victory.

The Bonairs and other tribes, who had previously shown signs of weariness at the protracted defence, submitted to terms, and Mulka, the objective point of the expedition, was duly destroyed.

From the 22d October till the 15th December, a period of fifty-four days, the British force had stood at bay, but our advance was the signal for the collapse of the enemy's resistance,—again vindicating the principle of the superiority of attack over defence.

This operation, which cost us in round numbers a loss of 36 officers and 1000 men killed and wounded, taught us the impolicy of penetrating an unknown mountainous region, with a heavily and hastily equipped force, of which Europeans must necessarily form an important portion, and the operations of which must be further impeded by the difficulties attending the movement of artillery, stores, and baggage, in a

rugged country, without roads, and in face of a determined enemy, thoroughly acquainted with the ground and inured to mountain warfare.*

In October 1868 a very interesting expedition, under Major-General Sir A. T. Wilde, operated against the tribes of independent Hazara. The chief feature of the force, from 6000 to 7000 strong, a large proportion being Europeans, was its extreme mobility, and the absence of all baggage, with the exception of the commissariat and the ordnance trains. The result was, that the troops experienced no check, and moved with perfect freedom, forcing the passes leading to the Muchaie Peak, the crest of the Black Mountain, 10,200 feet high, which was occupied with comparatively little resistance, and with trifling loss, mainly owing to the covering fire of the mountain train (mortars), which was carried on mules. The field-guns were mounted on elephants, two of which were brought to the top of the peak.

From this point measures were taken to punish such of the offending tribes as did not immediately submit.

The troops traversed eighty miles of rugged country, making their own roads, and carrying their own supplies. They took no tents with them, and were in bivouac for three weeks without any injury to their health,—a satisfactory proof of the advantage offered by light and suitable equipment to the initiative in operations conducted in a mountainous country.

There are few works in English, at least known to me, that treat specially on mountain warfare. In the sixth volume, however, of Napier's "History of the Peninsular War," the subject is critically handled, and that, too, in a masterly manner, when describing the Duke of Wellington's operations in the Pyrenees

* "Sitana : a Mountain Campaign on the Borders of Affghanistan in 1863," by Colonel J. Adye, C.B., R.A.

Lecture delivered in the United Service Institution, 12th April 1867, on the subject of the foregoing campaign, by Captain Fosbery, V.C., Bengal Staff Corps, *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, vol. xi. No. xlvii. p. 548.

and the South of France. The military reader need never regret the time expended in making himself acquainted with the contents of this portion of Napier's matchless work.

A portion of Lallemand's instructive compilation on the minor operations of war was translated by the late Sir St Vincent Troubridge, but the plans and their explanations, which are to be found in the original, are not given with the translation.*

The chapter on mountain warfare is in great measure a transcript from passages in the Archduke Charles's work on the campaign of 1799, perhaps all the more valuable on that account, and well worthy the attention of the military student.†

A short but thoughtful essay on mountain warfare has been published by Lieutenant C. M. Macgregor, Bengal Staff Corps, which reached a second edition in 1866. The idea seems to have been prompted by the events arising out of the Umbeylah campaign. It is a painstaking little treatise, and especially valuable to those who, in the course of their service in India, may be called upon to serve against the hill-tribes on our frontier.‡

In the last few years, however, there has been published at Vienna a comprehensive work on "Mountain Warfare," by Lieutenant-General von Kuhn, until within a few months since Minister of War in Austria.

The author, who bears a high reputation in his own country, commanded with great success in the Southern Tyrol, and

* *Traité Théorique et Pratique des Opérations Secondaires de la Guerre, accompagné d'un Atlas in 4to, par A. Lallemand.* Paris, 1824.

† "Principles of the Minor Operations of War," translated from the French of Lallemand by St Vincent Troubridge, Major, 7th Royal Fusiliers. London: Parker Furnival & Parker, 1852.

‡ "Mountain Warfare: an Essay on the Conduct of Military Operations in Mountainous Countries," by Lieutenant Charles Metcalfe Macgregor. London: Niessen & Parker, 43 Mark Lane.

conducted in those mountains the operations arising out of the war between Austria and Italy in 1866. He has enjoyed the advantage of practical experience in mountain warfare, and has evidently given much time and attention to the subject.

This work I have rendered into English, with the view of publishing it hereafter.*

LAWRENCE SHADWELL.

10th December 1874.

* *Der Gebirgskrieg von Franz Freiherrn von Kuhn, K.K. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant, mit 21 Karten und Plänen, Wien, 1870.*

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
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HENRY S. KING & CO 65, CORNHILL, LONDON

SWISS NARRATIVE

OF THE

CAMPAIGN OF 1799 IN SWITZERLAND.

THE treaty of Campo Formio had put an end to the first coalition. The dissatisfaction of Austria at having been deprived of a considerable portion of her Italian possessions, and, on the other hand, the tendency to invasion on the part of the French Directory, which, not content with a refusal to evacuate Switzerland, had renewed the occupation of the Roman and Neapolitan dominions, were the causes which speedily led to the formation of a second coalition, in which the following powers took part : England, as usual ; Austria, interested in the recovery of her losses during the preceding campaigns ; and lastly, Russia, impelled to action by her aristocratic animosity towards revolutionary ideas.

The campaign of 1799 was the first act of this new coalition, which terminated at Marengo.

The military operations of this year embrace three distinct theatres : Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. It is principally the operations in Switzerland which it is here intended to trace.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE BELLIGERENT FORCES PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.

First Period of the Campaign.

I. The Austrians had formed three independent armies : one under the immediate command of the Archduke Charles—

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A

54,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, in Bavaria, Ulm, &c.; 24,000 infantry, 1400 cavalry, in the Vorarlberg and the frontiers of the Grisons.

2. One under Lieutenant-General Bellegarde—44,000 infantry, 26,000 cavalry, in the valley of the Inn and the Southern Tyrol.

3. One under Lieutenant-General Kray—64,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry—was in the act of assembling on the Adige, but two divisions were still in distant cantonments between the Muhr and the Isonzo.

The French.

At the end of February the French armies, incomplete and deficient in many of the most important articles of equipment, were dispersed between Mount Vesuvius and the Texel; whilst the Austrians, superior in numbers and *matériel*, were concentrated between the Danube and the Adriatic.

The forces of France were distributed in five independent armies :—

1. The Army of the Danube, commanded by General Jourdan, 46,000 effectives.

Stationed between Landau and Hüningen, this army was destined to enter Germany by Kehl and Hüningen, between the Lake of Constance and the Danube, crossing the Black Forest. It had to refuse its left and move its right upon Bregenz, so as to be in communication with the army which was to force an entry into the Tyrol from Switzerland.

2. The Army of Helvetia, under General Masséna, 33 battalions and eight squadrons—in all, 30,000 combatants.

This army had orders to gain possession of the Grisons and the Tyrol. With this object in view it was to cross the Rhine between Bregenz and Mayenfeld, make a simultaneous attack upon Bregenz and Chur, and march upon Innsbruck; whilst a third column, reinforced by a detachment from the Army of Italy, was to open the passage which leads from the Valtelline to Glurns, Botzen, and Brixen.

3. The Army of Observation, under General Bernadotte, 49 battalions and 38 squadrons—total, 48,000 combatants.

This army was intrusted with the task of blockading Philipsburg and Manheim, of assisting the operations of the Army of the Danube by demonstrations and diversions between the Main and the Neckar, of guarding the bridges on the Rhine, and of holding, in case of necessity, such points as might be threatened.

4. The Army of Italy, under General Scherer, 50,000 combatants.

This army was to direct its left wing upon Trent, send a corps into Tuscany, and debouching from Verona, move with its main body upon the Brenta and upon the Piave.

5. The Army of Italy, under General Macdonald, 30,000 strong.

This army was to complete the conquest of Naples, commenced by Championnet, and protect Malta and Corfu.

In addition to these five armies, General Brune remained in Holland with a corps 10,000 strong, to repress the disaffection of the inhabitants, and to show front to the English.

From the distribution of these forces, it may be seen how faulty was the plan of campaign adopted by the French Government. Instead of concentrating its forces in two bodies, and sacrificing the accessories, at least until success and the result of the conscription had enabled it to enlarge the scope of its ambition, it endeavoured in some degree to aggravate its errors. Of 110,000 men in Italy, more than 30,000 were utterly thrown away at the foot of the Neapolitan Peninsula, or at Rome; 15,000 were employed in the subjection of Piedmont and Tuscany, so that barely 50,000 men remained to oppose the Austrian forces united with the Russians under Suwarow on the Adige.

In Germany the same faults in the distribution and direction of the masses were no less patent. Instead of regarding Switzerland as merely an advantageous point of departure, and using every effort to concentrate 90,000 men between

the Upper Danube and Constance, the French Government was actuated by the desire to enter, at the outset of the operations, an inhospitable country intersected by sterile mountains, which was incapable of maintaining its own inhabitants, still less so large an army. Thus half of the army of Germany was devoted to the conquest of the Rhætian Alps from the Splügen to the Vorarlberg, by which measure 30,000 men were dangerously exposed in case the enemy were victorious on the Danube; and to General Jourdan and forty odd thousand men was assigned the difficult task of contending with the *élite* of the Austrian forces under the guidance of a great commander.

With 170,000 men scattered between the banks of the Adige and the mouth of the Main, the Directory was desirous of obtaining possession of the salient formed by the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg with the hereditary states of Austria—of turning the Imperial Army of Italy, and separating it from that which was operating on the banks of the Danube. This plan, so gigantic in conception, but so faulty in detail, was based on the erroneous maxim that “the possession of the mountains gives the command of the principal valleys.” The theatre of war should have been carried into the valley of the Danube or into Italy, for a victory gained in those regions would of necessity have involved the loss of the Tyrol. Moreover, the distribution of the troops in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy destroyed the power of striking an important blow at one of those points on the opening of the campaign. The partition of the forces in Italy and on the Rhine into five armies exposed them to successive annihilation for the purpose of gaining secondary objects of little or no importance.

Besides, even had the plan of the campaign been better arranged, means other than those at the Directory's disposal would have been requisite for its success; for instead of 170,000 men, there were but 128,000 available for action. In a word, the preparations both at home and abroad for the

conduct of a war of considerable proportions were absolutely insignificant.

Austria had made better use of her time. Her armies were fine, numerous, well-disciplined, and provided with ample *matériel*. The Emperor, relying on the approaching arrival of a Russian auxiliary corps, was desirous of throwing on the French the odium of an aggressive initiative, so had not yet determined his plan of operations. Nevertheless, to provide for every contingency, three armies had been assembled, as stated above, behind the Lech, in the Tyrol, and on the Adige.

At the beginning of March the armies in Germany were ^{1799.} a dozen marches distant from each other; in Switzerland they were in each other's presence. The Army of the Danube and the Army of Observation crossed the Rhine on the 1st March. On the 3d the Austrians moved beyond ^{1st March.} the Lech.

The Austrians had drawn their cantonments nearer to the Swiss frontier. Eighteen battalions and seven squadrons under Hotze occupied the Vorarlberg, for to this corps the protection of Bregenz had been specially assigned by the Archduke with the object of securing the left flank of the army in its advance from the Lech. Hotze collected the largest portion of his corps in the neighbourhood of Bregenz, and established himself with the remainder at Feldkirch, an entrenched position intended to cover the entrance into the Tyrol by the Arlberg, and to preserve the communications with Chur and the Grisons. A simple chain of posts watched the Rhine between Bregenz and Mayenfeld.

General Auffenberg commanded a detachment of Hotze's corps in the Grisons; three batteries and a squadron from the central points of Chur furnished the posts of Mayenfeld, Zizers, and Reichenau; a battalion and the armed peasantry defended in the west the approaches to the cantons of Glarus and Uri, in the south those of the Splügen and the Bernardino, as well as the entrances to the valleys of the

Middle and the Vorder Rhine. The Army of the Tyrol, commanded by Bellegarde, was in second line in rear of these positions, and was distributed as follows:—

Three battalions near Tonale, in the valleys of Non and Sole; ten battalions and two squadrons in the Southern Tyrol; one battalion at Landeck; one battalion at Innsbruck; 14 battalions between St Johann and Rattenberg; two battalions and 150 cavalry in the Bregaglia and Poschiavo valleys. Ten battalions and seven squadrons were on the march to Reute and the Arlberg.

Masséna, in view of his object—the Grisons and the Tyrol—disposed his troops as follows:—

The left wing, under Xaintrilles, was to maintain the communication with the Army of the Danube by the brigade Rubi, which was moved to the vicinity of Schaffhausen; to occupy with a few troops the left bank of the Rhine as far as Constance, and to assist the movement of the centre.

The centre, under Ménard, was to force the passage of the Rhine between Fläsch and Reichenau. Ménard's division consisted of the three brigades, Desmonts, Lorges, and Chabran.

Desmonts was directed to ascend the Tamina with the right brigade, to force the Kunkels, to seize both the bridges at Reichenau, and to march on Chur, placing himself in communication with Loison's brigade, which, from the valley of the Reuss, was to descend the Rhine with the object of seconding his attack.

Chabran was to cross the Rhine opposite Mayenfeld as soon as Lorges had effected a passage opposite Fläsch and directed a column upon Mayenfeld.

Simultaneously with these movements, Lorges, pressing forward a detachment upon the Luziensteig, was to ascend the Rhine with the remainder of his brigade towards the toll-bridge—the rendezvous designated for all the troops of Ménard's division—for the ultimate purpose of attacking Chur.

The detachment told off for the attack of the Luziensteig was to cross the Rhine near Atzmoos and be supported by Oudinot's brigade, which was to cross at Werdenberg and Haag. When the Luziensteig was taken, Oudinot was to move in advance of Vaduz on the Feldkirch road, and take up such a position as would intercept any reinforcements that Hotze might send into the Grisons.

The right wing, under Lecourbe, was directed to send a detachment under Loison from Urseren to Dissentis, and to leave Bellinzona with the main body of his corps, in order to reach the Vorder Rhine by the Splügen, and force his way into the Engadine. A detachment of the Army of Italy under the orders of General Dessolles was to assist in this enterprise, and move by the Valtelline upon Bormio.

On the 6th March Masséna summoned Auffenberg to 6th March. evacuate the Grisons in two hours. The French, without waiting for a reply, attacked the Austrian troops in the morning.

Loison marched from Urseren upon Dissentis, and was at first repulsed; he had only 800 men. The Austrians had been reinforced at this point by several thousand men, the result of a *levée en masse* in the Grisons, greatly excited by the action of their priests. Between Urseren and Calmot and Selva, Loison sustained seven combats, in all of which he was victorious, but the fatigue of his troops obliged him to bivouac on the snow-clad heights. The next day he attacked the Austrians in front of Dissentis, and drove them back beyond that town. A panic, however, having seized his rear-guard and his right flanking parties, he was driven out of the town with great loss. Nevertheless, he succeeded in reaching Urseren with 500 men, who made their way across the mountains up to their waists in snow. Many of the troops, including the general, had their hands and feet frost-bitten. As for the three companies that had been routed, they were all taken prisoners and very badly treated.

Desmonts' march and the capture of Chur soon enabled Loison to resume the offensive and rejoin Masséna, who in revenge satisfied himself by laying a contribution of 100,000 francs on the abbot of the Benedictine monastery, who had fomented the insurrection by the use of exciting language in the pulpit, and by the distribution of arms and money.

General Desmonts advanced with his brigade from Ragatz and Vättis by the mountains towards the Kunkels Pass, drove away the post that occupied it, defeated a company and two
7th March. guns above Tamins, and on the 7th March took possession of Reichenau, as well as both the bridges on the Rhine. At seven in the morning he moved upon Ems. Forced back upon Reichenau, he held his ground, and sent a detachment in the direction of Dissentis to take in reverse the post which had repulsed Loison: it surrendered, and from that moment all the Austrian posts in the valleys of the Vorder and Middle Rhine found themselves deprived of support and their communications.

Simultaneously with these operations, the brigade under Lorges attempted the passage of the Rhine near Fläsch. A battalion was to cross on a trestle-bridge near Atzmoos, so as to threaten in front the passage of St Luzien, whilst Ménard, supported by the attack from Fläsch, was to force the passage opposite Mayenfeld, and take the hill in reverse.

Auffenberg, reinforced by a battalion of Hotze's corps, succeeded by the use of his artillery in defeating the attempts of the French on Fläsch and Mayenfeld; but he had omitted to occupy the heights which slope to the Rhine between Fläsch and Balzers, and which he considered were safe from an escalade.

The French with difficulty succeeded in constructing their trestle-bridge at Atzmoos: at two o'clock the infantry crossed, though the river was swollen and the bridge was anything but firm.

ATTACK OF THE LUZIENSTEIG.

The Luziensteig is a hill four kilometres * in length, measured from the rocks of the Falknis to the Fläsch road. It is hemmed in on the left from Balzers to Mayenfeld by the prolongation of the Falknis, and on the right by a block of the same mountain, which determines the course of the Rhine between the re-entering angle formed by that river in front of Atzmoos and Fläsch. Throughout this extent the rocks fall precipitately into the river. At three-fourths of the ascent from Balzers, and at the narrowest point of the defile, the road is closed by a hornwork faced with masonry, and provided with a ditch, palisade, and drawbridge. From the flanks of this front of the fortification extend walls reaching on the right and left to the crests of the mountains, and supported by two redoubts constructed on the plateau. These redoubts sweep with their fire the road on both slopes of the defile, and command the interior of the entrenchment, which forms the gorge. This important post was defended by 1800 men and five guns.

Although hemmed in between the positions of Luziensteig and Feldkirch, having in his front the inaccessible chain of mountains which borders the Rhine, in his rear the river, and, in case of retreat, the rickety bridge at Atzmoos, Masséna did not hesitate to give the order for attack. Without artillery wherewith to force the gates of the fort, and ladders for attempting an escalade, but confident in the bravery of his troops, he set at nought all these obstacles, and relied on his good fortune.

It was all the more necessary to carry the position that very day, as it was the only means of placing himself in communication by the right bank with Ménard's troops, and of preventing Hotze's arrival to assist Auffenberg. Masséna therefore assembled the grenadiers under the command of the Chef-de-bataillon Arnouil, and directed them by the

* About 4370 English yards.

Falknis road upon the left redoubt. In the centre a battalion in close column moved against the drawbridge, obliquing slightly to the left to assist the attack of the grenadiers. On the right three companies covered, in skirmishing order, the mountain bordering the Rhine.

At three o'clock the attacking columns advanced at a rapid pace towards the points indicated to them. The left column, on reaching the crest, assailed the redoubt, but was forced back into the snow; and the intrepid Arnouil, inspiring the grenadiers with his own energy, led them back to the attack four times with no better result.

The accumulation of snow on the mountain impeded the progress of the skirmishers of the right column. The centre alone would have encountered fewer obstacles had not a heavy fall of snow, melting as it fell on the previous coating, which had become frozen, rendered the footing extremely slippery. On this side the attack was reduced to an ineffectual fire of musketry against the walls.

It was necessary to bring the affair to a conclusion: night was closing in, and all the troops of the reserve, save four companies of infantry, had been successively brought into action. Masséna brought up these troops in support of the left column. Arnouil, however, after rallying his column, had already delivered his fifth assault. At this moment one party of the grenadiers escalated the upper redoubt, whilst the other, precipitating itself like an avalanche from the mountain height, fell on the terreplein of the hornwork, broke the chains of the drawbridge, and secured an entrance into the fort for the troops of the centre attack. The Austrians fell back upon Mayenfeld, leaving the work strewn with corpses: 800 prisoners and five guns were the result of the first combat. Arnouil, whose obstinacy had decided the affair, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier on the field of battle.

Oudinot's brigade, which should have supported the troops appointed to attack the Luziensteig, had been compelled to cross the Rhine on a bridge constructed with waggons. As

it was very late when the passage was accomplished, Oudinot confined his operations to taking up a position at Schan, and pushed his advanced post along the Feldkirch road.

Auffenberg, separated from Hotze's army, and pressed on his flanks, could do nothing better than make his escape. Unwilling, however, to expose himself to the discredit of a precipitate retreat, he resolved to attempt a final effort: leaving 12,000 men at Ems to observe Desmonts' column, he abandoned all his posts beyond the Landquart, and took up a position behind the toll-bridge.

Masséna left Luziensteig on the morning of the 7th with ^{7th March.} Lorges' brigade, to march on Mayenfeld, and thence to the Landquart. At the same time, Chabran and Ménard made a movement to cross the Rhine—the former at the ford above Mayenfeld, the latter at the toll-bridge—as soon as the commander-in-chief had obtained possession of it. Masséna, who did not in the least expect to find these posts undefended, obtained immediate possession of Mayenfeld and Malans; and Ménard's column having crossed the Rhine at the toll-bridge, the two brigades effected their junction on the Landquart without any obstacle.

Whilst Masséna was making his arrangements to force the enemy behind this river, an aide-de-camp from Oudinot brought the intelligence that this general was engaged with Hotze. Masséna despatched General Lorges with a demi-brigade to his assistance, and posted himself on the toll-bridge with the intention of dislodging Auffenberg from thence. The enemy, however, did not attempt to dispute the position: he withdrew in good order to Zizers, where he evinced a desire of establishing himself—the right on the mountains of Gavadura, the left on the Rhine. Masséna, however, did not experience the satisfaction of seeing him accept battle in this new position. At the approach of the French the Austrian column fell back upon Malans, and from thence upon the heights in front of Chur, where they finally appeared disposed to stand their ground.

Wearied with this long pursuit, and desirous of striking an important blow, Masséna speedily made his dispositions. He detached to his left the "compagnies d'élite" to reach by the mountains the valley of Plessur, in which the Austrian general had taken the Davos road that leads to the Tyrol; and as soon as he calculated on the arrival of this column at its destination, he massed the battalions of the 37th and the 103d, and put himself at their head. Simultaneously the 7th hussars on the right executed a vigorous charge. The enemy, beaten at all points, endeavoured to escape by the valley of the Plessur, but the flanking column in possession of Maladers and the path leading to the Albula stopped him. General Auffenberg was taken prisoner by Brigadier Lacroix himself, and the Imperialists, deprived of their leader, were forced to lay down their arms. Three thousand prisoners, sixteen guns, three standards, and all the artillery equipment, fell into the hands of the French, as also the magazines of Chur, containing considerable supplies of stores, forage, and flour—the latter, unfortunately, damaged. Only eight companies succeeded in saving themselves by the valley of Domleschg,* whence they crossed the Albula for the purpose of reaching the gorges of the Engadine.

Auffenberg, on the occupation of the bridges of Reichenau and the Luziensteig, should have realised the danger which threatened him. Instead of posting himself behind the Landquart, he ought to have retired with due speed to the Albula, even at the sacrifice of his artillery, in order to join Loudon in the Engadine; by so doing, he would not have made a useless sacrifice of a number of his troops, and would have covered one of the principal approaches to the Tyrol; finally, he would have drawn nearer to a country whence he could derive his reinforcements.

In the position in which he was, Auffenberg could not undertake an offensive movement save in one or other of the following directions:—

* Domleschg is the valley leading from Chur to Tüsis.

1st, In the direction of the Luziensteig: in this case he increased his distance from Chur, and left the entrance to the Engadine exposed without any hope of a successful issue, or the means of finding another line of communication.

2dly, In the direction of Reichenau: in this case he remained more within reach of his line of retreat, but supposing the combat were not promptly decided, and Masséna advanced from Mayenfeld, he was caught between two fires, and had no longer the time to file by Chur into the mountains. If, on the other hand, he succeeded in repulsing the French from Reichenau, and Masséna carried Chur, the entrance to the Engadine was barred to him, since Masséna, being in possession of the shortest line of communication, could anticipate him by Lenz and Davos.

To halt in such a position is always dangerous, even in an open country where several lines of retreat are available; to do so in the mountains is to court almost inevitable defeat. The enemy throws himself against the weakest side of the position, and forthwith gains the line of retreat of the troops that await the attack. Under such circumstances one should manœuvre on encountering the enemy, and retire at once.

Beset on both his flanks by superior forces, and having no line of retreat save by the mountains of Lenz and Davos, why did Auffenberg persist in holding his ground? Simply because he deemed it his duty to receive the enemy's attack with the idea of saving the honour of his arms by a combat the issue of which could be easily foreseen.

Moreover, the Austrian line extending to the Lake of Constance, not only combined the inconveniences of a cordon which could be cut on any point that the enemy might attack in superior numbers, but it was likewise exposed to all the dangers of a position hemmed in by impassable barriers. The Austrian retreat was only to be effected by some outlets that were on the same line as their posts, and by which all the troops must of necessity defile, because they were the sole debouches leading across the mountains. As soon as the

enemy pierces a line of this kind, and gains the debouches, all the detachments scattered along the cordon are compelled to lay down their arms, or seek for safety by impracticable roads, in consequence of which the greater portion of them fall into the hands of the victors, who follow up their success in clearly-defined directions. But to return to the operations of the campaign.

LOUDINOT MARCHES ON FELDKIRCH.

7th March. Oudinot left Schan on the 7th, and marched on Feldkirch with the 14th light infantry, four chosen companies of the 24th regiment, two squadrons of dragoons, and three pieces of light artillery. He had already passed BERN, and scaled the first slopes of the Schellenberg, that commands Feldkirch, when he met the enemy.

Hotze, apprised of the movements of the French, had been anxious to concentrate his scattered troops in the camp of Feldkirch with the view of drawing Oudinot away from the Schellenberg, and of re-establishing his communications with the Grisons; but he was unable to collect more than 16 companies and two squadrons, which he distributed in four columns.

The first of these was to move from the windmill of Nendeln upon Mauern, the second by Egelsee upon Hub; the third was directed to make its way to BERN across the crest of the Schellenberg, and the fourth, composed entirely of cavalry, was to march upon Nofels and Rugell. Four squadrons and a company were posted on the main road in advance of Nendeln.

The forces on both sides were about equal, and the chances of success evenly balanced. The French had exhausted their ammunition, and were relying entirely on their bayonets, when the intervention of the troops sent with Lorges decided the affair. Oudinot placed himself at the head of his cavalry, and, supported by a battalion of infantry, overthrew the column in occupation of Nendeln. Lorges moved by the meadows of the Esch rivulet on the rear of the Austrians,

who still held the Schellenberg. On the highroad the pursuit was so keen that the chasseurs entered the first lines of the camp helter-skelter with the enemy. The combat lasted far into the night, and with some additional battalions Oudinot would probably on this occasion have carried the position of Feldkirch, for the Austrians had great difficulty in maintaining it beyond the windmill of Nendeln. Of the four columns that had left the Austrian camp scarcely a soul returned: more than 800 men died on the field: 1000 prisoners with four guns fell into the hands of the French.

The taking of Chur and the capture of Auffenberg's corps produced a marked sensation in the Tyrol, where Bellegarde did not expect hostilities so immediately. He lost no time in concentrating his troops, that were scattered about the province. Six battalions were sent into the Montafon to support Hotze; six others reached Botzen, in the valley of the Adige; and the reserves marched from Rattenberg to Lienz to act according to circumstances. Loudon, who commanded in the Engadine, received orders to concentrate his troops in the Lower Engadine: he posted three battalions and a squadron at Nauders, five battalions and a squadron at Taufers and Sta Maria, and marched in person to Zernetz with four battalions. There he rallied the remains of Auffenberg's corps, to whose keeping he confided the Fluela and Scaletta passes with the view of covering his right, as well as the paths leading from the Engadine into the valley of the Landquart. One battalion took up its quarters at Bormio, another guarded the Col de Cierfs, which commands the road between Sta Maria and the valley of the Inn. All these movements were executed on the 11th, with the exception of that of the troops of the Upper Engadine still on the march.

OPERATIONS OF LECOURBE.

Whilst the left and centre of the Army of Helvetia opened the campaign with such brilliancy, General Lecourbe, at the

6th March. head of the right wing advanced against the Engadine. The three demi-brigades commenced their march at 6 A.M. on the 6th March from Roveredo on the Bernardino route, the base of which mountain the skirmishers of his advanced guard reached the same evening. The main body of the division passed the night at Mesocco and Soazza, and the next day the Bernardino was passed in a fearful storm. A heavy fall of snow agitated by a violent wind obliterated all trace of the roads, and the cold was such that even the guides, habituated to the severity of the climate, narrowly escaped with their lives. Many soldiers fell dead in consequence of having stopped only for a few moments. At length, after twelve hours of incredible exertion, the debouches of the valley of the Rhine were reached. An insignificant body of peasants, supported by some Austrian companies, made a feint of resistance at the foot of the mountain, but Lecourbe beat the charge, and the ground was quickly cleared.

8th March. The brigade Mainoni took up a position at Hinterrhein, that of Daumas at Nufenen, and the skirmishers pushed on to Splügen, where they believed the enemy was entrenched and furnished with artillery. Anticipating a combat at this point, Dessolles had sent a battalion from Chiavenna to Splügen by the Val St Giacomo: this precaution, however, was useless: a slight engagement left that place in the hands of Lecourbe, who sent back the battalion to Dessolles and transferred his headquarters to Andeer. On the 8th the advanced guard bivouacked on the Tiefenkasten road.

10th March. The accumulated snow compelled Lecourbe's division to halt in its position; and as the provisions had failed to arrive, it became necessary to procure them in the country: this required time, and afforded Loudon the opportunity of reconnoitring. Lecourbe's division lost the whole of the 9th March; but the convoys of supplies having arrived, it resumed its march on the 10th in two columns: the first, consisting of three battalions under the orders of Mainoni, moved upon Silva Plana across the Septimer and Julier mountains, sending a

party forward to Casaccia for the purpose of placing the enemy between two fires; the second, of similar strength, conducted by Lecourbe in person, advanced by Lenz and the Albula, routed the posts established at Bergün, and descended on Ponte in the Engadine, which his advanced guard reached on the evening of the 11th. The first column surprised at Silva Plana an Austrian battalion, which was on its way from the Bregaglia to rejoin Loudon, and threw it back on Casaccia after having taken from it 200 prisoners and two guns. The remainder escaped by the mountains into the valley of the Adda, only to fall into the hands of General Lecchi, who reached Tirano on the 12th with two battalions of Dessolles' brigade. 11th March.

To return to Lecourbe. Loudon's scouts, who reached Zernetz on the 11th, drove the French advanced guard from Ponte. Loudon moved during the night to Zutz, Madulein, and Ponte, and on the morning of the 12th made his appearance at the foot of the Albula. There Lecourbe had posted himself in order of battle with the 36th and a battalion of the 38th regiments, whence he sent a detachment by the valley of Davos to turn the post which the Austrians had established at the Scaletta Pass, and then remained on the defensive. Loudon, emboldened by the circumspection of his adversary, made a vigorous attack upon him; the combat had already lasted seven hours, when suddenly a discharge of musketry on the Republican left announced the accomplishment of the turning manœuvre. At this signal Lecourbe formed his troops in close column, and charging the Austrians with the bayonet, overthrew them in the valley of the Inn. Loudon after his defeat with difficulty reached Zernetz with half the number of his troops, and then marched all night to gain Schuls, after having directed the occupation of the Col de Cierfs and the mountains of Fuorn, which command the road to Sta Maria. On his arrival at Schuls, he summoned some reinforcements from Glurns and Tauffers. 12th March.

The Austrian loss was enormous; anticipated at the issue

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of Ponte more than 2000 men, including 45 officers surrendered; but the most important capture of the day was the magazine of Tarasp, containing 30 boxes of cartridges, several hundred sacks of oats, and a number of barrels of flour. Loudon continued his retreat, and arrived at Martinsbruck on the night of the 13th-14th.

13-14th
March.

Lecourbe, urged by Masséna to accelerate his movements, and persuaded that Dessolles was well on his way to Glurns, marched on the 13th to Schuls, and left that place on the 14th with three battalions of his left brigade to attack Martinsbruck and Finstermünz, leaving a battalion of the 44th at Zernetz to watch the debouches of the Livigno and Münster valleys. The brigade of Mainoni had orders to echelon itself between Schuls and Livigno, and to push its scouts into the Val da Scarl, which debouches on Münster.

Loudon had had time to summon all the hunters of the surrounding country to the support of his three battalions, which he posted with three mountain pieces on the heights in front of Martinsbruck: his front was covered by the deep ravine of the Rrambach, which falls into the Inn. Lecourbe met the enemy in advance of the bridge of Remüs. On his approach the Austrians set fire to the bridge, but the grenadiers and the skirmishers of the advanced guard, followed by two companies, crossed it through the flames: the bridge fell in with a crash behind them. These troops paid dearly for their temerity, and Lecourbe, assisted by the inhabitants of the country, who had been taken on requisition, opened a fresh passage across the ravines. One battalion crossed the mountain on the way from Remüs to Schleins, whence it repulsed the enemy; Lecourbe marched with two battalions right upon Martinsbruck, which he pertinaciously attacked in front, thus neglecting the slowest but surest method of sending detachments by the mountain paths against his adversary's flanks. His front attack was repelled, and after having combated to no purpose the whole of the 14th, he determined to wait for his second brigade. He

therefore took up a position in rear, for his soldiers were exhausted with fatigue and hunger. He himself fell back upon Remüs, whither he went for the night with three companies of grenadiers, who had suffered in this day's fighting.

Lecourbe made arrangements for the renewal of his attack upon Martinsbruck; but Loudon, who had collected in the Münster-Thal 7000 men of the *levée en masse* and three companies of the line, resolved to push these troops forward to Zernetz by the Ofener Pass, whilst the other companies marched upon Schuls by the Col da Scarl: the troops holding Martinsbruck were directed to assist this double operation by a vigorous front attack from Remüs.

At 2 A.M. of the 15th March the Austrians debouched upon Zernetz, and at first obtained possession of the village. The battalion of the 44th, surprised in the first instance by this confused mass of armed men, rallied quickly, drove the militia outside the village, and forced them beyond the Col de Cierfs, capturing 300 prisoners. The second column, after crossing wellnigh inaccessible rocks, appeared before Schuls. With unpardonable negligence, Mainoni not only had no posts in the Val da Scarl, contrary to Lecourbe's instructions, but he had also omitted to place a guard at the bridge of Schuls. Consequently the Austrians were not perceived as they descended the mountains, and took the imprudent general and some 50 grenadiers prisoners; the remainder fled to Remüs.

Just at this moment Lecourbe had left Remüs for Schuls. He had received intelligence that his advanced posts had been attacked from the direction of Martinsbruck, and had ordered the second battalion of the 38th to repair thither with all speed. The sight of the fugitives from Schuls explained to him the danger which threatened him. He set off at a gallop, countermarched the battalion of the 38th, and brought it back at the double to Schuls. Loudon had already regained the Scarl Pass with his capture, but the remainder of his detachment, about 300 in number, were taken prisoners.

As regards the attack on Remüs, it was feebly conducted, with only two battalions, and was easily repulsed by the 36th demi-brigade.

Loudon's movement against the flank of the French division would have seriously compromised it, if he had employed sufficient force thereon. Loudon, without inconvenience, might have withdrawn two battalions from Sta Maria to support the central attack upon Zernetz, and have pushed forward four against Remüs; in a word, have launched all his troops against Lecourbe with the certainty of conducting a similar operation against Dessolles, after having first disposed of Lecourbe. Moreover, it must be admitted that Lecourbe's position in the direction of Martinsbruck was attended with some degree of risk; for as the Austrians were in possession of the Montafon-Thal on his left, as well as the passes which lead from Bormio and Münster to Schuls and Zernetz, he might have been entirely surrounded. It is true that he reckoned on the co-operation of Dessolles; but, as will shortly be seen, the march of the latter was retarded from various causes, so that Lecourbe for some days was deprived of all protection on his right flank.

17th March.

On the 17th Lecourbe recommenced his movement against Martinsbruck. He detached a battalion of the 38th by the paths of the Spissberg, so as to gain the rear of the enemy's position, whilst he attacked it in front. General Alcaini, however, who commanded at Martinsbruck, had received some reinforcements, and had posted on the mountain a reserve augmented by all the district militia. He waited till the battalion was sufficiently compromised beyond the reach of help, and then surrounded it. The French showed front in all directions, and expended their last cartridge before surrendering. The front attack failed likewise.

This circumstance reduced Lecourbe's force to 4000 men, from which must further be deducted the detachments required for the escort of provisions and prisoners, whilst the Austrians, on the other hand, faced him with a corps of 6000 men aug-

menting every day, and which was supported by the Grisons militia and a considerable body of Tyrolese hunters. The French had suffered considerably in the preceding combats, were deficient of supplies, and had undergone extraordinary fatigue. Lecourbe determined to suspend his operations until Dessolles had arrived at a point parallel with his own.

DESSOLLES' MARCH.

Lecourbe had sent orders on the 9th March to Dessolles to move in four marches upon Sta Maria by Tirano and Bormio. The order, however, did not reach him till the 11th, and it was not till the 13th that Dessolles was enabled to move, in consequence of his troops being so much scattered, the want of provisions and the means of transport. Moreover, he experienced numerous difficulties on the march. After having attacked the enemy fruitlessly though vigorously at Bormio on the 16th, he succeeded, after a bloody combat on the 17th, in opening a passage towards the valley of the Adige at the moment Lecourbe was renewing his attack against Martinsbruck. He obtained possession of the baths of Premadio. Loudon withdrew to Sta Maria, and afterwards to Tauffers. The French followed him, and established their advanced guard on the 18th at Münster, opposite Tauffers.

Thus, by the 18th March, the French had effected the conquest of the Grisons, and had reached the principal approaches to the Tyrol, when they found themselves before Martinsbruck and Tauffers.

The Grisons emigrants returned in crowds to their country at the heels of the French, and offered their services. It was, however, a matter of urgency to pacify the country. So Masséna installed on the 18th a provisional municipal council of seven members, presided over by Larcher, a man distinguished for his moderation and intelligence. On the 21st he nominated an administration of eleven members and a secretary, who furnished a list of citizens fit to be appointed

18th March.

members of the cantonal municipalities, and impressed afresh on the authorities the necessity of future action in conformity with the views of the commander-in-chief.

The first question put to the vote was the union of the province with the Helvetian Republic; the people, on being appealed to, pronounced in the affirmative.

REAL POSITION OF MASSÉNA, AND THE REASONS THAT
NECESSITATED HIS OBTAINING POSSESSION OF FELD-
KIRCH.

After the passage of the Rhine and the invasion of the Grisons, Masséna directed an offensive operation on three divergent lines: one in the valley of the Rhine upon Feldkirch, the second in the Engadine, and the third amongst the sources of the Adige.

In proportion as the divisions advanced in the directions respectively assigned to them, the distance between them became greater. Feldkirch was still in possession of the Austrians, and Masséna dared not venture to quit the valley of the Rhine, and by so doing compromise his right wing, and expose himself to a separation from the Army of the Danube, the right flank of which it was his duty to cover. Moreover, in this position he could not undertake any prompt and decisive manœuvre. The inevitable obstacles encountered by the commissariat in the transport of supplies across the mountains and along the tedious defiles of the valleys of the Engadine, the Adda, and the Adige, forbade his undertaking any movement of this sort. Every operation of a similar nature in the Tyrol was certain to fail unless preliminary successes had been obtained either in the plains of Italy or Germany. It is in these plains that the issue of the campaign will invariably be determined, whatever may be the success otherwise obtained in the Tyrol.

As long as Masséna failed in making himself master of the whole valley of the Rhine and the debouches of Bregenz,

with the ultimate purpose of invading the Tyrol by the Arlberg, or of skirting the Suabian or Bavarian mountains, the columns of his right wing remained abandoned to their fate, and were threatened with very serious danger, should the Austrians succeed in making their way from Feldkirch to Chur.

Masséna was so sensible of the danger of his position, that he was anxious to make a personal reconnaissance of Feldkirch. Hotze had strengthened this position to such an extent, that Masséna deemed it impossible to carry it with the limited means at his disposal. He accordingly directed Xaintrailles, in command of his left wing, to keep an eye on the enemy's movements in the direction of the Rhine and the Lake of Constance. Ménard was ordered to establish batteries on all the favourable points between Werdenberg and Rheineck; the guarding of these points was intrusted to two garrison battalions; and Ménard was enjoined to post himself at Balzers or Vaduz, for the purpose of watching the Luziensteig, where he caused important works to be executed. Next, on hearing of Lecourbe's position, he detached Generals Desmonts and Loison with five companies of grenadiers and one battalion of the 76th to his aid. Masséna had made prodigious efforts to procure supplies for him, and convoys were directed from several points towards the valley of the Inn. Finally, under the supposition that Dessolles had arrived, he directed the above-mentioned generals to lose no time in obtaining possession of Glurns and Finstermünz, and he made preparations to attack Feldkirch in person, in conformity with orders received from Jourdan. The disproportion between the forces of the contending armies rendered Masséna's position, and Lecourbe's more especially, very perilous. Lecourbe's and Dessolles' corps comprised only six demi-brigades, barely numbering 10,000 men, whilst the Austrian Army of the Tyrol, together with the provincial militia, formed a total of 50,000 combatants.

SYSTEM OF DEFENCE OF THE TYROL ADOPTED BY THE
AUSTRIANS.

The system adopted by the Austrians for the defence of the Tyrol was to guard all the passages by posts, reinforced by the local sharpshooters organised in companies. Some strong reserves had been established at Laatsch and Landeck. Several of these posts had been fortified with works in masonry, commonly known as "*cloisons*,"* which, resting against the rocks, barred the high roads; but these works were neither closed at the rear nor casemated, so that they were not calculated to withstand a plunging fire directed upon them from the neighbouring heights; neither could they resist a shower of stones. The reserves posted at Laatsch and Landeck were too distant, and not in a position to afford direct assistance in the defence of the posts of Tauffers and Martinsbruck, before which the French were in position.

The principle of this system of defending the Tyrol was to occupy all the points, all the passages, all the mountain paths, and to offer a vigorous resistance to the enemy in whatever quarter he might appear. It arose out of deference to a prejudice generally entertained at this period, viz., that the best method of preserving a country consisted in guarding all its approaches, and in defending all the positions comprised in it; whilst the true principles of defence, when it concerns an entire country, consist in never losing sight of the essential points; in the concentration of all disposable means in the positions which cover the keys of the country; and in refraining from the occupation of secondary and detached posts, unless they be in immediate connection with the principal object; in not dividing the troops so much as to render them liable to be sacrificed in partial and useless combats; in the choice of a central position; in offensive action whenever the occasion presents itself, and in the re-

* In German, "*Klausen*."

occupation of such a position after a victorious issue, so as to recommence an offensive movement on every fresh occasion offered by the enemy. Such are the true principles for the defence of mountains.

Let these principles be specially applied to the Tyrol, keeping in view the forces assembled by the Austrians in that province.

The Tyrol has three principal approaches on its western frontier :—

1. The first leads from Feldkirch and crosses the Arlberg. This one was not threatened so long as Hotze remained in the valley of the Rhine, and an Austrian army was on the left bank of the Lech.

2. The second leads by the Engadine into the valley of the Inn. This was by far the most important, for the valley of the Inn possesses in the Tyrol convenient roads; and the enemy, by following this line of operations, was enabled to gain the communication between the Tyrol and the key of the theatre of war in Germany, towards which a French army was marching.

3. The third passes by Taufers to Glurns in the valley of the Adige. This debouch was worthy of attention, since it conducted the French to the communication between Germany and Italy.

It therefore became a question of barring to the enemy the two latter approaches, which were unconnected on the frontier save by the cross road between Nauders and Glurns, and in the interior by that leading from Innsbruck to Brixen and Botzen. The communication between Nauders and Glurns evidently furnished a convenient spot for the establishment of a reserve suitable for the protection of the approaches of the Inn, as well as of those of the Adige, and available for alternate movements into one or the other of these two valleys. But time was precious. The French were so close to the road, that the least delay might deliver it into their hands.

Before all things, therefore, it was necessary to concentrate

the reserves in the valley of the Inn, which was the most important passage, and to take up a central position at Nauders, at the junction of the respective valleys of the Inn and the Adige. From thence the first operation to be effected was to drive back the French from Martinsbruck, and then march rapidly by Nauders to Glurns to attack the French at Münster. After having repulsed the enemy at both of these points, the position at Nauders would have to be resumed, and the manœuvre repeated as long as circumstances compelled a resort to the defensive. This was the real method of covering the western frontiers of the Tyrol, even with forces inferior to the enemy's.

The distance from Martinsbruck to Glurns is barely ten leagues.* Prudence forbade passing from one valley to the other before the enemy had been driven sufficiently far back in the former to prevent his annoying the flanks and rear of the army during its countermarch; but this movement once accomplished, it mattered little if the French endeavoured to force their way into the valley just quitted by the Austrians, and which, in the interval, would be but slightly guarded, seeing that the Austrians would perpetually be on the flank of the French, so as to prevent the latter following up their advantage. At the worst, the Austrians preserved by the use of moderately rapid action the power of withdrawing by the same valley in which their attack had been conducted. It would have been a "defensive offensive," but it was the proper method of conserving the western frontier of the Tyrol.

Austria, however, had collected too large a force in the Tyrol to confine herself to a merely defensive operation. What then was she to do? To direct an operation on Tauffers was to incur the risk of encountering serious obstacles for the sake of unimportant results: an operation of this kind leading to Italy by the valley of the Adda, and forbidding the employment of forces sufficient for the execution of an important operation either in Italy or Switzerland. By

* About 30 miles.

operating in the Engadine it would have been difficult for the troops to make their way by that long line of lofty mountains without encountering considerable privation, added to which no commissariat service was organised in the Tyrol. A third plan recommended itself, which was more easy, more vigorous, and more decisive, viz., the despatch of a considerable corps by the Arlberg into the valley of the Rhine, for the purpose of reinforcing Hotze, and of making a combined attack on the position of Masséna, who was covering Lecourbe's and Dessolles' flank and rear. By a successful issue on the Rhine it was possible to separate the Army of Helvetia from that of the Danube, to disperse it among the mountains, and to throw it back at least as far as Zürich. The loss of the corps advancing into the Tyrol would have resulted as an infallible consequence, and the more these divisions were engaged in the valleys, the less chance they would run of escaping total defeat. If the Austrians, in spite of their numerical superiority, were defeated, a retreat to Germany was open to them, and they could always reach the Northern Tyrol. By preserving the communication with Suabia, the entire resources of that rich province would be at their disposal, and the Tyrol would have been relieved of a great mass of ill-provided troops, too numerous for watching that country, and too weak in consequence of their separation from each other.

The folly of lavishing such means on the defensive was so evident, that Bellegarde received directions from Vienna to reconquer the Grisons.

From that moment preparations were made for a general attack, the execution of which was fixed at first for the 19th March, but was postponed till the 2d April. The plan was to issue simultaneously by all the issues, whilst the reserves, entering the Engadine by Finstermünz and the valley of Tauffers by Laatsch, were to unite and make a general advance towards the sources of the Inn.

By this plan, so great a number of troops were put in

motion at so many different points as to impose insurmountable difficulties on the commissariat.

The great facility of manœuvring outside the mountains, and the preponderance of operations in the plains, gave rise to the idea of the Army of Italy co-operating at the foot of the Alps, and of a simultaneous attack by General Hotze in the valley of the Rhine. But as hostilities had not yet commenced in Italy, and Hotze was not under Bellegarde's orders, the latter wrote to Vienna to obtain the necessary authority, and at the same time applied to Hotze to concert preparatory measures with him.

Bellegarde was at Botzen, Hotze at Bregenz. This distance caused the loss of precious time in correspondence and discussion, each of these commanders, as is generally the case, being pre-occupied with the importance of the post intrusted to his charge. Thus Bellegarde, to whom was confided the defence of the Tyrol, believed he was securing himself from blame by endeavouring to cover the frontier by a series of offensive movements against such divisions of the enemy as most nearly approached him, whilst Hotze, who had the task of covering the flank and rear of the Austrian army in Germany, was apprehensive of compromising its safety by ascending the Rhine. He was even anxious regarding his own retreat.


COMBAT OF FELDKIRCH.

We left Masséna watching for the moment to attack Feldkirch with some prospect of success. To carry this post by main force was a perilous operation, for nature and art had rendered it a formidable position.

The advance of the French into Germany and the arrival of Ferino's advanced guard before Markdorf having caused Hotze anxiety for his flank, he left his position at Feldkirch
 19th March. on the 19th March with a portion of his troops, and formed a camp of eight battalions and six squadrons between Leitenhofen and Lochau to defend the passage of the

March.

March.



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Leiblach; five battalions and three and a half squadrons were moved to Dornbirn. General Jellachich was left at Feldkirch with five battalions and two squadrons to guard this entrenched position. Orders were given him, in case of a forced retreat, to move on Bregenz, and not to take the Bludenz route by the Arlberg except in the last extremity.

As soon as Masséna learned Hotze's departure and that of his troops from Feldkirch, he determined to attack this point, which offered important advantages, and the capture of which had been specially recommended to him by Jourdan. By forcing the position of Feldkirch he effected an important diversion in favour of the Army of the Danube, and forced one of the principal approaches to the Tyrol. Separating the enemy from his communication with Lecourbe in the Engadine, he gained the Arlberg road, and with it the means of forwarding reinforcements and assistance in provisions and supplies to the valley of the Inn, should Lecourbe in the interim succeed in obtaining possession of Landeck.

Masséna decided therefore on an immediate attack, his project being to assault the place in front, without sending a detachment by the valley of the Samina, whereby he could have taken Feldkirch in reverse; but to do this he would have required more time and more troops. Apprehensive of losing the favourable moment when Hotze had diminished his force, he gave the preference to a front attack.

On the 22d March Masséna united Lorges' brigade and ^{22d March.} some other troops of Ménard's division with those commanded by Oudinot, and marched to the Schellenberg, where he was desirous of establishing batteries to overpower those of the Blasenbergl: his efforts however were fruitless. In the evening rumours reached him from the advanced posts that the Archduke had repulsed Jourdan's army, and though he did not place much confidence in these reports, he resolved to anticipate his attack by one day.

At 7 A.M. on the 23d, the Republicans commenced their ^{23d March.} attack on four different points.

On their extreme left four battalions were directed on Nofels ; half of this body was to cross the Ill at the ford and turn the position, whilst the remainder was to proceed by the left bank and assault St Margaretha Kopf. A third column of two battalions descended the Schellenberg a little beyond Hub and Egelsee, and crossed the marsh to make a simultaneous attack on Saint Michael and the redoubts on the western side of the Blasenbergl.

The commander-in-chief marched straight from Nendeln to the head of the entrenched camp with the remainder of his forces, amongst which were the grenadier companies of all the battalions. The attack was repulsed on the three accessory points. The three columns, after losing a great number of men, were obliged to withdraw behind Nofels and to Mauern in the Schellenberg.

The principal attack had been made on the single road by which the position of Feldkirch could be reached *en masse*. The Austrians had fortified the Blasenbergl, and had thrown up from thence to the road a line of redoubts which barred the valley. The road was closed by another line of redoubts, in advance of the former and of Difis, extending from the plain to the bordering forest. Some other detached works covered the ground in front of Gallmist. In short, the forests which fringed the border were covered with abatis, reaching from the windmill of Nendeln to Gallmist.

The configuration of the ground, which, on the French side, formed a defile as far as the windmill of Nendeln, and was exposed to the fire of the Austrian entrenchments, prevented Masséna from advancing his guns and establishing his batteries, so that it was impossible to reach the Austrian works under cover.

Nevertheless, the grenadiers, under the guidance of the commander-in-chief, after having rapidly carried the works in rear of the windmill, moved in two columns upon the first line of the camp. The first, supported by the 13th dragoons was directed on the redoubts of Difis ; the second,

inclining to the right, advanced in the direction of Gallmist. This double attack was so impetuous, that several companies of dragoons forced their way by the road into the midst of the two entrenched lines. One portion of the works was occupied for an instant by the grenadiers, but the Imperialists, returning to the charge, drove them out again. During the whole day the struggle was maintained with an equal amount of ardour on both sides.

On the approach of evening, Masséna directed his reserve to ascend a deep ravine, which leads from the summit of the Roja to the windmill, to turn to the left, and so gain the flank of the enemy's position. This chosen body, under shelter of the forest, traversed another ravine called the Bärnloch, and by 4 P.M. arrived on a level with and outside the skirts of the village of Gallmist. It made its preparations to cross the abatis, and take the entrenchments in reverse. General Jellachich, however, had been made aware of the movement executed by the French; he had but six companies as a reserve at his disposal; four of these he despatched as soon as possible to climb the steep sides of the Roja, supporting them with seven or eight companies of local chasseurs. Just as the small French column was about to debouch upon Gallmist, the Tyrolese assaulted it from the heights, raining upon it a shower of musketry, and overwhelming it with an avalanche of rocks, whilst the Austrian infantry attacked it in front.

This manœuvre was crowned with success. The Republicans were driven back to the Bärnloch, and rejoined Masséna just as the entire force of the camp attacked him. The enterprise had failed; a longer resistance would have resulted only in useless bloodshed. Thereupon Masséna ordered a retreat to be made on Nendeln, where he took up a position at nightfall.

This combat, in which the French made 300 prisoners, cost them 1500 of their best troops, a loss the more to be regretted, because Masséna received the next day a despatch from

Jourdan communicating the result of the battle of Stockach, and informing him of the retrograde position which the latter was about to take up at the head of the defiles of the Black Forest.


Masséna had been too venturesome in his attack ; he was unacquainted with the ground, and not aware of the deficiency of paths leading to the mountains, which bristled with rocks, or through the forests that lined his right wing. As the field of battle extended in proportion to his advance from the windmill, he should have enlarged his front in order to assure his retreat. In short, time pressed, and Masséna was prevented from employing a larger body of troops in the turning manœuvres, otherwise, he doubtless would have tried to vanquish the Austrians, as the Swiss did 300 years previously, by escalading the Prophezey Kopf, and by advancing from thence by the mountain crest simultaneously with the movement of the column in the valley of the Samina.

The Austrians, on the other hand, though their position was a very favourable one, well entrenched and partly inaccessible, only succeeded in holding their own against the French by assuming the offensive in their turn, and by a judicious use of their reserve.

25th March. The difficulties that Masséna thus experienced in an undertaking against Feldkirch, coupled with the news received from Jourdan, induced him to assume a defensive attitude for the moment. On the 25th March, he evacuated the heights of the Schellenberg and the camp of Nendeln. Oudinot recrossed the Rhine. The Luziensteig and the mountains which flanked it remained unoccupied. The Austrian advanced posts were established on the Rhine as far as Balzers.

COMBAT OF TAUFFERS.

Since the 18th March the troops of Lecourbe and Dessolles, harassed and in want (Dessolles was dismounted), remained in observation in their positions of Remüs and Sta Maria,



when Masséna, just as he was preparing to attack Feldkirch, and was still in ignorance of the disasters at Stockach, sent them orders to march, Lecourbe on Finstermünz, Dessolles on Glurns by Tauffers.

The road from Sta Maria to Glurns passes by Münster and Tauffers ; it traverses a narrow valley along the Rammbach torrent, which flows through a deep and precipitous ravine ; steep slopes bar access to the right bank ; the ground on the left is more open, especially between Münster and the torrent of Vallarola, which descends from the Col da Scarl, traverses the valley, and falls into the Rammbach over a rocky bed. Beyond the Vallarola, and after the village of Tauffers is passed, the valley begins to contract in the vicinity of the villages of Rawail and Rofaier, between which the Glurns road passes. A footpath leaves Tauffers, ascends the Vallarola, crosses the Col da Scarl, and leads to Schuls in the Engadine.

Loudon occupied Tauffers with eight battalions for the defence of the approaches to the valley of Münster. The Vallarola, which covered the front of the position, was almost dry, as was the Rammbach on its flank.

The Austrians had thrown up two lines of entrenchments, the first of which rested its left upon the deep ravine of the Rammbach, and crossed the Münster and Tauffers road, 150 paces in rear of the Vallarola ; the second line, 300 paces in rear of the right wing of the first, and parallel with it, formed an echelon protecting the right flank of the first ; it crowned the crest of a small ravine, rested on a rocky steep, and connected two redoubts thrown up on its wings. Sixteen guns composed the armament of these works, which were besides sufficiently furnished with troops. A battalion formed a reserve to the first line ; four battalions were camped in rear of the second line to the right of Tauffers. Some detachments of light infantry and some local chasseurs occupied the mountains on either side of the valley ; four Austrian companies on the right, three on the left, and four others detached

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to the valley of Drofuy. The advanced posts were about 1500 paces beyond the Vallarola, watching the issue from Münster in front of the hamlet of Bundweil; they communicated by a single wooden bridge, defended by a *fleche*, the steepness of the torrent-bed rendering any other crossing difficult.

The French advanced posts were close at hand, and from the mountain heights above Münster made out all the dispositions of the Austrian troops. Loudon had imprudently paraded his troops on the occasion of Bellegarde, his superior, visiting him on the 24th March. This circumstance, coupled with the reports of deserters, enabled the French to ascertain the strength and position of their adversaries, and to arrange their plan of attack.

24-25th
March.

During the night of the 24th-25th, Dessolles advanced from Sta Maria with 4500 men and two guns: he debouched by Münster, resting his right on the Rrammbach, and refusing his left on quitting the place. Before daybreak on the 25th March he overthrew the enemy's advanced posts, and pushed his sharpshooters against the Vallarola with the view of annoying the Austrians along their entire line. Three battalions were detached from his right, and formed the principal attack; three others followed in echelon to assure their flank.

The Rrammbach was dry. Through inexplicable negligence Loudon had neither occupied nor directed the bed of the torrent to be watched. Dessolles knew how to take advantage of the occasion, and directed Fressinet, the adjutant-general, to throw himself with two battalions into the bed of the rivulet, the high banks of which concealed them from the enemy, and protected them from his fire. Fressinet thus made his way to the edge of a ravine leading to the rear of the entrenchments, which he assailed in reverse, whilst the remainder of the brigade made their attack in front. The Austrians, thus caught between two fires, made but a short resistance. A battalion of the 39th threw itself into Tauffers

at the same time that the 12th light infantry, re-entering the ravine of the Rrambach, advanced in double-time upon the villages of Rofaier and Rawail, and succeeded in taking up a position on the Glurns road in order to intercept the enemy's retreat.

As soon as Dessolles saw his first brigade reach the entrenchments, he put in movement the force under Lecchi, and supported it with the second battalion of the 39th. Some companies of sharpshooters carried the Vallarola bridge, whilst the remainder of Lecchi's brigade resolutely attacked the right portion of the works of the first line. Terrified by this rapid attack, and by the fusillade rattling in their rear at Tauffers, the Austrians fled in all directions, and fell into the hands of the 12th light infantry, who were guarding the defile of Rawail. The second line, resting on two redoubts that were all but closed, offered a longer resistance, but Dessolles at that moment had in hand four battalions, whose well-combined efforts broke through the enemy at all points, and entirely dispersed him. Loudon saved himself by crossing the mountains, and having reached Burgeis, entered the valley of Lang-Tauferer in the direction of Hinterkirch, scaled the glaciers of Gebatscher, followed the valley of Kauns, and reached Landeck by Prutz. The troops in occupation of the mountains on the right bank of the Rrambach withdrew to Laas by the pasturages of Lichtenberg. The remainder fell into the hands of the victors: 5700 men were killed or taken prisoners; all the artillery was captured. Of the French, not above 400 men were put *hors de combat*.*

Dessolles reached Glurns on the 26th March, and took up 26th March. his position between Laatsch and Glurns. He caused the heights in front of Schluderns to be occupied. The possession of this village was disputed on the 26th and 27th, but

* Dessolles having previously to this engagement made a requisition for bread on Lecourbe, the latter replied that the magazine was at Glurns. Stung to the quick, Dessolles informed his troops that they must be victorious to avoid being hurled back into the defiles of Bormio, where they must necessarily perish from hunger. Officers and soldiers rivalled each other in bravery.

finally remained in the hands of the Austrians. Glurns was burned without its being possible to arrest the progress of the flames.

The remarks of the Archduke Charles on the position and the operations of the Austrians at Tauffers disclose a theory of such importance that one cannot resist a transcription of them. These are his words :—

“The moral effect produced on the soldier’s mind by acting on the offensive is not the only advantage which the aggressor derives from it. The resources of the art are favourable to it. The aggressor forms his plan, determines his movements, assembles his forces at a point fixed upon beforehand, and thereby gains an advantage which cannot be neutralised by him who is attacked, unless he paralyses the means of his adversary and arrests the development of his forces. To attain this object, he who remains on the defensive should avoid all useless fighting, resist in none but advantageous positions, apply the use of his arms according to the nature of the locality, and seize unhesitatingly the favourable moment for assuming the offensive.

“In general, the only positions that are capable of a serious defence, with any chance of success, are those which provide the defenders with the means of defeating all the enterprises of the assailants; that is to say, such as are protected from any possibility of surprise by a skilfully concealed attack or from any unforeseen manœuvre. A combination of such qualities, however, is rarely to be met with in mountainous countries. Nevertheless, as the plan of operations sometimes requires the possession of a secondary line, by which the entrance or issue of a lateral valley can be closed, or that the enemy’s movements should be arrested for some time by the occupation of posts, which in the long run could not resist his combined efforts, it is at least requisite that positions taken up for such purposes should be incapable of being surrounded by superior forces, and should not be exposed to a cross fire, resulting in their evacuation, and that the ground

should not admit of the employment in the attack of means disproportioned to those of the defence. Moreover, the advanced posts should be placed at a convenient distance, so as to be able to prevent surprise, as well as to arrest the enemy for such a length of time as will admit of the main body, when informed of his projects, adopting measures necessary for their defeat. All the approaches and avenues of the position should be in sight of the defending troops, swept by artillery fire, and commanded, if possible, by the defending troops. The reserves should be sufficiently near the points of attack to succour them at the decisive moment, and too distant to be exposed to the first fire of the enemy, or to participate in the first reverse. Finally, the retreat should be assured, and if it must be made through a defile, care must be taken to occupy it beforehand; otherwise the loss of the position may entail the total defeat of the troops engaged in its defence.

“The position of Tauffers fulfilled none of these conditions.

“In rear of Rawail the valley was contracted by mountains wellnigh impracticable; nevertheless a position was taken up at the mouth of the funnel, whilst the gorge, through which the retreat had to be made, was unguarded.

“The right wing rested on the mountains traversed by the Schuls road; and for a long time Schuls had been in the enemy's power.

“The left wing touched the Rrammbach, and the bed of this rivulet was undefended, though a simple traverse armed with a gun would have answered the purpose.

“The deep channel of the Vallarola was hidden from the view of the Austrians, and was not swept with any fire; a trench on the edge of this ditch would have obviated all inconvenience on that score.

“The reserve was posted in rear of the right wing, which the enemy could not reach without exposure to the fire from the heights, and the defeat of which would have been less

disastrous than that of the left wing, since it led the French straight upon the gorge of Rawail.

"The distance of something like 200 paces between the reserve and the first line was insufficient to re-establish the combat after the latter had been broken.

"In short, the advanced posts were rendered nearly useless, because the distance of 1500 paces was insufficient to protect even vigilant troops from a surprise. If in the night following an engagement care be taken to place the advanced posts at a greater distance, it becomes much more necessary to adopt the same precaution when it is a question of holding a position in which the soldier should be spared the fatigue of being constantly under arms.

"The science of war is simple, and confined to a limited number of principles; but their application varies according to the different cases that occur. Hence, it arises that offences against elementary ideas are so often made and repeated, less from their being ignored, than from an unsuitable application of them. Men ordinarily exercise their memory much more than their judgment. They are content to retain the rules handed down to them by tradition, without comprehending their meaning; and when, from a complication of circumstances, objects are presented to them under several varying aspects, they are incapable of distinguishing the particular rule that corresponds with the essential point. Then, irresolute and apprehensive, they follow no rule, or rather allow themselves to be guided by erroneous calculations. This was the case with the Austrians.

"Not foreseeing any risk in their projected attack, which was fixed for the 2d April, they considered the position of Tauffers to be conformable to the general rule, which requires one to be in possession of the ground necessary for the development and employment of one's forces before proceeding to act on the offensive; consequently they were unwilling to forego this advantage by taking up a position

in rear of the defiles of Rawail, and were of opinion that the gratuitous cession of ground, which would have to be conquered at a later period, was foreign to their object. Pre-occupied with this idea, they forgot the first principle of never compromising one's safety. Although there is great imprudence in remaining a single night in a defective position in presence of an enemy, the Austrians exposed themselves to imminent peril for fifteen days in preparing to obtain an uncertain result. The advantages of some preliminary measures, and the avoidance of a double manœuvre to recover ground voluntarily abandoned, do not compensate for the loss of a battle and the unsuccessful issue of a combined operation.

"The dangers of a hazardous position are more formidable in a mountainous country than in open countries, because the difficulties of the ground are adverse to rapid manœuvring for the purpose of repairing an original mistake.

"At Tauffers, the faulty dispositions of the Austrians were more disastrous than the inherent defects of the locality. Had they pushed their advanced posts beyond Münster, watched and barred the banks of the Vallarola, and posted their reserves at the entrance of the gorges for the protection of their retreat, they would have at least escaped the surprise, which led to their defeat. Unable to fulfil these indispensable conditions, undesirous perhaps of provoking a combat by moving their advanced posts beyond Münster, and having no other convenient position between Tauffers and the Adige, they should have re-entered the lines occupied by the reserves between Laatsch and Glurns, rendered the defile of the Rawail impracticable, and caused the road from Tauffers to Laatsch and Glurns on the right back of the Adige to be watched by light troops, so as to repulse the enemy in this defile should he attempt to pass through it.

"The rules of mountain warfare forbid entrance into valleys before the heights on either side are occupied. This maxim holds good in every case where the enemy occupies the

heights and effectually commands the valleys. Moreover, it is to be expected that isolated mountain posts will offer less resistance than bodies of greater strength, composed of different arms and enjoying greater freedom of movement in the roads below. The laws of motion also teach us that it is easier to act from high on low ground than *vice versâ*. But none of these conditions existed at Tauffers; the valley was so slightly commanded by the neighbouring mountains, that the light infantry in occupation of them did not even participate in the combat. The weak part of the position was in the bottom, where the Austrians could be turned, overlapped, and taken in flank and rear. Thus Dessolles was right in departing, under these circumstances, from the ordinary rules in favour of the more essential principle of selecting for his point of attack the weakest spot in the enemy's position.

"The vigour with which he executed his plans responded to the justice of his views; he exhibited the resolution of a man sure of his game, and confident in the object he had carved out for himself."

COMBAT OF NAUDERS.

The strong position of Martinsbruck was occupied by two Austrian battalions, having their line of retreat upon Nauders, at the point where the valleys of the Inn and Adige unite. Four battalions held Nauders; some detachments of infantry with local riflemen watched the mountain paths, and furnished an intermediate post between Nauders and Glurns.

Lecourbe, after a careful study of the mountain paths that cross the mountains, and when he had satisfied himself that the heights on the right bank of the Inn, which were reputed to be inaccessible, were guarded by nothing but militia, issued the following directions. Loison with three battalions was to pass the Inn at Sclamisott, escalate the mountains, and descend by the Gufra valley on the flank and rear of the position

of Nauders, whilst a small chosen detachment, inclining more to the left, was to arrive by the heights of St Norbert, and make a direct attack on the entrenchments. Desmonts, leaving the plateau of Schleins with two battalions, was to turn Martinsbruck and move rapidly on Finstermünz, with the view of intercepting the retreat of the Nauders garrison in case Loison's attack succeeded. Lecourbe remained in the centre with the reserves and a detachment destined to make a demonstration upon the front of Martinsbruck.

Loison set out at an early hour on the 25th March; he had ^{25th March.} not more than eight kilometres* to traverse, but his way lay over mountains covered with snow and abounding in precipices. In four hours he succeeded in crossing these frightful rocks, whence he still had to dislodge the Tyrolese, and eventually obtained possession of the road from Glurns to Nauders. He made a rapid movement upon the latter village, which he attacked in flank and rear. The Austrians maintained their defence until the St Norbert detachment arrived opposite the entrenchment. Then seeing they were likely to have the Finstermünz road barred to them, they fled in that direction, having suffered considerable loss. Had Desmonts executed his instructions with the same energy as Loison, there would have been an end of the Nauders garrison; not a single man would have escaped. Finstermünz, however, being still unoccupied, the greater portion of the fugitives continued their retreat unmolested.

The two Martinsbruck battalions were less fortunate: their sole line of retreat was upon Nauders, there being no other communication with Finstermünz. Being vigorously attacked towards the close of the day, they were obliged to surrender.

This day, which cost Lecourbe barely a hundred men, gave him 2000 prisoners, 12 guns, and the enemy's ambulances and magazines. The Austrian loss in killed and wounded was considerable.

On the approach of the enemy's scouts, the Austrians aban-

* Nearly five miles.

doned Finstermünz and withdrew to Landeck, where the reserves from the different valleys were concentrated.

CRITICISM OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES.

“The Austrians felt the necessity of a reserve at Nauders, for they had moved four battalions to that point. The inactivity of the troops at Nauders, however, defeated the purpose attaching to every central position. General Briey, who commanded them, remained immovable at his post, and confined his efforts to its defence, although it was impossible to maintain his position with his own forces. He did not see that his determination should have been guided by the progress of events, and that a position at the junction of several roads could not be defended inactive.

“Some indifferent paths led to the flank of his position, over mountains that were wellnigh inaccessible. Briey had them watched, and imagined he was perfectly secure. But he had to deal with an enterprising enemy. Loison crossed the precipices, escaladed the rocks, turned and drove the guards from the paths, and outflanked the position of Nauders, which being simultaneously attacked in front, was unable to offer resistance.

“Nowhere does boldness produce greater effect than in intersected countries, and especially in high mountains, where it is generally a matter of detached combats, which occur and are decided on a sudden, and where the effect of a surprise—the ordinary result of audacity—paralyses the enemy’s forces at the critical moment. In open countries the adversary’s dispositions can be discovered from a distance, his intentions divined, and if his movements lead but to the suspicion of some undertaking on his part, there is at any rate time to prepare for any contingency. Should he presume on too venturesome a stroke, advantage is taken of the mistake before he attains his object, and he is punished for his rashness. None of these advantages are to be met with

in mountainous countries,—a further proof of the great superiority of attack over defence in mountain warfare.

“What would be often an imprudence in the plain becomes a matter of course in mountainous countries. Lecourbe would not have dared, in an open country, to divide his forces on either bank of a river, throw himself between Martinsbruck and Nauders, and turn the Austrian position as he did. He would not have dared to do it at these places against an enterprising enemy. Such expeditions, then, can only be justified by the configuration of the ground, the well-known character of one's adversary, and his manner of waging war.”

Jourdan's retreat placed the Army of Helvetia in a most critical position. How could the 25,000 men he had left enable Masséna to face the armies of the Archduke, of Hotze and of Bellegarde? How could he, with so slender a force, defend a line extending from Schaffhausen to Schuls on the Tyrolese frontier? It was pretty certain that the Archduke, profiting by his success, would endeavour to pass into Switzerland, in order to debouch on France after having defeated Masséna's insignificant army,

It was necessary to act with promptitude. Jourdan, doubtless, overwhelmed by other anxieties, had failed to issue directions warranted by the gravity of the case. Masséna did all that lay in his power to avert a disaster, and directed the Vorarlberg to be evacuated during the night of the 24th. ^{24th March.} Oudinot's two demi-brigades, as we have seen, after the combat of Feldkirch, were directed upon the left bank of the Rhine, the communications of which they guarded from Atzmoos to the gates of Schaffhausen. The Brigade Rubi was posted in advance of that town to keep up the connection by means of patrols with the Army of the Danube. Masséna, then confining his efforts to the conservation of the Grisons, recalled thither Ménard's troops, occupied the Luziensteig and the toll-bridge in force, and transferred his headquarters to Chur. The difficulties of his position were further aggra-

vated in consequence of the extraordinary effect produced in Switzerland by the retrograde movement of the Army of the Danube. The Austrians were expected to arrive at any moment. The Helvetic Government was in a state of consternation, and the patriotic party despaired of the future.

As yet unacquainted with the events which had placed in the hands of his lieutenants the communication between the Inn and the Adige, Masséna had sent orders to Lecourbe and Dessolles to suspend their operations. The numerical superiority of the Austrians forbidding any hope of a return of good fortune on the right bank of the Rhine, the communications of the Army of Helvetia, as well as its line of retreat, would have been compromised in proportion to the further advance of its right wing into the Tyrol. The defective dispositions of the generals intrusted with the defence of the Tyrol had alone favoured thus far the success of the French.

Masséna's orders did not reach Lecourbe and Dessolles until after the combat of Tauffers and Nauders. Those generals foreseeing, moreover, that they had to deal with a superior enemy, withdrew on the 30th and during the night of ^{30-31st} March. the 31st March—Lecourbe to Remüs, Dessolles to Tauffers.

This narrative will be suspended for a moment to trace the operations of the Army of the Danube, which also present features of interest, and, moreover, exercised no inconsiderable influence on those of the Army of Helvetia.

PASSAGE OF THE RHINE BY JOURDAN—BATTLES OF OSTERACH AND STOCKACH.

Jourdan crossed the Rhine at Basel and Strasburg on the 1st ^{1-2d} March. and 2d of March. He passed the Black Forest by way of the Forest towns, the Höllen-Thal, the valley of the Kinzig, ^{7th} March. and by the Oberkirch and Freudenstadt roads. On the 7th March he cantoned his army between Blumberg and Rottweil, with his advanced guard at Tuttlingen.

Simultaneously Bernadotte with the Army of Observation (8000 strong) crossed the Rhine at Manheim, and sent detachments into the neighbourhood of Philipsburg.

On the 3d March the Archduke, whose headquarters were ^{3d March.} at Friedberg, heard of the passage of the Rhine. On the ^{4th March.} 4th he put his army in movement, and on the ^{9th March.} 9th reached his destination, holding the line of Memmingen-Leutkirch, and occupying cantonments between the Iller, the Günz, and the Mindel, with his advanced guard on the banks of the Schussen.

The Archduke's plan was to move against the enemy with the whole of his force, and to open the campaign by a decisive battle. With this object in view, he rapidly pushed forward his advanced guard to the Schussen, so as to cover the right flank of the Austrian troops in the Vorarlberg, and to check the enemy in case he showed a disposition to outflank them. To the accomplishment of this object the Archduke postponed every other movement until he assembled his forces. His line of operations led by Memmingen to Osterach: it was the shortest, the one which most surely led to a battle, and from which the enemy could not depart.

Jourdan dared not risk an advance between the Lake of Constance and the Austrian army, nor could he attempt it in the valley of the Danube, where he had in his front the fortress of Ulm, and on his flank the range of the Rauhe Alp. His plan, in pursuance of the orders of the Directory, was to lend a hand to Masséna, with the object of expelling the Austrians from the Vorarlberg.

Considering the insufficiency of his means, Jourdan resolved, before assuming the offensive, to wait for the primary success of the operations in Switzerland. Satisfactory intelligence having reached him on the 13th, he put his army ^{13th March.} in motion, and advanced upon the line between Tuttlingen and Hohentwiel, Lefèvre's division forming a chain of advanced posts between Siegmaringen and Radolfzell.

On the 15th, Jourdan marched upon Stockach, his advanced ^{15th March.}

guard being concentrated at Mösskirch. Ferino was directed to rest his right on the Lake of Constance, whilst Jourdan advanced with the centre on Pfullendorf, and General St Cyr skirted the Danube. Ferino took up a position on the 16th at Überlingen, his advanced guard under Tharreau at Salmansweiler, St Cyr at Siegmaringen, Lefèvre at Pfullendorf, which place Jourdan reached on the 17th, and pushed forward his advanced guard to Osterach. The Brigade Rubi of the Army of Helvetia joined in Ferino's movement. A false report led to Vandamme, who was on the left bank of the Danube, being directed to leave that river and repair to the Neckar.

17th March. The Archduke left Piaczek to observe Ferino and the Bregenz road, and cantoned his army in a narrow space between Ochsenhausen and Wurzach: on the 10th he formed several camps in advance of Biberach.

18th March. Jourdan, who was resolutely determined to assume the offensive, and to come to a general engagement, had several roads to follow. In order to join Masséna, and co-operate with him, he could push forward his right wing, but then he increased the distance between himself and Bernadotte considerably, and rendered any mutual assistance between the Army of the Danube and the Army of Observation impossible: he exposed his left wing to the risk of being thrown back on the Lake of Constance, and abandoned to the enemy the decisive line of operation. If, on the contrary, he advanced his left, whilst refusing his right wing, he failed in the object of co-operating with Masséna in the conquest of the Vorarlberg. By commencing his movement from the centre, an action was inevitable, and the chances were in favour of the strongest. It should be observed that the disparity in numbers affected the French injuriously in proportion to their advance, because the course of the Danube ever augmenting its distance from the Rhine and the Lake of Constance, and the ground becoming in consequence less contracted, they lost the support of their wings, whilst the

Austrians obtained greater freedom of movement, as well as development of their superior strength.

To counterbalance these adverse chances, Jourdan recommended Masséna to direct all his efforts on Feldkirch, and selected for himself the central line between the Danube and the Lake of Constance on Osterach as the least unfavourable direction.

Thus both the contending generals had selected the same line of operation, so true is it that the strategical points and the lines of operation are naturally prescribed by the configuration of the ground.

The manœuvres of Jourdan and the Archduke between the Danube and the Rhine resulted in the two affairs of Osterach and Stockach, in which the French were defeated, and in consequence of which their army recrossed the Rhine at Kehl and Alt-Breisach on the 5th and 6th April, whilst Jourdan went to Paris. ^{5-6th April.}

In Italy, on the other hand, Scherer, after a fruitless effort to cross the Adige, had withdrawn behind the Adda. In the middle of April the Russians effected their junction with the Austrians; and Moreau, who had succeeded Scherer in command, having no other means of preserving the Army of Italy against the advance of the Austro-Russians under Suwarow, had fallen back on Turin.

In these critical circumstances Masséna was appointed to the supreme command of the Armies of the Danube and of Helvetia, circumstances which entirely altered his position, and compelled him to change his plan. It was no longer a question of the invasion of Imperial territory, but of covering Switzerland, for the purpose of maintaining the communications with the Army of Italy, and holding in check the Austrian armies of Suabia and the Tyrol, until the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to justify the resumption of hostilities.

The Army of Helvetia amounted to barely 30,000 men, extended on a dangerous line from the Lake of Constance to

the debouches of the Prättigau, with Lecourbe's division hemmed in between the narrow gorges of the Engadine at an advanced point in the direction of Martinsbruck. The Austrian army consisted of 30,000 men on the Tyrolese frontier, 28,000 men on the line of the Vorarlberg up to Bregenz, 40,000 men concentrated between the Lake of Constance, the Aach, and the Danube, and threatening the communications with France and the best lines of retreat into that country. The sole protection to the Army of Helvetia in this quarter was that afforded by the Brigade Rubi in advance of Schaffhausen.

Masséna, convinced of the necessity of rallying the majority of his forces, and concentrating them in Switzerland, ordered a general movement of all the troops from Alsace to Switzerland, preferring this to the plan of the Directory, who were in favour of the Army of the Danube making a fresh offensive movement from Kehl and Basel through the Black Forest. As it could not produce any result beyond an unimportant and momentary diversion, Masséna decided on the former arrangement.

In the new position he was about to assume, the line from the Engadine to the Lake of Constance became of trifling importance; for it was the most distant from the reinforcements, and possessed no other advantage beyond that of ceding spontaneously the first conquests, and of retarding the enemy's forces; therefore it did not require to be strongly guarded.

8th April. On the 8th April, the posts on the Rhine, from the frontier to the lake, were diminished in succession, and Oudinot's division in occupation of this country was withdrawn to Frauenfeld, to act as a reserve against either end of the Lake of Constance.

Masséna, foreseeing the moment for crossing the Rhine, selected the central position of Zürich as the rallying-point in case of retreat, and forthwith directed the commencement of works for a huge entrenched camp on the Zürichberg and

the plateau of Wipkingen. Five or six companies of French sappers and several hundred Swiss were employed thereon under General Andréossi's direction.

Vandamme's division, starting from Alt-Breisach, entered Switzerland by Basel on the 11th. Ferino and Soult took ^{11th April.} the same direction, as also a portion of the Army of Observation. Towards the end of the month Masséna distributed his forces as follows:—

The army was composed of nine divisions of unequal strength, distributed in four corps. The commander-in-chief in the selection of his wing commanders was guided rather by public report than by personal acquaintance with the men.

Ferino was justly esteemed a capable and experienced man. He was appointed to the command of the right wing, comprising Ménard's, Lecourbe's, and Lorges' divisions, with an effective strength of 24,000 men, including artillery and engineers.

Xaintrailles, a man of noble origin, who had embraced republican principles, had rendered some service to the Army of the Rhine and the Moselle, and enjoyed a certain reputation. He was intrusted with the left wing, comprising only two divisions, Souham and Legrand, in all 18,000 strong.

The centre, the direction of which the commander-in-chief reserved to himself, consisted of four divisions, viz., Vandamme, Oudinot, Tharreau, and Soult, amounting to nearly 24,000 men of all arms.

The cavalry reserve was composed of two divisions. The heavy cavalry was commanded by General Klein, the light cavalry by General Ney. The total strength of this arm amounted to 4086 sabres, including four companies of light artillery.

The total of the active army comprised an effective force of 79,436 combatants of all arms, together with an artillery *matériel* of 98 divisional and 48 guns attached to the park. Its provisional organisation could not be carried out immediately. Ferino had not joined the right wing in consequence

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of indisposition: Lecourbe took his place, and happily did not permit the absence of the former to be remarked. Vandamme, who had been accused of exaction in a district in Würtemberg, was sent by the orders of the Directory to Lunéville to be arraigned before a court-martial.

The divisions occupied the following positions:—

1. The right wing was charged with the defence of the entire line comprised between Bormio and Constance.

Lecourbe occupied the Engadine and Bormio in the Valteline with the first division.

Ménard guarded the Grisons, as far as the Luziensteig, with the second division.

The third division, under Lorges, was extended so as to furnish a chain of posts in the valley of the Rhine from Atzmoss to Rheineck, and on the shores of the lake to Münsterlingen.

2. The centre between Constance and the Frick-Thal.

Oudinot connected his right with Lorges, and had his left near Stein.

Vandamme held the Rhine from Stein to Eglisau.

Tharreau prolonged the line to the confluence of the Aare.

Soult, who formed the reserve, was quartered in the neighbourhood of Wyl.

3. The left wing was extended in the direction of the Lower Rhine.

Souham covered the Frick-Thal and Basel, between the Aare and Hüningen.

Legrand (formerly St Cyr) held Alt-Breisach and Kehl, and watched the debouches of the Black Forest.

4. The heavy division of the cavalry reserve occupied Basel, the light division Zürich.

Finally, Collaud and Dufour were detached with two *corps d'armées* 33,939 strong. The former watched the neighbourhood of Mannheim, whilst the second had his headquarters at Coblenz.

In addition to this, Xaintrailles was directed to take over

at Solothurn several battalions that had come from the Rhine and conduct them to Le Valais, where Suwarow's successes in Italy and the approach of the allied columns had rekindled the fire of revolt.

Masséna was compelled by the disproportion of his forces to adopt a defensive policy, and to confine his attention to his own safety. He was bound, therefore, in the first place, to cover his base of operations and his communications with it. The positions taken up by him tended to this object.

As for the divisions left in the Grisons, Masséna was unable to reinforce them sufficiently to enable them to resist Bellegarde.

Strictly speaking, they were intended merely to observe the enemy. Nevertheless, they fulfilled an equally important object by securing the communications with the Army of Italy during the course of operations. In effect, the communication by the Valtelline was lost; that by the St Gothard was on the eve of being lost, for the Austrians would be sure to profit by the advantage they had obtained from the superiority of their numbers, and repulse the French right wing. From that moment, the sole remaining communication between Switzerland and Italy was that by the St Bernard, a passage which, in other respects, was highly important to France, for it was the only point by which she could send reinforcements to Italy. Masséna, therefore, was bound out of sheer necessity to provide for the security of this communication, by keeping a certain body of troops sufficiently near to be quite sure of reaching the valley of the Rhone, preserving at the same time their communication with the main body of the army by the smaller cantons. Such was the object that Lecourbe's and Ménard's divisions had to fulfil.

But if the employment of these two divisions in the Grisons be justified by the motives explained above, their distribution was inexcusable. From the commencement of April, Ménard's division was scattered over the Grisons, and

Lecourbe, as has been seen, had advanced to a considerable distance in the direction of Remüs. In these positions, the French observed the enemy in an indifferent manner, failed to cover the Grisons, and did not secure their retreat by the valley of the Rhone. Not only did the Austrians threaten from Balzers Lecourbe's base of operation, on the prolongation of which they were to be found, and the defence of which Ménard was not in a condition to undertake, but they could also pounce from Münster on the flank of this division, and intercept its retreat to the St Gothard.

The following is the Archduke's opinion of the manner in which Masséna should have manœuvred :—

“On the failure of the attack on Feldkirch, he should have endeavoured to strengthen the Luziensteig by the construction of fresh works on its rear face, and of some blockhouses for the protection of the garrison against fire and stones hurled from the heights that commanded it. On this reinforced base it would have been possible to have assumed such an attitude as might have been deemed suitable for an obstinate defence of the Grisons. Lecourbe's and Ménard's divisions, concentrated between Mayenfeld, Chur, and Lenz, where the roads of the adjoining districts meet, would have been in a position to await in tranquillity the reports of their advanced guards and the development of the enemy's operations. If the Austrians advanced in force, and evinced a desire to gain the St Gothard before it was possible to anticipate them, these two divisions could always effect their retreat by both valleys of the Rhine into the smaller cantons. If, on the contrary, the enemy, through the necessity of separating his force into several columns, should err in the combination of his marches, these divisions could issue from the valleys of the Plessur and the Landquart, and crossing the Albula, Fluela, and Septimer passes, throw themselves on the most exposed column.

“The Austrians failed to profit by the advantages of their position, and suffered the whole of April to slip by in a state

of inaction, the causes of which will be shortly seen, as they proved fatal to them."

Their efforts were limited to petty combats with the advanced guards.

It was at this juncture that the affairs of Schaffhausen and Petershausen occurred.

The Archduke having determined to drive the French from the right bank of the Rhine, intrusted the operation to General Nauendorf, in command of the advanced guard. On the 13th April, the Austrian general Baillet Latour threw back the French advanced posts on Schaffhausen. General Paillard, who defended this town, lost no time in assembling the troops of his brigade. The Austrian general allowed him half an hour to evacuate the town. Paillard parleyed with him to gain time, but Baillet, alive to his object, burst open the gates of the work with artillery, made his way into the town, pursued the French from street to street, and thrust them back on the bridge, which was their sole line of retreat. This bridge, a perfect specimen of woodwork, was 134 mètres in length, with only two rows of piles. The Austrian general and the municipal authority had made a separate proposal to the French general to consider it neutral, but Paillard preferred to burn it. By doing so, he could effect his retreat in security, though he deprived the French army of an important debouch. The Imperialists, checked by the flames, sent swimmers to carry off the craft moored near the port on the left bank, and succeeded in establishing posts on it.

The next day General Piaczeck, supported by a flotilla that had been equipped by an English naval officer at Bregenz, took Petershausen from the French, after a short resistance by the weak posts occupying the town.

Let us here review the reasons which prevented the Austrians undertaking anything of importance in the month of April. The Archduke had appointed the 10th April for an operation against Zürich, in which Hotze was to participate

by an advance from the Vorarlberg and St Gallen. Everything was ready, including friendly proclamations to the Swiss, &c., when the inspector-general of supplies announced the impossibility of furnishing the necessary provisions. This impediment, which, however, in such a country as Suabia, was not insurmountable, coupled with the indisposition of the Archduke, which obliged him to depute his command to Wallis, and finally the orders from the Court of Vienna, paralysed the Austrian army. The Court of Vienna considered the entrance into Switzerland west of the Lake of Constance too hazardous an operation; it strenuously recommended that the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg should not be stripped of troops, and expressly ordered the principal operation to be directed from both those countries against the Grisons. Later on, it enjoined an expectant attitude pending the arrival of the 40,000 Russians, whom Korsakow was conducting across Germany for the purpose of entering Switzerland by Suabia without exposing Germany. Now the Russians could not reach the Rhine until some time during the month of July. By the successive occurrence of such obstacles was the activity of the Archduke impeded.

OPERATIONS OF BELLEGARDE.

Bellegarde experienced still greater difficulties in directing his operations from the Tyrol against the Grisons, because, to execute the offensive movement intrusted to him, he required the employment of a considerable number of troops, which were not to be fed without infinite trouble, and that only for a very limited period, in these inhospitable mountains. The Army of the Tyrol, which had been considerably reinforced, was in the month of April still deficient of the most necessary requirements for entering the field, owing to the wretched organisation of the commissariat, which was independent of the commander-in-chief, and was unacquainted with the object of the operations.

In compliance with orders received from Vienna, and at Suwarow's request, Bellegarde resolved to enter the Engadine on the 22d April. Much snow, however, having fallen on the heights, he was compelled to countermand the movement. A small corps, consisting of one battalion and six companies of arquebusiers, left Ischgl in the Patznaun-Thal on the evening of the 21st, and having received no counter-orders, crossed the ^{21st April.} Fimber Alp, drove the French from Manas, and made their way to the centre of the enemy's cantonments at Remüs. This body was completely defeated after having disputed Remüs for a long time with the French.

Finally, on the 30th April, the Austrians made a decisive ^{30th April.} attack. Lecourbe was posted on a salient slope of the Fimber, which fell towards the Inn in rear of the Varana, known in the country dialect as the Ramoschbach, a torrent confined in a rocky bed, which covered the position. Manas and Remüs are in front of this stream. On the right a palisaded redoubt commanded and swept the opposite bank of the Inn. Several works of less pretension protected the front of the position, as well as the flank turned towards the river.

This position, in spite of all that could be done, possessed the inherent defect common to every mountainous position, viz., that its left rested on mountains, no doubt of considerable height, but yet not impracticable.

The French were echeloned in the valley, and posts guarded the summits of the mountains on both banks of the Inn.

Bellegarde advanced on the 30th April with 20 battalions, ten of which, under his personal direction, were to debouch from Martinsbruck on the front of the position of Remüs, whilst General Hadik with the ten remaining battalions was to make flank attacks at Schuls and Zernetz. At 3 A.M. six Austrian battalions advanced by the road against the French advanced posts established at Strada, Chaflur, and Schleins, whilst three battalions proceeded along the heights on either bank of the Inn, the right column by the flanks of

the Piz Mondin upon Schleins, whilst the left ascended the right bank of the Inn by the meadows of Meiss and Sclamisott, so as to gain the bridge of Strada, and so second the attack of Schleins and Chafur. Simultaneously, as on the 22d, a battalion descended from the Fimber upon Manas.

Lecourbe had at this point only the 38th, commanded by Desmonts, the grenadiers of which regiment formed the reserve at Saraplana. Desmonts withdrew his troops behind a breastwork which cut the road to Strada, and with the assistance of a small piece of artillery he thrice repelled the enemy's attacks. Finally, however, being turned by his left, he withdrew behind Saraplana, where he held his ground sufficiently long to enable him to receive the support of eight companies who were engaged in the mountains on the left bank with the Austrian flankers. At 9 A.M., having concentrated his whole force, he traversed Remüs, and lined the edge of the entrenchments thrown up in rear of the Varana or Ramosch, where already was a battalion of the 44th. Bellegarde, in a hurry to conclude the affair, crossed the Varana at its confluence with the Inn, and made a furious attack on the palisaded redoubt that flanked the right of the works. But he failed to carry it, and his efforts, though several times renewed, were frustrated by the firmness of Desmonts' troops. At the close of the day, these fine fellows had exhausted their ammunition, and defended themselves with nothing but stones.

The night supervened, leaving the Austrians at the foot of the heights, which were crowned with the French entrenchments.

Hadik's column was assembled on the 29th in the neighbourhood of Tauffers; on the 30th it marched by the hill and valley of Scarl upon Tarasp and Schuls; one battalion, flanking the right, climbed the Rosenkopf mountain, so as to surprise the bridge of Blatta Madu; on the left, a small column, re-ascending the Cierfser Joch, attacked the bridge of Zernetz. Finally, three battalions from Sta Maria were to

30th April.

observe the debouches in the direction of Bormio, and to follow later by the Cierfser Joch.

A single battalion of the 44th defended the narrow valley of the Val da Scarl; but the French had broken up all the paths, entrenched several posts requiring to be taken in succession, and displayed so much intelligence in the organisation of their defence, that Hadik, after spending the entire day in attempting to overcome it, was compelled to pass the night with his exhausted troops on the heights on the right of the valley; for Lecourbe had destroyed the bridge of Schuls, and his artillery swept all the fords in such a manner as to render its passage impassable.

The attack directed upon Zernetz by the Cierfser Joch met with no better success. The 36th regiment suffered the Austrians to get entangled between several lines of abatis, with which they had obstructed the passage. Then making a vigorous charge, they captured from 400 to 500 prisoners, amongst whom was the Prince de Ligne, major in his father's regiment.

On this day, during which the Austrians left more than 2000 men on the field of battle, barely 300 of the French were put *hors de combat*. Never had they displayed such courage, self-possession, and unity of action. Nevertheless, Lecourbe did not permit himself to be carried away by his success; convinced of the danger of his situation, and of the impossibility of opposing an enemy in such force, he ascended the Inn during the night, and took up a position at Sûs. General Desmonts, to whom was intrusted the duty of breaking the bridges, remained with the rearguard at Lavin.

Bellegarde, at the head of his concentrated columns, marched on the 1st May to the steep heights of Fettau, and moved his advanced guard to the banks of the Tasna against Ardetz. 1st May.

If Lecourbe had continued his movement during the whole of the 1st May, Bellegarde would have been unable to come up with him; but the former was waiting for Loison's brigade,

which he believed was retreating by the Poschiavo valley, but which, on the contrary, was falling back on Morbegno. This delay enabled the Austrians to attack him on the 2d.

2d May. Bellegarde moved on the 2d May to Lavin, flanked by a column which marched parallel with him on the right bank of the Inn. Compelled to check his advance at Guarda, in order to re-establish the sole point of communication destroyed by the enemy, he threw a portion of his troops across the other side of the river. The French rallied their posts in rear of Lavin, and resisted for a length of time. Desmonts did not leave Lavin till he saw that he was outflanked and turned by the mountains. Before reaching Sùs, just as the French were crossing a small plain, Bellegarde sent a detachment of cavalry against them, which occasioned some disorder amongst the ranks of the 44th regiment, and drove it back into the village, which the Austrians entered pell-mell with the fugitives, and where they captured some prisoners, General Desmonts amongst the number! But a battalion of the 38th regiment, and Lecourbe himself arriving with the grenadier reserve, favoured the rallying of the 44th. Lecourbe made a pretence of defending the village of Sùs and the defile of the Fluella valley, but he was already overlapped by the mountains, when the Austrians took Sùs and debouched from the village. He fell on them from the heights of his position, and obtained some advantages, but on the arrival of the main body of the enemy's column, he was thrust back into the defile of Zernetz, where he was wounded in the arm, and where he endeavoured to make a stand with the view of rallying the detachment in occupation of the Fuorn or Ofener Pass. Notwithstanding his wound, Lecourbe with unabated energy effected his retreat on Ponte safely, and without leaving a single wounded man or a carriage in the enemy's hands. His rear-guard followed him at 3 A.M., after having burned the bridge of Zernetz.

3-4th May. During the night of the 3d-4th, after having detached a battalion to Chiavenna, where Loison was to arrive on the

3d or 4th, Lecourbe crossed the Albula with his five remaining battalions, and took up a position on the 4th at Lenz. He took measures for guarding the Fluela and Scaletta passes, as well as the post of Weissenstein on the Albula, and occupied Davos with a detachment. His rear-guard followed during the 4th.

Bellegarde, who was at Sûs on the 3d, caused Brail and Cinuschel to be occupied on the 4th, pushing forward detachments beyond Ponte to the Albula, and in the direction of Silvaplana. On the 6th he encamped at Zernetz.

6th May.

On the 6th May Lecourbe moved his headquarters and reserve to Tüsis, connecting himself with the right of Ménard's division, which occupied Splügen, strong detachments being sent to guard the debouches of the Julier and Septimer mountains. He reckoned on communicating with Loison by Casaccia ; but as Bellegarde's scouts had already made their appearance at that point, and Loison had not a ration of bread to issue to his troops, and was pressed by superior forces (Rohan's and Strauch's) he evacuated Chiavenna on the 8th, and effected his retreat to the Splügen by the St Giacomo valley. Lecourbe lost no time in sending him with three demi-brigades by the Val Mesocco to Bellinzona for the purpose of re-establishing the communication by the St Gothard. Then leaving the charge of the debouches from the Splügen and the Albula to Chabran's brigade, he crossed the Bernardino, and reached Bellinzona on the 10th.

8th May.

10th May.

Let us now see what had occurred in the Chiavenna direction, obliging Loison to retreat.

On the 28th April, Bellegarde, when preparing his expedition against the Engadine, had detached five battalions and a half squadron, under Colonel Strauch's command, to march into the Val Camonica by Ponte di Legno. Strauch had occupied the Mortirolo mountain, and established his communication with the Army of Italy by Edolo, along the course of the Oglio as far as Lovere, on the shore of the Lake of

Iseo. Suwarow had ordered this column to join his right wing by Palazzolo (on the Oglio below its exit from the Lake of Iseo), but circumstances having changed in the interim, and Suwarow having just occupied Milan, a fresh order was sent to Strauch directing him to march from Lovero by Ponte di Nozza into the Val Brembana, and to move by Morbegno upon Chiavenna, where the head of the column arrived on the evening of the 8th. Four battalions, which had remained behind on the Tonale, were ordered by Bellegarde to march on the 5th to Tirano, so as to follow Strauch when he debouched from the Val Brembana on Morbegno. On the same day Rohan's brigade, detached by Suwarow to Switzerland, reached Lugano.

It was the approach of these troops which had compelled Loison to fall back upon the Splügen.

HOTZE'S ENTERPRISE AGAINST THE LUZIENSTEIG.

When Bellegarde undertook his operations against the Engadine, it had been arranged with Hotze to make an attempt on the Luziensteig. This operation was fixed for the 1st May, and to aid it he despatched five battalions as a reinforcement, which started from the Patznaun and Montafon valleys under the orders of Colonel St Julien. This brigade was intended to return after the capture of the Luziensteig by the Prättigau, and move upon Zernetz, Klosters, and Davos, whence it was to renew its communication with the troops in the Engadine. To facilitate this expedition, another detachment of half a battalion was to leave the Montafon on the day fixed for the enterprise, cross the Schlappina mountain by the Gargellen Pass, and make a false attack on the French post of Klosters.

30th April. On the evening of the 30th April, Hotze assembled his troops, which were formed into four columns.

1. The first, consisting of a battalion and a half, sent the evening before the assault into the valley of Gamperthon, was

to take the Luziensteig in rear by the pasturage of Mayenfeld, and determine the success of the enterprise.

2. The second, consisting of one battalion, scaled the Falknis during the night, in order to carry at daylight the hamlet of Guscha, and descend on the enemy's right flank.

3. The third, one battalion and one squadron, formed on the Balzers road, to engage the attention of the French on their front, where they were all but unassailable.

4. The fourth, of three and a half battalions, under St Julien, was posted at 1 A.M. behind the bridge of Mels, on the banks of the Rhine. It was to seize the mountain of Fläsch, turn the entrenchments by the right, and form a junction with the first column on the enemy's rear.

It was agreed that the fire of the first column should be the signal of attack for the other three.

Two battalions and a squadron remained in reserve at Balzers.

The first column did not reach its destination. Either from the incapacity or cowardice of its commander, it deviated from its route.

The advanced guard of the second column shortly encountered the French pickets in the direction of Guscha; a fusillade ensued, and this the other two columns took for the signal of attack which had been agreed upon.

The third column made an immediate charge on the French advanced posts on the Balzers road, drove them back into their entrenchments, and extended its fire along the whole front.

St Julien had set out at daylight with the fourth column, and had crossed the meadows as far as the point where the declivity of the Fläsch mountain touches the Rhine. Having left a picquet there to watch the bank of the river, he scaled the mountain wall, made his way into the abatis which crowned it, surprised the French posts, crossed the rocks, carried the village of Fläsch, and, after a combat of two hours' duration, put the enemy to flight, inflicting on him a sensible

loss. Four companies of the 14th light infantry defended this post furnished with abatis, and four other companies covered the space between Fläsch and the river.

Having overthrown the French and taken Fläsch, St Julien advanced upon Mayenfeld, where he was to effect his junction with the column from the Gamperthon valley.

St Julien, instead of making a sudden attack on the Luziensteig, which possibly, owing to the weakness of its garrison, would have succeeded, lost several hours in waiting for his auxiliaries and in collecting his several detachments, his troops no doubt (as the Archduke states) being exhausted with the fatigue of scaling the rocks, in doing which they were obliged to use crampons. But this delay afforded Ménard time to march against him with the reserve of grenadiers, one company of cavalry, and several guns, which he had at Malans. Chabran, who defended the fortifications with the second battalion of the 14th, as soon as he saw Ménard debouch from Mayenfeld, made a sortie with a detachment on the Balzers road, and fell with the remainder of his force on the enemy's left flank. Then St Julien was desirous of effecting his retreat, the more so that Hotze recalled him because the enterprise had failed; but it was too late. Crushed by Ménard's artillery and attacked obliquely by Chabran, he regained the mountain, not without considerable difficulty; and whilst preparing to cross it, he fell under the fire of the four companies, which had rallied behind it. The head of his column under his personal guidance, about one and a half battalion, nevertheless succeeded in forcing the passage. The remainder, that is to say, 1500 of the Prince of Orange's regiment, including a major and 24 officers, laid
2d May. down their arms. St Julien returned on the 2d May to Bludenz, whence he rejoined Bellegarde by the Montafon valley, Galthür, and Remüs.

The small column intended to operate on Zumkloster left Gargellen early on the 1st May, reinforced by the arquebusiers of the district. It passed the Schlappina Joch when

covered with deep snow; stormed the entrenched post of Klosters; repulsed the enemy partly on Fideris, partly on Dörfli; occupied Mezza, Selva, Conters, and Küblis; and for two days maintained its position on the Landquart. When, however, it learned the unfortunate result of the attack on the Luziensteig, and saw that it was liable to be surrounded on all sides, it fell back on Gargellen during the night of the 2d-3d, without having experienced any great loss.

INSURRECTION IN SWITZERLAND.

Hotze and Bellegarde concocted measures for a simultaneous attack on the entire French line, but, as is commonly the case when an enterprise depends upon the agreement of two independent judgments, the signal for action was delayed, and not until after several conferences was the 14th May fixed on for the commencement of the combined operations against the Grisons. Up to this time both the Austrian generals remained quiet, instead of occupying the enemy's attention by a series of petty combats, so as to prevent his rallying his troops on any one point.

The Austrians had issued proclamations in Switzerland declaring that their intention in entering that country was to rescue it from the tyrannical oppression of the French Revolution, and to restore it to its ancient institutions, together with other assertions of a similar kind. General Hotze, of Zürich origin, supported by the influence of several patrician families who had preferred emigration to the new state of things, Steiger, De Roverea, and others, maintained secret relations with the disaffected, who were numerous in the Grisons and the minor cantons. They excited the population with the ardour and confidence common to the proscribed of all countries and parties, because a change, in their way of thinking and their passions, could not but ameliorate their grievous position, so that they had everything to gain and little to lose. They had succeeded in fomenting

a formidable insurrection, and had set the country on fire, especially in the valleys of the Upper Rhine, the Ticino, the Reuss, the Muotta, and the Rhone. Hotze hoped to envelope the French in a chain of insurrections extending along the entire range of the High Alps.

The Austrian emissaries and the Swiss emigrants found almost everywhere the most formidable inclination towards the revolt. At Sentis, at Olten, at Münsingen, in Aargau, in the Upper Valais, the Bernese highlands, at Morat or Murten, and in certain spots in the canton of Freyburg, the Easter fêtes saw the people rise at the sound of the tocsin. At Ruswyl, three leagues from the seat of government, the peasants, armed with iron-headed bludgeons, called morning stars, advanced on Luzern, where an exaggerated report of their strength had inspired alarm. General Nouvion, commanding the troops of the interior, put a battalion in movement, which dispersed and pursued them to a wood, where they entrenched themselves to little purpose.

In the Oberland matters assumed a still graver complexion ; for there one large body of peasants was concentrated between the Kander and Thun, while another insurrectionary column moved along the left bank of the Aare.

5th April. On the 25th April, a crowd of armed men equipped as soldiers, and wearing the ancient cockade of Uri, moved upon Altorf, on which point a battalion of Helvetian militia was advancing for the purpose of dispersing a gathering which threatened to intercept the communication with the St Gothard. The commander of the battalion, informed of their approach, disembarked the companies between Attinghausen and Seedorf, but being furiously attacked, was compelled to re-embark.

The next day, the 26th, a public meeting was held at Altorf: Vincent Schmidt, having been selected as the leader, and having established a certain kind of order amongst the insurgents, made preparations for giving a warm reception to the Helvetian battalion. These troops, smarting under the

defeat of the previous day, determined to have their revenge. They lost no time in attempting a fresh disembarkation, but it met with as little success as the first. Schmidt forced them to withdraw with loss to Luzern, after which he lined the shores of the lake with his posts.

The success of the Altorf rebels spread through the canton of Schwyz. On the 28th April, when the session of the local ^{28th April.} Parliament is generally held, the tocsin sounded in all the communes. The peasants, arming themselves on all points, marched to the principal town, and drove back the small garrison to Brunnen, where fortunately it was able to embark. The triumphant insurrectionists next held a meeting, to which were convoked the principal inhabitants of the country. The greater portion of the latter, however, not blinded by unreasonable hatred of the French, declined to appear. Some men of discretion, amongst whom were Schuler, the former chief magistrate, and Aloys Reding, endeavoured to represent to them the folly of a hostile demonstration.

The success obtained by the insurgents over the militia at Altorf and Thun would have put the French in a very awkward position if Masséna had not immediately adopted vigorous measures. Soult was directed to march on Schwyz and Altorf with the 1st and 53d regiments of the line; the 110th, on its way from Geneva, remained near the lake to oppose the progress of the insurrection in Le Valais.

The following are the details given by Soult in his *Memoirs* of the repression of the insurrections of Schwyz and Altorf.

The insurrection had been marked by great excesses. As soon as it broke out, the French who were scattered throughout the cantons had been arrested, robbed, and assassinated. Some small detachments had sold their lives dearly; others had been able to capitulate, but were thrown into prison. The public mind was highly excited, and the insurrection was spreading rapidly. A crowd of Austrian agents were holding out promises to these simple inhabitants, and pro-

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misgiving them immediate assistance. Schmidt had, moreover, organised a kind of insurrectional government, and presided over the general movement.

In this state of public excitement, two courses for the re-establishment of order were open for adoption—one of severity, wherewith to terrify the insurgents (on which the Helvetic Directory and its agents, as well as Masséna, determined), another of moderation and forbearance. Both were attended with a certain inconvenience. Forbearance might have given rise to the idea of weakness on the part of the agents of authority, and so have encouraged the people to join the insurrection. On the other hand, the exercise of severity was quite as dangerous, as being likely to excite the insurgents to resist, to sow despair amongst them, and to induce them to stake their safety on their courage, and to re-awaken the example of their ancestors, who had shaken off the domination of Austria. Thus the French might involve themselves in a fresh contest, necessitating the withdrawal of a portion of their forces from the principal object, by which means a diversion in favour of the enemy would be created.

These considerations, coupled with the repugnance which Soult entertained to rigorous measures, such as might confound the innocent with the guilty, and which would have fallen unduly on the people, who had committed no fault beyond being misled, whilst they could not have weighed heavily on the instigators, led him to adopt the system of clemency, and to discard a rigorous line of action, except in extreme cases. In spite of the orders he had received, he assumed the responsibility of a general amnesty, which he was desirous of offering in the first instance to the insurgents.

2d May. “On the 2d May (Soult says), I appeared before the first assembly I happened to come across, which was in camp at Rothenthurm near Einsiedeln. Its members at first caused me a deal of trouble to avoid a collision, in consequence of

their swaggering, and to induce them to listen to peaceful counsels. I succeeded, however, in distributing amongst them some copies of my proclamation, the effect of which I supported by the display of my forces, which were ready to attack. They were moved, and sent me deputies proposing submission, on condition that they were not prosecuted for what had occurred. I gave them a promise to that effect, upon which they laid down their arms, and the assembly dispersed; confidence was re-established, and the good news spread through the neighbourhood.

"I staid some hours at Rothenthurm to admit of other gatherings, which occupied different posts in the canton, hearing what had happened, and of being induced to follow the example that had been set them. During the march, I experienced the satisfaction of seeing the peasants coming in crowds to lay down their arms along the line of march, offer refreshments to my troops, and testify their recognition of us.

"A league from Schwyz I met Reding, the respectable former chief magistrate, with several cantonal authorities. On the breaking out of the insurrection, they had done their best to combat disorder, and had succeeded in saving the remains of four companies of the 76th regiment, which happened at that time to be at Schwyz. These companies had been engaged, had lost a considerable number of men, and but for the intervention of these generous persons, would have been entirely destroyed. Uncertain of the reception I would give them, the inhabitants of Schwyz conceived the idea of making our soldiers, who had been released from prison, precede them on their way to meet me. This mediation was unnecessary. I had proclaimed a general pardon, and was much more desirous of forgetting past injuries, than of avenging them. I was, however, sensibly touched by the conduct of our brave soldiers, many of whom bore the marks of recent wounds, but who, nevertheless, went so far as to intercede for their enemies. I experienced still greater emotion when I found myself in the centre of a population which had been augmented by the greater portion of

the canton. I came in the guise of a liberator, and brought peace, safety, and an oblivion of the past to this spot, in which, a few hours previously, terror, anxiety, and fear of the future had reigned supreme. So happy a change in the situation produced an universal cheerfulness, which was evidenced by all sorts of demonstrations. For my own part, the reception accorded me by this worthy population will never be effaced from my memory, and I experience fresh pleasure every time I indulge in the recollection of it. By the performance of a good action every man procures a like return.

“The canton of Schwyz was thus entirely pacified, without any bloodshed or the least damage to property. But the cantons of Uri and Unterwalden were still in rebellion, and their submission was attended with greater difficulties. These difficulties caused me less anxiety than the apprehension of seeing a fresh storm burst out in my rear. With the view of holding the country in subjection, and for the protection of the administration of the Helvetian Government, the commander-in-chief had adopted the plan of replacing my troops as I advanced by Swiss demi-brigades, the soldiers of which, recruited principally from the canton of Zürich, declared their intention of renewing former hostilities and wreaking their vengeance on the canton of Schwyz. Following them were Government agents, who, to augment their importance, and possibly also for reasons of their own, were desirous of treating as rebels and prosecuting those who on the good faith of my promises had submitted.”

In consequence of Soult's representations, Masséna consented to abrogate the severity of his original order to treat the rebels without mercy, withdrew forthwith the Helvetian demi-brigades, and directed the Government commissaries to quit the canton.

The same line of conduct was not so successful at Altorf. Soult heralded his approach by a proclamation similar to that issued to the Schwyzers, but he was obliged to support it by much more energetic measures.

The principal assembly of the insurgents was at Altorf, their leader being Schmidt, who possessed an energetic temperament, was intrepid, acquainted with military matters, and held the title of president of the insurrectional government established by himself.

The position he had taken up was well selected. Covered on its flanks by mountains still inaccessible from snow, he had established on his front on the eastern shore of the lake a continuous line of entrenchments furnished with artillery, the right of which rested on the steep rocks of Flüelen, the left on the Reuss near its mouth. The parapets had been strengthened by a great quantity of packages of merchandise taken from the custom-house at Altorf, and everything evidenced a determination to offer a very obstinate resistance.

Every day rendered it more important to stifle the revolt with a view to the re-establishment of the communications with the St Gothard and the Ticino. All the boats found at Luzern and at Gersau had been collected at Brunnen. When, however, Soult desired to embark on the 6th, a tempest made the navigation impossible. It was not till the 8th according to Masséna, the 9th according to Soult, that ^{9th May.} the embarkation could be effected.

Had it been summer, Soult would have been able to send a column from the Muotta-Thal through the Schächen-Thal to Spiringen, so as to take Altorf in reverse by Bürglen. The 53d regiment had actually been despatched in that direction, on the understanding that the paths were used by the inhabitants. During the night, however, there was so great a fall of snow, that the demi-brigade was obliged to retrace its steps, and was unable to take part in the action. Soult made good the deficiency by two other columns intended to create a diversion on both banks of the lake, along the dangerous paths which are jointly marked across these precipices. The first column, composed of a battalion, advanced from Stanz to Seelisberg and Bauen. It was directed to reach Seedorf and

Attinghausen in order to seize the bridge over the Reuss, and, in case of need, open a passage for the principal column.

The second column, of three companies, detached to Sisikon, was ordered to proceed by Tell's Chapel and the rocks above Flüelen, and annoy the enemy's right, whilst Soult at the head of the principal column was to attack in front.

At 3 A.M. on the 9th May, Soult embarked at Brunnen with three pieces of light artillery, the first demi-brigade of the line, 30 chasseurs à cheval, and a company of sappers, making for Flüelen and Seedorf. At 7 A.M., being off the advanced posts of the insurgents, he gave the signal to disembark. The first battalion of the 1st regiment moved at the foot of the rocks to the right of and on a level with Seedorf, whence it reached that village and Attinghausen, and then advanced upon Am Stäg by either bank of the Reuss. The second battalion disembarked at the foot of the bay to the left of Flüelen. It scaled the mountain, turned the village, and moved by Altorf in front of Bürglen into the Schächen-Thal. The artillery, the chasseurs à cheval, and the sappers followed this movement, which was protected by the column posted above Flüelen. The attack of the right was protected by a battalion of the 103d that had come up from Bauen.

The insurgents, to the number of 2000, furnished with four guns, and completely entrenched in the plain, held all the heights, and offered everywhere a vigorous resistance, but on being charged they were put to the rout. Schmidt was among the first to fall. His death discouraged the mountaineers; 600 of them withdrew into the valley of the Reuss, and the remainder escaped through the Schächen-Thal, which the 53d regiment, as has been seen, had been unable to reach.

During the night, the 1st and 53d demi-brigades were directed to assemble between Am Stäg and Silenen to march at an early hour in pursuit of the insurgents. The battalion of the 103d was to remain at Altorf to hold the district, and to induce the inhabitants, the majority of whom were dispersed among the mountains, to return.

The defeat of the insurgents and the loss of their chief had the effect of shaking their resolution; but in order to stamp out any remaining spirit of resistance, it became necessary to remove all possibility of any check to the progress of the expeditionary column through the long defile which it had to follow on its march to the St Gothard and Bellinzona. The smallest obstacle in this defile, supported by a hundred or so determined men, was capable of rendering all the efforts of this column useless, and of obliging it to retrace its steps. Nothing was easier than to intercept or obstruct the road, which is suspended throughout on the brink of precipices, to destroy some bridges, especially the Devil's Bridge, and to stop up the Urnerloch.

Soult was full of apprehension lest he should encounter these obstacles, and not without reason. Some prisoners had warned him that he would find at Wasen an insurgent corps ready to defend the difficult country about that village, and that the men unprovided with arms had been sent to the perpendicular mountains beyond Wasen, along the foot of which the road winds, to roll down rocks on the assailants, should they venture to approach that spot, after Wasen had been carried. They added, that it was proposed to destroy the Devil's Bridge, and that an entrenched camp had been marked out in the snow on the summit of the St Gothard, of which, as at Altorf, bales of merchandise, discovered in the dépôt at the Hospice, formed the revêtement.

There was need of great haste to anticipate, if possible, these defensive preparations. Before daybreak of the 11th 11th May. May, Soult attacked and carried by assault the entrenched post of Wasen, whereby the insurgents suffered considerable loss. The French as soon as possible entered the defile, hurrying their advance with the object of anticipating fresh gatherings at Urseren. "I admit," says Soult, "that the terrific noise of the massive rocks incessantly hurled down upon us caused me momentary anxiety, and that my soldiers in their surprise hesitated for an instant to advance. A dozen

soldiers had been crushed, alarm had seized the remainder; the road was impeded, and the disorder which was extending throughout the column rendered our position more and more critical. Happily a flanking detachment, which on leaving Wasen I had sent up the heights, succeeded, in spite of many dangers, in escalading them and dislodging the enemy that was crushing us from above. We were thus enabled to continue our rapid advance, and the same day we succeeded in saving the Devil's Bridge, the destruction of which had been commenced, as also in clearing the passage of the Urnerloch, which had been obstructed. Thus we reached Urseren."

On the evening of the 11th, Soult occupied Urseren and
12th May. Hospen-Thal; he halted there on the 12th, to give his troops a day's rest, and to receive information regarding the fresh arrangements made for their defence by the insurgents.

The insurgents of Le Valais had withdrawn by Realp into their canton; the remainder, the majority of whom belonged to the forest cantons, and with whom were united some reinforcements from the Val Leventina, stopped on the St Gothard, where they entrenched themselves in the snow with bales of cotton and silk captured at the dépôt of the Hospice.
13th May. Soult left on the morning of the next day (the 13th), with the first demi-brigade commanded by General Bontems, to ascertain in person what was taking place at the St Gothard. The insurgents had taken up a position between the village of Hospen-Thal and the Hospice. They occupied a spot hemmed in by the rocks which the road traversed. To reach it, it was necessary to proceed by single file, and to follow a very rapid descent, sinking up to the waist in snow. Five companies were ordered to scale the mountain called Muten-Alpenlei, turn it, and finally attack the insurgents in their rear.

The French displayed the greatest intrepidity while exposed, not only to the enemy's fire in front (they, moreover, had sent troops secretly to obtain possession of the summit of the mountain), but also to the falling avalanches, and the

consequent danger of being swept into the abysses beneath whilst descending the rocks, which could only be effected by a glissade over the snow. All these difficulties were happily surmounted. The insurgents, unable to maintain their position on the mountain, and seeing that they were on the point of being enclosed between the rocks on either side, withdrew into their entrenchments on the actual mountain of St Gothard. They were followed thither by the French, who repeated the manœuvre by directing three companies against the insurgents' right, which rested on the Blauberg. The insurgents, thus outflanked on the right, and unable to protect the defence of their entrenchments, fled in disorder to Airolo.

Bontems was directed to pursue the insurgents beyond Airolo, whither Soult himself proceeded in spite of the snow, which was falling heavily at the moment. The French were in possession of Airolo by 5 P.M. Soult quitted it at midnight, leaving Bontems there with the first demi-brigade to continue the pursuit. The next day he was obliged to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Faïdo.

Soult had left at Airolo one of his aides-de-camp, who returned the following day, the 14th, to report that the 14th May. insurgents had been pursued to Ambri, where at 11 P.M. of the 13th the fighting still continued. There had been terrible slaughter, which, however, had not reduced the insurgents to submission. Finally, on the 15th, the remainder of them who 15th May. were still in the Leventina dispersed, some through the mountains, some into the Maggia valley.

On the same day, Soult's troops effected a junction with those of Lecourbe in advance of Faïdo. The communication with Lecourbe being quite open, Soult relieved his own troops by those under General Novion, and resumed his march to Zürich, completing the disarmament of the valleys by the way, taking some hostages, and directing the arrest of the leaders of the insurrection, whom he sent to Luzern for trial.

As Ménard was re-entering the Landquart valley, information reached him that a swarm of rebels were already at the gates of Chur, whilst others were on the march to Ragatz by the valley of the Tamina. He lost no time in sending a detachment to Pfäfers to intercept the progress of the latter, and assembling two battalions of the 103d and 109th regiments, several companies of the 14th light infantry, and a squadron of chasseurs, he flung them against Chur. On the approach of this column the peasants fell back upon Ems, where they made a vigorous resistance, from thence upon Reichenau, the bridges of which place they barricaded. Here their resistance was still more energetic, nor was their dislodgement effected until after several charges with the bayonet, in which 600 of these poor creatures were killed.

The detachment of the insurgents which had reached Vättis was cut to pieces at Tamins, and the village set on fire. On the 4th the expeditionary column marched to Ilanz, driving the crowd of fugitives before it. Early on the morning of the 5th, Dissentis was invested. Whilst searching the Benedictine convent for the chiefs of the insurrection, the grenadiers discovered the bloody remains of the 108 unfortunate soldiers of the 103d regiment, who had been massacred some days previously. At this sight the fury of the soldiers was ungovernable, and the result was, that the village as well as the convent were reduced to ashes.

Moreover, the insurrection in the Grisons was coincident with Hotze's attack on the Luziensteig, and it appeared that this general had exercised on it his entire influence, which was greater in the Grisons than in the other cantons.

Le Valais alone could not be reduced: the insurgents succeeded in maintaining a position at Leuk, where with 6000 men and seven guns they barred the valley of the Rhone.

Thus the efforts of Austria to succour Switzerland were disconcerted in less than a week. They had no other result than the extermination of a crowd of unfortunate peasants,

and the destruction of several villages, which were burned for the purpose of terrifying the remainder.

Let us now picture to ourselves Masséna's position if Hotze's attempt on the Luziensteig had been successful, and the insurrection had not been promptly extinguished. Threatened on his left by the victorious Archduke, attacked on his right by Hotze and Bellegarde, compelled to resist superior forces, he would have seen his communications exposed to the mercy of the enemy. The slightest success on the part of Hotze would have caused total ruin to the Army of Helvetia if the Archduke had duly supported him.

THE ALLIES TAKE POSSESSION OF THE GRISONS.

The departure of Lecourbe's division had seriously weakened the French in the Grisons. Nevertheless they persisted in maintaining the same unfavourable attitude, which may be likened to a triangular position with acute and salient angles. Ménard's division, at that time commanded by Chabran, and reinforced by a detachment left him by Lecourbe, occupied a line which, starting from the Luziensteig, followed the course of the Landquart, turned the head of that river, and fell back by the summits of the Fluela, the Albula, and the Septimer in the direction of the Bernardino. Its strength, utterly disproportioned to such a vast extent of ground, was insufficient to maintain so many posts, to cover which by means of entrenchments and abatis a vain attempt was made.

The offensive operations of the Austrians, to be successful, simply required to be conducted with knowledge of the ground, apart from any extraordinary efforts. A cordon had to be broken, and once broken, the consequences to the French would have been inevitable and fatal in a mountainous country.

Masséna was so convinced of the untenability of his position,

that, with the view of contracting his line, he had applied to the Directory for authority to abandon the Grisons and the Italian districts before the Austrians attempted their conquest, so that his defence might be limited to the Simplon, the St Gothard, and the line of the Rhine. The state of public opinion in Switzerland left no doubt on his mind that a retreat, commenced in consequence of an offensive movement by the Imperialists, would be a pretext to the disaffected to excite a fresh insurrection in the country, and to cause the defection of the militia. Whilst, on the other hand, a voluntary evacuation of the Grisons would be regarded as merely a measure of prudence, and would not conduce to any disaster. The Directory, however, took a contrary view. Masséna, having received positive instructions to hold the Grisons, is therefore not to be blamed for the defects of his position.

Hotze, having provided for the security of the Vorarlberg by leaving strong garrisons at Bregenz, Dornbirn, and Feldkirch, set out again for the conquest of the Luziensteig, with eighteen and two-third battalions, and eight and a half squadrons. He divided his troops into four columns, two of which were to operate directly against the fort, the remainder to cross the mountains and descend into the valley of the Landquart, whilst Bellegarde made his entry from the south.

The first column, led by Hotze himself, was formed at 14th May. Balzers on the 14th May: it protected the operation against any attempt from the left bank of the Rhine, silenced the batteries established on its banks, swept with its fire the opposite road of Werdenberg and Ragatz, and was held in readiness to escalate the Luziensteig with ladders previously served out to the soldiers.

The second column, which had entered on the 12th May the valley of Gamperthorn, reached the pastures of Mayenfeld on the 13th, and detached on the 14th a battalion to the rear of the Luziensteig. Two other battalions took posses-

sion of Mayenfeld, Jenins, and Malans, and drove the French 37th demi-brigade over the Landquart, with the loss of one gun.

As soon as the battalion detached to the rear of the Luziensteig saw that its rear was secured by the progress of the others, it assaulted the fort, defended by two battalions of the 14th light infantry, made its way into the camp in spite of the terrible artillery fire directed against it, captured eleven guns and ten ammunition waggons, as well as the greater portion of the garrison, routed the remainder, and opened the gates to the first column. Hotze threw himself into the mêlée, pursued the fugitives, captured three more guns at Fläsch, and pushed forward his cavalry to the banks of the Landquart. On the arrival of the first column at this point, it communicated with the others, which had commenced their movement on the 12th May.

The third column debouched by the pastures of Gamperthon on Seewis, turned and took the entrenchments that had been thrown up at this spot, forced the bridge over the Landquart, traversed the French posts, which it held with small detachments, and marched without halting to Zizers, where it rejoined the first column and moved upon Chur.

The fourth column made for Tschaguns in the Montafon, whence it crossed the mountains at Gargellen; met in this village one of Bellegarde's columns, and descended, without meeting any obstacle, into the valley of the Landquart, making for the Upper Toll Bridge.

Whilst Hotze was marching on Chur, Chabran, who had for some days succeeded to the command of Ménard's division, fell back on Ragatz and Sargans; afterwards he took up a position between the last-named village, and Walenstadt, his right resting on the ruin of Gräplang, his left on Mount Bärschis.

In these different affairs the Austrians took 3000 French prisoners, captured 15 guns and 22 ammunition waggons, as well as some provision stores at Zizers and Chur. Their losses were inconsiderable.

Bellegarde debouched also in four columns from the Montafon and the Engadine.

^{13th May.} The first column started from Galthür and Gargellen on the 13th, joined at the last-named village Hotze's fourth column commanded by Plunkelt; crossed the Schlappina in company with it, and turned to the left at Klosters, which the enemy forthwith evacuated. It finally rejoined the second column at Davos.

^{13th May.} The second column left Süs on the evening of the 13th, drove the French posts from the Flüela, and advanced to Tschuggen.

^{14th May.} On the 14th it attacked an abatis in advance of Davos, carried it and took some prisoners. On the 15th it detached two battalions to Langwies in the Schanfigg-Thal. The remainder took the road to Lenz, on which they took up a position at Alvenen. On the 16th their advanced guard pushed forward to Obervatz.

^{15th May.} The third column, assembling at Ponte, reinforced on the afternoon of the 14th the advanced posts on the Albula, took Weissenstein, and marched on the 15th to Bergün. Bellegarde took up a position at Filisur behind the Landwasser.

The fourth column marched from Silva Plana, a portion by Casaccia and the Maloggia, and effected a junction above the sources of the Inn. The entire column advanced on the 14th to Molins in the Ober-Halbstein valley, and reached Tiefenkasten opposite Lenz on the 15th; a flanking party occupied a bridge over the Albula stream below Obervatz and the village of Fürsternau on the Rhine.

The French hastened their retreat; all that belonged to Lecourbe's division withdrew by the Splügen to Bellinzona, where they rejoined their general by the Val Mesocco. The remainder belonged to the brigade under Suchet, who rallied his troops at Reichenau, the bridges of which place he destroyed.

The Austrians collected a great number of stragglers, and found at Filisur two guns, which the French had thrown over

a precipice through their inability to drag them along with them.

After the capture of the Luziensteig, Chabran's division, formerly Ménard's, was separated into two portions. One under Chabran crossed the Rhine, as has been seen, at Ragatz, and shortly withdrew into the canton of Glarus; the other, under Suchet, took refuge at Reichenau. The bridge of Felsberg was broken down, and that of Reichenau burned under cover of a smart cannonade.

Suchet reckoned on rejoining Chabran at Ragatz by the Kunkels Pass and Vättis, but Chabran's retreat, in the first instance to Sargans, and thence to Græplang, together with the enemy's appearance at the debouch of the Tamina valley, compelled him to take the road to Ilanz after throwing his artillery and stores into the Rhine. From Ilanz he entered the valley of the Reuss. On the 19th he reached Urseren by frightful roads, having to struggle continually with hunger and the armed peasantry. In this painful march Suchet lost nearly 400 men, many of them having perished from starvation and exposure. It was the identical road that Loison took at the beginning of March, when he was compelled to abandon the valley of the Rhine.

Thenceforward Suchet was in communication with Lecourbe. Hotze followed him, though in a feeble manner, as far as Ilanz, his object being to draw nearer to the Archduke. Bellegarde, instead of marching on the St Gothard, with the view of anticipating Lecourbe, put his troops into cantonments between Lenz, Splügen, and Chiavenna, to the great astonishment of every one. In explanation of this conduct it appears that Bellegarde had been required by Suwarow to enter Italy. In obedience to these instructions, he came down to Chiavenna, established a magazine of provisions in that town, and turned his attention to obtaining means for the passage of the Lago di Como. Might he not, however, have accomplished his object less equivocally? Hotze's advice was totally different.

Bellegarde, indeed, ought to have made a rush by both

valleys of the Rhine for the St Gothard, the central point whence the principal valleys and communications of Switzerland radiate, and whence he could have descended into Le Valais for the purpose of rejoining Suwarow in the plains of Piedmont by the Simplon and the St Bernard, by which means he might possibly have brought about the evacuation of Switzerland. The Austrians could have reached the St Gothard as soon, if not sooner than Lecourbe; his corps might have been defeated, and the valley of the Rhone invaded with greater facility, since it was in the power of the reactionary insurgents. By reaching the St Gothard, Bellegarde enjoyed greater facility in following his new direction. He held the roads leading to Italy, and could dispense with the tedium of the preparations for crossing the Lago di Como. All the issues leading from Southern Switzerland were in the hands of the Austrians, who shortly afterwards gained possession of the fort of Bard at the foot of the St Bernard. Le Valais was in a state of insurrection: 6000 men with seven guns, supported by the main body of the inhabitants, held the post of Leuk. Finally Hotze had made an offer of some of the resources from Suabia for victualling Bellegarde's corps during the expedition to the St Gothard. Leaving Chiavenna, Splügen, and Dissentis, the troops would reach the St Gothard in four or five marches. Imagine, therefore, the position of Lecourbe, who, as will shortly be seen, was at this moment (between the 13th and 20th May) operating beyond Monte Ceneri at the foot of the Val d'Agno. Bellegarde's arrival in Italy would not have been delayed beyond the time that he lost on the shores of Como, where, notwithstanding all his exertions, a portion of his troops, the artillery and the train, were not embarked at Riva and Novate until the 27th May, whilst the remainder, owing to the want of boats, took the road along the western shore by Gera.

OPERATIONS OF LECOURBE.

On reaching Bellinzona on the 10th May, Lecourbe sent Loison to reconnoitre Lugano, which had been occupied by Rohan's brigade. The Austrian advanced posts were driven in with a loss of 300 prisoners, but a reinforcement of two Russian battalions arriving, compelled the French to fall back on their original position.

Lecourbe had likewise to repress some insurrectional gatherings at Airolo and in the Val Mesocco.

As yet unaware of the occurrences in the Grisons, and of the compulsory retreat of the French, he marched with a strong detachment on Lugano. The enemy had nothing there beyond some advanced posts, which were defeated. Rohan withdrew to Ponte-Tresa, in rear of the canal which connects the lakes of Lugano and Maggiore, leaving advanced posts at Bioggio and Agno. Lecourbe posted his at Bironico and Taverna, at the bifurcation of the Lugano and Ponte-Tresa roads, and established a strong post at Magadino and a reserve at Bellinzona.

Lecourbe by his advance to Bellinzona on the 10th had opened a road into Italy, but had not established a communication with the French army engaged therein, and which by its retreat had augmented its distance from the issues of the St Gothard. The Allies, on the contrary, were drawing nearer Turin, and an auxiliary corps was on the march from Arona to Domo d'Ossola. In Switzerland, the conquest of the Grisons enabled the Austrians to operate by the valley of the Hinter Rhine. Lecourbe, therefore, was unable to tarry any longer in the valleys of Agno and the Ticino. He promptly recrossed Monte Ceneri, and learning that some of the enemy's detachments had already shown themselves on the 16th on the Splügen, he withdrew his troops on the 20th, from the valleys of Mesocco and the Bernardino, and commenced his retreat to the St Gothard on the 21st, leaving

21st May.
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behind him a few posts of observation, the last of which remained at Bellinzona until the 23d.

Lecourbe's retreat, according to the Archduke, was attended with a considerable loss of stragglers, warlike stores, and beasts of burden, occasioned much more by the impracticability of the roads than by the activity of his adversaries.

The Archduke's statement is formally denied by Masséna, who asserts that the artillery and the wounded had left for Altorf more than eight days before the commencement of the retreat. The only loss to be regretted, he says, was a large supply of grain, which Lecourbe could not carry with him in consequence of a deficiency of beasts of burden.

24th May. Lecourbe reached Altorf the 24th May, and immediately set about re-organising his division.

He sent by water to Luzern all the administrative employés, whose presence with the troops interfered with discipline. Provisions, moreover, were not deficient, the two companies engaged in this service disputing which should furnish them.

Lecourbe's march, as Masséna states, was so rapid as to anticipate the enemy, notwithstanding the difficulties caused by the crowd of employés belonging to the Army of Italy, who were accompanied by their families.

Loison was directed to guard the issues from Dissentis and Le Valais with five battalions. For this purpose he left one battalion of the 76th at Airolo, sent another to Wasen, and took post with the other three at Urseren. Lecourbe left a post at Am Stäg, and established the 38th at Altorf, and the remnant of the 12th light infantry at Schwyz, for the purpose of defending Rothenthurm and the Muotta-Thal.

OBSERVATIONS ON MOUNTAIN WARFARE.

The theory of mountain warfare has never been presented to observers in so clear a manner as in the first six months of 1799 in the Tyrol and the Grisons, the most elevated countries of Europe.

The French initiated the campaign with the offensive, and beat the Austrians in detail. The latter, in spite of their well-established numerical superiority, were unable to obtain the upper hand, because they limited themselves to the defensive.

When Lecourbe was compelled to assume a passive attitude, he assembled all his forces on his adversary's line of operations in the Engadine. This measure, which is all very well in an open country, when the enemy is unable to pass such positions with impunity, led to no result in the mountains.

The French, easily driven out of the valley of the Inn, endeavoured to make a stand in the Grisons, and occupied too great an extent of country. Their line, however, was pierced, because not one of the posts composing it was sufficiently strong in itself to offer a serious resistance. Thus was lost the passive advantage of the defensive, viz., the power of arresting the enemy, of weakening him by partial losses, of economising their own troops, and of effecting an unmolested retreat.

Whenever either of the combatants gained an advantage, it was always by turning his adversary's position. In the mountains, this is the easiest, surest, and most decisive manœuvre. Imagine the difficulties of a front attack against an important point in a mountainous country. The defender utilises all the resources afforded by a prior occupation; he selects his position at his pleasure, assures his flanks by resting them on torrents and inaccessible rocks or heights carefully occupied. He easily establishes a cross-fire wherewith to annihilate the enemy, who, compelled to approach with a narrow front, to debouch and deploy, wins each step at a terrible sacrifice. Impeded by roads that have been broken up, by entrenchments and by abatis, and restricted in the use of his artillery, the assailant is continually exposed to a murderous fire, to which he can make no effective reply. In such a case, the turning manœuvre is his only resource.

If posts defended and protected in this manner are well-

nigh inaccessible in front, they lack the means of meeting the danger of being turned which are to be found in an open country. The confined area does not admit of formations *en échelon* to guarantee the flanks, and flank movements of the reserves, by which the outflanking enemy can be turned, are impossible. Posted on bare and naked rocks, the troops frequently experience difficulty in sheltering themselves from fire and stones hurled from the points surrounding them. The enemy's manœuvres are concealed from the defenders, and the difficulties of communication prevent warning being given in time enough to avoid, by a prudent retreat, dangers otherwise inevitable.

The most important posts are invariably to be found in valleys, or at points where the high roads debouch from the mountains. Strictly speaking, it is there where the defiles are, and not on the crest or the slopes of the mountains ; for although the roads leading to the passes on the summits are generally indifferent and barely practicable footpaths, they are nevertheless not shut in by rugged rocks, nor fringed by walls inaccessible to lateral communications. It is possible to make a detour on one side or the other, to separate the files, to follow several paths simultaneously ; and if in some spots difficulties occur, it is seldom that a single man cannot succeed in overcoming them. By advancing thus from several directions, and scaling several mountains simultaneously ; the enemy's attention becomes distracted, and he will always succumb if energetically and continuously pressed by his adversary, whether he employs his troops in guarding the footpaths, or keeps them in hand to defend his position ; for it is possible to keep a body of men in the mountains supplied for a momentary enterprise, but not for a stay of any duration.

The forcing of a single post obliges the remainder to retreat, because, taken in flank and rear, they have neither the time nor the ability to manœuvre so as to deprive the enemy of his primary advantage ; and should they hold out,

they run the risk of being destroyed or compelled to lay down their arms.

In a word, he who passively awaits his adversary's attack, exposes himself to the dangers resulting from the defeat of a cordon, which involves consequences far more disastrous than in the plains; for there, by a rapid manœuvre, the face of affairs may be suddenly changed for the better. Generally speaking, the worst position is that, the security of which is dependent on the possession of isolated points, and all defensive positions in the mountains come more or less under this category.

But to revert to the operations of the campaign. Hotze having carried the Zollbrücke (the lower customs bridge), had pushed forward in the direction of Ragatz five battalions and a squadron under the command of Gavazini. This officer vigorously pressed the remnant of Chabran's division, already reduced to a trifle over 1000 bayonets, drove them out of Sargans, and compelled them to withdraw to Walenstadt. Chabran having embarked his artillery and heavy baggage on the lake, moved to Kerenzen, where he hoped to obtain news of Suchet. On the 19th Gavazini took up a position at ^{19th May.} Bärschis, where he dropped his reserve, and marched with three battalions upon Walenstadt, which Chabran's rear-guard had evacuated in order to reach the heights of Mols. After an obstinate combat, in which the valour of the French made up for their deficiency in strength, they were compelled to fall back upon the main body of Chabran's division, which with this additional force gained the valley of the Linth.

Simultaneously with Gavazini's advance upon Walenstadt, a second column was directed to descend the Rhine, and sweep the left bank as far as Werdenberg, and open a passage for the other troops coming from the Vorarlberg. Humbert's brigade of Lorges' division disputed every inch of ground, but was obliged to abandon, in turn, the Schellenberg and the entrenchments of Atzmoos. In the evening, it

took up a position at Wildhaus, at the sources of the Thur, leaving a rear-guard at Gams. The Austrians took advantage of their success to establish a bridge of boats opposite Balzers.

Hotze's corps was thus enabled to join the advanced guard of the Archduke Charles, commanded by Nauendorf, by which measure the Imperialists were enabled to operate in mass against the French line.

RECAPTURE OF THE ST GOTHARD BY THE AUSTRIANS.

Three brigades under General Hadik had been appointed by Suwarow to remain in the mountains for the security of his flank and for the occupation of the St Gothard. This corps was composed of troops under the orders of Strauch, Rohan, and St Julien, forming sixteen battalions and one and a half squadron.

Strauch had left Chiavenna on the arrival of Bellegarde's leading troops, and was joined by Rohan at Lugano. They advanced together to Bellinzona, when the French evacuated
 23d May. that town on the 23d May.

At Hotze's request St Julien's brigade had been left by Bellegarde in the valley of the Vorder-Rhine for the purpose of taking part in subsequent operations in the minor cantons. It now received orders to march by Dissentis to Urseren at the back of the St Gothard, whilst ten battalions, the remainder
 27th May. of Hadik's division, advanced to Osogna, and on the 27th attacked the French rear-guard at Airolo.

According to the Archduke, this rear-guard, commanded by Loison, amounted to 2000 men. Masséna, however, states that Loison had left at Airolo only one battalion, which, being at too great a distance from Urseren to obtain support in case of a serious attack, was about to be recalled, when at 3 A.M. on the 27th May, its main-guard was attacked in advance of the defile of Piotta by Rohan's advanced guard, and thrown back on its battalion after more than an hour's

resistance. The battalion commanded by Lovisi retired to the St Gothard, but being pressed too closely by the enemy, he let loose the grenadier company upon him, and hurled him back with loss to Piotta.

The French had lost their one line of retreat by the valley of the Reuss, and they were necessarily compelled to make an obstinate defence of the approaches to the mountain, in order to afford time to their trains to file across the Devil's Bridge.

Whilst Lovisi was defending Airolo, Loison, who was occupying Hospen-Thal and Urseren, was attacked by two Austrian columns, viz., St Julien's, and one which Hadik had detached for the purpose of turning the summit of the St Gothard. Loison was forced back to the Devil's Bridge, the passage of which was disputed by a party of Austrians, who had traversed the Peterstock. He made fruitless attempts to rally the 109th at Wasen: the soldiers were demoralised, and he was unable to re-assemble them until the morning of the 29th at Altorf.

In the meanwhile, Lovisi, who had reached Hospen-Thal, and found there were no troops to support him, suspected that Loison had been driven thence. He continued his march to the Devil's Bridge, where he found the enemy in battle array. Summoned to surrender, he opened a passage with the bayonet at the head of his column, but the enemy re-forming, and attacking the two companies in the rear, obliged them to lay down their arms. The Austrians pushed on to Am Stäg, and Lovisi rejoined Loison in the direction of Altorf, valiantly disputing every inch of the way.

As for Hadik, he halted at Airolo with Strauch's troops, to await the arrival of Brieg's and Lamarseille's brigades, which were to rejoin him by the Ticino valley. Believing himself to be secure on the line of the Reuss, he sent Rohan to Domo d'Ossola, in order to mask the approaches to the Simplon, so that St Julien's brigade advanced by itself to Am Stäg, which it occupied in a feeble manner.

Whilst Loison was engaged with St Julien, Lecourbe learned from General Rubi, who was in command at Schwyz, that General Gavazini had entered the Muotta-Thal, defended by the 12th light infantry, and that these troops, overwhelmed by superior numbers, had been compelled to fall back upon Schwyz. This was on the 27th May.

Lecourbe was greatly embarrassed by these tidings. On the one hand, Loison's position at Urseren caused him considerable anxiety ; on the other, Rubi, who had lost his head, was no longer in a state to preserve so important a post as Schwyz. Lecourbe hastened to the one in greatest need, believing that he would have time to crush Gavazini and
27th May. return straight to Urseren. He therefore left on the 27th with three companies of grenadiers, two guns, and a few hussars. These troops embarked at Flüelen, but the lake was disturbed by a storm, and it was not till evening that the troops could be disembarked. Lecourbe made his arrangements for the attack during the night, and commenced the engagement at daybreak with the remnants of the 6th and 12th light infantry, holding in reserve his three companies of grenadiers. The behaviour of the 12th light infantry, commanded by the chef-de-bataillon Costé, was on this day beyond all praise ; that of the remnant of the 6th was no less heroic. Gavazini, who was in position behind the Muotta bridge, and supported by the legion of Roverea, made an obstinate defence. Costé, braving the musketry fire and the discharge of the two guns, which scattered death through his ranks, charged over the bridge, drove the enemy back, and closely pursued him when retreating. The 6th and the reserve followed up his success, and overcame all resistance as far as the base of the mountain that separates the canton of Schwyz from that of Glarus.

Three hundred prisoners and two guns were the trophies of this day, while the French did not lose beyond 50 wounded and some few killed ; so true is it that, in the

majority of cases, the economy of life is in direct proportion to the impetuosity of attack.

On the termination of this affair, Rubi requested to be superseded, on the pretext of recovering his health and of his inability to ride. Masséna replaced him by Rheinwald, his former chief of the staff.

On the following day Lecourbe returned to Altorf. He found everything in confusion. Loison had arrived. Lecourbe reproached him, not for having given way too easily, but for not having followed his instructions, which enjoined him to make a stand with his back to the Furka, and under certain contingencies to fall back on Le Valais, where he could have rejoined Xaintrailles. Loison justified himself as he best could, but gave no sufficient reason for his want of energy.

Lecourbe's position was again very embarrassing. Just escaped from one danger, he had to encounter another. His division was posted with its back to the lake, and he had few or no boats in which he could cross it. There was no retreat open to him but by the footpath to Luzern through Unterwalden, which was impracticable for horses. In that case he must have abandoned his artillery and his convoys; but he was not the man to retire without attempting the last chance of success.

Lecourbe ordered Loison to retake Am Stäg, a matter of no difficulty, since it was not occupied in strength. Then bringing the 38th from Schwyz, he marched with it and the grenadiers in support of Loison. St Julien, repulsed from Am Stäg, was unable to withstand the shock. He broke down the bridge over the Madera and fell back upon Wasen. The same day Lecourbe cleared the Schächen-Thal, and on the following day, the 31st May, Loison advanced with two ^{31st M. Y.} battalions to attack Urseren, but owing to bad weather he was compelled to resume his position on the heights opposite the Austrians.

At 3 A.M. on the 1st June the combat commenced. St ^{1st June.} Julien gave the French a warm reception, and for a long time

disputed the approaches to the village. Then suddenly retreating, he crossed the bridge and broke it down, under a continuous fusillade from either bank.

Lecourbe was very desirous of sending a detachment to Dissentis, to threaten the flank of the Imperialists whilst he attacked in front, but the troops were deficient in shoes, and except in his presence were dispirited. He found himself compelled to delay the attack till the following morning. St Julien spared him the trouble by retreating during the night upon Geschenen; nevertheless, in spite of the rapidity of his movement, the French were upon his heels at 8 A.M. The combat commenced immediately; the French drove back the Austrians into the village; finally, the French having expended their ammunition, attempted a bayonet charge, which being repulsed, they were obliged to withdraw to the heights in their rear. St Julien then rallied his troops, and led them back to Wasen; as they approached that village they quickened their pace, in hopes of anticipating the French.

The French were in disorder and giving way in all directions, and all appeared lost; but Lecourbe, convinced of the inutility of the efforts he was making to check the troops and to induce them to stand firm, appeared for a moment to give way to the panic, and dashed off on horseback to Wasen, where the three grenadier companies of the 38th, 76th, and 109th were in reserve. Dismounting on his arrival there, and snatching a musket from the hands of a fugitive, he ordered his brave grenadiers to follow him. The charge was beaten, and at the head of this small column, he dashed against the enemy. The disordered troops, encouraged by this example, blushed at their weakness, rallied, and repulsed the Austrians in the direction of Geschenen, with a loss of 200 dead and 1500 prisoners, of whom two were officers of superior rank. Loison was amongst the French wounded.

The exhaustion of his troops and the want of provisions compelled Lecourbe to halt, and confine his efforts to the

sending some scouts into the mountains to collect the fugitives. St Julien fell back upon Urseren with the remnant of his brigade; the two battalions which he had left there, reinforced by a third which Hadik had sent him, enabled him to preserve this naturally strong position. Lecourbe, after two days' repose, was making his arrangements to attack St Julien, when he received orders from Masséna to fall back upon Altorf and Schwyz.

With Lecourbe obedience was law, but it appeared to him hard to let the enemy, whom he considered half vanquished, escape. He therefore put the order in his pocket and gave orders for the attack.

St Julien occupied an excellent position in advance of the Devil's Bridge and on the heights. Attacked about 11 A.M. by Loison's brigade, he was gradually dislodged from the mountain slopes, and compelled to mass his troops in the defile leading to the bridge. Here he held out for a considerable time, but on Lecourbe's arrival with the grenadier reserve, the Imperialists were defeated, and they abandoned the field of battle, which was strewn with killed and wounded, making for the bridge, where there was a scene of frightful confusion. St Julien would have been lost, had he not destroyed the bridge, and thus saved the only battalion that had time to cross the Reuss. The other two were caught in the gorge, enclosed by glaciers, and obliged to surrender.

In the meanwhile Masséna, who had become anxious at not having received news of Lecourbe, determined to send one of his aides-de-camp, who arrived just as the destruction of the bridge had separated the combatants, and who at length prevailed on Lecourbe to acquiesce in the instructions of the commander-in-chief.

OPERATIONS OF XAINTRAILLES IN LE VALAIS.

Whilst the Austrians were preparing for a combined attack on the Grisons, the French Executive Directory, in conse-

quence of what had happened to the Army of Italy, and the reverses successively experienced by it, instructed Masséna to transfer a corps of 15,000 men from the Army of Helvetia to that of Italy. Masséna, notwithstanding the extreme danger of his position, prepared to obey this order, and actually detached a corps of 10,000 men, which he sent under Xaintrailles to the Lake of Geneva. As, however, the Directory had not specified the route to be taken by this corps, Masséna took advantage of the circumstance to retain it at Lausanne and its vicinity, so that it should be in a position to be moved to Le Valais, where the insurrection threatened to be serious. It even appears that Masséna furnished Xaintrailles with secret instructions. He then stated his objections to the Government, and represented so forcibly the dangers that would be incurred should Switzerland under existing circumstances be denuded of troops, that the Directory on consideration modified its instructions.

The insurrection had made great strides in the upper part of Le Valais. The rebels, reinforced by the fugitives from the Oberland and the minor cantons, and recruited by French deserters, had been organised by some retired Swiss officers in the service of Piedmont, and by Count Eugene de Courten, a daring and active man, as well as a gentleman of consideration, who had placed himself at their head.

The Helvetian Government, whose alarm was increased by the distance that separated the French army from the centre of the insurrection, applied to Masséna for assistance. The commander-in-chief lent a willing ear, being very unwilling to abandon his communications with Italy to the enemy's mercy at the very moment when the disasters of the Army of Italy were opening the Simplon route to the Austro-Russians. He therefore despatched to Le Valais the 110th, a Vaudois battalion, the 7th hussars, and six guns, under the orders of the Adjutant-general Schiner, accompanied by Delöes, acting as civil commissary. Schiner encountered the insurgent advanced posts between Sion and Sierre, and drove

them back upon Brieg, but failed in an attack upon the wood of Finge. At this juncture, Xaintrailles' corps was assembling at Vevey. Schiner made the most earnest representations to Xaintrailles for assistance, which the latter entertained with the greater readiness, because this intervention formed part of the secret instructions which he had received from Masséna. Two demi-brigades forthwith joined the camp at Sierre, whilst the arrival of other troops enabled operations to be commenced in earnest.

On the 24th May, the insurgents, emboldened by the in-^{24th May.}action of the Republicans, issued from the wood of Pfyn or Finge to the number of several thousands, and attacked the camp, but being met with a warm reception, they very quickly withdrew to their entrenchments.

An hour before daybreak, on the following morning (the 25th), Xaintrailles attacked in two columns. The first^{25th May.} column, led by the Commandant Barbier, consisting of three battalions and one squadron, drove the insurgents out of the wood of Finge and pursued them to Leuk. The left column, composed of two battalions of the 89th and the 110th, as well as of the grenadiers of these two demi-brigades, personally directed by Xaintrailles, attacked the position of Leuk, which was defended by seven guns so placed as to enfilade the narrow passage of the valley, the approach to which was rendered still more dangerous by the cross-fire of the sharpshooters. Two flanking detachments (the turning manœuvre again) ascended the crest of the mountains out of artillery range, whilst the main body of the column in the bottom of the valley attacked the position in front. It was received by a storm of musketry and canister at the foot of the entrenchments. The column was beginning to show symptoms of wavering, when a well-sustained fusillade from the crest of the mountains on the insurgents' flanks gave them to understand that they had omitted this danger in their calculations. Xaintrailles redoubled his efforts in the centre, and his troops making their way into

the entrenchments, slew the artillerymen at their guns. The Upper Valaisans fled to Raron, abandoning their artillery and magazines.

26th May. The next day (the 26th), the right column crossed the Saltine by a ford, and moved upon Brieg, where the insurgents had rallied. They, however, abandoned this town and fled to the mountains behind it, whither they were pursued till nightfall. The capture of Brieg was important, as it facilitated the occupation of the Simplon.

The left column reached Naters, on the right bank of the Rhone, the same day, and marched from thence by the mountain slopes to Mörel and Lax, in the hope of seizing the bridge between Lax and Aernen, where the largest body of the insurgents was collected. The position was by nature a strong one. Xaintrailles, after he had reconnoitred it, came to the conclusion that he had not sufficient troops to advance with any chance of success ; he therefore sent orders to the 28th and 104th regiments, which had reached Vevey, to rejoin him by forced marches. At the same time, he tried what conciliation would do by issuing a proclamation to the inhabitants, promising them an amnesty for the past if they would lay down their arms and return to their homes, but threatening, on the other hand, those who should persist in the revolt with summary execution. The result was, that a number of peasants laid down their arms and submitted, but the most obstinate amongst them, and the most compromised, withdrew to Lax, where, reinforced by two Austrian battalions sent thither by Strauch, they rejected the offers of the amnesty in reliance on their formidable position.

1st June. Xaintrailles, who had rejoined his division on the 28th, attacked on the 1st June. The Upper Valaisans made a steady resistance, and for several hours the French could not gain an inch of ground. Towards noon, however, the insurgents being outflanked by the sharpshooters, were thrown back upon the Imperialists, in rear of whom they re-formed, and continued to

combat for several hours with alternating results. Finally they were routed, and the contest was fiercely maintained with the Austrians, who eventually abandoned the field of battle, strewn with their dead, about 8 P.M., and with the loss of 200 prisoners.

Xaintrailles pushed forward the grenadiers of the 110th to the Simplon; several companies of the same demi-brigade were sent to the St Bernard, and he intrusted to the Helvetian troops the guard of the gorges and defiles in his rear.

Tranquillity would have been established long ago in Le Valais, if Loison, when defeated at Urseren, had marched by the Furka upon the flanks and rear of the insurgents, instead of returning to Altorf.

In the meantime, Hadik having been informed of Xaintrailles' march, decided upon moving Strauch to Oberwald in support of the Valaisans, and at the same time he sent Rohan to Domo d'Ossola. Xaintrailles ascertaining this, and being anxious as to what might happen in the direction of Mont Blanc, moreover being threatened by the Austro-Russians, who were in possession of Susa, suspended his movement. He established his headquarters at Brieg, and awaited orders from Masséna.

In comparing the respective movements of the French and Austrians at this period, it is impossible to withhold a tribute to the rapidity and vigour of the French. It was this that gave them such a decided preponderance over the Austrians, who from the slowness of their action failed to profit by their advantages, notwithstanding their numerical superiority.

But it is time to return to the operations conducted by the centre of the Army of Helvetia.

MASSÉNA CONCENTRATES HIS ARMY UPON ZÜRICH.

Since the 7th May, the Archduke had concentrated his troops in the camps of Wahlwies, Singen, and Neunkirch. He had ceased making demonstrations against Switzerland, having made up his mind to enter that country as soon as Hotze, taking advantage of his successes, could approach him near enough to render action in concert with him possible. The abandonment of the Grisons and of the sources of the Rhine by the French, having enabled these generals to combine their movements and to ensure active co-operation, there was no longer anything to prevent the Archduke from entering Switzerland.

Masséna did not consider it prudent to await the movement of the Austrians in a position that was too extended, stretching to a point on the Lake of Constance, and threatened by Hotze in flank and rear. He had no time to lose in concentrating his forces.

19th May. On the 19th, therefore, he issued directions to his divisional commanders to fall back upon Zürich.

Winterthur was assigned as the point of junction to the divisions Tharreau and Oudinot, who were to pass, the former by Andelfingen, the latter by Frauenfeld, detaching a party of cavalry in the direction of Wyl in order to maintain the connection with Lorges. Tharreau and Oudinot were in the first instance to deposit their magazines and heavy artillery in a place of safety.

Lorges had orders, after having freed himself from all impediments to his march, to withdraw to Wyl and Lichtensteig.

These three divisions were directed to leave on the banks of the Rhine some artillery and several companies of Swiss auxiliaries, for the purpose of masking their retrograde movement.

Chabran's division, which Masséna had reinforced with

two French demi-brigades, two Swiss battalions, and several squadrons, had orders to descend to Rapperschwyl, along both banks of the Linth. To the first brigade, conducted by Chabran, was intrusted the duty of escorting to Zürich all the vessels from the Lake of Walenstadt collected at Wesen, leaving one battalion at Gauen, rallying the first regiment of chasseurs at Utnach, and of taking up a position in front of Rapperschwyl. The second brigade, under the orders of Laval, was to pass by Bilten, Reichenburg, and Galgenen, with the object of establishing itself in the vicinity of Lachen.

Both columns received stringent instructions to have all the communications in their rear intercepted by the sappers. Masséna in like manner sent instructions to Lecourbe to fall back on the St Gothard, and to occupy the Furka as well as the passes leading to the Grisons: he placed under his orders General Rubi, who commanded at Schwyz, and directed him to correspond with the headquarters at Zürich through the division Chabran. We have seen under what circumstances this order was received by Lecourbe, and by what a concatenation of events its strict execution was frustrated.

Suchet, whose arrival at Urseren, under the circumstances narrated above, had become known on the previous day, obtained from Masséna the praise which his able and vigorous conduct merited, as well as the order to repair immediately to Zürich, leaving with Rubi the battalion of the 38th which he had with him.

The retreat commenced on the 20th May. The line of the 20th May. Thur possessed the same defect as that of the Rhine, and although shorter, it required a greater number of troops for its defence, for its centre was not, like that of the line of the Rhine, covered by the Lake of Constance. For these reasons Masséna did not consider it prudent to halt on it. Commencing his march on the 21st, he concentrated his 21st May. troops between the Töss and the Glatt. Chabran occupied

both shores of the Lake of Zürich as high up as Rapperschwyl; Lorges marched on the 21st from Lichtensteig and Wyl to Winterthur, and on the 22d took up a position in front of Wallisellen on the right bank of the Glatt. On the same day, Tharreau and Oudinot occupied at Bassersdorf and Kloten the principal approaches to Zürich, maintaining a strong advanced guard at Winterthur. Soult continued to watch the Rhine between the confluence of the Aare and Basel.

Whilst the troops were repairing to their destinations, the commander-in-chief organised them afresh. The denomination of the right, centre, and left corps was abolished, and the army was arranged in seven active divisions, of which one was an advanced guard, and one a reserve.

To Ney was confided the division of the advanced guard, a charge which was well suited to his watchfulness and impetuous activity. As he was then absent, he was replaced provisionally by Oudinot, the command of whose division was taken by Paillard. The reserve was placed under the orders of General Humbert.

Tharreau was appointed to the supreme command of the 2d, 3d, and 4th divisions, and several days afterwards to that of the advanced guard. Ferino was appointed to the command of the 5th and 6th. Tharreau's appointment was not well received, and gave rise to uncomfortable relations between him and the generals under his orders.

The French, however, had scarcely quitted the banks of the Rhine, when the enemy seized the opportunity of throwing bridges across the river—Hotze at Meiningen, the Archduke at Stein. Let us first trace Hotze's movements, and then return to those of the Archduke.

After the taking of the Schellenberg, and the retreat of Lorges, Hotze lost no time in throwing a fresh bridge of rafts across the Rhine opposite Meiningen. Some partisans followed the French along the whole line of the Vorarlberg. The flotilla of the Lake of Constance cruised along the shore, destroyed the enemy's batteries, seizing some guns, as well as

some dépôts of provisions and munitions of war at Frauenfeld and Constance. Hotze himself passed the Rhine at Meiningen and Balzers on the 22d of May with 18 battalions and 13 squadrons, intrusting the defence of the entrenched posts of Feldkirch and the Luziensteig to the local arquebusiers, and to five battalions with six squadrons, which remained in rear for the purpose of restoring these posts to the local militia that had been assembled by Hotze. The five battalions rejoined Hotze a few days subsequently.

Hotze arrived at St Gallen on the 23d. His advanced guard, having reached Gossau and Bischofzell, marched on the 24th to Schwarzenbach, occupied Wyl, and endeavoured to open the communication by Lichtensteig, Wattwyl, and St Johann with Gavazini, who had entered Mollis unopposed on the 23d. Hotze, instead of drawing nearer to the Archduke, halted a whole day with the main body of his forces at St Gallen, contrary to the intention of the latter. Hotze was not aware that Lorges had evacuated Lichtensteig, and Chabran the Linth-Thal. Undue apprehensions for his communications with the Vorarlberg had induced him to move only General Petrasch towards the Archduke. This officer marched on the 24th to Pfyn with six battalions and six squadrons.

On the 20th May the Archduke caused two bridges of boats to be thrown across the river at Stein, which were crossed by General Nauendorf on the 21st with 21 battalions and 30 squadrons, whilst a party of cavalry passed the river at Constance with the view of establishing a connection with Hotze. The bridges of Stein and Diessenhofen were repaired, and the pontoons of the army were transported to Büsingen above Schaffhausen, at which point the Archduke intended to cross the Rhine with the remainder of his troops, who were on the march to rejoin him. Simultaneously some detachments from a strong body of cavalry that he had between Eglisau and Waldshut crossed the Rhine for the purpose of harassing the left flank of the French between the Töss and the Limmat.

Nauendorf, on his arrival at Steinegg, took up a position with his right at Nussbaumen and his left at Hüttwylen, whilst his cavalry spread out along the valley of the Thur from Andelfingen to Pfyn, pushing on scouting parties as far as Frauenfeld.

22d May. On the morning of the 22d, the Austrian advanced guard crossed the Thur, and encountered the first French posts at Hettlingen. Oudinot, whose headquarters were at Winterthur, rested the right of his line upon Seuzach, whence it was prolonged by Neftenbach and Dättlikon to Freienstein. His reserve was at Wülflingen, and he had a grand guard posted at Hettlingen. This was the post which the Austrian advanced guard attacked vigorously, and forced after a very sharp engagement. The five battalions and sixteen squadrons of which it was composed then established themselves in front of the French line, strongly occupied Henggart on the Andelfingen road, and formed a chain of posts from the confluence of the Töss at Pfyn, passing by Buch, Hünikon, Hettlingen, Rikenbach, Oberwyl, and Frauenfeld. In the evening Nauendorf quitted the position of Steinegg with the main body of his forces, to encamp on the elevated plateau between Marthalen and Andelfingen: one of these brigades occupied Klein-Andelfingen, for the purpose of preserving the connection with the advanced guard. In this position Nauendorf awaited the Archduke's troops, which were to pass the Rhine on the following day.

On the same day the Austrian cavalry posted at Eglisau had pushed forward between the Töss and the Glatt a strong detachment, which advanced as far as Embrach, and caused some alarm to the French troops at Lufingen. The strength of this detachment being unknown, Masséna, in his anxiety lest this should prove a serious attempt to intercept the communications of the advanced guard with Zürich, directed Tharreau to march forthwith with nine squadrons and Hendelet's brigade of the fourth division, which was encamped at Kloten. They were unable to come up with the enemy, who had

already recrossed the Rhine, but Masséna, having himself proceeded to Bülach to judge of the real state of affairs, detached Tharreau to Baden with two battalions, three squadrons, and a light battery of artillery; he himself remained at Bülach with the fourth division.

The Austrians, who were uninformed of this movement, transported in their boats during the night a considerable body of troops to the left bank of the river between Coblenz and Kaiserstuhl. Tharreau in the first instance made his troops fall back to admit of the enemy developing his attack, and then assailed him vigorously in front, in the direction of Zurzach, whilst Masséna attacked his left flank at Kaiserstuhl. The contest was of short duration. The Austrians, assailed by superior numbers, retreated in disorder, leaving 300 horses and 500 prisoners in the hands of the French. In the hurry of re-embarkation, many of them were drowned.

The same day (the 22d) the main body of the French remained quiet at Winterthur, and Ney assumed the command of the advanced guard, to which he had been appointed.

The Archduke crossed the Rhine at Bisingen on the 23d ^{23d May.} May, and with 15 battalions and 10 squadrons took up a position in front of Paradies. He had selected the road from Andelfingen to Zürich for his line of operation, in order to facilitate his junction with Hotze, while at the same time he covered the important position of Stockach.

The news which Masséna received on the 24th regarding ^{24th May.} Hotze's march showed him that he had not a moment to lose in opposing the junction of the latter with the Archduke. Informed, moreover, by a spy that the Archduke had not yet moved from his position at Paradies, Masséna promptly made the following dispositions.

Paillard was instructed to move from Bülach with the 2d and 37th regiments of the line, the 5th regiment of chasseurs, and the light artillery of the fourth division, and march upon Andelfingen. Hendelet was to support Paillard with a demi-brigade and three squadrons detached from Tharreau's force.

Ney, with half of the advanced guard, was intrusted with the attack upon the enemy's posts in the direction of Altikon, whence he was next to move upon Pfyn.

Oudinot, with the remainder of the advanced guard, the Helvetian legion, and several Swiss battalions *d'élite*, was instructed to obtain possession of Frauenfeld.

Soult was appointed to act in reserve to Ney's and Oudinot's columns; the commander-in-chief was to remain near this division.

Finally, Chabran was instructed to push forward strong detachments into the Linth-Thal, and in the direction of Lichtensteig, for the purpose of threatening Hotze on his left flank, and so preventing the movement of his forces upon Wyl.

The Archduke criticises severely, and with reason, Masséna's dispositions, which were not calculated to effect his object. Instead, says he, of directing all his forces upon Andelfingen, the decisive point destined to connect the operations of the Austrians, and against which he could operate whilst covering his base,—instead of sending only a flanking party in the direction of Frauenfeld, and directing his principal effort against the Archduke, Masséna left Tharreau in observation on the Rhine between the Töss and the Aare, and divided his expeditionary force into three bodies, no one of which was sufficiently strong to effect its object. Instead of massing his troops upon the Archduke, who was manœuvring on the really important line, he directed his principal forces against Hotze. Jomini agrees with the Archduke, and in like manner finds fault with Masséna.

25th May. At daybreak on the 25th May, Paillard moved out of Bülach, and crossed the Töss by the bridge of boats at Rorbas. He turned the Ircchel mountain, leaving on his right all the enemy's posts, and did not encounter the first Austrian vedettes until he reached Dorf. He was in hopes of arriving at Andelfingen before Nauendorf's grand guards had reached this, the only point of retreat. With this object in

view, he had endeavoured to divert the attention of the grand guards by some light troops thrown forward in the direction of Humlikon and Hettlingen, and by these means he had hoped to mask his movements. Warned, however, in time, the grand guards rallied in good order, and gained at a run the heights which command Andelfingen, under the protection of their cavalry. Three companies occupied the extreme houses at the lower end of the town. Two others guarded the extremity of the bridge on the right bank, whilst the remainder were ranged in order of battle in front of the town, and steadily awaited the attack.

On reaching the foot of the hill, Paillard directed his advanced guard to gain the approaches above the bridge, which the enemy had neglected to occupy, and attacked the position in front with the remainder of his troops. The Austrians sustained the shock for some moments, but in consequence of the fire of Paillard's flankers, which was shortly heard in rear of their left, they were alarmed lest they should be cut off from the bridge, and the infantry lost no time in reaching the town, and moving in close column down the long street leading to the Thur. The cavalry posted in rear in vain endeavoured to stop the pursuit; it was routed, and the French light artillery, crowning the crest of the bank on the slope of which the town is built, inflicted a horrible carnage upon the fugitives. The moment they reached the bridge, on which their safety depended, the Austrian cavalry, pressed too hard by the 5th chasseurs à cheval, and fearful lest the latter should anticipate them, galloped to the bridge: the infantry, which was hurrying thither, was thus trampled underfoot, and for an instant horrible confusion ensued. The cavalry of both nations were blocking up the approaches to the bridge, and already the 37th had opened a terrible fire from the houses in which it had made a lodgement. At this critical moment, the officer commanding the detachment posted at the bridge-head on the right bank, crossed it at the charge, and by a sharp and well-sustained fire succeeded in

opening a passage for the head of the Austrian column. The left wing, however, about 800 men, were cut off, and compelled to lay down their arms. In this retreat the infantry set the lower part of the town on fire and burnt the bridge, whilst the cavalry, which it had left behind it, reached the Lower Töss and swam across it.

Ney, on leaving the neighbourhood of Winterthur, moved with such despatch on Altikon that he surprised Nauendorf's posts. One portion escaped by the ford of Gütikhausen, in which many were drowned, and reached Andelfingen, where the fugitives, who were hotly pressed, made their appearance at the moment when Paillard's troops had carried this position. The fugitives and their pursuers entered the town pell-mell, augmenting the confusion that previously existed. The other portion of Nauendorf's posts fled to Pfyn, where they endeavoured to establish themselves in position; but the pursuit of Ney's advanced guard was so sharp, that they were unable to make any disposition for the defence of the bridge of Pfyn, and were obliged to escape in the direction of Herdern, leaving 400 prisoners in the hands of the French. Ney occupied the bridge in force, and established himself in advance of Pfyn to await news of Oudinot.

About 3 o'clock, Nauendorf, who had been informed of the check experienced at Pfyn, sent thither Simbschen's brigade, which rallied the fugitives at Herdern, and about 9 o'clock in the evening, having attacked Ney unexpectedly, he dislodged him, and threw him back beyond the bridge.

Oudinot had advanced at 3 o'clock A.M. in column by the roads of Winterthur and Frauenfeld. Gazan's brigade defeated the enemy in advance of this point, carried the town at the point of the bayonet, and proceeded to take up a position on the Constance road, leaving a battalion and 100 cavalry to observe that of St Gallen.

Simultaneously with Ney's carrying the bridge of Pfyn, Petrasch's division of Hotze's corps, which had left Wyl in the morning to march upon Pfyn, filed along the Frauenfeld

road, which skirts the right bank of the Murg, and encountering near Mazingen the detachment placed in observation by Gazan, overthrew it without difficulty, and reached Frauenfeld before the main body of the brigade had time to make any disposition for its defence. Petrasch occupied the town, placing three battalions on the heights to the right of it. One battalion took post in the salient bend of the river as a protection to his left flank ; while two other battalions with six squadrons remained in reserve. Oudinot appeared in front of Frauenfeld with the remainder of his troops, and placing his guns in position on the banks of the Murg, by a brisk cannonade he overpowered the Austrian artillery, notwithstanding the advantage of its position, and compelled the Imperialists to withdraw behind the town. The 10th light infantry then forced its way into it, and after a brisk fusillade drove out the enemy's sharpshooters, pursued them into the gardens surrounding the town, and captured the entire battalion which had been posted at the bend of the river.

Nevertheless, Petrasch having supported the centre with a portion of his reserve, Gazan experienced difficulty in holding his own in the town. The arrival of Soult, however, with the 23d of the line and two squadrons of the 13th dragoons, changed the fortune of war. A fresh attack supervened, to resist which Petrasch fruitlessly engaged his last reserve, and made his cavalry dismount and fight in the gardens. He was, however, compelled about 7 in the evening to give way, and fall back upon Wyl by Mazingen, defending the ground inch by inch. Thus again was demonstrated the value of the employment of reserves. In almost all engagements the victory is on the side of the commander who is sagacious enough to employ them in the most vigorous manner, at the most useful time, and at the latest possible moment.

As has been seen, the 25th was a glorious day for the French. The Austrians lost 2000 killed and wounded, besides 3000 prisoners. The loss of the French, according to Masséna's account, did not exceed 600 men. Nevertheless,

Masséna failed in his object, as he had been unable to prevent Hotze's junction with the Archduke.

It is true that it might have turned out quite otherwise, if Paillard, on obtaining possession of Andelfingen, had repaired the bridge and crossed the Thur; in which case, Simbschen's brigade would not have succeeded in dislodging Ney from Pfyn, and the French, in possession of the passages across the Thur, would have prevented the junction.

The Swiss who fought in the ranks of Oudinot's corps maintained their ancient reputation. In the *Journal de l'Armée* it is stated—"The fine Swiss companies of the Leman, and a battery *d'élite* of Zürich, displayed the greatest courage in this engagement, and proved themselves worthy of their ancestors. The Adjutant-general Weber, who commanded them, was killed, to the general regret of his and our own troops, who were also greatly distinguished on this day. Officers of all ranks, as well as private soldiers, showed more than ever that they were Republicans, and that the success of this affair, which proved so murderous to the enemy, was mainly to be attributed to the undaunted courage of all engaged."

Soult recounts in his Memoirs that the Swiss demi-brigades attached to his division displayed as much courage as the French troops, but that after Weber's death these militiamen, when they had lost their chief, gave way, and left uncovered the curtain which it was their duty to defend.

However that may be, the advantages were worthless to the French, for Masséna had missed his aim. The destruction of the bridge at Andelfingen, and the loss of that at Pfyn, decided the commander-in-chief to concentrate his troops in their original position.

Whilst this was occurring on the Thur, Chabran, who had been directed to molest Hotze's left flank, experienced a sharp encounter on the Glarus road, in the direction of Bilten, when Laval's brigade drove back the enemy, capturing some prisoners. Chabran advanced next to Näfels, whence

he fell back at nightfall to Siebnen. The left brigade caught sight of the Austrians on the Lichtensteig road, but were unable to come up with them.

Hotze had left St Gallen on the 25th for Schwarzenbach. His advanced guard, on arriving at Münchwylen, pushed on to Elgg, in spite of Chabran's demonstrations. If, instead of detaching Petrasch, Hotze had moved on the 24th with his entire corps, the affair of Frauenfeld would probably have resulted in the success of the Austrians.

THE ARCHDUKE'S REFLECTIONS ON THE MANŒUVRES
OF THE 25TH MAY.

The Austrians, on their approach to the Thur on the 22d, scattered their light troops over a long chain of posts—a measure attended with inconvenience, except in an open country, where the retreat is free in every direction, or in a position momentarily assumed, but never when a halt is made in front of a defile with few openings for a retreating force. Were such an attitude excusable on the first day of his arrival, Nauendorf should have changed it the following day, as he was aware that the Archduke wanted to gain time.

By the occupation in strength of the two principal debouches of Andelfingen and Pfyn, by posting in front of them the main body of the advanced guards, and by the establishment of batteries opposite the most practicable fords of the Thur, every inconvenience would have been met, and it would have been possible to establish behind the river a chain of posts which ran no risk of being forced or cut off. If, nevertheless, it had been really an object to maintain the ground occupied beyond the river, Nauendorf should have moved the greater portion of his corps in front of Andelfingen and of Pfyn, and the Archduke, instead of remaining at Paradies, should have advanced to the Thur, near enough to support Nauendorf. The Austrians adopted a middle course, and that attended with many difficulties and few advantages.

At Andelfingen, the Austrians neglected all the precautions which are considered advisable in the passage of defiles. When compelled to retire, they formed in front of the town, but at such a distance that their wings did not rest on the defiles formed by the river. Instead of occupying the gardens and the buildings on the outskirts of the town, and, farther on, the outlets which abut on the bridge, their only care was to guard the approaches to the Lower Thur in connection with the right flank of their position. The passages through the town and the environs of the Upper Thur were left to chance. The old castle which commands the road along the bank, and the houses which line it, offered excellent means of defence, yet they were unoccupied. This want of precaution enabled the enemy to effect an entry on all sides whilst the Austrians were breaking into column, leaving in their rear nothing but the cavalry, which, though suitable for the charge, were incapable of defending in a semicircular position the approaches to the town. If Paillard's column had been stronger, the Austrian rear-guard must have been overwhelmed, and the French would have obtained possession of the passage of the Thur.

Masséna had failed in his object ; the more strategical dispositions of the Archduke prevailed over all the tactical advantages momentarily obtained by the French, so that it was no longer possible to prevent the junction of the two Austrian corps. Thenceforth all that the French general could do was to place his troops *en échelon*, to defend step by step the contracted ground which he occupied, and to delay the enemy's progress as long as possible.

26th May.

The French fell back on the 26th upon all the points whence they had moved prior to the combats of the previous day, leaving at Winterthur a reserve in support of the advanced guard commanded by Ney. According to Jomini, Masséna would have done better to abandoned forthwith the line of the Töss, as not affording sufficiently good positions.

The Archduke, on his part, determined to move the Prince of

Reuss' division the same day to Pfyn, for the purpose of re-inforcing Hotze, who received instructions to attack the French advanced guard on the following day. The entire day was spent in re-establishing the bridge of Andelfingen, which was completed by noon of the 27th. On the 26th the Archduke rejoined Nauendorf with six battalions in the neighbourhood of Andelfingen, while Hotze, encamped at Frauenfeld and Hüttwylen, pushed forward his advanced posts to Islikon and Elgg.

Hotze marched on the morning of the 27th to Winterthur. ^{27th May.} His advanced guards (he marched in three columns) took possession successively of the wood of Islikon, and the villages of Gundetschwyl, Schottikon, Wiesendangen, and Stogen, after several partial combats. He shortly deployed the greater portion of his troops along the front of the French, whilst one of his columns manœuvred to turn them on the right.

Ney occupied near Ober-Winterthur a height surrounded by marshes. He was making his dispositions to fall back upon Winterthur, when Tharreau galloped up and directed him to resume the offensive, promising to support him with Soult's division. Ney, in consequence, directed the brigade Gazan to move to the front, whilst the Brigadier Roget, in command of the centre, attacking the column which threatened the right, marched on Winterthur, he himself supporting the left. Gazan, being too weak, was repulsed. Roget, more fortunate, overthrew the enemy, Ney on his part fought like a lion, but Soult did not arrive, and the enemy's columns were visibly increasing. Ney, wounded by a musket-ball in the knee, had already handed over the command to Gazan. Scarcely had the first dressing been applied to the wound before he once more rushed into the thickest of the fight, and for some time sustained the combat. Forced back in front of Winterthur, he still defended himself at that spot. Time slipped by and no reinforcements came. At length, despairing of Soult's arrival, Ney made his preparations to retreat.

The reserve, under the orders of the Adjutant-general Walther, moved to take up a position at Töss, with a view to defend the bridge, the remainder of the division proceeding to the heights of Steig, behind the Töss.

A range of hills, which commences opposite the village of Töss, borders the left bank of the river, and extends to Pfungen. A muddy rivulet separates their crest from the steep and wooded mountains which are heaped up in a second line as far as Brütten. The highroad from Töss to Zürich winds round the foot of the first heights, and leads obliquely to the summit of the second by a difficult mountain, called the Steig. On the summit of the latter the French took up their position, leaving detachments to watch the bridge and the village of Töss, as also the first range of hills.

Walther sustained the shock with vigour. At the expiration of an hour and a half, the Austrians, by an extraordinary effort, threw back the French on the bridge, which they took, but were unable to cross. Ney, from the heights of Steig, commanded the road, and his artillery committed such ravages in the enemy's ranks, that Hotze, convinced of the inutility of an attack, limited himself to a fire of musketry. Ney then received a fresh wound, which obliged him to resign the command definitely to Gazan.

What had become of Soult's division? It certainly appears that Tharreau had instructed him to support Ney, but he did not stir; at least Tharreau formally accused him of disobedience, and attributed to him the loss of the line of the Töss. A sad result of the jealousy existing between the generals! Ney's division, at the most 3000 strong, was thus left to struggle for eleven hours against 8000 Austrians.

The bridge of Andelfingen having been re-established at
27th May. noon of the 27th, the Archduke advanced in two columns to Winterthur and Neftenbach, but having learned Hotze's success, he directed all his troops upon Neftenbach, which General Oudinot defended for a long time. He did not evacuate it until the evening of his withdrawal to Pfungen,

from which he was in like manner dislodged a short time afterwards. About ten o'clock at night Oudinot returned to the charge, but could not succeed in retaking this post.

The losses on the 27th were equal. The Austrians had a great number killed and wounded. They left 800 prisoners in the hands of the French, taking from them four guns and disabling 500 men.

By obtaining possession of Pfungen, whence the French position was more accessible than from the Steig, the Austrians had secured the means of turning the heights, which were wellnigh inaccessible in front. The French, therefore, fell back during the following night upon the Glatt. Oudinot established himself upon the heights of Kloten. Tharreau abandoned the Lower Töss and the Rhine, and fell back upon Bülach. The Austrian light troops were distributed between Rorbas, Embrach, and the woods beyond.

Whilst these movements were being executed under the fire of the sharpshooters, Tharreau collected his forces and advanced at 11 A.M., occupying the heights on the edge of the stream which flows into the Töss at Rorbas. A demi-brigade drove the Austrians from Rorbas, and was on the point of entering Freienstein and Teufen, when four Austrian battalions arrived in support of their advanced posts, and checked the enemy's proceedings, compelling them to recross the Töss and abandon Rorbas. This affair, in which the French cavalry were unable to deploy, cost them 200 prisoners. Lieutenant Parrien, of the 10th light infantry, with four privates, took thirty of them. This combat had no other result, as the general-in-chief was not desirous of bringing about a general engagement.

Hotze followed the French by the Steig.

Masséna, in his report to the Directory, remarked, "I have the line of the Glatt: if I am driven from this position, I shall take that of the Limmat, and afterwards that of the Reuss. I shall cling to these positions, and shall not abandon them without making the enemy pay a heavy price for them."

In spite of Masséna's equanimity and his characteristic hardihood, the situation of the French army was anything but satisfactory to him. Its strongest demi-brigades did not exceed 1500 men, and they had lost many of their officers incapacitated through fatigue and wounds. The Helvetian militia did not render the services expected of them. If some battalions supported the ancient military reputation of their nation, many abandoned their posts with their arms and baggage. And, to crown all, the concentration of the troops was soon about to demonstrate the insufficiency of their supplies.

29th May.

" 10th Prairial (29th May) 1799.

" To the Generals of Division, Soult, Oudinot, and Tharreau.
—Instructions for taking up a position in rear, in case of the army being compelled to abandon the line of the Glatt.

" Soult's division is to withdraw into the entrenched camp of Zürich. The brigade of General Laval, which at this moment is posted between the Lake of Greifen and that of Zürich, will occupy the right of the entrenched camp.

" General Oudinot's right brigade will move by Zürich, in order to take up a position behind the Limmat. His left brigade will cross that river by the flying bridge which is to be established at Oetwyl. This division will be intrusted with the defence of the Limmat, and will connect its right posts with those of the entrenched camp of Zürich, its left posts with those of the brigade Paillard.

" General Tharreau's division will retire on two points. General Paillard's brigade will occupy the heights of Baden, connecting his right with the division Oudinot. It will detach several posts in rear of the Limmat, as far as its confluence with the Aare, so as to communicate with the brigade Heudelet. The latter brigade will pass the Aare by the bridges and ferryboats which will be established, and will take up a position behind this river, with its right at the

confluence of the Limmat and Aare, its left at the junction of the Aare with the Rhine. The generals will forthwith cause the points which they are to occupy, and the roads they are to take, to be reconnoitred.

"The generals of division are sufficiently aware that, in order to secure combination in action, they should keep one another acquainted with each other's plans and movements; and they should on no account retreat until they have offered the most vigorous resistance to the enemy."

During the night of the 29th the whole of the French ^{29th May.} army, with the exception of some detached posts, passed the Glatt, and its right wing occupied the entrenched camp of Zürich. Hotze took up a position on the advantageous heights of Bassersdorf, with his advanced posts at Kloten; the bridge of Dübendorf was carried by storm, and remained in possession of the Austrians after a sanguinary struggle.

The Archduke encamped in the direction of Pfungen, and sent some troops to Bülach to assure his right flank. It was not till the 31st that the main body of his army marched to Embrach.

For the purpose of harassing Masséna's left, and impeding his communications with Basel, the Archduke sent three battalions to Stetten, on the right bank of the Rhine, to threaten the passage of that river between Eglisau and Waldshut. Masséna reinforced his left on the Lower Glatt with Tharreau's troops which were at Kaiserstuhl, and replaced them with four battalions taken from Basel.

Having made his right as secure as possible, the Archduke being anxious to provide for the safety of his left, detached General Jellachich with six battalions and four squadrons from Winterthur to Utznach, there to join Gavazini, and in conjunction with him to drive the enemy from the banks of the Linth, so as to gain the upper portion of the lake, and to open the road to Zürich. Several squadrons drawn from the Grisons marched by Sargans to co-operate in this enterprise.

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The latter was a useful measure, for Zürich was the decisive strategical point, and in the event of the Austrians carrying it, the French would, as a consequence, be obliged to evacuate the minor cantons and the upper portion of the lake.

Chabran had quitted Utnach on the 28th, and had retired to Rapperschwyl. On the 29th he had crossed the Seesteig bridge, and had broken it, as also that of Grynau on the Linth. He then marched to Zürich by the left bank, and took up a position between Horgen and Lachen.

As regards Gavazini, it has been seen how Lecourbe had repulsed his attempt upon Schwyz, and had compelled him to withdraw into the valley of the Linth.

All this came to Jellachich's knowledge on his arrival at 30th May. Pfäffikon on the 30th; on the 31st he reached Rapperschwyl, pushed forward his advanced guard to Stäfa, and decided on taking the road to Zürich by the right bank. Gavazini was instructed to watch the debouch of the Klön-Thal upon Näfels, to guard the toll-bridge at Wesen, to send a detachment to Utnach, and to be in readiness to march to Zürich by the left bank of the lake should circumstances permit.

1st June. On the 1st June the Austrians under Jellachich, when advancing upon Meilen, were attacked by a detachment sent by Soult to reconnoitre in the direction of Rapperschwyl, which came unexpectedly upon the Austrian advanced guard by the pathway of Hombrechtikon. On the failure of this attack, Soult took up a position at Herrlisberg, and Jellachich continued his march in three columns by Stäfa, Esslingen, and Gröningen, occupying the line of Meilen and Egg as far as the Greifen-See, along which he placed himself in communication with the Archduke's advanced posts. From that time the Austrians encompassed the entrenched position of Zürich, rendering a general action inevitable in the event of Masséna determining to hold his ground.

THE POSITION OF ZÜRICH, AND ITS STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE.

The country comprised between the Lake of Constance, the Rhine, the Limmat, the Lakes of Zürich and Walenstadt, and the frontiers of the Vorarlberg, like that which extends from the Reuss, where it issues from the Lake of Luzern, up to the Lake of Neuchatel, is more open than the rest of Switzerland. The spurs that project from the lofty mountains into these countries do not often interrupt the freedom of manœuvring, and even when they do somewhat impede the progress of operations, do not present those inexpugnable barriers which are to be met with in the southern regions. The fall of Zürich must be followed by the subjection of the whole of the country above mentioned, inasmuch as this town contains within its enceinte the best point for crossing the Limmat, and all the principal roads converge on this point.

Hence it follows that, if the forces of the belligerents are not relatively too disproportionate, Zürich becomes a *strategical point*: one, that is to say, *from which the enemy cannot be dislodged by a turning manœuvre, but which must be vigorously attacked ; nor could any commander venture on leaving such a position either unassailed or unmolested without incurring serious risk and blame.*

An army making an offensive movement upon Zürich from the Rhine, is limited to the choice of two lines of retreat: either to retire towards the Vorarlberg, or to recross the Rhine between Stein and Eglisau. Below these towns the passage of the Rhine is impossible, unless considerable preparations be made for crossing the mountains which lie parallel to the course of that river. A defensive army, on the other hand, can avail itself of all the roads which lead from Zürich westward. If an assailant be desirous of reaching the opposite side of the lake, and forcing his way by the minor cantons, or rather by making a movement towards the Lower Limmat,

or even crossing the Aare with the intention of turning his adversary, there is nothing to prevent the latter from falling upon the communications of an attacking force without exposing his own.

To these strategical advantages Zürich unites some tactical ones. In the direction of the Glatt, on the right bank of the Limmat, and between these two rivers, lies an extent of broken country, crowned with steep and wooded hills, on the sides of which are numerous ravines and marshy valleys, the occurrence of which renders the approaches to Zürich very difficult on that side. To these natural difficulties of the country the French had added an entrenched camp, which surrounded the Zürichberg and the hill of Wipkingen, which helped to render this position still more formidable. The Zürichberg and the heights of Wipkingen formed, as it were, two bastions connected in the shape of curtains by a succession of mamelons extending from one to the other, and which were furnished with redoubts so placed as to sweep the approaches from the Glatt. On the right a series of works descended to the lake. All of them were covered with abatis, some of which were as much as 800 feet broad.

The French position was intrinsically strong, as well as fortified by the very nature of the ground which an assailant would be compelled to traverse when advancing to the attack, viz., the Glatt and its marshes. It, moreover, possessed this further advantage, that the Austrians, limited by the marshes of the Glatt to certain points of crossing, were compelled to direct from a distance their movements upon the proposed points of attack, without the ability of masking their designs, or deviating by a flank movement from the direction once taken.

Five lines of operations were open to the Austrians:—

1. *Along the Lake of Zürich, their right resting on the Greifen-See and the Glatt.* This line was the shortest and the easiest to traverse, but by its adoption the roads leading from Bassersdorf and Kloten to the Rhine would be exposed to, or at least not sufficiently guarded against, a sudden attack.

2. *To make a front attack on the Zürichberg from the direction of the Glatt.* By this measure the line of operations and retreat would be covered, but it would be necessary to debouch across the marshes of the Glatt, and scale the strongest point of the position, an undertaking which would present serious difficulties to an assailant.

3. *By marching from Kloten and Rümlang against the heights of Wipkingen,* a route still longer than the preceding one, and subject to the same inconveniences.

4. *By operating between the Glatt and the marshes of Regenstorf.*

5. *Along the Limmat against the extreme left of the French.*

Supposing either of the two latter directions to be selected, it would be necessary to give up the lines of retreat towards the bridges that had been established on the Rhine, in order to cross the mountains of Kaiserstuhl by very bad roads, and to lose time in the construction of fresh bridges. Moreover, Tharreau occupied the country situated between the Aare, the Limmat, and the Rhine.

Having balanced all these considerations, the Archduke decided on the adoption of the surest, though most difficult, line. The principal attack, therefore, would have to be directed against the Zürichberg, starting from the left wing and centre, the right wing being refused, with the view of assuring the flank of the retreat, and to enable Jellachich, whose position already abutted on the lake, to advance along its shores. Before, however, this plan could be carried out, it became necessary to push back the French within their entrenchments, which were as yet occupied by only the right wing under the orders of Soult, the remainder of the army being on the banks of the Glatt, and in possession of all its bridges, with the exception of that at Dübendorf. The French advanced posts watched the foot of the mountains at Fällanden and in rear of Dübendorf, crossed the Glatt at Wallisellen, and extended thence along the right bank of the river.

On the 2d of June, Jellachich executed to the letter the 2d June.

order, which he had previously received, to march from the environs of Rapperschwyl and Utznach upon Zürich, although this movement, by which he engaged the main body of the French army, led to no result so long as it was alone executed by himself. He marched in three columns: upon Zollikon by the right bank of the Lake of Zürich; upon Wytikon by Ebmatingen and the left bank of the Greifensee; upon Fällanden turning the Greifensee by Schwarzenbach. The French advanced guards, forced back into the position of Riesbach and Hirslanden, abandoned Fällanden, leaving some weak posts in rear of Dübendorf and Wallisellen, and withdrew all their pickets on the left bank of the Glatt from Kloten to the Rhine. The Austrian light troops followed them closely, and took possession of the bridge of Glattfelden, which the French had omitted to destroy, as well as all the approaches to the river. The Archduke advanced the same day with the centre of his army to the heights in front of Kloten.

At this juncture bad feeling manifested itself amongst the Swiss militia. Spite of the efforts of the generals to hold them to their allegiance, desertion, commencing with the retrograde movement of the French on Zürich, had already thinned their ranks. On the 1st June a Zürich battalion of Chabran's division deserted in a body. In Soult's division a Luzern battalion abandoned its post and broke up. With the view of checking defections of this nature, Soult advised the commander-in-chief to incorporate the militia in the Swiss auxiliary demi-brigades, whose fidelity had not yet wavered. This measure was unfortunately adopted too late, when already two thirds of the militia had melted away. The battalions of the Canton Vaud did not share this disgrace; they continued faithful to the revolutionary flag, and by their conduct well deserved the encomiums which they received from the commander-in-chief. It may be observed, however, that their own territory was not endangered at this moment, at least, not immediately so.

Nevertheless, Masséna, still in doubt as to the point of attack, effected a further concentration of his troops. Tharreau was directed to connect himself with Soult by resting his left upon the Rhine, his right at Steinmaur, and by holding the intermediate points. Oudinot, on the left, directed Gazan's brigade to move upon Zürich, whilst that of Roget fell back upon Baden by Dielsdorf. The Adjutant-general Walther with the reserve took post at Adlikon. Chabran established himself behind the Limmat and formed a battalion of grenadiers, which he sent to Zürich to be made use of as a reserve.

The Archduke suspecting that Jellachich was going to attack the main body of the French, despatched one of his aides-de-camp with instructions to him to remain in his position until the moment for the attack should arrive. This general, however, was already engaged.

At 3 A.M. on the 3d of June he had actually attacked the brigade Humbert, and after a sanguinary struggle of four ^{3d June.} hours had driven the 25th of the line from Wytikon, and the 1st light infantry from Zollikon and Riesbach. Masséna, who at this moment arrived at full gallop with the chief of his staff, directed these villages to be retaken. Soult's division, encouraged by the presence of the commander-in-chief, drove Jellachich at the bayonet's point back upon all these points. The Austrian general in vain returned to the charge. Seeing his efforts frustrated, he continued to engage the attention of the French on his right by a series of threatening manœuvres, impetuously pushed forward his left column along the shores of the lake, and in spite of the efforts of the 1st light infantry, reached the suburbs of Zürich at 5 P.M. Masséna, however, launched against him the battalion of grenadiers of reserve belonging to Chabran's division, and compelled him to resume his original position with the loss of 500 prisoners, whilst the chasseurs and the dragoons overthrew the Imperialists in front of Wytikon and Zollikon. In this affair, which cost the French in killed, wounded, and prisoners, 500 men, and which

was otherwise fruitless, Cherin, Masséna's chief of the staff, was mortally wounded. If he had not been so isolated and beyond the reach of support, Jellachich might perhaps have succeeded in entering the place.

Everything betokened a battle next day—a battle which was, perhaps, to determine the destiny of Switzerland and of France. The French army, inferior in number, certainly occupied a good position, though the works commenced for its defence were not such as to make it impregnable. The supply of provisions was not assured, and the armament of the works was yet incomplete, although there was more than sufficient *matériel* in the arsenal of Zürich. In short, the pontoon train, for which a requisition had been made upon Strasbourg for upwards of two months, and on which reliance had been placed for the establishment of the bridges across the Limmat, had not arrived.

In doubt as to the issue of the battle, the commander-in-chief issued instructions to his lieutenants, in case the army should be compelled to make a retrograde movement and evacuate Zürich.

Lecourbe had orders to quit the valley of Altorf and to occupy the canton of Unterwalden, watching the passes of the Grimsel, the Furka, the Meien-Thal, the Surenen, and the Seelisberg.

The brigade Rheinwald (formerly Rubi) was to evacuate Schwyz, and take up a position in front of Art, holding the Rigi. It was moreover to occupy Steinen, Sattel, Morgarten, Rothenthurm, and the chain of heights as far as Schindellegi, covering the pass which leads to Einsiedeln.

Chabran's division was to leave the shores of the lake and take up a position on the Sihl, its right at Schindellegi, and its left on the height of Adlischwyl. Its duty was to cover the road from Horgen to Zug and the passage of the Albis.

Soult's division, after evacuating Zürich, was to rest its right upon the height of Adlischwyl, with its left at Dietikon, in order to cover the Bremgarten road.



Oudinot was instructed to cross the Limmat at Zürich and Baden, and to rest his right upon Dietikon, and his left on the confluence of the Limmat with the Aare.

Finally, the division Tharreau, crossing the Aare with its bridges, was to take up a position behind this river, its right resting on the confluence of the Limmat, its left upon the Rhine.

Masséna issued these orders under the seal of secrecy, with the reservation of fixing the moment for their execution. According to his ostensible orders and the tenor of his conversation, he led people to imagine he was resolved to meet the enemy's attack in a position that he feigned to believe was impregnable.

THE BATTLE OF ZÜRICHBERG.

The Archduke, having divided his army into five columns of attack, issued his orders.

The first column of the left wing, under General Jellachich, consisting of five battalions and three squadrons, marched briskly along the high road, forced the French into the town, and occupied the suburb. Repulsed by the reserve under Gazan, Jellachich thrice returned to the charge under the walls of the town without being able to maintain himself there. Finally he took post on the heights of Riesbach, where he was several times, but unsuccessfully, attacked by Gazan.

The second column, commanded by General Bey, consisting of four battalions and three squadrons, seized the village of Hirslanden and the neighbouring entrenchments, and then attempted to gain the slopes which descend upon Hottingen and Fluntern. The ravines and slopes of the ground were, however, too well guarded. The French under General Brunet attacked in their turn towards noon, and Bey replaced himself in line with the first column.

The third column, under the command of the Prince of Lorraine, was destined to scale the Zürichberg, but the direct

ascents from Dübendorf, whence it was to start, being found impracticable, it was obliged to march by Fällanden and Pfaffhausen, so as to put itself in communication with the second column. One portion made its way by the forest to the farm of Attisberg. The other marched by Göhrins and Gokhausen to that of Topelhof. But the attack, which was to have been delivered after the completion of this movement upon Brunet's flank, failed before the abatis under the murderous fire of the French infantry and artillery, to which the Austrians could only reply with two guns, moved with great difficulty to the heights. About 2 P.M. the Prince of Lorraine withdrew beyond the range of the enemy's fire.

The fourth column, under General Hotze, consisted of seven battalions and twelve squadrons. The bridge between Wallisellen and Schwamendingen had been burnt by the French, and the fire of a battery below Schwamendingen prevented its re-establishment. Hotze filed by his left, leaving the spot on which the bridge stood to be watched by two battalions, and crossed the Glatt at Dübendorf at the tail of the third column. Hotze advanced to Stottbach, secured the village notwithstanding a vigorous resistance, left the greater portion of his cavalry along the road which leads to Schwamendingen, and continued his attack upon the latter village. When the two battalions which had been left to watch the site of the bridge across the Glatt perceived the progress of the column, they threw themselves into the water, and entered Schwamendingen with a rush. Verlé, the adjutant-general, who had at this point only the 1st regiment of the line, two squadrons of the 13th dragoons, and four guns of position, being attacked on both sides, resisted bravely for an hour both at Schwamendingen and the heights in rear; he then withdrew in good order behind the abatis of Zürichberg, against which Hotze had expended all his efforts. The density of the forest and the rapid fall of the slopes rendered the ascent from Schwamendingen almost impossible.

The fifth column, under the command of the Prince of Reuss,

consisted of ten battalions and twenty squadrons. Marching from Opfikon, it carried Seebach, the wood in front, and Oerlikon, put itself in communication with the fourth column near Schwamendingen, and took up a convex position, the right resting on Rümliang.

Oudinot, posted at the foot of the heights of Wipkingen, assembled his troops near Affoltern, and at noon attacked with three demi-brigades and two regiments of cavalry the height of Seebach, whence the Austrian position doubled back upon Rümliang. It was Oudinot's intention to cut the column sent by the Prince of Reuss to effect a communication with Hotze at Schwamendingen. Had this attack succeeded, Oudinot would have reached the passage of Glattbrücke before the Austrians, who had advanced from Oerlikon, and who, being surrounded by marshes, and thereby constrained in their movements, would have been in a condition to prevent him. It failed, however, before the vigorous resistance of the Austrians, who had received a reinforcement of two battalions from their right wing.

The reserve, consisting of the remainder of the centre, viz., eight battalions and sixteen squadrons, occupied the spot vacated by the Prince of Reuss at Opfikon.

The whole of the right wing, consisting of fifteen battalions and nine squadrons, remained to guard Glattfelden, with instructions to watch Tharreau and the Lower Glatt. This strong detachment was placed under the orders of Nauendorf, and was, moreover, intended to protect the communications with Schaffhausen. Jomini rightly blames the Archduke for the employment of too many troops for this purpose. In his opinion, half of Nauendorf's corps would have been much more usefully employed in reinforcing the attack of the centre against the heights of Adlikon, and taking the entrenchments in flank. As it happened, only a few skirmishes and unimportant combats occurred in that direction.

It was 2 P.M., and the operations had not progressed either in the direction of Schwamendingen or in that of the farm of

Adlisberg. The Archduke, who had remained with the reserve at Opfikon, had two tressel-bridges thrown across the Glatt near Wallisellen, and directed General Wallis to storm the Zürichberg with five battalions of the reserve. Wallis left one battalion to watch the bridges, and marching with the other four along the steep ravine which leads from Schwamendingen by the brickfield to the farm of the Zürichberg, he then pushed forward a chain of sharpshooters, and drove those of the enemy behind the abatis. The troops could only advance in file until an open meadow was reached, when the first two companies formed and made their way into the abatis. The remainder of the column deployed under their cover on a front of two companies, the ground not admitting of a greater development. The fire of the French shortly caused the two front companies to give way, but supported, or rather pushed on, by the others, they returned to the charge, and making their way a second time through the abatis, they actually stormed the first battery.

Masséna seeing the danger to which Werle's troops were exposed at this spot, directed the artillery in the works, which commanded the point of attack, to redouble their fire, whilst he in person, at the head of a reserve of grenadiers, marched against the Imperialists, and poured on them such a murderous shower of musketry and canister as to compel them to retire in disorder at nightfall, leaving the neighbourhood strewn with dead and wounded, amongst whom were Generals Hotze, Wallis, and Hiller, seriously injured.

The Austrians guarded the fringe of the wood opposite the farm of the Zürichberg, established posts along the abatis, and connected their main body with the troops of the fourth column in front of the brickfield of Schwamendingen.

Simultaneously with Wallis's attack, the third column renewed the attempt to escalate the Zürichberg from the direction of the farm of Adlisberg; but to no purpose did the Prince of Lorraine endeavour to establish himself on the heights

of Wytikon, leaving some troops to guard the farm and the surrounding wood.

The loss of the Imperialists in this affair was naturally greater than that of the French, who were sheltered by their entrenchments. The Austrians lost 2000 men killed and wounded, and 1200 prisoners. The French had 500 men killed, and from 600 to 700 wounded.

The armies passed the 5th in the same attitude as that of ^{5th} June. the previous evening, both the chiefs being mutually anxious to feel their way. Masséna was desirous of being assured that the obstinacy of his resistance would induce the Austrians to abandon the enterprise. The Archduke, on the other hand, repaired to the advanced posts to reconnoitre from its proximity a position which, as long as the French occupied it with their forces outside, he could neither see nor form an opinion regarding it. From the observations made by him on the spot, he determined to prepare a fresh plan of attack, the possession of the Zürichberg being an absolute necessity to the Austrian army for the purpose of covering conjointly the country about Stockach, the Vorarlberg, and the communications with Italy. Besides, he was aware that the French were in daily expectation of reinforcements—an additional argument to induce him to act with promptitude.

It was therefore settled to make the attack, which was fixed for 2 A.M. on the 6th June, and was to be effected with two columns of 2000 men each, the first against the Zürichberg by Schwamendingen, and the other against the heights of Wipkingen by Oerlikon and Seebach. A reserve of two battalions, two batteries, and 16 squadrons was posted behind the hills which lie between Schwamendingen and Oerlikon, with directions to be in readiness to hasten to the support of the attacking columns. The right wing under the orders of Nauendorf, which was watching the Lower Glatt, had orders to take up a position on the heights of Wallisellen, Opfikon, and Rümlang, so as to secure the bridges of the Glatt in rear of them until

such time as they could be guarded by four battalions drawn from the right bank of the Rhine.

Masséna, however, did not leave the Archduke time to execute his project. The attitude of the Austrians during the whole of the 5th, at the foot of the French positions, close against the mountains, with considerable defiles in their rear, was evidently offensive, and left him in no doubt as to the intentions of the Archduke. His superiority in numbers afforded him the means of promptly effecting his object by the sacrifice of many troops, or attaining the end by gradually gaining ground by means of successive combats of posts. Masséna was unable to cherish the hope of maintaining his position in front of Zürich until the arrival of the expected reinforcements. He resolved, therefore, to abandon a position better suited for the base of an offensive operation than for resistance against the renewed efforts of his adversary, and to fall back temporarily upon a more advantageous line of defence.

5-6th June. Just as the Imperial troops were moving to the posts assigned to them in the approaching battle, Masséna issued definite orders for a retreat during the night of the 5th-6th. He quitted the right bank of the Limmat with the exception of the town of Zürich. The previous evening had been occupied with the passage of his parks and ambulances, so that the streets should be unencumbered with carriages and be left clear. Tharreau's troops, which defended the Lower Glatt, marched partly by Regenstorf to Klosterfaher, partly by Buchs and Würenlos to Wettingen, where there were some bridges over the Limmat. The more distant detachments moved to Baden by the valley of the Surb, and crossed the Aare by means of a flying bridge at Stilli.

Masséna abandoned 28 guns, which were spiked, and 18 baggage carts in the position he was leaving. All these had been taken from the arsenal of the town, the French having carefully withdrawn their own *matériel* of war.

The next day the Austrians advanced upon the town. The

French garrison requested time to evacuate it, threatening to burn the bridges and bombard the town from the opposite bank in case violence were used against it. After some parleying the French left the town at noon.

Masséna conducted his retreat in three columns.

1. Two demi-brigades and one regiment of cavalry took the road to Zug.

2. The second column passed Albisrieden and ascended the Steig.

3. The third column followed the Baden road as far as Dietikon and moved upon Urdorf.

The three columns climbed the crest of the Albis and the Uetliberg, where Masséna took up a position almost unsailable in front, which he still further strengthened by entrenchments and abatis. One part of the troops was scattered in small camps on the slopes of the height, the other was cantoned on the opposite slope; an eminence somewhat more accessible than the rest, near Albisrieden, was armed with 12 guns, and the advanced posts in front occupied Alstetten, the banks of the Limmat, and those of the Aare as far as the Rhine. Masséna transferred his headquarters to Bremgarten.

The Austrians placed five battalions in the town of Zürich; an advanced guard of three battalions and 14 squadrons crossed the Sihl and moved upon the Sihlfeld. The right bank of the Limmat and that of the Aare were protected by a chain of posts, and the army encamped on the heights between the Limmat and the Glatt: the headquarters were at Kloten.

The Archduke found in Zürich 149 guns of different calibres.

On the 8th the Austrians made a reconnaissance, drove ^{8th July.} the French from Alstetten, Schlieren, and Albisrieden, and advanced to Uetikon upon the Uetliberg. In the evening, however, they were compelled to evacuate all the villages before the troops Masséna had assembled, and to resume

their original position. Alstetten remained unoccupied, and was scoured by the patrols on either side. On the 15th June a French attack on the enemy's line of posts, especially upon Wiedikon, was repulsed.

At the commencement of the third week in June, the French army was definitely established in the following positions, which, subject to slight alteration, they held up to the third week in August:—

Lecourbe had his right at Engelberg in the valley of the Aa, and his left at St Jost in advance of Egeri. Lecourbe, who was at Luzern with about two battalions and his cavalry, had also under his command the division Chabran, the right of which rested on Unter Egeri, the left at Albis, guarding the bridge of Schindellegi.

Soult occupied the ground at Uitikon and Urdorf.

Lorges, the successor of Oudinot, had his right at Dietikon, and his left at Killwangen.

Ney, Tharreau's successor, had his right at Baden, and his left at Böttstein on the left bank of the Aare.

The division Goullus, formerly Ney, occupied the Frick-Thal, and watched the banks of the Rhine as far as the confluence of the Aare.

Souham rested his right on Rheinfelden, and his left at Hüningen. His division occupied this place as well as the entrenched camp at Basel.

Ferino held the superior command of these two latter divisions.

An infantry reserve under Humbert was cantoned at Mellingen, Sulz, Villmergen, Anglikon, and Sarmensdorf. The cavalry reserve, under Klein's orders, was stationed at Geneva, Yverdun, Morat, and Solothurn or Soleure.

General Montchoisy formed the division of the interior, and protected Solothurn or Soleure, Lausanne, Lenzburg, Berne, and Aarburg.

Finally, the Valais division, at this time commanded by Tharreau, who had replaced Xaintrailles in consequence of

the latter being tried by a court-martial on a charge of exaction, had his principal posts at Brieg, Susten, the Simplon, and the St Bernard.

The evacuation of Zürich by the French army preventing, according to Jomini, the continuance of the Helvetian Government at Luzern, that place was abandoned for Berne. The Directory, the two councils, the supreme tribunal, the departments, and their offices, formed a train of carriages as formidable as that belonging to an army. The whole marched under the protection of a weak detachment, not without anxiety, owing to the unsympathetic feeling evinced by the population of Luzern, Aargau, and Berne for the new order of things.*

The disbandment of the Helvetian militia was an unfortunate result of the capture of Zürich. The death of their commander, the Adjutant-general Weber, having deprived them of their chief, the battalions of Aargau, Berne, and Solothurn, who were ill disposed, and employed on the entrenched works of the camp, were still further reduced by desertion. That of Luzern, roughly handled in the fight, had dispersed. Ten battalions of Zürich and Thurgau, on the eve of seeing their hearths invaded and abandoned to the mercy of the Austrians, lost no time in returning to them, from fear of exposing their families to the vengeance with which the Archduke in his proclamations had threatened all inhabitants taken with arms in their hands.

The mystery with which Masséna had imagined it was his duty to surround the evacuation of Zürich, had induced him to leave the Helvetian staff in the belief that everything would be sacrificed to the defence of the entrenched camp.

* Jomini is evidently in error both as regards the time as well as the causes assigned by him for the removal of the Helvetian Government to Berne. Zürich was taken by the Austrians on the 6th of June. The removal of the Government was decreed on the 31st May, and was carried out prior to the 4th of June, for in the official records there is to be seen a decree dated Berne the 4th June. The latest decree dated at Luzern was on the 28th May. The removal of the Government must therefore have taken place anterior to the capture of Zürich.

The disorder resulting from a retreat, as sudden as it was unexpected, contributed in no small degree towards the dissolution of the Swiss battalions, who, nevertheless, would have re-assembled, had not the impossibility of providing for their pay, as well as the gigantic expenses of the war, interposed an insurmountable obstacle. Therefore, for want of means, the remainder of those on whom the least dependence could be placed were disbanded.

Masséna, in speaking of the desertion of the militia, makes the following remark:—

“It was not through fear that this body of young men broke up, for it had given proof of considerable valour in several engagements. It was rather a reaction of the cantonal feeling in opposition to the system of unity. The Swiss, imbued with federal ideas, did not realise the conception of the unity of their country. Every individual was anxious to defend his home, which he regarded from a cantonal point of view, rather than from that of Helvetia as a whole.”

The battalions of Vaud, several companies of Aargau, and from 500 to 600 honest and patriotic Zürichers, the greater portion of them officers or sub-officers of the militia, remained with the colours. The latter formed a battalion of volunteer carbineers, the command of which was assumed by the Prefect Tobler. Two Vaudois battalions were left actively employed in the north, two others having been sent to Le Valais.

The Archduke, on his entry into Zürich, established a provisional government, which adopted a very reactionary system, and in a revengeful manner persecuted such of the inhabitants as had shown any sympathy with the Revolution. The next measure was the mobilisation of the inhabitants of the cantons then occupied by the Austrian army. The summons was issued to all the minor cantons. Numbers of the mountaineers of Glarus and Appenzell made their appearance, but they quickly perceived that their pretended liberators were harder masters than their former ones. The

Imperialists accepted their services without offering to defray the expense of their military organisation. The Aulic Council imagined that it had effected a great stroke in recommending them to the King of England, who took them into his pay, and formed three regiments on the Austrian footing, giving them the English uniform and cockade.

Thus denationalised, many of them withdrew, and it was with difficulty that the legions Bachman, Salis, and De Roverea could be completed.

The Austrian army, at the commencement of the third week in June, held the following positions :—

Strauch held Airolo, the Nufenen, the Upper Valais as far as Mörel, and the Grimsel. He himself was at Münster, in Le Valais, with a small reserve.

Bey was in the valley of the Reuss, between the Devil's Bridge and Altorf, the main body of his force being at the latter place.

Jellachich was on the Etzel, with posts at Schwyz, Biberegg, Ober-Egeri, Schindellegi, Bennau, and Richterschwyl.

Hotze, in garrison at Zürich, furnished the posts in advance of the town, the ramparts of which had been repaired and armed. Several gunboats cruised on the lakes. The Archduke's encampment was between Regenstorf and Döttingen. His troops were disposed close to the principal issues, so that the greater portion of them could in a single march move in support of the threatened point. Twelve battalions and 19 squadrons formed a cordon on the banks of the Limmat and the Aare, and guarded the passages of these rivers, which were protected by batteries. Two and a half battalions and eight squadrons occupied the right bank of the Rhine above Waldshut, with a support of four battalions at Stühlingen.

In the minor cantons, the Austrian posts were reinforced by a small number of armed inhabitants.

Starray, at the debouches of the Black Forest, formed the extreme right, but he was detached from the Army of Switzerland.

By this disposition the Austrian army massed the greater portion of its force on the Limmat, participated with the detached corps of the Black Forest in the defence of the key of the theatre of war in Germany, and commanded the entire line comprised between the sources of the Rhine and the Limmat. It was a position of constant menace to the French; in other words, a point of high strategic importance.

The Austrians constructed a spacious tête-de-pont at Büsingen near Schaffhausen. They paid no attention to the right bank, on which they should have done the same thing as they did on the left. By so doing they would have more completely secured this important communication, and would thereby have acquired greater liberty of action for their operations in Switzerland.

Thus far the Austrians had not sufficiently availed themselves of the means of fortification, of which the French had made more frequent use, exhausting all the resources of the art on the strengthening their positions and their posts.

Both armies remained quiet in the positions detailed above for two months, *i.e.*, from the middle of June to the middle of August.

Before touching on the events which marked the second period of the campaign in Switzerland, let us quote Jomini's remarks on those with which we have been dealing.

"In the memory of man," he says, "a similar succession of such combats had never been witnessed. A hundred valleys, overrun in different directions, had become the theatre of a multitude of barren exploits; the violation of sound principles in the primary direction of the masses having caused the death of so many brave men, in a way as deplorable as it was useless. Posterity will greedily devour the details of these wellnigh incredible struggles in the centre of the most barren masses of the Alps, but the principal matter of astonishment will be, how means were found to support with provisions and munitions of war so large an amount of troops encamped for many months in these inhospitable dis-

tricts, wherein the lonely traveller finds it difficult to obtain a lodging.

"In seeing these intrepid columns escalate the frightful rocks of the Crispalt, the glaciers of the Wormserjoch, the steep sides of the Kunkels, the St Gothard, the Tödi, and the abrupt slopes of the Engadine, we could fancy ourselves carried back to the fabulous ages, and in imagination witnessing the combats of giants. So much glory acquired by the French battalions was eclipsed in the plains of Stockach and Magnano, where the shock of arms at the decisive points had determined in the twinkling of an eye the question of the possession of the Alpine chain, and had annihilated the prejudices consecrated by twenty centuries of errors."

The first battle of Zürich, the consequences of which we have just seen, closed, so to speak, the first period of the campaign, which had opened at the beginning of March, and which had continued for three months. We are now about to pass to the second period.

SECOND PERIOD OF THE CAMPAIGN.

From the first Battle of Zürich to the evacuation of the Swiss Territory by the Austrians and Russians.

Was Masséna wrong in quitting the position he occupied on the Zürichberg and the Glatt in order to occupy the position of the Albis?

Many generals of the army, surprised at the sudden abandonment of Zürich, seized the opportunity of condemning the commander-in-chief's resolution. In later times, some historians, indulging in unfavourable criticisms, have availed themselves of the same grounds for an attack on Masséna. Neither the Archduke nor Jomini shared these opinions.

If the entrenched camp, as well as the works, which were intended to enclose the space between the Zürichberg and the Limmat had been completed, Masséna would have been

enabled to abandon the remainder of the line along the Rhine and the Aare, and to concentrate his troops in the camp. He would then have been in a position to employ Tharreau's division and a part of Oudinot's, whilst, in the imperfect state in which these works were, owing to the want of funds, and his uncertainty as to what point the Archduke would select for attack, Masséna was obliged to separate these divisions. In reality, Zürich was only a tête-de-pont, valuable for the purpose of aiding an offensive operation, but not of sufficient importance to justify the safety of the army being hazarded for its preservation. What Masséna might have done was to destroy the bridges and defend himself in Klein-Zürich. He would thus have covered the arsenal, which would not have fallen into the hands of his adversaries. But Masséna meets this charge by asserting that such a determination would have resulted in the ruin of the town, and that he was under too many obligations to its inhabitants to involve them in the consequences of such a plan of operations. Moreover, the destruction of the bridges would not have impeded the enemy for any length of time.

Thus it may be concluded that Masséna, under the circumstances, could not prudently have remained in the position of the Zürichberg. It would have been sufficient for the Austrians to have forced the camp on some one point to enable them to reach the bridges of Zürich simultaneously with the French, and cut off their retreat.

Moreover, Masséna expected reinforcements. He therefore acted rightly in not undertaking anything serious prior to their arrival, and in abandoning a line where the smallest check might compromise the safety of his army. The sequel of events, besides, proved the wisdom of his determination.

In the position in which he found himself after the first battle of Zürich, the Archduke was unable to engage in any serious operation without risking the uncovering of his base, and compromising his communications with it. It would seem, therefore, that his best plan would have been to content

himself with assuming a defensive attitude, as imposing as possible ; but the desire of profiting by the advantages and the superiority he had gained on the field of battle induced him to continue the offensive. He had several plans to follow :—

1. *To pass the Aare with his right wing, and follow the upper course of that river*, which would bring him upon Masséna's flank and rear. This operation would have been the most decisive, because it threatened the enemy's principal communications with Alsace, and because the latter could not anticipate it, having behind him the defiles of the Reuss and the Aare, which would impede his movements. The Archduke, however, to carry out this plan, would have required a much larger force, since it would have been necessary to hold Zürich for the purpose of covering his march to the Aare, and, after having passed this river, to mask Basel, which would then be on his right flank. Moreover, a French division was watching the Rhine from the confluence of the Aare to Basel, while another occupied an entrenched camp below that town. All these facts demanded serious consideration.

2. *To cross the Limmat in the vicinity of Baden*. This operation would not have conduced to any really brilliant success. Moreover, the banks of the river in these parts presented difficulties that could not easily be surmounted.

3. *To move from Zürich, and operate directly against the Albis and the Uetliberg*. This operation was likely to fail against the wellnigh inaccessible slopes of the Albis, especially since the French were on the look-out, the attack of the 8th of June having been of use to them in this particular.

4. *Finally, to manœuvre by the left bank of the Lake of Zürich*, with a simultaneous advance of all the troops scattered amongst the high mountains, with the view of inducing the enemy to uncover his central position, and if possible to force it. Between the St Gothard, however, and the banks of the Sihl, the ground admitted of the employment of only small detached corps, which, after they had crossed or carried the

mountain paths, would become impotent on quitting the defiles. The troops advancing on the Sihl would have had to approach the enemy's principal position, and thus to incur the risk of being defeated and destroyed before the Austrian army could receive intelligence of their danger from the other side of the lake, and come to their assistance. And even if the French had been momentarily induced to quit their position and to fall on these troops, the Austrian centre, posted at Zürich, could not have been informed of this circumstance in sufficient time to enable them to take advantage of their false step.

All these considerations, carefully weighed by him, did not stop the Archduke. Simultaneously he addressed himself to Hadik and Suwarow to secure their co-operation in his project by means of the troops which Bellegarde was to have left on the St Gothard. In the meantime, however, Suwarow, as has been seen, had recalled these troops into Italy, so that only Strauch's brigade remained in the vicinity of the St Gothard. This upset the projects of the Archduke, who was compelled momentarily to renounce the offensive. He satisfied himself by sending to Jellachich, who was at a distance from any support, a reinforcement of three battalions, with instructions to halt on the line from the Etzel by Schwyz-Altorf to the Grimsel, for the purpose of occupying the smaller cantons.

Up to the middle of August, nothing of importance was undertaken. The causes of this prolonged inaction on the part of both commanders-in-chief will shortly be explained. Only two partial combats occurred, producing no important result. Nevertheless it is as well to mention them, if only to follow the chain of events.

The Austrian forces between Richterschwyl and Brunnen consisted of eleven battalions and two squadrons, of which a battalion and a half with four guns occupied Schwyz. Lecourbe attacked the whole of this line, essentially for the purpose of breathing his troops.

On the 3d July one column moved from Menzingen and passed the Rossberg; a second column marched from Unter-Egeri on Sattel by the Jostberg; a third from Steinenberg upon Steinen; a fourth from Art and Goldau by Lowerz upon Seewen; finally, a fifth from Gersau upon Brunnen, protected by a flotilla. 3d July.

The first Austrian posts gave way, but the reserves, collected by Major Etwös, repulsed the French, who debouched in disorder from Seewen. The French column, which, after it had taken Brunnen, endeavoured to force its way to Schwyz, was likewise repulsed. The Austrians lost two mountain guns at Brunnen. The same day, the 3d July, both sides resumed their original positions, except that the French maintained themselves at Brunnen until the morning of the next day. They evacuated this position on the 4th, after having destroyed the Austrian works, and burned the boats that were in course of construction. The flotilla withdrew to Bauen, on the left bank of the lake.

General Bey, with seven weak battalions and one squadron, held the valley of the Reuss from Altorf to the Devil's Bridge, and maintained his communications with Schwyz by means of patrol-boats on the lake. The French had one battalion in the Hasli valley, and four at Stanz, their advanced guard occupying the line from Engelberg and Ober-Rickenbach to Bekenried, with posts on the western bank of the lake between Seelisberg and Seedorf. Their flotilla caused continual annoyance to the post at Flüelen. The communications with Schwyz were so compromised, that Bey could not but attempt to oust the French.

On the 29th July, Bey passed the Reuss at Attinghausen with from 4000 to 5000 men, turned the French out of Seedorf, reached the Isen-Thal, and entered Bauen without difficulty. The French withdrew to Seelisberg. Bey was still desirous of obtaining this latter point, which would have given him a much shorter communication with Brunnen. He had, however, been compelled to leave several detachments to watch the 29th July.

paths which led from the valleys of Rickenbach, Emmetten, and Bekenried to his flank and rear, so that there only remained two battalions wherewith to attack the Seelisberg. Nevertheless he won it, and continued his pursuit. Loison, however, who was cantoned behind the Aa, having promptly assembled his brigade, fell upon Bey in front of Seelisberg, and simultaneously by the valleys which lead from Emmetten and Ober-Rickenbach. The Austrians were routed, and retreated in the greatest disorder, leaving behind them from 500 to 600 prisoners, amongst whom was the general himself.

The greater part of the summer in like manner passed away on the Rhine without any important event. The Austrians who occupied the Black Forest covered the right flank of their army, and the convoys that proceeded thither. The French still retained several posts on the right bank, for the purpose of protecting the construction and repair of their *têtes-de-ponts* and of distracting the attention of the enemy. They renewed the ramparts of Alt-Breisach and the fort of Kehl.

Both sides harassed each other daily by insignificant combats along the whole line as far as the Swiss frontier. The result of these combats amounted to nothing more than the maintenance on either side of their respective posts.

In the meantime, the French under Macdonald and Moreau in Italy had been thrown back upon the Riviera of Genoa. Suwarow, after winning the battle of the Trebia, was approaching nearer to the operations in Switzerland, but paralysed by the misunderstandings of the Allied Cabinets, he lost much precious time in inaction.

On the other hand, the miseries which at that time Helvetia suffered were incalculable. The presence of 150,000 men, bivouacked or quartered in the most sterile part of that country, had reduced its inhabitants to despair. The cantons that had remained faithful to the Helvetic Directory

suffered doubly—from the consequences of the war, and from the charges imposed by France upon her allies. Owing to the extraordinary drain on its finances, the French Government was unable to fulfil its most sacred engagements ; while, notwithstanding the most positive promises on their part to pay for the subsistence of the army in Switzerland, the Helvetic Government was none the less compelled to find the necessary provision ; and disorder and embarrassment became daily worse and worse from this branch of the service being intrusted to inefficient administrators.

The Ministry of the Interior, by allowing the commissaries to be at the same time accountants and controllers, enabled them to conceal the malversation of their subordinate agents, from whom they derived a considerable share of the profits. Unhappy Helvetia, thus consumed by her protectors and invaded by her enemies, who treated her with even less consideration than the French, deprived even of her ordinary revenues, and unable to maintain the few of her militia who had remained faithful, had only retained the paid legion, three or four Vaudois battalions, the Zürich volunteers, a few Valaisan patriots, and a few companies from Basel, who were intended to reinforce the garrison of the camp in front of Basel.

The Revolution of the 30th Prairial, which compelled the French Directory to give place to a new one, awakened hopes of some amelioration. Glayre, a member of the Helvetic Directory, was even sent to Paris to demand the execution of the treaties, and the repayment of the enormous sums expended by Helvetia in support of the French army. Nothing, however, but vague promises could be obtained, because the new Government, in spite of its good intentions, had not the means of altering the state of affairs, or of supplying the requirements of their position. All it could do was to send grain for the subsistence of the army, which was threatened with famine, and to repeat its entreaties to Masséna to resume the offensive.

Towards the middle of August, Masséna and the Archduke, who were mutually wearied of the inaction to which they had been condemned, the former by reason of the political intrigues of Bernadotte, the Minister of War, the latter in consequence of the orders of the Vienna Cabinet, turned their attention to the progress of the Russians, whose arrival by way of Germany, announced for the latter half of August, would give the Austrian army a superiority of 30,000 men. There was nothing, therefore, to prevent the Archduke resuming the offensive vigorously, since he would be in a position to cover his principal line of operations on the Danube, and to derive the greatest advantage from a victory which might be regarded as almost certain. Masséna, on the contrary, having no expectation of receiving similar reinforcements within the same period, was bound to try and anticipate his adversary, and take advantage of the time during which the respective forces remained on a par. He could take one or other of the following courses:—

1. *To operate from Kehl or Breisach on the Black Forest.*

This operation presented greater facilities than any other. It is true that from that moment a battle in the vicinity of the sources of the Danube became inevitable, and that the Austrians posted on the Limmat held the shortest line for reaching the field of battle. Still there were many chances of success in such an attempt. Promptness of resolution, great vigour of execution, the facility of drawing troops unknown to the enemy from the right wing, and of moving them to the point of concentration under cover of the mountains, the hope of inducing the Austrians to commit some mistake by feigning a reduction of the force in their presence, or of withdrawing from the Limmat, so as to induce the enemy to increase his distance from the Danube;—all these considerations rendered success possible, if not probable. But this operation no longer depended solely on Masséna from the moment the army of the Rhine ceased to be under his direction.

2. *To direct an attack upon the Lower Aare and the Lower Limmat between Coblenz and Zürich.*

This operation would have been attended with difficulties wellnigh insurmountable, since it would be necessary to cross two rivers, which the Austrians were guarding in great force.

3. *To manœuvre in the high mountains between the Lake of Zürich and the frontiers of Italy.*

Masséna determined on the latter course. The success of the primary movements was certain, as much on account of the advantage presented by the offensive in such a region, as by reason of the superiority of the force with which the enterprise would be conducted. In fact, it was easier for the French to reinforce their right under the protection of the allies and the Sihl, than for the Austrians to reinforce their left wing separated from the centre by the Lake of Zürich. Nevertheless, so long as the enemy occupied the menacing position of Zürich, the result of this operation was limited to the possession of a curved line intercepted by lakes and intersected by lofty mountain ranges, besides being quite as disadvantageous as the one Masséna had very properly abandoned after the battle of the Zürichberg. If the French were desirous of carrying their successes further, whether with the object of threatening the Archduke's left flank, by turning the Lake of Zürich, or for the purpose of entering the Grisons, the Tyrol, or Italy, they would require such an augmentation of forces on their right wing, at the expense of the centre, that the Austrians advancing from Zürich might easily attack their centre thus weakened, cut them up in detail, and so seriously compromise the retreat of the columns, whose attention would be fully occupied in the south.

Masséna neglected these strategical considerations in favour of a purely tactical advantage, and bent himself to the task of driving the Austrians from the line which they held between the Etzel and the Rhone.

The Archduke took a wiser view of the situation ; although he saw clearly enough the object of Masséna's movements,

he remained firm in his position, determined to await the arrival of the Russians, and then by a single blow, aimed at some decisive point, annihilate the present purposes and ulterior projects of the French.

A circumstance, however, intervened unexpectedly to disconcert his combinations. Before Masséna commenced his operations, and before the Russians were in a position to act, the Archduke, as well as Suwarow, were removed from the theatre of their exploits in consequence of orders from the Viennese Court. It happened in this wise :—

England, apprehensive lest the maritime ascendancy to which she aspired might be seriously affected, should she permit Suwarow to pursue his victorious career in Italy, and effect a permanent settlement in one of the Italian ports, thus securing for Russia a new entrepôt on a foreign coast, sought to prevent this result by getting rid of the Russians out of Italy.

Austria, on her part, attached too great a value to the conquests in Italy not to desire the exclusive possession of them. She looked upon the presence of the Russians, and the obstinacy of their commander-in-chief, as an obstacle to her views. She was therefore quite ready to listen to the proposals of England.

The Russians, wounded in their pride on account of the secondary part they had had to play in the war by being amalgamated with the Austrians, reckoning, moreover, upon a victory, which they regarded as easily within their reach independently of Austrian assistance, and which would deliver into their power the only frontier of France unprovided with fortresses, and calculating, also, somewhat on the re-establishment of the ancient order of things in Switzerland, viewed with pleasure their separation from the Austrians, which left them free agents.

The selfish policy of England cleverly developed and turned to her own advantage these varied feelings. By means of intrigue she succeeded in effecting an arrangement with

the three Courts of London, Vienna, and St Petersburg, in virtue of which :—

1. The Russian auxiliary troops in Italy, together with those on their march to the Rhine, were to act separately in Switzerland with the corps which England calculated on raising in the former country.

2. The Archduke was to evacuate Switzerland, as Suwarow was to quit Italy. After leaving a corps to watch Southern Germany, he was to march with the remainder to the north, and there assume an offensive position on the Lower Rhine, with the view of seconding an operation of an Anglo-Russian squadron against Holland.

This convention completely altered all the hitherto existing relations in the theatre of war, and the result was an entirely new order of things. It was attempted to justify this change in the disposition of the allied troops by the necessity which existed for placing the Russians and the Austrians under the separate commands of generals of their respective nations, owing to the incompatibility of feeling that existed between the two armies. The true cause, however, was to be found in the interests of England, who objected at any cost to a Russian establishment on the Mediterranean, and who sacrificed every other consideration to her own interest.

It must be said, however, that Suwarow's removal from Italy was justifiable in a military point of view. The French had only two *points d'appui*, Coni and Genoa ; and the troops left in front of those places, notwithstanding the absence of Suwarow and his 20,000 men, were still so superior in number, that no doubt could exist regarding the speedy reduction of these strongholds. The Allies would thus possess a line of positions extending from the Mediterranean to the St Bernard. Suwarow's departure made no alteration in this respect, nor diminished the chances of their capture.

The order, however, sent to the Archduke to evacuate Switzerland at the moment when the junction of the Russian corps marching upon that country was about to give the

Allies so marked a preponderance over Masséna, cannot be justified in a military sense. The concentration of all these troops offered the most favourable choices to the Allies. The greatest misfortune that would have befallen them, in case of a reverse, would have been the necessity of resuming their excellent defensive position. If, on the contrary, the result proved favourable, Switzerland was open to them, and they could reach the frontiers of France. The defeat of the French army in Helvetia would lead the Austrians to the gates of Hüningen and Strasburg. The capture of the latter place would deprive the French of the most advantageous debouch for acting on the base of their adversaries, and at the same time relieve the Allies of the obligation of maintaining a corps of observation before Kehl. The conquest of Strasburg was the only one in the theatre of war which could produce an essential change in favour of the Allies, and this prospect authorised their assumption of the offensive as soon as their base was assured.

The orders emanating from Vienna and conveyed to the Archduke were dictated by considerations to which the military art was completely strange. They were, as has been stated, the result of the intrigues of England, who knew how to take advantage of the mutual jealousy existing between the Austrians and the Russians. The Archduke was none the less compelled to submit.

Let us resume the narrative.

Masséna, pressed by the French Directory, and threatened, moreover, by the early arrival of Korsakow, had, as has been stated, determined to undertake a serious operation on his right, having for its object the expulsion of the Austrians from the smaller cantons, the recapture of the St Gothard, and the menacing the Grisons and the Vorarlberg. This operation was intrusted to Lecourbe, whose division was augmented to 12,000 men by reinforcements which he had received since the commencement of August. Masséna directed a false attack to be made simultaneously against the

rest of the line, and principally before Zürich, with the object of distracting the Archduke's attention, and preventing the despatch of reinforcements to his left.

The Austrian left wing occupied the country as follows :—

Strauch with his brigade watched the Upper Valais, the main body of his troops being between Münster and Aernen. Two battalions posted at Ried and Rosswald formed the advanced posts against Naters and Brieg, and maintained the communication with Colonel Rohan, who defended the Simplon with two and a half battalions. Two other battalions were detached to the Grimsel.

Simbschen commanded the line of defence on the Reuss, from Urseren to Altorf. Three battalions and one squadron occupied Urseren, Am Stäg, Erstfeld, and the debouches of the Maderaner and Schächen valleys. Two battalions held Wasen, the Meien valley, and the mountains on the left bank of the Reuss, without which it would have been impossible to watch this line. One battalion held with some posts Attinghausen, Seedorf, and Flüelen, as well as the entrenchments thrown up alongside the Lake of Luzern.

The bridge of Attinghausen was broken ; those at Seedorf, Erstfeld, Wasen, and the Devil's Bridge were preserved.

Simbschen's position was perfect by nature; that of Strauch, however, possessed very great disadvantages as a defensive one, since it afforded an enemy the means of attacking in front, and, moreover, exposed him to all the risks of a hazardous retreat, and to considerable difficulties in maintenance of his communications. In fact, the Austrians, in advancing down the valley of the Rhone to Brieg, had reached the point where the French could assail them with their cavalry, their artillery, and all the appurtenances of war, whilst, with nothing but steep rocks in their rear, they were in a position of difficulty, both as regards the power to hold their own, and the means of obtaining their provisions, which they drew from Bellinzona. Moreover, a footpath from the Grimsel led

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towards their flank and rear, which considerably augmented the dangers of their position.

As all the different roads through these districts degenerate into footpaths, and all these footpaths terminate on the principal crest of the St Gothard, Strauch's corps should have been posted on it, so as to cover all the approaches from Italy and the Grisons. The difficulty of transporting provisions and the munitions of war, which constitutes the principal obstacle in taking up positions of this nature, did not exist in this instance, since the only road suitable for this purpose, viz., that from Bellinzona by Airolo to the St Gothard, was beyond the reach of the enemy. The French could alone approach by the valleys of the Aare and the Rhone, between the glaciers of the Furka and Nufenen passes, and it simply resolved itself into a question of occupying both these passes, which were naturally difficult. The main body of the troops should have been held in readiness at Airolo to be moved in whatever direction the enemy might appear. This attitude, the only suitable one for guarding a mountainous country, should have extended its influence as far as the valley of the Reuss.

Lecourbe had arranged with more skill his plan of attack.

Gudin was to start from the valley of the Aare with five battalions and force the pass of the Grimsel.

Tharreau was simultaneously to drive the Austrians from Le Valais and the Simplon, and to march upon the St Gothard by the valley of the Rhone.

Loison, with two battalions and three companies of grenadiers, was to march from the valley of the Aare upon Wasen over the Stein-Alp through the Meien-Thal.

One column, under the orders of Brigadier Daumas, was to march from Engelberg by the Surenen upon Erstfeld and Attinghausen.

Another column of two battalions under Porson, the chief of the staff, was to move into the valley of Altorf by Bauen, the Isen-Thal, and Seedorf, whilst a detachment led by Captain Forgues was to disperse the Austrian posts defending the

mountains in the vicinity of the Rothstock, before joining the main body again at Seedorf.

These several columns were to obtain possession of the whole length of the valley of the Reuss, connecting their communications with each other, whilst Lecourbe disembarked at the mouth of the Reuss.

Lecourbe, in the centre, was to embark with his reserve of grenadiers, get, *en route*, possession of Brunnen and the mouth of the Muotta-Thal, and afterwards disembark under cover of the gunboats at the mouth of the Reuss, with the object of ascending that river, and effecting a junction with the columns which were operating in the lateral passes, and were clearing his right flank. A small detachment of three companies was directed to leave Gersau by road, and proceeding along the shore of the lake, to assist in the attack on Brunnen, and the bridge in the Muotta-Thal, and so cut off the enemy's retreat.

Chabran was intrusted with the task of obtaining possession of Schwyz and the Muotta-Thal, whilst the brigades Laxal and Humbert, also under his orders, drove the enemy from Einsiedeln and Mount Etzel. Molitor commanded the brigade that was to march on Schwyz.

Soult and Lorges, in front of Zürich, were limited to making demonstrations wherewith to distract the enemy's attention.

According to these dispositions, the principal attack was directed upon the St Gothard, with the object of turning by that mountain the valley of the Reuss. The subdivision of the troops in several isolated columns, so dangerous a measure in the plains, could not be regarded as faulty under the circumstances, considering that the rugged nature and the narrowness of these valleys did not admit of the concentration of a large body of troops in one or two strong columns, and that it was necessary to occupy the enemy along the whole length of his line, and to overwhelm him by superior numbers simultaneously launched against him. In such positions

only is it dangerous to form several incoherent columns, where the enemy has the power of attacking them with the whole of his forces, and breaking them up in detail. Now such was not the case in this instance, since the mountains prevented the Austrians, who were scattered over a long line, discovering the intentions of the French sufficiently soon to oppose them by rapid manœuvring. It may also be remarked, that the advantage of being able to mask one's movements often favours an offensive operation in the mountains, and gives it an enormous advantage over defensive measures.

The execution of this plan responded entirely to the views of the French general. The enterprise was conducted with that determined resolution which ensures a successful issue to a well-devised scheme, and in default of which a favourable result is unattainable, especially in mountain warfare. On the 13th August, the troops in the Valais set out, and on the 14th they were in movement on all points from the Rhone to the Lake of Zürich.

13th August. On the 13th, four demi-brigades and one battalion of Helvetian troops attacked the post of Rosswald, forced back the Austrians behind the Binne, and interrupted their communications with the Simplon, which the French seized. Rohan retired to Domo d'Ossola, by which movement Tharreau's flank was secured. Strauch, relying too much on the natural strength of the Grimsel, advanced with his reserves to the Binne, and compelled the French, who had approached the pastures of Saffnismatt, to fall back upon Rosswald.

14th August. On the 14th, Tharreau proceeded along the Rhone to Aernen, but was unable to hold his ground in advance of Mörel. The Austrians were making their arrangements to drive them from Rosswald at nightfall, when Strauch ascertained Gudin's success in his rear.

In fact, Gudin on the same day, the 14th, with two battalions of the 25th light infantry and one Vaudois battalion, had scaled the Grimsel by paths covered with ice, and after an obstinate struggle, had defeated the two battalions that

defended the pass. Notwithstanding the strength of their position, the two Austrian battalions were, by Masséna's account, broken by a bayonet-charge, and pursued as far as their camp, between the Grimsel and Oberwald, whence they were quickly expelled. Their loss on this day exceeded 200 men killed and wounded, and 500 prisoners. Towards evening, Gudin bivouacked at the foot of the Furka, threatening Münster.* At this moment, Tharreau, who with his left brigade had forced the camp of Lax, made his way up the valley of the Rhone. Defeated on both wings, Strauch had no other course open to him but to retreat: this he did in the night of the 14th-15th, by the Nufenen Pass. On the 15th he was at Faido, on the 16th at Osogna, and on the 17th at Bellinzona. The troops which had opposed Tharreau on the Binne crossed Mont Albrun by paths known only to the local hunters, emerging by the Val Formazza, whence, on the 18th, they reached the Val Maggia by Bosco, Locarno on the 19th, and Bellinzona on the 21st, where they rejoined Strauch.

As soon as Tharreau covered the French manœuvre on the Italian side, Gudin remitted to him the task of guarding the Grimsel and the Furka, and continued on the 15th his march by Realp to Urseren (Andermatt), with the view of effecting his junction with Loison and Lecourbe.

Loison marched the whole of the 14th along frightful paths on the edge of precipices, which rudely tested the endurance of his soldiers. Having crossed the Reichen and passed Im Grund, he reached Nessel-Thal, where he was overtaken by an awful storm, which, but for the flashes of lightning, would have enveloped his path in total darkness. At length he reached the chalets in the Gadmen-Thal. The troops scaled the mountain in single file; the guns were dragged up with ropes, and in the most dangerous spots they were carried on the backs of sturdy peasants. The beasts of burden, though

* For a detailed account of the attack on the Grimsel, and the turning manœuvre of the French by the Nägelis Grättli, see Appendix No. I.

relieved of their loads, made their way with difficulty, and frequently, losing their footing, rolled down the chasms. Fortunately the enemy was nowhere visible, but in the evening, when approaching Wasen, Loison was stopped by the small fort of Meien. The Austrians had repaired that work, and had occupied it with one battalion and two mountain guns. Loison had with him a detachment of Vaudois sharpshooters (the company Morier), which he sent up the heights with the view of harassing the defenders of the redoubt. The latter, however, maintained their position on the 14th, and compelled Loison to wait till the next day. The fire of the Vaudois sharpshooters recommenced on the 15th, with such effect upon the Austrians, that they were unable to resist a fresh attack. The grenadiers of the 109th, led by Captain Stopfe, debouched in single file along a foot-path assailed by a shower of balls and grape. They were repulsed four times, and it was not till the fifth attempt that they succeeded in gaining possession of the redoubt. Only a few Austrians, according to Jomini and Masséna, reached the banks of the Reuss. The remainder fell into the hands of the conquerors. The Austrians, by the Archduke's account, marched without delay to Urseren with three companies which had come to their assistance. However this may be, Loison lost no time in marching to Wasen, whence he sent a detachment to meet Lecourbe.

14th August. The two columns that had been directed upon Seedorf by the Isen-Thal under Porson, and upon Attinghausen by the Surenen under Daumas, reached their destinations after very severe marching. On the 14th, Porson found the enemy at Seedorf, defeated him, and thrust him back into the valley of Altorf, but was unable to proceed, owing to the bridge being broken. In like manner, Daumas' column fell upon the Austrians at Attinghausen, and forced them over the right bank of the Reuss, the bridge across which they had time to destroy. The impossibility of crossing this river prevented the pursuit of the Austrians into the Schächen-Thal, so that

the combat was limited to musketry fire from one bank to the other.

It was 6 P.M. when Lecourbe arrived off Flüelen. It will shortly be seen that, up to that time, he had not remained inactive. Having learned the state of affairs at Seedorf and Attinghausen, he made his arrangements for disembarking. The fire of a couple of guns and that of the Austrian sharpshooters rendered this a perilous operation, but the grenadiers, under cover of the guns of the flotilla, easily surmounted this obstacle. No sooner were they on shore, than they swept everything before them, and a detachment which had been landed in the morning by Lecourbe at Sisikon behind Tell's Chapel, after having crossed the Axenberg, appeared on the flank and rear of Altorf. Simbschen, who was totally routed, was pursued as far as Bürglen in the Schächen-Thal, and Erstfeld in the direction of Am Stäg, with a loss of 600 men and 400 prisoners. On the evening of the 14th, Simbschen was between Am Stäg, Wasen, and Urseren: the French occupied Erstfeld, the Meien-Thal, and the Furka.

On the 15th the combat was renewed at all these points. 15th August.

Lecourbe pushed on to Am Stäg. The troops in defence of this post, seeing that they were taken in reverse by those which Loison had sent to meet Lecourbe, were reduced to the extremity of throwing themselves into the Maderaner-Thal, and finding their way into the valley of the Vorder Rhine by the Crispalt and Tavetsch. Lecourbe, leaving a battalion under Lovisi to pursue the Austrians up the Maderaner-Thal, continued his march, and effected a junction with Loison, following the course of the Reuss, to which Simbschen still clung, between Geschenen and the Devil's Bridge. He drove the enemy from Geschenen, and arrived in front of the Devil's Bridge, fighting his way along. The Austrians withdrew to the right bank, within the formidable entrenchments resting on the Reuss and perpendicular rocks. They had also had time to make a breach in the bridge, which brought Lecourbe's grenadiers to a halt. After some

fruitless endeavours to turn the position, Lecourbe decided on waiting for news of Gudin, and directed the bridge to be repaired during the night.

As has been seen, Gudin was marching on Urseren by Realp. In vain did Simbschen attempt to dispute with him the entrance of the valley. Placed in nearly the same position as that from which Strauch had extricated himself, Simbschen fell back in the night of the 15th-16th upon the mountain of Urseren, and took up a position with three battalions on the summits of the Crispalt, behind the Ober Alp-See.

15-16th
August.

16th August. From daybreak of the 16th the French laboured to re-establish the Devil's Bridge. Having at last succeeded in covering the breach with planks, they crossed the Reuss at 7 A.M., and joined Gudin, who was debouching from Urseren on the right bank of the Reuss.

Simbschen occupied a threatening position, whence he could debouch on the valley, and in which it was impossible to leave him. To accomplish the enterprise, it became necessary to dislodge him. Lecourbe having detached a battalion to Airolo, attacked the front of Simbschen's position with another battalion and his reserve of grenadiers. Simbschen showed resistance at first, and held his position till 5 P.M. Lecourbe, however, having sent a detachment by Badus against the enemy's flank, repeated his attack in front with such vigour that Simbschen was unable to withstand it. He was completely routed, and it was not without the greatest difficulty that he was enabled to reach with the remnant of his force Calmot and St Giacomo in the valley of the Rhine, whither he was followed sword-in-hand. The French took 1000 prisoners and secured three guns.

17th August. Simbschen rallied his troops at Tavetsch, and continuing his march to Dissentis, reached Somvix on the 17th, Ilanz on the 19th, and Chur on the 20th. Ilanz, Laax, Flims, and Tamins remained occupied.

No fault can be found with Simbschen's retreat on Chur ;

for an isolated position in the valley of the Vorder Rhine, at Dissentis, for instance, fulfilled no object. By taking up his position, on the other hand, at Chur, Simbschen re-established his connection with the army, whilst he covered one of the principal communications with Italy. He was free from apprehension lest the enemy should move from Italy upon his flank or against the Tyrol, so long as the Archduke remained in possession of the debouch from Zürich and of the Glarus road.

Molitor, to whom Masséna had repaired, attacked, in compliance with the general plan of operations, the post of Schwyz in two columns.

One of them, moving from Gersau, skirted the lake, making for Brunnen and the Muotta bridge. It was at first repulsed, and, with like want of success, returned to the charge. At this moment, however, Lecourbe was passing Brunnen with his flotilla on his way to Flüelen, where we have seen him arrive, and lend a helping hand to Daumas and Porson. Disembarking five companies of grenadiers from the 84th and 109th regiments, he directed his aide-de-camp Montfort to carry the bridge with them, and join Molitor's brigade. The disembarkation was not unattended with danger. Five guns swept the landing-place, and the Austrian sharpshooters, assisted by the peasants, opened a well-sustained fire. The grenadiers, nevertheless, having disposed of the enemy in their front, reached the Muotta bridge, effected a junction with their brave comrades of the 76th, and in concert with them obtained possession of it, after an obstinate struggle. The Austrians abandoned their artillery and 200 prisoners.

Lecourbe having assured himself of the disembarkation of a portion of his reserve at Brunnen, made for Flüelen with his flotilla.

The second column, that marched by Seewen, met with determined opposition at Schwyz. The regiment of Stein, reinforced by 700 or 800 insurgents, resisted for a long time, but towards noon a battalion of the 84th succeeded in turning

the flank of the Austrians by the mountains of Hacken and Mythen. The Austrians then withdrew to the village of Muotta, with a loss of two guns, 200 killed and wounded, and 600 prisoners. The French attacked this new position on the 15th, carried it, and pushed on to the Klön-Thal lake. The Austrians continued their retreat to Glarus and Nettstall.

14th August. Chabran, at the head of four demi-brigades and six squadrons, advanced on the 14th in three columns. The two first endeavoured to turn the left flank of the Austrians by Morgarten and Rothenthurm; the third marched upon Schindellegi. An Austrian battalion posted on the Rossberg was compelled to abandon it, and fell back in the first instance on Katzenstrick, next on Einsiedeln, and finally on the Etzel, whilst the French sent detachments against Jellachich's rear by St Johannisberg into the Wäggi-Thal and in the direction of Galgenen. The latter, collecting all his troops, succeeded in staying the progress of the French near Wollerau and Schindellegi, but at length, finding himself menaced in rear and on his flank, he abandoned his first position, and withdrew to a second beyond, but in a line with the Etzel.

18th August. Chabran, continuing on the 18th his manoeuvre of the previous evening, sent some French troops into the Wäggi-Thal, and directed a general attack at noon against the Etzel. The combat lasted till evening with varied success. Then the French threw themselves impetuously on the first position of the Austrians, and forced them back in disorder beyond the Linth near Grynau, taking two battalions that had been compromised by their stubbornness, and three guns. Jellachich destroyed the bridge of Grynau, occupying the right bank of the river from the lake to Schänis, and the left bank from that village up to Urnen and Näfels, where, in conjunction with the troops from Schwyz, he succeeded in preserving the Glarus road, and establishing communications with Simbschen's corps, which was at Chur, a portion of it, however, being in the Schächen-Thal.

The French were established on the line of Richterschwyl,

Einsiedeln, Schwyz, the Reuss, and the St Gothard, leaving only detached posts at Somvix, in the valley of the Vorder Rhine, in the direction of the Klön-Thal lake, and on the banks of the Linth at Reichenburg and at Bilten.

Any further enterprise would have been dangerous at that moment, requiring fresh arrangements for the supply of provisions and the organisation of convoys.

On the 14th August, the commencement of the operations 14th August. between the Sihl and the Rhone, Soult made a demonstration in force below Zürich.

His right, commanded by General Mortier, forced the passage of the Sihl at Adlischwyl, in face of an obstinate resistance, and taking Kilchberg, marched upon Wollishofen. To no purpose did the Austrians attempt to intervene; they were thrown back upon the glacis of Zürich, but having been reinforced and supported, they returned to the charge, and compelled Mortier to withdraw inside his original position at 7 P.M.

The left, under the orders of General Brunet, moved upon Wiedikon, where a spirited combat took place. But the enemy having advanced 20 field-pieces and a large body of cavalry into the plain of Zürich, Brunet effected his retreat in good order.

On the 15th, Soult made fresh demonstrations. Mortier 15th August. retook Kilchberg, and pushed on to Wollishofen, where he remained undisturbed till evening. Brunet, from his side, attacked the camp in front of Zürich, where the Austrians were reinforced. The combat lasted till nightfall without any result.

These two days cost Soult 300 men killed and wounded, but the real object, of distracting the enemy's attention on the Limmat, was attained, for the enemy had been put on the wrong scent. Six Hungarian battalions on the march to Baden were hastily recalled to Zürich. The French generals withdrew their troops inside their positions.

According to Masséna, more than 2000 killed and wounded,

6000 prisoners, 21 guns, the conquest of the Upper Valais, the Simplon, the St Gothard, the smaller cantons, and the Lower Linth, were the results of this series of combats, prepared by the combinations of the general-in-chief, and executed with zeal and intelligence by his lieutenants.

These successes would have been attended with still more important results if the head of Korsakow's Russians corps, marching in six echelons, had not at this moment reached Schaffhausen, whence two days later it moved upon Zürich, thus enabling the Archduke to detach General Hotze with 4000 men upon Schwyz and Glarus to the assistance of the two defeated Austrian corps.

Jomini criticises this brilliant campaign of the French right wing in the following terms:—

“This short expedition, as rapidly executed as it was brilliantly conceived, did not cost the French more than 1500 men. Lecourbe deserved all the credit. Too much praise cannot be awarded him for his dispositions, nor can one sufficiently admire the precision with which he calculated the march of his columns, so as to effect their junction alternately, with the object of always placing the Austrians between two fires.

“Masséna's enterprise did not, however, produce in the general scheme of operations the results it would have done twelve or fifteen days earlier. It would then have assisted the manœuvres of Joubert (the Army of Italy) by threatening Suwarow's right flank; and it may be supposed that the latter, instead of ordering Kray's corps, which had taken Mantua, to join him, would have sent it to the Lake of Como to cover Lombardy. In this case, if the Marshal had fought at Novi, the French would have enjoyed the superiority of numbers. Moreover, it was not an impossibility that the Archduke, thrown back on the Grisons at the end of July, when the Russian auxiliary corps was still far distant, would have evacuated the central position of Zürich, and regained the Rhine and the shores of Lake Constance, so as to avoid

the risk of losing his communications with the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg.

“Whilst blaming Masséna for delaying his operation, it is but fair to remark, that he was not alone responsible for it. The extreme versatility of the French Government, and the opposition of all kinds which it threw in its general's way, contributed much towards it.”

THE ARCHDUKE ATTEMPTS THE PASSAGE OF THE AARE.

To support the very extended operations of his right wing, Masséna had been compelled to reinforce it by drawing troops from his centre, and by replacing the latter with troops from the left wing, which by these means was much reduced in strength.

The Archduke, being a witness of these movements, was anxious to take advantage of the weakness, in which the French left this part of their line, to cross the Aare, and undertake an offensive operation on his right. The reasons which weighed against this undertaking after the battle of Zürichberg no longer existed. The Austrians had no further apprehensions that any large number of troops would be moved against them from the direction of Basel and the Frick-Thal. The ramparts of Zürich were repaired, and contributed fresh importance to this point. The French appeared to direct all their means towards the smaller cantons.

The 26,000 Russians under Korsakow were reaching the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, and it became possible not only to make a forward movement in considerable force without compromising his communications, but also to defend the Black Forest in the event of its being attacked. The passage of the Aare led the Austrians directly upon Masséna's communications, and by an advance up the left bank, the flank and rear of their adversary could be reached before he could possibly prevent them, owing to the necessity he was under of crossing the defiles of the Reuss and the Aare.

In the event of a successful passage, Masséna would have been placed in a position of extreme danger. If he had desired to meet the enemy the moment the latter crossed the river, he would not have had it in his power to assemble a sufficient number of troops to force him back to the opposite bank, and he would have had reason to apprehend being beaten in detail. The same reason prevented Masséna from assuming an imposing attitude between Brugg and Aarau, because Zürich was on his flank, and at that moment he dared not reduce his force in that direction. Should he fall back, he and his right wing would be separated, as his retreat could only be effected upon Berne, in the direction of the Jura, between the lakes of Neuchatel and Geneva; because if he attempted it along the Aare, the enemy would flank him uninterruptedly up to the Lake of Biel. Should he temporise, with the intention of concentrating his troops, he would afford the Austrians the means of extending themselves along his flank, and pushing him back upon the High Alps or the Lake of Geneva. The latter determination would have been the best, although it afforded no security against the risk of being attacked prior to the concentration of his forces; and in case of a reverse, the line of retreat would have fallen upon the prolongation of the enemy's line behind the Aare.

A special circumstance, of which the Archduke was ignorant, and which tended to augment the chances of the undertaking, existed in the fact of Masséna having quitted his headquarters for the right wing, with the view of assisting in the operations of the 14th, 15th, and 16th August. Oudinot, the chief of his staff, assumed temporary command.

The village of Gross-Döttingen was selected, because the river at that spot makes a bend on the eastern side, and because the right bank, being higher than the left, commands the latter. This point being situated below the confluence of the Limmat and the Reuss, these two rivers would have formed an obstacle to troops hostilely assembled in the high-

lands, who might desire to move rapidly on the menaced point. Lastly, the village of Klein-Döttingen, on the left bank, was occupied by not more than two companies.

It was finally determined to attempt the passage on the night of the 16th-17th. Korsakow was to arrive during the night at Ober-Endingen with 20,000 men and 1600 Cossacks, and effect a junction with 32 battalions and 42 squadrons drawn from the different positions on the banks of the Limmat and the Aare. Hotze was directed to remain at Zürich with seven battalions and 20 squadrons, 4600 infantry and 2800 horse, to defend the town to the last extremity, and to follow up the enemy in case he retreated. Five battalions and six squadrons, 4000 men and 1000 horse, remained on the banks of the Limmat between Höngg and Kloster-Wettingen. Some batteries were thrown up at the confluence of the Limmat and the Aare, to sweep during the passage the road leading from Brugg. On the right bank of the Rhine four regiments of cavalry were ordered to march from Villingen to Stühlingen. The light troops were to alarm the enemy at Alt-Breisach, Basel, and along the whole line of the Rhine, with the object of withdrawing his attention from the banks of the Aare. For this purpose it was requisite to open a cannonade at Waldshut, and preparations were made with artillery at Coblenz to play upon a small French camp situated at the spot, where the Aare empties itself into the Rhine.

16-17th
August.

The movement of the troops was so well timed, that the different corps, concealed by the undulations of the ground, reached at nightfall of the 16th the rendezvous between Gross-Döttingen, Degerfelden, and Ober-Endingen, without awaking the suspicions of the enemy. They were formed in close column according to their destinations.

The Archduke had determined to throw two bridges across the river, one above, the other below Gross-Döttingen. Across the former he desired to pass an advanced guard of five battalions and six squadrons, which were to possess them-

selves of the chain of mountains that are to be met with between Mandach, Möhn-Thal, and Effingen, so as to intercept the road between Brugg and Rheinfelden, and to cover the march of six other Austrian battalions and the entire Russian corps, which were to move upon Brugg by Villigen, Böttstein, and Stilli, and seize the bridges of Brugg, Aarau, and that of Gebensdorf, on the Reuss. The lower bridge was told off for the passage of a column of 12 battalions and 12 squadrons, who were to turn to the right upon Leuggern in order to assist the operation by hugging the Rhine by Bernau, Rheinsulz, and Lauffenburg. Finally, a division of nine battalions and 24 squadrons, intended in the first instance for the protection of the passage, was eventually to form the reserve, and follow the column moving along the Brugg road, after having dropped one battalion to guard the bridges.

Owing to the vigilance of the advanced posts, the French had not the slightest suspicion of the enterprise. All was as could be wished; but the operation failed from want of foresight in the preparation of the means requisite for effecting the passage. The engineers intrusted with the construction of the bridges had neglected to acquire the local information indispensable to success. They were satisfied with guessing the breadth of the channel. The exact number of boats for the two bridges had been collected, but they had not in their possession a single bark for the transportation of the light troops to the left bank. The steep bank near Gross-Döttingen made the launching of the boats a difficult matter. In short, the rapidity of the current was far greater than had been anticipated.

The Archduke, who, through fear of divulging the secret, had not desired to make a personal reconnaissance of the ground, depended so much on the commanding position of the right bank, that he had no doubt of being able to sweep the left bank with his artillery. The operation of crossing was proceeded with, but no troops were in the first instance sent to gain a footing on the opposite bank.

The Austrians having transported the pontoons behind the village, and established some batteries on the heights of Gross-Döttingen, commenced the construction of the bridges at 2 A.M. As soon as the French posted at Klein-Döttingen perceived an extraordinary movement, they directed a smart fire upon the spot whence the noise proceeded. An Austrian battalion posted at Gross-Döttingen replied with volleys of musketry; the artillery opened fire, and the village of Klein-Döttingen was shortly enveloped in flames.

Nevertheless, the French, consisting of two companies of Zürich volunteers armed with rifles, did not abandon the village, and continued to fire on the enemy, who was hidden from their sight by a thick fog, which lasted till daybreak.

The construction of the bridges did not advance. The bottom of the river was rocky, and the anchors would not hold. The means for obviating this difficulty were deficient. Cables, even, for lashing the boats were unprovided. Some of the latter were leaky, others broke away. In short, unpardonable negligence and disgraceful want of order (terms used by the Archduke himself) were visible in all the engineering preparations. It was not till 9 A.M. that, with considerable efforts, the engineers succeeded in lashing thirteen boats for the bridge up the river, and fewer for that down stream. The fog clearing away at this moment, the fire of the Zürich troops became so deadly that all the pontonniers employed on the works were killed or wounded.

In the meanwhile, the sound of the guns having attracted the attention of the French, Ney, who commanded in the Frick-Thal, hastily assembled such troops as he had at hand, and promptly moved them to the scene of action. He assembled a sufficient number to occupy the woods and heights surrounding the plain of Klein-Döttingen and the vicinity of Böttstein.

The Archduke had failed in his object, and a cannonade that had become useless was terminated by an agreement,

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in virtue of which it was arranged that the Austrians should withdraw their pontoons unmolested.

The Archduke, having severely and deservedly criticised the Austrian engineer corps, or rather its method of training, and the small amount of instruction imparted to its officers, dilates in his narrative on the conduct of the two companies defending Klein-Döttingen in terms which we cannot resist transcribing; for these two companies, which the Archduke speaks of as French, were Zürichers, and the Archduke's eulogium of them is too glorious to be omitted.

"Two French companies" (to use his own words) "stopped 50,000 men, and this handful of brave men deserve the highest praise. They demonstrated the fact that posts which are not liable to be turned, and in which the soldier finds shelter against the enemy's fire, cannot be carried except by a personal encounter. Neither the hail of bullets and balls that the Austrians raised on them, nor the firing of the village, sufficed to shake their intrepidity. Profiting by the shelter afforded them by the ruins of the houses, they remained firm in the midst of the conflagration."

The Archduke withdrew all his troops into their original positions, and the French followed his example, leaving, however, for a few days some posts reinforced on the Aare, and some reserves at Gebensdorf and Windisch, until they had assured themselves of the abandonment of the enemy's designs.

"If," says Jomini, "the project of passing the Aare at Döttingen reveals the true genius of war, it is a matter of surprise to see the originator of the idea so easily abandon the offensive. If it be the case that the omission of a simple precaution rendered the operation impracticable, why was not advantage taken of the manœuvre, that had attracted the entire attention of the French on the Lower Aare, to effect a vigorous countermarch upon Zürich with the 50,000 men collected at Gross-Döttingen, and to debouch them against the division that was guarding the Uetliberg? However much activity

Lorges might have displayed in coming to its rescue, he could not have saved it from inevitable defeat ; and these two divisions, overwhelmed by forces four times their number, and only too fortunate had they reached Brugg and Aarau, would have found Lecourbe engaged in the farther end of the valley of Urseren, and in a very critical situation ; for his greatest luck would have been the power of moving off to Geneva by way of the Valais."

THE AUSTRIANS EVACUATE SWITZERLAND.

The Archduke, influenced by the desire not to leave Switzerland until he had so far advanced his left wing as to facilitate Suwarow's advance upon that country, determined to detach in the night of the 17th August nine battalions and six squadrons, under the command of Hotze, by Rüm-17th August.lang and Grüningen to Rapperschwyl. These troops reached their destination on the 19th. Hotze issued directions for an attack on the 21st, with the whole of the left.21st August.

The first column, under the personal command of Hotze, was to march by the bridge of Grynau against the French position between the Lake of Zürich and the Sihl.

The second column, under Jellachich, was to move from Glarus, and march upon Schwyz by the Klön-Thal and the Muotta-Thal.

The third column, under the orders of Simbschen, was to start from the Grisons, and march along the valley of the Vorder Rhine against the positions of the Crispalt.

Hotze reached on the appointed day the banks of the Aa, which river descends from the Wäggi-Thal, and his light troops advanced along the lake to Altendorf, whence the French withdrew into their advantageous position between Pfäffikon and the Etzel.

The second column was obliged to halt at Schwanden in the valley of the Linth, because Lecourbe had moved some

troops into the Schächen-Thal, and made Jellachich apprehensive of being turned if he plunged into the Muotta-Thal.

The third column reached Ilanz on the 23d, and pushed forward its advanced posts to Dissentis.

The views of the Archduke were opposed to the orders that had emanated from the Court of Vienna. These he considered it his duty to obey, and this contradiction in his position gave rise to an indecision at variance with his character. Persuaded that the result could alone justify him in prolonging his stay in Switzerland, he believed he ought to leave nothing to chance.

Masséna, who felt that his left was quite secure, was apprised of the march of the Austrian corps upon Rapperschwyl, and again reinforced his right at the expense of his left.

Simultaneously the Archduke was informed of the general movement of the French on the Rhine, of their collecting in the neighbourhood of Speyer, and of symptoms of an offensive operation commencing from that point. From that moment he incurred too much risk in remaining at a distance from Germany, and after the orders he had received, he became responsible for any success the enemy might obtain in that quarter.

Hotze was slow in acting, and asked for reinforcements. The Russian general, who had been cantoned in Seebach since the unsuccessful attempt to cross the Aare, was awaiting behind the Austrian lines the arrival of his cavalry and the rear columns of his corps. Under the plea that the organisation of his troops would not admit of their separation, he refused to send several thousand men in support of the left wing. So many contradictions produced stagnation in the operations, which of necessity prejudicially affected the Allies.

At last Korsakow moved with his entire corps, and reached
25th August. Utznach by way of Grüningen on the 25th. The masses of troops assembled in that part of the country were from that

time too numerous to act exclusively upon the left bank of the Linth and the lake. The Archduke withdrew from thence six battalions, which he reunited to the forces holding the positions on the Limmat, with the view of debouching upon Zürich, and assisting the movement of the left wing by attacking Masséna's centre on the Uetliberg. The suspicious Korsakow believed that it was intended to lay a snare for him; he declared that, as he was perfectly cognisant of the intentions of the Court of Vienna, the enterprise would only result in the loss of all the advantages which up to this time had been obtained, and that as soon as the Austrians evacuated Switzerland, there would be nothing left for him to do but to take up a position near Schaffhausen. Subsequently citing an order of Suwarow to send 10,000 men into Italy under the command of Prince Gortschakow, he demanded as the condition of his accession to the projected enterprise, that the six battalions which had been recalled should remain with the left wing, and that the Archduke should engage to co-operate with the whole Austrian army.

In this way time slipped by unprofitably. The enemy daily receiving reinforcements, Germany was threatened more and more. There was no further hope of seeing the re-establishment of the harmony which alone could give life and energy to all the forces distributed between Germany and Switzerland. Reasoning thus, the Archduke considered it his duty to conform to the instructions of his Court in leaving to chance that which no longer depended on himself.

Nevertheless, the Archduke was desirous of not exposing Korsakow to a defeat that appeared too inevitable; so that, with the object of assisting him to remain with honour in a defensive position until Suwarow should arrive, he left Hotze in Switzerland with 30 battalions and 34 squadrons (25,000 men, including 3000 Swiss), the remainder of his forces being in his opinion sufficient to march against the enemy, who had already advanced to Philipsburg, on the right bank of the Rhine. Finally, as the ultimate measure, it was agreed

that the Russians should quit Utnach on the 27th ; that they should relieve the Austrians between the Lake of Zürich and the Rhine, and that Hotze should form the left wing of the army between Meilen on the Lake of Zürich and the Italian frontier.

At this period, however, Hotze's position did not cover, in its whole extent, the line of communications, the protection of which it was desired to intrust to him. He was apprehensive of being attacked by superior forces on the borders of the Aa, and believed that, in accordance with Korsakow's design, he could not rely on the assistance of the Russians.

This distrust was the reason of his withdrawal on the 26th behind the Linth, during the Archduke's negotiations with Korsakow, of his destroying the bridge of Grynau, and of his dividing his troops between Rapperschwyl, Schänis, and Schwanden, leaving only a few posts at Nettstall to watch the Klön-Thal, on the left bank of the Linth, with the object of protecting the Glarus road, and the shortest communication with the Grisons.

Whilst these movements, which had their origin in the want of understanding between the allied generals, were in the course of execution, Masséna had received the greater portion of the transport for which he had been waiting. Inaction weighing heavily on his temperament, which urged him to incessant activity, he determined to resume the offensive against the enemy's centre, connecting this movement with a simultaneous attack by his right wing in the mountains. Whilst contemplating this movement for several days, he had caused to be examined, and had himself reconnoitred, the course of the Limmat. Two points appeared to him to be suitable for a passage—one at the actual confluence of this river with the Aare, the other above Dietikon, at an equal distance between Zürich and Baden. The boats and pontoons were conducted to the first point by the Aare and the Reuss, but the ground suitable for the landing-place on the right bank was too confined, the current being too

rapid to admit of the hope of its being reached with nicety ; besides which, it drew the craft under the Austrian fire. This inconvenience was to be met by moving up the boats from the Aare into the Limmat, to Vogelsang, where the landing-place was suitable ; but to accomplish this they would require to be towed for more than 500 mètres under the enemy's fire ; and supposing that by good luck they should arrive safe and sound, the whole of the difficulties were not even then surmounted. Before reaching the plateau of Unter-Siggingen, traversed by the Zurzach and Baden road, a hillside planted with vines, steep, difficult of access for artillery, and commanded by the enemy's batteries, would have to be carried. Success, therefore, was not possible, unless the attention of the Austrians could be distracted by some means. With this object Masséna directed Soult to take the command of the third division (Chabran), leaving that of the fourth to Mortier, and to clear the right bank of the Linth by a movement upon Utnach, in concert with General Lecourbe's left brigade, under the guidance of Molitor, who was to attack the enemy at Glarus.

On the 29th the troops began to move, but Masséna believed that his project had failed, the pontoons having been injured in the descent of the Reuss. He therefore gave up the undertaking, and it was a happy circumstance for him that he did so, as the Russians had been in line for twenty-four hours, and the Archduke had not yet commenced his movement on the Lower Rhine, so that Masséna would have had to contend with very disproportionate forces, and a check would probably have compromised the future of the campaign.

Soult, unable to be informed in time of the counter-order, had nevertheless made his attack, which was so much the more successful because the enemy had diminished the forces in his front for the purpose of effecting the changes in his troops ; consequently Molitor advanced on the 29th with about 1500 men of the 84th regiment against the summits of the Pragel, carried that position with the bayonet, and pursued the

Austrians as far as the mouth of the Klön-Thal, where they took refuge in the entrenchments that covered Nettstall, and which were defended by a numerous artillery. Before he endeavoured to dislodge the enemy from this point, Molitor marched upon Glarus, at the head of four companies, which he posted in front of this town with a view of securing his right; but on his return to direct the attack upon Nettstall, he found the road intercepted, and he fell, together with his aides-de-camp and the troopers of his escort, into the middle of the regiment Salis. They broke their way through sword-in-hand, and regained the Klön-Thal, where the troops which he had left were already engaged with the enemy. A part of the Salis regiment had followed Molitor closely, and attacked the rear of the 84th. Then the general at the head of the grenadiers charged, and overset into the torrent all that were not taken prisoners or killed. The remainder of the regiment had simultaneously moved upon Glarus, and, in concert with an Austrian battalion, which debouched from the town, had surrounded the four companies left in observation at his point. After a bloody struggle these valiant fellows made their way through at the point of the bayonet and rejoined Molitor. Thus reunited, the French brigade repulsed the attacks of the Austrians all the day and part of the night. When the ammunition was becoming exhausted, Molitor had an enormous quantity of large stones and masses of rocks placed in front of the position. The Austrians, being under the impression that they could easily wrest it from a body of

30th August. men worn out by fatigue, commenced at daylight of the 30th to escalate the position with loud shouts. They were permitted to ascend three-fourths of the slope, when the masses of rock that had been collected were rolled down upon them. Austrians and Swiss, crushed by this avalanche of stones, were overthrown. Molitor seized the fitting moment, and descending rapidly, at the charge won the position of Nettstall. This brilliant feat of arms obtained for the French the possession of Glarus, which they did not enter till the

31st, and the whole of the Upper Linth, so that Molitor ^{31st August.} effected his junction with Soult's column on the other side of Näfels. On the following day the Austrians withdrew by Engi, Matt, and Elm into the Sernf-Thal. Molitor pushed forward his advanced posts into this valley; nevertheless a reserve that had hurried to their assistance from Kaltbrunn, enabled the Austrians to maintain their position behind the bridge of Näfels. On the 30th Soult, after having sent the 36th regiment, under the command of the Brigadier Lapisse, to Glarus to assist Molitor's movement, advanced on the 29th at the head of the brigade Laval upon Grynau, ^{26th August.} the bridge of which was cut, and defended by a numerous artillery. After a cannonade which lasted till nightfall, Soult abandoned the attempt to cross the river, and withdrawing Laval's brigade, took up a position in rear of Grynau to guard the banks of the river and of the lake. Lapisse had spent the entire day in a useless cannonade.

On the morning of the 30th the attack recommenced; but ^{30th August.} the Austrians during the night had received reinforcements, which had been conveyed to Utznach by Williams's flotilla. From that moment Soult, satisfied with the impossibility of forcing the passage, left Laval's brigade opposite Utznach, with directions to occupy the enemy with demonstrations, and moved the 36th (Lapisse) upon Näfels. It repulsed the Austrians after an obstinate struggle, but was unable to cross the bridge, behind which the Austrians maintained their position, thanks to the reserve from Kaltbrunn. At nightfall this brigade withdrew to the heights which command Näfels.

Hotze, who had been kept the whole day on the Lower Linth by Laval's demonstrations, returned in the evening with several battalions to Glarus. In the night of the 30th–^{30–31st August.} 31st, he was anxious to make a reconnaissance on the left bank towards the Klön-Thal and in the direction of Ennenda. On the other hand, Soult, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, left only a weak post on the heights of Näfels,

and took the same direction as Hotze, with the intention of crossing the river at Ennenda, and moving down by the right bank to Mollis and Kerenzen, with the object of intercepting the enemy's retreat.

Hotze, who was surprised and attacked with vigour, was completely defeated, and hurled back in disorder onto the right bank. He consequently renounced all his attempts, evacuated the left bank of the Linth, broke the bridges of Näfels and Nettstall, and occupied with the left wing of the allied army a line by which he could secure the communication with the Grisons. This line started from Meilen, followed the right bank of the Linth by Utnach and Schänis to Wesen, passed behind the Walensee to Walenstadt, Sargans, Ragatz, Vättis, Kunkels, and Flims, terminating at Ilanz. The track of Kerenzen on the opposite bank of the lake, as well as that of Weisstannen in front of Sargans, were preserved, though outside the line. Some reserves were established by the Austrian general on the wings of his corps at Kaltbrunn and at Chur.

Hotze, in his apprehension of an attack, had left his concentrated position behind the Aa to take up a more extended one, and thus exchanged his menacing attitude for one that was simply passive. In short, he abandoned every offensive project when he saw the French make a pretence of reaching his flank by the difficult path in rear of Mollis; he nevertheless held the main road of the valley which the enemy would have to traverse to reach Kerenzen by the steep rocks of Ennenda. He wished to occupy all the passes and all the avenues of the Grisons, the Vorarlberg, and the Tyrol, and he found himself too weak in every direction. If he had concentrated his troops in a position between the Lakes of Zürich and Walenstadt, at the points where the roads ascend to the sources of the Linth, upon Dissentis and the St Gothard, he would have thereby acted with greater effect upon the enemy, who from that moment would have been unable to have advanced farther without

compromising his communications. The Linth is easy to cross, and Hotze would have been enabled to contrive a secure passage for his troops, if, whilst in possession of the left bank, he had thought of constructing a tête-de-pont. It is a measure that no general should ever neglect when a river flows in rear of his position.

The Russians relieved the Austrians without any trouble. The mass of troops assembled at this juncture was too considerable to admit of Masséna undertaking any enterprise against them. The Archduke committed to Nauendorf the duty of covering his flank and rear in case the Russians were compelled to give way. He moved on the 31st August and 1st September with 30 battalions and 40 squadrons in the direction of Tuttlingen. 31st August.
1st Sept.

Here is the opinion of Jomini upon the various events which have been touched upon since the battle of the Zürichberg.

“This period of the campaign, though less complicated than the first, offers some important instructions on mountain warfare. It clearly demonstrates the activity and the talents of Lecourbe, the superiority of movements over positions; in a word, all the advantages of taking the initiative. The more important operations do not seem to be as satisfying; for on the one hand is observable the fatal folly of cordons, intended to cover all the approaches of an extensive country, with the inability on the other to perceive the slightest readiness to profit by this mischievous system.”

The Archduke had established his headquarters at Schaffhausen on the 31st. Part of the 36,000 men that he was taking to the Lower Rhine proceeded by forced marches to the Palatinate, whilst he with the remainder took up a position at St Blasien in the Brisgau, for the purpose of annoying Masséna's left flank, and leaving him in doubt as to the ulterior destination of his columns. We will now leave him to operate in Germany, to raise the siege of Philipsburg, to take Mannheim, and to defeat the French corps d'armée, 31st August.

which had operated in this part of the country with the distinct purpose of attracting the attention of the Allies and inducing them to leave Switzerland. We will let him finally concentrate his forces on the Neckar, and return to the operations of the armies who were trampling on the soil of Switzerland.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF ZÜRICH.

The coalition at this period originating in the jealousy with which England and Austria regarded Suwarow's successes in Italy, resolved upon a fresh plan, too gigantic for the means at their disposal, but which was simply the execution of a convention concluded between the Courts of London, Vienna, and St Petersburg.

To attain this object, England and Austria laid great stress upon the advantage of reuniting all the troops of the same nations under the orders of their respective commanders, under the pretence that it was the only means of putting an end to the dangerous rivalry which had already manifested itself in the Russian and German armies.

They thus obtained the Czar's sanction for the removal of his contingent to the Alps, the climate of which was better suited to the Russians than that of Italy, and where it was to form the army of the centre under Suwarow's orders.

According to the same convention, the conquest of Italy was to be accomplished by an Austrian army under the orders of Melas.

The Archduke Charles, with a third army, composed of contingents from the Circles, was instructed to operate between the Brisgau and the confluence of the Moselle.

Simultaneously 45,000 men disembarked in Holland were, after conquering that Republic, of which there was no doubt, to make their way into Belgium, exciting insurrection everywhere by the way, and to connect their left with the Archduke's troops.

Thus the theatre of war extended from the Appenines to the Zuider-See.

It was in accordance with this plan, as has been stated before, that the Archduke had evacuated Switzerland, and that Suwarow was to replace him in that country. For what reason, however, did the Archduke evacuate Switzerland prior to Suwarow's arrival? First, in consequence of express orders from Vienna; secondly, because of the disputes which had occurred between himself and Korsakow; and finally, from the apprehension of more, which he foresaw must inevitably occur with Suwarow, if he awaited his arrival.

When Suwarow commenced his preparations for entering Switzerland, he put himself into communication with Hotze and Korsakow, to arrange with them the scheme of operations in which they were to co-operate on the 10th of September. It was agreed that Suwarow should move from Bellinzona on the 21st of that month, and attack the St Gothard. Strauch, who was watching Tharreau on the roads leading into Italy, was enjoined to cover this expedition. An Austrian brigade was ordered to move from Dissentis to Am Stäg by the Crispalt. Suwarow calculated on taking the St Gothard on the 24th, on reaching Altorf on the 25th, Schwyz on the 26th, and Luzern on the 27th, where a division, which he intended detaching from the valley of the Reuss, would, after turning the western bank of the Lake of Luzern, join him by the Engelberg valley. Hotze, reinforced by 5000 Russians of Korsakow's corps, was to advance from Utznach upon Einsiedeln, supporting himself by flanking columns, which were to move from Sargans upon Glarus, and from Flums upon Schwanden, and from thence were to traverse the Klön-Thal. On the completion of this movement, Hotze was to take in flank the French position on the Albis, whilst Korsakow, debouching by Zürich, was to attack it in front, and afterwards effect a junction with the Austrian general.

Should this plan prove successful, the Allies, in possession

of the entire course of the Reuss, would be in a position to move on the Aare with the whole of their forces. Suwarow clearly foresaw that this advance could not be effected except by opening a way through the mountain passes sword-in-hand, but he imagined that he was incurring so much the less risk, in that, after the conquest of the St Gothard, it still depended upon him to reach the valley of the Linth, or at worst the valley of the Rhine.

The idea of assuming the offensive between the Lakes of Luzern and Zürich was quite right, and to this end Suwarow selected the line of the St Gothard and that of the Reuss as the shortest and the best calculated to effect the prompt junction of the forces on the most important part of the theatre of war. This manœuvre was, however, subject to serious inconveniences, and presented numerous difficulties.

1. It was necessary to scale the St Gothard, to carry it, and to traverse it by roads scarcely practicable for artillery of the smallest calibre.

2. The army would lend its flank to the enemy during the four days it was engaged in penetrating the most frightful defiles in the world.

3. It became necessary to secure the lateral issues of these defiles, the only means of effecting which was by sending on in advance detachments too weak to engage the enemy's forces. Moreover, it was necessary to guard in rear the approaches to the main road in an equally imperfect manner.

4. The movement did not cover the communications that were indispensable to enable the transport to reach the column, so that it was obliged to carry with it all the common necessities of life.

5. Suwarow could not reckon on reaching his line of retreat, and revictualling his troops from the Austrian magazines, until the termination of his long and difficult march.

6. The great distance from the commander-in-chief and

the appointment of the rendezvous of the columns at the points in possession of the enemy, which could not be reached except by a succession of combats, the date of the conquest of which it was consequently impossible to fix beforehand, rendered the success of the operation, so to speak, almost a matter of chance.

The only operations likely to prove successful are those in which troops, placed from the commencement on decisive lines, follow the direction of those lines, march against the enemy without fear of ambushes, and which cover simultaneously their retreat and their communications.

Suwarow's manœuvre would have been more wisely planned, if, with a view of entering Switzerland, he had selected the two routes, one of which passes by the Val Mesocco, and crosses the Bernardino, the other leading by Riva and Chiavenna to Chur across the Splügen. The positions of the Austrians protected these lines. The latter need only have pushed forward their posts in the direction of the sources of the Vorder Rhine, and have made some offensive demonstrations against the St Gothard, to have rendered the transport of supplies by the Lake of Como all the more secure. The Chiavenna road, more suitable for carts, and traversing countries less wild than the St Gothard, afforded Suwarow the possibility of conducting in safety along with him the greater portion of his artillery, and of procuring the necessary subsistence for his troops. He then would himself have covered the flank of his convoys, by marching with the main body of his troops up the valley of Mesocco, parallel to the Chiavenna road; and even supposing that, in the interval, the enemy had occupied the debouches of these defiles, they would still have been less difficult to force than those of the St Gothard and the Reuss, hemmed in, as they are, by walls of tremendous rocks.

In case of a reverse, the army would have been nearer its lines of communication and retreat. Finally, there was

every probability of the different corps reaching the point of junction in a better condition than after the performance of several complicated movements, and the carrying of many posts which were difficult to attack.

Besides, Suwarow's manœuvre, in whatever direction he marched, possessed one great defect, which it was not in his power to correct, because it resulted from the original dispositions, according to which he was desirous of entering Switzerland from the Italian frontier across a lofty mountain range, instead of proceeding thither by the open countries bordering on Germany. In this enterprise troops should have started from the extremity of the left wing, that is to say, from the flank farthest removed from the probable point of attack ; but this operation could not be commenced until the space which separated the troops proceeding out of Italy from those already in Switzerland had been traversed ; whereas Masséna already possessed the advantage of having concentrated a superior force.

The French army numbered at this period, according to the Archduke, 77,000 combatants, and 82,759 men according to Masséna and the official statements, exclusive of 7000 men under Mengaud cantoned at Besançon.

This army was distributed as follows :—

1st Division—Tharreau : Upper Valais and the Simplon, as far as Domo d'Ossola.

2d Division—Lecourbe : St Gothard ; the valley of the Reuss, his left wing at Glarus.

3d Division—Soult : the right wing near Glarus ; the centre on the left bank of the Linth, between the lakes of Zürich and Walenstadt ; the left wing near Adlischwyl on the Sihl.

4th Division—Mortier : on the Uetliberg, from Adlischwyl to Altstetten.

5th Division—Lorges : the left bank of the Limmat between Altstetten and Baden.

6th Division—Ménard : from Baden to the confluence of the Aare with the Rhine.

7th Division—Klein : forming the reserve in the Frick-Thal with the cavalry = eleven squadrons.

8th Division—Chabran : at Basel.

The allied army was composed and distributed as follows :—

Korsakow, 33,000 men, concentrated at Zürich and in the direction of the Lower Limmat. The following are the details of this corps, as furnished by General Dedon :—

1. In the camp of Sihlfeld, between the Uetliberg and the Limmat. Here was Korsakow's main body.

2. In the camp in front of Weiningen, opposite Dietikon, parallel with, and to the right of, the convent of Fahr. Here there were 2000 grenadiers and 400 Cossacks, huddled in the wood in front of the convent.

3. From 5000 to 6000 men in a camp established at Würenlos.

4. Two thousand men in front of the village of Wettingen.

5. Besides these camps, the cavalry and the Cossacks were distributed among the villages that line the road from Zürich to Baden by the right bank, especially at Höngg, Weiningen, Oetwyl, and Würenlos.

6. A strong reserve posted on the skirts of the town of Zürich on the Winterthur road, and another and stronger one at Kloten.

The Russian posts were, moreover, so multiplied along the whole course of the Limmat, that the greatest distance between the sentries did not exceed 100 paces.

Nauendorf, with 5400 men, between Waldshut and Basel, on the right bank of the Rhine.

Hotze, 25,000 men, including 3000 Swiss, in position from Utznach to Chur and Dissentis.

Suvwarow, 28,000 men, including Strauch, on the march into Switzerland.

Although Masséna's plan for a general attack on the Lower

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Linmat had failed on the 30th August, he did not abandon the project, but looked to the execution of it as soon as he saw a favourable opportunity. The absence of the Archduke momentarily gave the French a superiority in numbers. It was of importance to seize this moment, and to defeat Korsakow and Hotze before Suwarow's arrival had re-established an equilibrium. Had not the Archduke, however, made only a feint of marching to the Lower Rhine, in order to entice Masséna into the plains of Winterthur? This uncertainty was the cause of Masséna delaying his operation several days. This doubt having been removed, and having learned from a letter from Suchet, the then chief of the staff of the Army of Italy, that Suwarow was on the march into Switzerland, all hesitation ceased, and the 25th September was appointed for the projected attack.

Neither the number of the Russian troops, nor their position, nor their organisation, led him to expect serious difficulties in dislodging them. And this remark leads us naturally to take a brief review of the Russian troops at this period, their organisation, their tactics, and the character of both their generals.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1799.

The Russians appeared on the theatre of war with a considerable reputation for bravery and military discipline. Their valour was principally based on the consciousness of their physical superiority, which told in single combat and personal encounters; but the opportunities for attacking an enemy with naked weapons seldom occurred in the field, subsequently to the invention of firearms; and since the means of preventing the impetuosity of an attack by manœuvring had become known, such opportunities could only be imagined in cases, where both the opposing bodies manœuvred on equal terms, and simply resorted to these means as the only ones for deciding the contest.

The Russian troops at this period were not exercised in rapid manœuvring. They merely observed great exactitude in details, at the expense of rapidity,—a method absolutely indispensable as regards individual training, and so long as the instruction is confined to primary elements, but of much less importance, when it is a question of the active handling of masses, and the execution of important tactical manœuvres.

According to Masséna, the Russians employed the constant formation of squares for the attack, and especially prided themselves on the use of the bayonet; so much so, that Masséna considered it his duty to publish an order informing his troops, that they were about to encounter an enemy more familiar with the use of that arm than the Austrians; he accompanied it with the hope, that in this new style of fighting they would know how to preserve their ancient and glorious reputation.

The Russians in general are exceedingly temperate, but their stay in Germany and Italy had spoiled them in this respect. They had become gross eaters, and consumed everything in the regions which they traversed.

The Russian artillery at this time had not arrived at the degree of perfection which it reached at a later period. The carriages were too heavy, and the calibre of the guns too large for the projectiles. The Cossacks had in their exclusive keeping the safety of the army. Accustomed to prowl in the neighbourhood of the enemy, to spy his movements, and cause him constant annoyance, they lost their usefulness in a country unsuitable to cavalry, especially in defensive positions behind a river. Organised for the purpose of encountering the Turks on their frontier steppes, they hardly believed it possible to do without many articles, with which the necessities of modern warfare must dispense, while at the same time sufficient provision for the principal requirements of an army must be made. An enormous train accompanied

them on their marches, and long files of waggons hampered their movements.

Since the year 1763 they had engaged in no important war, except against the Turks. Their personal valour, and their careful adherence to formations in mass or in square, ordinarily decided the victory, without the necessity of having recourse to manœuvres. Moreover, the greater portion of the generals and officers were trained according to these principles, whilst they remained in ignorance of the other branches of the art of war.

Proud of their recent victories over the Turks, and imbued with an undue contempt for the revolutionary armies, which they had derived from the French emigrants, and consequently for the Austrians as well, because they were unable to terminate a struggle which appeared easy to them ; moreover, persuaded that Suwarow's arrival in Italy had alone decided the fortune of war in that country, the Russian soldiers and their chiefs were alike presumptuously blind. This feeling was not the offspring of that generous confidence, which relies on personal resources, which elevates courage, and incites it to the performance of mighty deeds ; it was, on the contrary, the index of a moral weakness foreboding disastrous demoralisation, as the consequence of the first reverse.

Korsakow, according to Masséna, more of a courtier than a soldier, was the avowed opponent of intelligence in the ranks, and of that paternal diligence, which anticipates rather than corrects errors, and of that pleasant fraternal relation in arms, which attaches by an invisible link the soldier to the officer, and the officer to the general ; nor was he superior to anything beyond automatic manœuvres, discipline dependent on the lash, and the faultlessness of uniform, especially the lofty conical caps at that time worn by the Russian grenadiers. He had served in only two campaigns in Persia, in which he had given incontestable proofs of personal courage, but no distinct evidence

of his military capacity. Brimming over with presumption and arrogance, he responded to the wise counsels of the Archduke by indulging in rhodomontades. The latter, before leaving Zürich, was desirous of showing him the points that required guarding. "Yes," replied the Russian, "but in the spot where you would place a battalion, one Russian company would suffice." When the Archduke wanted to point out to him the roads to be taken in case of retreat, he replied, "Russians never retire."

In dealing with an adversary so full of vanity and presumption, Masséna perfectly understood that it was necessary to inspire him with a blind confidence, and to engage him only in affairs of outposts, giving him a slight advantage, until the moment arrived for striking the decisive blow.

Korsakow ended by imagining his superiority to be so marked, as shortly to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to his desires; as if, by remaining in one position, it were possible to control the movements of an able and active adversary, and as if every enemy and every country did not require a perfectly different application of the rules of warfare.

Moreover, Korsakow lost sight in a great measure of essentials, while attending scrupulously to the Oriental luxury of his table, the honours of which he did after the manner of a man in the first rank of society. Zürich at that time was a kind of small military court, a Coblenz on a small scale, where intrigue and frivolity held their sway. All these circumstances, occurring at the season during which armies usually operate, had gained for Zürich the sarcastic epithet, applied to it by De Roverea, of a gay summer quarter.

SUWAROW.

Count Peter Alexis Wasilowitsch Suwarow-Rimnitzkoi, generalissimo of the Russian armies, imperial and royal field-marshal in the Austrian service, possessed within an

insignificant bodily frame a soul of iron. Having entered the military profession as a simple soldier at the age of seventeen, he passed through all the intermediate grades to the highest one, which he won by a life of exploits, and a heroism that occasionally amounted to almost unreasoning self-devotion. At this period, in spite of his sixty-nine years and his emaciated countenance, he preserved perfect health and the vigour and fire of youth. Cold baths, temperance, active habits, and the austere life of a soldier, had hardened his frame and his temperament. Having attained the highest honours, he would sleep upon a straw mattress under a blanket, and would partake of his soldiers' rations. He frequently dressed in the uniform of one of his regiments, with a sheepskin over it; at other times he would appear in a sparkling costume of great richness, with numerous and brilliant decorations. Constant to his creed, he exacted the practice of it from his army. On Sundays and fête-days, he was in the habit of reading to his men some pages of a devotional work, and he never gave the signal for a battle, without making the sign of the cross and kissing the image of St Nicolas. Immovable in his resolutions, faithful to his promises, and incorruptible, he was chary of his words on serious occasions, whilst in ordinary conversation he was lavish of them; and in a confused manner, amounting to affectation, he would indulge in buffooneries, or put extravagant questions in the same breath, in which he gave vent to expressions of a stilted character, changing his subject like a flash of lightning. At one moment, in a hoarse voice and with an indifferent pronunciation, he would mix up several languages; at another, his fine voice and pure language would assist the enunciation of ideas of a lofty character. His extraordinary eccentricity and undisguised affectation detracted from his glory in the eyes of foreigners; but his prompt and clear perception, his elevated nature, and the activity and impetuosity displayed by him in action, incontestably secured to him, according to Jomini, a high rank among the generals of that generation. The

troops which he led differed much from the actual Russian army, as regards equipment and instruction, but the race of men of which they were composed was hardy, and their military spirit perfect. If their imperfect instruction in manœuvring left much to be desired, nothing could surpass their self-possession when on the defensive, or the impetuous bravery of their attacking columns.

The bayonet was the favourite arm of the soldier and the general, who alike despised fire. The cavalry was of the most mediocre description.

The staff, composed of young men trained at the school of cadets, possessed knowledge sufficient for the development of talents in the case of a warlike genius, but not enough wherewith to form an intelligent body fit for the direction of general military operations.

The Marshal's first care was to recommend the use of the bayonet. As he attributed the reverses of the previous campaigns to the want of vigour on the part of the Austrian officers, he sent Russian officers to the regiments of the Imperial army to teach them the use of this weapon—a severe lesson, which was received in very bad part by those whom he was anxious to instruct.

An anecdote is told of him, that when General Chasteler, the chief of the staff, proposed to him on his arrival to make a reconnaissance, the Marshal replied with warmth, "Reconnaissances! I do not desire them. They are of no use except to timid natures, and to let the enemy know that one is coming. The enemy is always to be found when wanted. Columns—the bayonet, the naked weapon—the attack and piercing of the enemy's line—these are my reconnaissances!" Shocking bragging, whatever Jomini, who in this matter evidently flatters the Russians, may say; for it is always necessary to know where to attack, or in what direction to move, in order to break the enemy's line; and how is this knowledge to be gained except by reconnoitring? When a general assumes the command of an army in the field, what-

ever his qualities may be, is it not his first duty to endeavour to ascertain exactly the position of his own troops and that of the enemy? and how is he to accomplish this unless by reconnaissances? Let us, however, resume the operations of the campaign in Switzerland.

It has been seen how presumptuously the Russians undertook the defence of the banks of the Limmat. It was therefore no longer a matter of astonishment, that henceforth they were co-operating in their own destruction by vilipending, as a mark of pusillanimity, the whole of the prudential measures adopted by their predecessors, the Austrians.

Korsakow, having been informed of the intentions of Suwarow, who laid great stress upon the co-operation of the troops which had been encamped before Zürich, attached immense importance to the preservation of this issue; and since the beginning of September had concentrated the half of his troops, in front of and around the town, in the valley of the Limmat; he likewise transferred thither his headquarters and the train.

Prior to the date fixed for taking the offensive, 5000 men, reinforcements destined for Hotze, had been detached from Korsakow's corps. Consequently but few troops remained to guard the Limmat and the Aare, although the preservation of this part of the line was of the greatest importance, since all the convoys of the army, as well as Condé's corps, and 4000 Bavarians lately transferred to the service-pay of England, had been directed to march from the interior of Germany to Schaffhausen, and were obliged to take this route to join the Russians. To cover it, therefore, was indispensable.

General Durassow with eight battalions and ten squadrons formed the right wing of the expedition, occupying a camp near Kloster-Wettingen, and another still smaller one at Würenlos. Three battalions were near Kloster-Fahr under the orders of General Markow. Some Cossacks and chasseurs guarded the bank and the islets of the Limmat, but

neither, as regards numbers or vigilance, were they of a nature to inspire much confidence.

Korsakow totally forgot, that the primary condition of every enterprise is a well-ascertained conviction of the ability to execute it, without compromising one's safety. By concentrating his forces on his left, he denuded his communications, and left exposed the line which was of the first importance to him to defend. For a long time he had exposed himself to the gravest dangers, by the assumption of an offensive attitude three weeks too soon. He weakened his line of defence, which on principle should never be abandoned till the last moment, and when one has so nearly cut in on the enemy, that he has no further means of anticipating such a movement.

Whilst Masséna was enabled to employ the larger portion of his force in the attempt to cross the Limmat, Korsakow made no defensive preparations, except at the spot where the armies were not separated by any natural barrier: as if it was impossible to cross an indifferently-guarded river, and as if the ramparts of Zürich would not have been sufficient to protect this important debouche.

With a view of imparting greater solidity to his position, Korsakow ought to have followed the example of the Austrians, and have taken up a central position in advance of the Glatt, holding his troops in readiness to march and engage the enemy, at whatever point he might desire to cross the Limmat. The garrison of Zürich, sustained by the main body of the army, secured this post against every insult, and in this attitude the Russians, though weaker than their predecessors, would have been able to maintain themselves with ease. A reverse even would not have been attended with very disastrous consequences, because, in the manner above mentioned, the Russians would have covered their communications and their line of retreat, whether they moved on Schaffhausen, St Gallen, or Utnach. The posts of Zürich, as well as the proxi-

mity of the troops placed on the Linth, afforded them the facility of rapidly assuming the offensive.

THE PASSAGE OF THE LIMMAT.

An accurate reconnaissance of the Limmat had shown that the most favourable spot for its passage was above the village of Dietikon, where the river makes a considerable bend on the side of the French. This point offered some advantages, counterbalanced, however, by other and not trifling disadvantages.

Advantages :—

1. The river made a bend, the convexity of which, facing the French, afforded them the advantage of the protection of the cross-fire of a numerous artillery, for which a plateau in advance of Nieder Urdorf furnished an excellent position.

2. The peninsula on the right bank, enclosed by the bend of the river, on which the troops were in the first instance to land, was rather low. A small wood covered the advanced party. This wood was occupied by numerous posts, but when these were once repulsed or destroyed, the wood would serve the French as a sort of *tête de pont*, from whence it would be a matter of difficulty to dislodge their light infantry.

3. The place destined for the establishment of the bridge was covered by the same wood, and was not visible from the opposite bank.

4. The anchorage was good, and the current of the river, rapid everywhere else, was here moderated by the bend of the river.

5. The heights, covered with forests and ruins, which fringe the right bank of the river, are at some distance from it, just at the point where it makes the bend, and form, so to speak, the chord of the salient arc described by the river. Between this curtain and the clump of wood, at the most advanced

point, there was an open pasture, where the enemy had established his principal post in some huts, situated between the two woods ; but this plain could easily be swept by the French guns.

Inconveniences and difficulties to be overcome :—

1. The moderate breadth of the river forbade all hope of concealing from the enemy the preparations for the passage.

2. No affluent nor separate branch of the river existed for the transport of the boats.

3. No bushy islet covered the unloading of the boats from the drays.

4. The bed of the river, being too confined on the left bank, interfered with the launching of the boats.

5. In order to transport the boats by land to the river's bank, they had to be placed on vehicles, so that the noise produced by this operation could not fail to attract the enemy's attention. So embarrassing and difficult is the movement of pontoon trains, that one can easily see how dangerous it would have been to bring a train to the river's bank to unload it. The precipitation, so natural under such circumstances, in addition to the enemy's fire, would most certainly have thrown a large number of teams into a frightful state of confusion, composed, as they were for the most part, of horses obtained on requisition and conducted by peasants. Whatever might be the order and activity displayed, not more than a tithe of the boats of the advanced guard could in such a case be simultaneously unloaded ; and consequently the first batch would have had to wait for the others, or, still worse, the troops would have to cross in dribbles and by detachments. Calculate also the time during which the bank would be encumbered with carriages, horses, and carmen, before the troops could possibly embark, and it will be admitted, that these delays and these embarrassments would have afforded the enemy time necessary to

render unserviceable, by his fire, a considerable number of the boats and tackle, as well as to push forward his reserves and make his dispositions for defence. From that moment it was apparent that, however brave the troops might be, and however collected their leaders, the success of such an enterprise would at least be doubtful. It will shortly be seen what methods were adopted to overcome the above-mentioned obstacles.

6. Finally, Dietikon was too near Zürich; for if Korsakow was not forced to retain his position, or if the passage was not effected promptly enough to enable the French to gain the communications of the Russians, before the latter could reach those of the French, the Russian general in either case could, by starting from Zürich, move on the French rear, and attack them in the act of crossing.

7. To the difficulties occasioned by the locality selected for the passage, were to be added others resulting from the general configuration of the country, and the position in which the army was.

All the boats at the disposal of the French were collected at Brugg. Now the Baden and Wettingen bridges were destroyed, so that direct communication by road between Brugg and Dietikon no longer existed. To convey the boats to the latter place, it was necessary to take them to Bremgarten on the Reuss, traverse the narrow and tortuous streets of that town as well as its very narrow bridge, then cross the chain of low hills and ravines separating the Reuss from the Limmat, and to do this by a bad and very narrow mountainous road, saturated by the rains of an exceedingly wet summer. For this reason it was only by commencing the movement several days beforehand that the transport could be effected at the opportune moment.

However this may be, there was reason to hope that the difficulties might be overcome; besides, nowhere else were advantages, such as were offered at this point. Dietikon then was selected for the passage.

Masséna had ordered up from Strasburg, subsequently to the evacuation of Zürich, a pontoon train of 30 artillery-boats furnished with tackle. They were all he could obtain. Of these 30 boats, four had been burned by the Austrians at Döttingen on the 17th August, ten others were employed on the Reuss, in lieu of the ferry of Windisch, to form a bridge that had become necessary for the movement of the troops, which would have been too much retarded by the ferry, and which being in sight of the enemy, could not be removed unperceived, or without the suspicions of the enemy being aroused. The remaining 16 were employed in the construction of a bridge at Rottenschwyl on the Reuss. This bridge had already been taken to pieces on the 30th August, and transported by water to Windisch for the projected passage of the Limmat on that day, and it had been brought back to Rottenschwyl by the direction of the commander-in-chief, in order to mislead the enemy. It was this bridge, of which it was desired to make use in the construction of that on the Limmat at Dietikon, whither it had to be brought by the route of Bremgarten.

As to the means of disembarkation, the engineers, after an exploration of the lakes of Zug and Neuchatel, had succeeded in collecting 37 boats of different sorts, and the largest of which were capable of holding from 40 to 45 men with their arms and accoutrements, the smallest 20. These boats were brought in three successive batches, and unloaded in rear of Dietikon out of the enemy's sight, behind a clump of wood at nearly one kilometre's (1094 yards) distance from the point of crossing, and at this spot no time was lost in repairing the damages caused by the transport.

The artillery horses of Ménard's division conducted the convoys from Brugg to Bremgarten. There they were relieved by those of Lorges' division, which crossed the mountain. The convoys, according to Dedon's account, arrived, unobserved from the right bank, behind a clump of large fir-trees, situated on an eminence to the right of the

village, where they remained till nightfall. Then they were brought nearer the village, where the boats were unloaded behind the hedges, under cover of a small French camp. The drays were sent back as soon as possible by a subsequent convoy. Dedon says that this operation occupied not less than a fortnight.

23d-24th
September.

The pontoons of Rottenschwyl were obliged to remain in position up to the very moment fixed for the attack, so as not to awaken the enemy's attention. On the 23d September General Dedon received directions to remove them. This he effected on the night of the 23d-24th, which was almost entirely occupied in disuniting the bridge, removing the boats by water to Bremgarten, dragging them on shore, loading them on the vehicles and conducting them to Dietikon across the mountain. At nightfall of the 24th, the convoy reached Dietikon: it was composed of one barque and sixteen arsenal-boats, mounted on their trucks, and drawn by the horses of the artillery park attached to Lorges' division, and of 60 agricultural vehicles obtained on requisition, the greater portion of which were drawn by oxen, and which conveyed the various gear. The convoy was so organised, that in rear of every section of two boats there followed all the articles requisite to equip them. Besides the company of pontonniers belonging to them, several hussars were detached for the purpose of making the agricultural carts keep up, and of seeing that none lagged behind.

Masséna detailed for the passage the whole of Lorges' division and a portion of Ménard's; the remainder of it was to occupy the enemy by demonstrations at Vogelsang, where for several days some gunboats had been collected, and ostensible preparations made to deceive the Russians.

Mortier's division received directions to hold the enemy in front of Zürich by attacking him the same day at Wollishofen: he was ordered to direct the fire of his howitzers on the town.

Klein with the reserve was to cover the Altstetten road.

Soult was to cross the Linth at Bilten, and prevent the Austrians proceeding to the assistance of the Russians before the close of the operation.

The date of the attack had been fixed in the first instance for the 26th September, but the news, which Masséna had received from the St Gothard, obliged him to hasten the affair by one day. All the preparations were therefore to be completed for the night of the 24th–25th September.

24th September.

On the evening of the 24th, the Russians did not entertain the least suspicion of the undertaking. When night had set in, Dedon, the general of engineers, assisted by such of the pontonniers as were on the spot, superintended the loading of all the boats destined for the passage and for the transport of the troops, on the shoulders of the men of the 37th regiment and of a battalion of the 97th, who carried them in silence to the bank. These boats were ranged on the bank, so to speak, in order of battle. They were formed in three separate divisions in proximity to each other.

On the right or upper division were collected the smallest and the lightest boats. By this division were to be passed the first troops, destined to surprise the Russians, and to facilitate the embarkation, the passage, and landing of the centre and left divisions. Being smaller than the others, they could be more easily launched, and sooner laden with troops.

In the centre division were the heaviest and least manageable craft.

In the lower division, on the left, were placed the medium-sized boats, destined to land on an island formed by a small branch of the Limmat, where the Russians had some posts, which threatened in reverse the point of attack.

The pontonniers were distributed, similarly to the boats, in three divisions, and detailed beforehand in such a manner, as to enable every one to know the boat to which he was told off.

When he had completed the distribution of the boats, and had inspected them to see that each was supplied with the tackle and the necessary cordage, the commanding engineer

directed the pontonniers to lie down in rear of their respective boats, their oars in their hands, and to remain there maintaining the strictest silence, until the signal for the attack was given.

These preparatory arrangements, so laborious and so difficult of execution in the darkness, coupled with the silence so requisite to secure secrecy, especially on ground furrowed with ruts, slippery, and intersected with many ditches, were terminated at midnight, without the enemy appearing to be aware of them. The men of the 37th and 97th regiments returned to their camp for their arms. They were replaced for the service of the commanding engineer by the Helvetian legion, with directions to assist the pontonniers in the construction of the bridge. Some companies of sappers furnished with pioneering tools were distributed at the several points of embarkation; they were to render the steep banks practicable, so as to facilitate the launching of the boats, because the river being somewhat confined, the bank was from seven to eight feet above the level of the water.

To the Chef-d'escadron Foy, commanding the artillery of Lorges' division, was intrusted the disposition and posting of such of that arm, as had been detailed for the protection of the passage. On the right, the small plateau in front of Nieder-Urdorf was dotted with guns, which took in reverse the enemy's left, swept the plain between the two woods, and prevented the Russians, once they were driven from the point of the peninsula, from returning to annoy the works connected with the bridge. Above Dietikon, likewise, were placed guns in the lower bend of the river, which could be brought to bear on the enemy's camp, take his right in reverse, and cross their fire with those on the plateau of Urdorf. As the Russian camp was partially masked by wood, and commanded the French position, this spot was by preference selected for the howitzers, with the view of searching the wood and reaching the camp by ricochet shots. Between these two principal stations Foy

had distributed several guns in the direction of the point selected for crossing at the outlet of the village. Moreover, several pieces of light artillery were held in reserve for skirmishing in the plain near Schlieren, opposite to and below the village of Oetwyl. A battery also had been established on an eminence near the banks of the river. The object of this battery was to intercept the road from Würenlos to Zürich (on the right bank), at a spot where the rapid slope of the mountain, as it nears the river, affords no other outlet than the highroad, since this defile forms the only passage the troops from the camp of Würenlos could take, to enable them to march to the assistance of those at Weinigen. This spot was a remarkable object by reason of a solitary house, visible from a great distance, and situated on the road between Würenlos and Oetwyl. Below this house is a rugged slope, covered with vineyards, stretching down to the bank of the river.

The artillery had reached the ground, and had taken up its position prior to the attack, so silently and in such perfect order, that it was not heard either by the Russians or even by the French troops in battle array on the left bank. The infantry of the advanced guard, full of ardour, was in order of battle fifty paces from the bank well before the appointed time, and it had reached its destination, like the artillery, without being observed.

As the Russian advanced posts on the left bank, opposite Altstetten, were not above one league distant from Dietikon, the French were apprehensive of these troops making an effort to advance, and catch them from behind between two fires whilst they were engaged in crossing. It was to oppose this manœuvre, and to hold the enemy fast, that the reserve under Klein was destined: it was composed of grenadiers and a heavy body of cavalry. To accomplish its object, it was posted in the plain between Dietikon and Schlieren.

All these nocturnal dispositions having been completed with remarkable order and precision, and every one being at his

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post, as twilight approached, the signal for the attack was given.

In pursuance of instructions, the smallest boats were launched as soon as possible, and laden with troops. Unfortunately there was not sufficient depth of water, so that, when filled with troops, they took the ground, which circumstance delayed for several minutes the departure of this small flotilla. The French heard, in the first instance, cries proceeding from the Russian posts, amongst whom evidently some movement was taking place. Shortly broke forth the first discharge of their musketry, the fire of which was forthwith heard along the whole line. It was then a quarter to 5 A.M.

25th Sept. Shouts of "*En avant*" resounded as soon as possible from all quarters, and the other boats were dragged along the bank, and run into the water by the infantry, which was ranged in order of battle ready to embark. The launching of these boats was effected so promptly, that the sappers, whose duty it was to facilitate this operation by cutting away the ground on the slope, had not time to use their pickaxes. In short, the whole of this operation, as well as the passage of the first detachments, was conducted with such celerity, that three minutes did not elapse before the discharge of the first musketry fire occurred, by which time not a single boat remained on the left bank, and before six hundred men were thrown on to the right bank, amidst the cries of "*Vive la République*," and this, too, notwithstanding the rapidity of the current.

The enemy fired several rounds of musketry and grape-shot; nevertheless not a single boat was sunk, not a man drowned. The French replied as quickly, and with an alacrity which kept the enemy at a distance from the bank, and which crushed any attempt to oppose the disembarkation. The companies of infantry, which Gazan had posted on the flanks, in the intervals of the artillery, rendered additional protection to the passage by a smart and well-sustained fire. One portion of the boats had already returned to the left

25th 2

bank to transport a second freight, when, on the charge sounding, it was supposed that the French troops were advancing. Firing from the left bank was then stopped for fear of injuring their own troops, and every effort was concentrated on accelerating the passage of the infantry in the boats.

It was at this juncture that Dedon caused the pontoons, the head of the convoy of which had remained in rear of Dietikon, to come up at a trot. He forthwith directed the construction of the bridge to be proceeded with, although this point was still exposed to the fire of the Russian artillery, which continued in occupation of the commanding height formed by the plateau of Kloster-Fahr. This plateau, defended by seven guns, upon which the enemy's posts had rallied on their reserves, was forthwith attacked, and the French, whose numbers increased in proportion as the boats crossed the river, which they did with remarkable rapidity, carried it in spite of a vigorous resistance. By 6 A.M. they had won the height, wounded and taken General Markow prisoner, and defeated and dispersed his corps. Scarcely had an hour elapsed since the commencement of the attack, when the French were in possession of the pine-wood, as also of the Russian camp, which was abandoned all standing, and had taken up a position beyond the wood.

The bridge, however, was being rapidly constructed. The pontonniers, assisted by the Helvetian legion, worked at it with a will. With great celerity in the manœuvre was combined an order and precision, which would have been hardly deemed possible in the best-concerted exercise on parade. A detachment of sappers was simultaneously employed on the right bank in opening a passage through the wood practicable for the artillery and cavalry.

At 7.30 the bridge, as well as the approach to it, was completed, without the passage of the troops in boats being retarded by its construction, since by the time it was finished 800 infantry were already on the right bank.

On the establishment of the bridge, the light artillery, the

cavalry, and the rest of the infantry proceeded to defile across it. It was not yet 9 A.M., by which time the whole of the troops detailed for the passage were assembled on the opposite bank, and in occupation of the position on the plateau of Fahr. This plateau is formed by the high ground, which commands the convent and the point of passage: it extends from Fahr to Weiningen, and is connected by a gentle inclination with the slopes of the mountains that line the banks of the Limmat. It forms a sort of hog's-back, that occupies the whole extent between the river and the mountain. Its glaxis incline equally on both sides, so that this hog's-back furnished the French with a position, somewhat confined, whence they could advantageously receive the shock of troops directed against them, whether from Zürich or Würenlos.

Masséna did not lose a moment. His object was to stop the junction of the Russian right wing under Durassow with their left wing posted at Zürich. He therefore sent General Bontems with his brigade to Dällikon and Regenstorf, to gain the slope of the mountains on the Glatt, and to seize the communications between Regensberg and Zürich. Two battalions of Quétard's brigade occupied the Würenlos road in rear of the defile of Oetwyl, and so covered the left flank of Bontem's brigade. Several detachments remained to guard the bridge, and all the other troops, as well as the advanced guard, commanded by Gazan, followed Oudinot, the chief of the staff, in the direction of Höngg.

Masséna, desirous of ascertaining by personal observation what was taking place in the plain of the Sihlfeld, returned to Klein's reserve on the left bank.

In the meantime, Mortier's division executed the orders it had received. From 5 A.M., its right, under the command of General Drouet, overthrew the Russians and occupied Wollishofen; but, being shortly attacked by the six battalions under General Gortschakow, assisted by Williams's flotilla, it had been repulsed, and compelled to gain the Uetli, whither

the Russians pursued it. Simultaneously the left, under the orders of General Brunet, had advanced to the small plateau of Wiedikon, and had there been met by superior forces. Mortier calmly yet resolutely maintained a difficult game at these two points, whither Korsakow had imprudently moved the main body of his forces.

In fact, Gortschakow was not satisfied with confining himself to the repulse of the attack from Wollishofen, but seizing the initiative in his turn, he had pursued the French to the nearest plateaux of the Uetliberg, where he succeeded in taking some of their batteries. This success contributed in the end to the misfortunes of the day; for the enemy's progress on the right bank, and the advance of Klein, who, debouching from Alstetten upon the plain of Sihlfeld, cannonaded the right of the Russian corps in front of Zürich, obliged Korsakow to recall at 1 P.M. Gortschakow's troops. Closely pursued during their retreat, these latter experienced considerable loss.

Ménard's false attack, and his demonstrations against Brugg, had completely succeeded in outwitting the Russians. From daybreak Ménard had maintained a smart cannonade with all the batteries of position in the vicinity of Baden, and on either side of the Aare at the confluence of the Limmat, with the view of dismounting the enemy's batteries opposed to them, and those on the back of the Siggenberg, which enfiladed the course of the Aare. At the same time he caused all the large boats remaining in the river to be put in movement, and made at a distance a disposition of his sole remaining brigade in single rank. Durassow, completely duped by these demonstrations, as well as by the ostensible preparations made during the preceding days at Brugg, was detained nearly the whole day between Freyenwyl and Würenlingen. Having found out his mistake, he endeavoured in the evening to rejoin the corps that was engaged by the heights of Oetlikon; the way, however, being barred by Bontem's brigade, he was compelled to make a considerable detour in order to reach Zürich, where he arrived during the night.

Ménard succeeded in throwing a small detachment of light troops from the other side of the Limmat across the stream, by means of some wretched boats, which were transported by hand, and under the musketry fire of the Russians, from the Aare to the Limmat at Vogelsang, across the tongue of land situated between these rivers, and at a little distance above their junction. He thus succeeded in obtaining possession of the course of the Limmat below the village, so as to enable him to re-establish a flying bridge, which he had placed there, and of which he availed himself the next morning for the passage of a portion of his troops. The remainder had crossed the Aare on flat-bottomed boats, which he had moved down during the night.

Let us return to the principal attack, and imagine ourselves for an instant in the Russian camp.

Korsakow, when the attack was made, imagined himself to be perfectly secure. Since his arrival at Zürich, abandoning himself to good living and gambling, he had not made a single inspection of the line, was in ignorance of its advantages and disadvantages, and instead of establishing, as the Archduke had done, his hospitals, his parks, and his baggage at Kloten, or some other point in rear, he had left everything at Zürich in a great state of confusion. With presumptuous folly he talked of nothing less than sending Masséna to St Petersburg at the end of the first engagement, as a specimen of Republicanism.

Roused by the cannonade, he repaired to Höngg as soon as he was informed of the passage of the Limmat. Convinced, however, of the advantages attaching to his position at Zürich, and deceived by the attack upon Wollishofen, he looked upon the passage of the Limmat as a mere demonstration. He was satisfied by moving some troops to Höngg, where he learned Markow's disaster from some of the wounded who had escaped from Fahr. The weak detachments sent to Höngg shortly fell back upon the heights of Wipkingen, which they vainly endeavoured to defend.

At 10 A.M. the French were advancing to Zürich on both ^{25th Sept.} banks of the Limmat, and the cannonade opened along the whole line. Oudinot obtained possession of Höngg and the Wipkingen heights, where he was joined later on by a portion of the reserve infantry, and towards 3 P.M. he moved upon the Zürichberg, where the enemy had formed up several battalions. Gazan marched to Schwamendingen to obtain possession of the Winterthur road.

Korsakow, having at last become aware of the danger he was incurring, had recalled to the right bank a portion of the troops posted in advance of the town, to oppose them to Oudinot ; but they could not without considerable difficulty file through the town, the narrow and inconvenient streets of which were encumbered with the wounded and caissons and transport carriages. The musketry and howitzers which the French discharged on their approach, and which reached the town, increased the confusion, and assisted in impeding the movement of the troops. Thus it was that they arrived too late to prevent the French gaining the mountain on the side of the town. They repeatedly endeavoured to drive the French away, but their efforts proved fruitless against the brave soldiers of Lorges, supported by the Helvetian legion.

In the meantime, four Russian battalions, sent back by Hotze, reached Zürich. Korsakow placed himself at their head, and, aided by Bachmann's Swiss legion, made a vigorous onslaught on the enemy, and forced him back before nightfall to the foot of the heights of Wipkingen. Gazan's advanced posts, however, held their own at Schwamendingen.

Korsakow directed his troops to re-enter the place, the gates of which he closed, and which was, so to say, invested on both banks, for Oudinot's success on the right and left banks was incontestable. Klein and Mortier compelled the Russians to abandon the plain for the purpose of withdrawing to Klein Zürich, opposite which the French bivouacked.

Masséna summoned Zürich, but obtained no answer. Kor-

sakow even detained the flag of truce till 7 A.M. the next day.

During the night, Korsakow was rejoined by Durassow, who had made a detour by Bülach to avoid Bontems, as well as by the remainder of the corps that had been detached the day before to the Linth, from whence Hotze had sent them back to Zürich. Having by these means collected sixteen battalions, Korsakow cherished the hope of maintaining his position at Zürich, which had now become a matter of the greatest importance, inasmuch as the slightest retrograde movement on his part might have compromised Suwarow's advance and his junction with him. Every preparation was therefore made to recommence the struggle on the following day. If the result of his first attacks should leave no hope of preserving the position, an effort at least should be made to break through the line and save the *matériel*.

Oudinot assembled all the troops posted on the right bank with the view of carrying the Zürichberg. Bontem's brigade, which had taken up its position on the left, was destined to bar the Winterthur road. Lorges was to move along the Limmat in order to connect his attacks with those of Klein and Mortier, who were to advance by the Sihlfeld with Masséna at their head. It was hoped that by thus barring the retreat of the Russians to the Rhine they would be driven into the lake.

26th Sept. At daybreak on the 26th September, the Russians in two lines made an impetuous attack on Lorges' division. Directing their greatest effort on their right against Bontem's brigade, they succeeded in clearing the Winterthur road, and defeated the project of pushing them into the lake. Fortunate for the Russians was it, for at that instant Klein and Mortier were cannonading Klein Zürich, and Oudinot's artillery was breaching the Höngg gate.

The most terrible confusion reigned in the town. Korsakow, convinced of the impossibility of preserving Zürich, proposed

a capitulation,—too late, however, for no attention was paid to it.

Korsakow put a corps in movement along the highroad in columns by divisions, leaving in the town only a weak rear-guard to collect such as were posted at the gates and the stragglers. It is asserted that, in defiance of every military principle, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, the chests and transport-train in rear, and the field artillery on the left of the highroad, to cover the flank of the movement.

The head of the column overthrew everything in its front, but Masséna directed his light artillery to take up successively positions on the left flank of the Russians, and open upon them a brisk fire, without, however, attempting to stop the progress of the column. By these means he succeeded in spreading disorder throughout the column. He next ordered Lorges, Bontems, and Gazan to charge the enemy on the road. Gazan at the head of the 10th light infantry and the 17th of the line, Lorges with the guides of the commander-in-chief and the 9th hussars, fell on the centre of the Russians, who faced to the left, and defended themselves with desperation. Generals Sacken and Likotschin were severely wounded: the troops fought in an isolated and disjointed manner, and soon no one thought of anything but his own safety.

Simultaneously Oudinot was advancing along the Höngg road against the Limmat gate, which was still obstinately defended by one of the guards. Oudinot's column consisted of the 37th, one battalion of the 46th, and the Helvetian legion. Lacroix, the brigadier, who was at the head of the column, forced open the gate in spite of rather a brisk cannonade, whilst Klein with the reserve made his way into Klein Zürich. Some Russian sharpshooters still continued an isolated defence from street to street; and here it was that the venerable Lavater, imagining that his presence, as a minister of the God of peace, would suffice to disarm the soldiers,

rashly threw himself between the troops, and was mortally wounded.

In short, after having lost 8000 men killed and wounded, a large number of prisoners, 100 guns, the military chest, and the Russian records and chapel, Korsakow reached the Rhine by Bülach and Eglisau; one column retreated by the Winterthur road to Schaffhausen.

The retreat of the Russians was attended with all the disasters which are the inevitable result of being forced at all points, and of being compelled to break through a line by force of arms in an intersected country. In an open country it is possible to mass one's troops and make a passage; but when defiles are to be threaded without previous possession of the lateral approaches, then the main body has to be broken up into detachments, which, as a rule, succumb one by one to a pursuing enemy; for such a movement must be effected in long columns, with only a narrow front, and incapable either of overthrowing the obstacles in their way, or of offering a vigorous resistance at any point on which the enemy may choose to attack.

Rocquancourt's criticisms on Masséna's manœuvres at Zürich appear to be so fair as to justify their quotation.

"The battle of Zürich is one of those feats of arms which deserve consideration, inasmuch as it was won by manœuvring, and because the manœuvres were adapted to the time, the locality, and the distinct character of the Russians of that period. Opposed to adversaries who would not have been so blindly confident as to neglect precautions and the use of ordinary care, it would have been a matter of difficulty to throw the bridge across the river at Dietikon, and debouch on the plateau of Kloster-Fahr. But it never occurred to the Russians, accustomed as they were to look for victory only to front attacks, in which numbers and bravery count for everything, that they could be turned. Their false confidence, and the idea, which they entertained to the very last, that the best plan of the Republicans was to move

straight against the ramparts of Klein Zürich, must be regarded as the cause of their defeat. It should, nevertheless, be admitted, that Masséna, considering the brilliant manner in which he seconded Bonaparte at Arcola and Rivoli, did not derive all the advantage he might have obtained from his magnificent conception.

"As soon as it was evident that Korsakow's efforts were directed against Oudinot—of which on the evening of the 25th there could be no doubt—why did he not take advantage of the night, and move the whole of Klein's reserve and the remainder of Ménard's division to support the left wing? The Russians, completely surrounded at daylight, would have been compelled to lay down their arms. Was it to be apprehended that, contrary to all probability, the enemy, ascending the Sihl, would attack Soult in his rear, and eventually effect a junction with Suwarow? Mortier's division, however, would have more than sufficed to defeat so rash a manœuvre. These criticisms, to which other writers, viz., Jomini and the Archduke Charles, have previously lent their authority, should not prevent our regarding the passage of the Limmat as one of the most brilliant feats of arms in the revolutionary wars, nor denying to Masséna the well-deserved appellation of 'Saviour of the Republic.'"

The Archduke and Jomini agree in blaming Masséna on this account. They are both of opinion that Korsakow could not have moved simultaneously to Zug and Winterthur; that Mortier alone was able to mask the steep road leading to Zug across the Albis, and that from that moment it was indisputable that military principles required the use of all possible means for the attack on the Zürichberg, with the object of intercepting thereby the enemy's communications.

The battle of Zürich had a disastrous effect on the spirits of the Russians. They became discouraged when, disabused of the exalted opinion they had formed of their own superiority, and of the contempt in which they held their adversaries,

they saw their brightest hopes vanish. Masséna's victory was all the more important, because it rendered Korsakow impotent to resume the campaign for a lengthened period; for after the total loss of his artillery and warlike *matériel*, his army was thenceforward of small account in the balance. The French general, on the other hand, having no further anxiety about the most interesting part of Switzerland and of the theatre of war, was in a position to employ his forces elsewhere.

The French exercised method in their pursuit of the Russians. They had suffered considerably themselves, added to which the distance from their left wing and their line of retreat was augmented in proportion to their advance beyond Zürich. Finally, Masséna did not conceal from himself that there was plenty left for him to do, so long as he had Suwarow to deal with. He therefore consigned to Oudinot the task of pursuing the Russians, and left early in the day for Schwyz, at the head of Mortier's division and the grenadier reserve. The operations in that quarter had commenced on the same day and at the same hour as at Zürich.

SOULT'S OPERATIONS ON THE LINTH.

The success of Masséna's operations on the banks of the Linth was, as of those at Zürich, the just reward of sagacious combinations energetically executed.

Soult was intrusted with the operations against the Austrians on the Linth between the lakes of Zürich and Walenstadt. To have a clear idea of these movements, it must be explained that Jellachich and Linken, the former moving by Sargans and Walenstadt, the latter by the Martinsloch and Schwanden, were to effect a junction at Glarus, with the object of surrounding Molitor and falling on Soult's right, so as to open the valley of the Linth to Suwarow. Jellachich and Linken were acting in virtue of instructions received from Suwarow, whose arrival they were to await at Glarus. We will return to their operations further on.

It was therefore incumbent on Soult to penetrate by Wesen, for the purpose of separating Jellachich from Hotze, and driving the latter from the position, whence he commanded the sources of the Thur and the Töss. To accomplish this, the barrier of the Linth had to be crossed, and the passage of the river forced. Soult had selected Bilten and Grynau as the points for crossing.

Ten battalions and fourteen squadrons (Austro-Russians) defended the Linth between Wesen and Schmerikon, but their distribution was so faulty that the main body consisted of only two battalions at Kaltbrunn, where Hotze had established his headquarters, the remainder being dispersed in different posts along the river and in the neighbouring villages.

It has already been seen, in several instances, how impossible is the defence of a line of any extent by means of a chain of isolated posts. Troops that are thus scattered and subdivided, however strong in other respects the line formed by them may be, cannot do more than observe the enemy, a purpose which even weak bodies of troops would serve equally well. *The only way to defend a line in its entirety is to concentrate the greatest possible number of troops in a central position, so as to be able to move in mass against the enemy, on whatever point he may seriously threaten.*

THE ATTACK AT BILTEN.

The point for crossing the Linth, though favourable, was not without its difficulties. The breadth of the river does not exceed 120 feet, but the current is rapid, and its marshy banks render it difficult of approach. No other means being available, eight portable boats, procured from the Lake of Zug, were obliged to be brought by road from Lachen to Bilten, two of which were to be used in the establishment of a flying bridge for the passage of the artillery and the cavalry, the remainder in the transport of the leading troops. The embarkation was to be preceded by a company of swimmers,

who were to cross the river and overpower the first Austrian posts.

25th Sept. The French commenced their attack between 3 and 4 A.M. of the 25th, that is to say, about an hour before that of Dietikon. The convoy, which had left Lachen at five o'clock the previous evening, debouched from the village of Bilten to reach the bank of the river, a distance of 1200 metres, more than half of which was marshy ground, over which it was necessary to improvise a road made with planks. The noise made by the carriages on these planks attracted the attention of the enemy, whose posts opened fire on the convoy. Nevertheless, the boats were conducted to the bank, and unloaded from the drays without any serious mishap.

On the termination of this operation, the swimmers jumped into the water, their swords between their teeth, and their pistols fastened on their heads. They reached the right bank, and advancing under cover of the artillery, with shouts of "Forward," dispersed the enemy's posts. Having made some prisoners of the Austrian regiment Bender, they compelled them to shout in German, "Retire, Bender; save yourselves—the French have disembarked." By these means they cleared the opposite bank, and were thus enabled to launch the boats and embark the grenadiers. In a short time six of their companies, having reached the right bank, attacked the village of Schänis, a quarter of a league from the spot where they had crossed, dislodged from thence an Austrian battalion, and carried the place. The Austrian reserve, coming up from Kaltbrunn, retook the village, but the reinforcements, which the French were constantly receiving, by reason of the uninterrupted passage of their troops, enabled them to re-enter Schänis, in which they finally established themselves, after having been thrice driven out of it.

Hotze had hurried forward at the first sound of artillery to ascertain by personal investigation the state of affairs. Near Schänis he came upon a post held by some riflemen of the 25th regiment, who were concealed behind a hedge.

Summoned to surrender, Hotze wheeled round and spurred his horse, when both he and Colonel Plumkelt, the chief of his staff, were killed by a discharge of musketry. The news of this disaster, which spread like wildfire, increased the disorder amongst the Austrian troops. They made a stand, nevertheless, near Kaltbrunn, but the village having been carried by a charge, they were routed, and retreated, some to Wesen, others to Lichtensteig. Petrasch succeeded Hotze.

The infantry, in the meanwhile, had continued to cross by successive detachments up to 9 P.M. The pontonniers, who had had no food, and were exhausted with fatigue, could work no longer, so that the establishment of the flying bridge for the cavalry and the artillery was postponed till daylight the following morning. All the infantry who were at that point had crossed. Nevertheless, the flying bridge was established during the night, and the cavalry and artillery commenced to cross it at 4 A.M. of the 26th.

26th Sept.

ATTACK OF GRYNAU.

It was possible to support the passage at this point by troops embarked on the Lake of Zürich. A road leading from Tuggen to Utznach could be made available, and it was easy to re-establish the bridge, which the Austrians had only half destroyed. A flotilla of three gunboats and twelve barges had been assembled at Lachen. Six of the largest of these boats were detailed for the embarkation of 700 men under the command of Brigadier Lochet, who was instructed to ascend the Linth, disembark his troops on the right bank, and move upon Utznach, with the view of protecting the re-establishment of the bridge of Grynau and the movement of the column directed on that point. The other six barges were to convey 300 men, who were also ordered to start from Lachen, under the command of Valot, adjutant-major of the 94th, with instructions to disembark at Schmerikon, and make a vigorous effort to reach Utznach, so as to join the troops

marching to the latter place. The three gunboats were to protect both these movements, more especially that on Schmerikon ; to carry off such of the enemy's boats as might be within reach, and to intercept by their fire the communications between Utznach and Rapperschwyl. Finally, General Laval was instructed to make a demonstration before Benken, so as to attract the enemy's attention, and then, turning to his left, to cross the bridge of Grynau.

Soult was limited to the services of a single company of pontonniers, who were insufficient to meet simultaneously the requirements for the passage of the Linth, as well as the service of the gunboats and the barges detailed for the disembarkation of the troops. This deficiency was met by the aid of 100 infantry soldiers, who were exercised several nights in handling the barges ; and when the operation commenced, all the boatmen, of whom a list had been procured, were forcibly seized, and surprised in their houses, in order that they might be employed in navigating the boats on the lake.

The convoy of boats left Lachen at midnight, escorted by three gunboats, and conveying 1000 men of the 94th and 25th light infantry. The six smaller boats, destined for Schmerikon, disembarked their 300 men at the appointed spot. Two of the gunboats had in the meantime anchored opposite Schmerikon to cover the disembarkation ; the third brought to in front of Ober-Bollingen, with the view of stopping any reinforcements which the enemy might send from Rapperschwyl to Utznach. The boats destined to ascend the Linth could not fetch the mouth of the river, owing to the water being too low, and because the Austrians had a force on the right bank. They steered for Schmerikon, and the 700 men on board were disembarked between that village and Utznach, and marched to the bridge of Grynau under the guidance of Locket. General Laval placed 200 men of the 25th on rafts, and these attacked the redoubts, the fire of which impeded the re-establishment of the bridge.

During the repair of the bridge, Locket moved upon Utz-

nach, which was taken and retaken. At this moment two battalions of the 36th, brought by Lapisse, who had not discovered the ford, arrived at the bridge. Laval sent them immediately to support Lochet; but scarcely had the head of the column debouched before the bridge gave way.

The leading companies, thus cut off, were exposed to the greatest danger, for the reserve of the Russian general Titow, consisting of two battalions, was bearing down on them. This handful of soldiers of the 36th, retaining their presence of mind, let the Russians approach within easy range, when they received them with a murderous fire. Supported by the musketry fire of the remainder of the troops, drawn up in order of battle on the left bank, and by that of four guns, they spread disorder amongst the attacking column, and then rushing upon them with the bayonet, defeated them.

The 300 men disembarked at Schmerikon, which they took, marched half way to Utznach, where the Austrians, covered by an entrenchment, disputed the passage of a stream. After an animated struggle, the French fell back in two columns on Schmerikon and Grynau. The former of these columns, pressed closely by the Imperialists, was obliged to seek shelter in its boats.

The re-establishment of the bridge was attended with much delay, and the result was such that the troops could only cross in single file; so that Laval, on the night of the 25th, had only one battalion of the 36th, besides the corps of Lochet, on the right bank of the Linth. The remainder of the brigade was on the left bank, between the bridge and Tuggen.

The misadventures of this day, and the incipient rumours of the occurrences at Zürich, induced Petrasch to withdraw during the night by the Lichtensteig road. Titow, whose brigade had also suffered considerably, retired by Utznach to Grüningen.

On the 26th September the French advanced upon all the points. At Wesen the enemy offered a strenuous resistance,

26th Sept.

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the town being defended by 900 men and eight guns. Godinot, who had been directed to take it in conjunction with Molitor, bore the brunt of the affair. Molitor, who was occupied elsewhere, as we shall shortly see, could not assist in the attack on Wesen. Nevertheless Godinot, who had succeeded in holding the garrison in check during the whole of the 25th, was during the night reinforced by eight companies of grenadiers sent to him by Soult. One battalion turned the town by the heights of Amden, whilst another attacked it in front, and after an obstinate and bloody struggle, 800 men, eight guns, twenty tumbrils, and one standard, fell into the hands of the French.

Although the attack made the previous evening on Kaltbrunn had succeeded perfectly, the enemy was anxious to retake this post, and during the night he moved from Utznach to Benken a body of 1200 infantry and a squadron of the Granitz hussars. Soult, informed of this movement, surrounded this corps at dawn by the 36th. It laid down its arms, leaving in the hands of the French five guns and a standard.

Titow, who had evacuated Utznach in the morning, and taken up a position on the mountain in rear of Gauen, was here attacked and beaten by part of Laval's brigade. He then flung himself into the mountains in the direction of Wyl, and reached Constance on the 28th.

28th Sept.

Petrasch was pursued and overtaken in the direction of Lichtensteig; he lost a gun and some prisoners, and took the St Gallen road. Soult was on the point of pressing him closely, when the latter was compelled to turn his attention to the minor cantons, where Lecourbe was engaged with Suwarow, and Molitor with Jellachich and Linken. Petrasch, continuing his retreat, crossed the Rhine at Rheineck on the 28th, destroyed the bridge in his rear, and summoned the militia of the Vorarlberg to the defence of their frontiers.

A strong detachment of Laval's brigade was sent from Utznach to Rapperschwyl, the gunboats moving to the same point by water. That town was taken, and with it several

guns, gun-carriages, and vehicles, besides 15,000 rations of bread—a precious prize according to Masséna, as his army had been for eighteen hours without any. The three gunboats entered the port at 8 o'clock, and there found Williams's flotilla, consisting of seven gunboats, one of which mounted thirteen pieces. These gunboats were abandoned, and a portion of them sunk.

Petrasch had lost more than half his troops ; 3000 prisoners, twenty guns, and the entire flotilla of the Lake of Zurich, having fallen into the hands of the French.

Petrasch, though compelled to retreat, went, as the Archduke says, a great deal too far. Anxious regarding the approaches to the Vorarlberg, the pretended key of the Austrian monarchy, he was desirous of covering it by taking up a position behind the Rhine. He failed to see that, if the French intended to move in this direction, the shortest line by Amden, St Johann, and Werdenberg, was at their disposal. Petrasch would have done better to have halted behind the Sitter and in the defiles of St Gallen ; from thence it would have been in his power to establish communications with Korsakow, and at the same time threaten his adversary's flank and rear, should the latter venture to approach the Rhine. As a general rule, positions taken up on the flank of a victorious army, supposing that in other respects they fulfil all the requisite conditions, are always more favourable for arresting its progress than positions taken up in front. The latter cause no change in the relative situation of the antagonists ; the former oblige the pursuing enemy to change the direction of his movements. Time is thus gained, and thereby the object of the defensive is fulfilled.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN LEFT WING.

On the 25th September, the same day on which the French 25th Sept. commenced their operations, the Austrian left wing was put in motion, in conformity with Suwarow's plans, to execute a

general attack on the valley of the Linth. Jellachich, as has been mentioned, left the neighbourhood of Sargans and Walenstadt to regain possession of the bridge of Nettstall. He marched with three battalions and three squadrons by Kerenzen and the Fronalp to Nettstall. Two battalions ascended the valley of Weissbergen to maintain communication with the troops advancing by the neighbouring valleys; three other battalions marched by Mühlehorn upon Mollis.

The French had broken the bridge of Nettstall. Two battalions occupied the heights of Beglingen; a third faced Wesen; 500 men and one piece of artillery held the bridge of Näfels. The entire success of the Austrians was limited to their entry into Mollis. The defenders of the bridge of Näfels, as well as those guarding that of Nettstall, stood their ground. These passages were again disputed on the 26th, on the arrival of the fugitives of the battalions which Godinot had defeated at Wesen, pursued by the French, who commenced a lively cannonade upon Jellachich. The latter, on learning the catastrophe of Bilten and Kaltbrunn, became anxious for his retreat by the shores of Walen-See, and commenced it forthwith. One column marched from the broken bridge of Nettstall straight to Murg by the Fronalp. Jellachich with the remainder detained the enemy till night-fall in the defile of Kerenzen, and continuing his retreat by Walenstadt, reached Ragatz on the 28th, whence he crossed to the right bank of the Rhine. The French did not pursue him, their attention having been distracted by the movement of Linken, who was advancing by the Upper Linth.

Linken had left Chur and Ems on the 23d September to march on Flims, where he divided his corps into three columns.

The first column, consisting of one battalion, entered the valley of the Sernf by Martinsloch.

The other two were conducted by Linken to Panix, which he reached on the 24th.

The second column, of two and a half battalions and one squadron, effected the passage of Segnes between the Hauss-

tock and Martinsloch, and descended, together with Linken himself, to the baths of Wichlen, near the head of the valley of the Sernf.

The third column, of one and a half battalions, reached on the left the sources of the Linth near the bridge of Panten.

Linken, with the second column, met at Wichlen a French battalion, which broke the bridge across the Sernf, and made an obstinate defence. Turned, however, by the two other columns, the first of which had advanced to Elm and Matt, and the third to Schwanden, this battalion, as well as a detachment that had reached it in support, were cut off and obliged to lay down their arms.

Simultaneously with Jellachich's retirement on the 26th, Linken was uniting his columns at Schwanden, and a skirmish occurred at Mitlödi, in consequence of an attempt by the Austrians to reconnoitre in the direction of Glarus.

The French having no further cause for anxiety regarding the Lake of Walenstadt, Molitor moved on the 27th with two battalions and two guns against Linken, who compelled him to re-enter Glarus, and taking up a position in front of the town, endeavoured to seize the debouche of the Klön-Thal. Molitor hastened thither, and whilst he defended with vigour the approaches to the defile, he directed against the Austrian left half a battalion, which by its fire paralysed their attack, and caused them considerable loss. The combat lasted the whole day, and with all the greater intensity, because it was by the debouche of the Klön-Thal that Linken was bound to lend a hand to Suwarow. Molitor, however, remained master of the position. 27th Sept.

The Austrian general, uneasy concerning Suwarow's delay, remained inactive on the 28th; and the French, exhausted by the combat of the previous day, did not molest him. Nothing occurred on this day, save some insignificant skirmishes at the advanced posts. The French were waiting for the reinforcement of a battalion of the 25th light infantry, which Mainoni sent them the following day. 28th Sept.

Nevertheless Molitor, having heard about noon that an enemy's column was threatening his rear by the Muotta-Thal, and uncertain who this fresh adversary might be, hastened to detach the second battalion of the 84th to the head of the Klön-See, but found that the regiment of Kerpen was already in possession of it. A flag of truce on the part of Suwarow made its appearance, but was not received. Molitor, far from suspecting that he had the Marshal's advanced guard in his rear, thought that this regiment was detached from Linken's corps to turn his right by the Bisi-Thal, when a despatch, sent to him by Lecourbe from Altorf, undeceived him, and explained what hitherto he had been unable to comprehend, viz., that the movements of Jellachich and Linken were combined with the advance of the Russians, and had for their common object the junction of their respective troops at Glarus.

Though the position was critical, the general regarded it complacently, and determined to face the danger, notwithstanding he was without instructions from either Masséna or Soult. The ground being unsuitable for deployments on a large scale, he did not despair of his ability to extricate himself by boldness and activity. As there was only a portion of the Russian advanced guard in his rear, it was simply the question of getting rid of Linken before being obliged to engage the Russians.

28th Sept. Molitor, assembling his officers on the evening of the 28th on an eminence, whence the enemy's position could be seen, explained to them his plans, assigned them their places in the impending struggle, and by stirring language inflamed their ardour.

Linken occupied with two lines the entire breadth of the valley in rear of Glarus, and covered his flank by two battalions posted half way up the opposite sides. In view of this disposition, Molitor directed two demi-battalions in detached companies to turn the flanks of the Austrians, and to manœuvre so as to gain their line of retreat, by reaching during the night the points which commanded them. Three columns, preceded

by artillery, were designed to make a front attack in the valley, the instant the lateral detachments had begun to operate on the enemy's rear.

At daybreak of the 29th, the attack was made with unity ^{29th Sept.} and precision, the ordinary harbingers of success. The first line of the Austrians was thrown back on the second, in the centre of which the French artillery committed frightful ravages. Simultaneously the skirmishers forced back into the valley the Austrian flanking posts. The Austrians, huddled together on one road, and harassed on all sides, withdrew in disorder, leaving the field of battle covered with dead and wounded. Molitor pursued them as far as Engi in the Sernf-Thal, and brought back with him 300 prisoners.

Linken, without news of Suwarow, though he had endeavoured to procure some by means of trusty adherents, and through a party which he had sent into the Schächen-Thal, had been apprised of Jellachich's retreat on the 25th instant, and likewise judged fit to abandon the field of battle. Under cover of the night he reached the baths of Wichlen unmolested, and without being pursued by the French, whose attention was engrossed by the presence of Suwarow in the Muotta-Thal. From the baths of Wichlen, Linken, unsuspecting of the real cause of the French not pursuing him, continued his retreat on the 30th in two columns. One returned to Flims by the Martinsloch; the other crossed the Sagoin Alp, and descended by Panix upon Ruis in the valley of the Vorder Rhine. The main body returned to Chur. Some detached posts remained in observation between Ilanz and Dissentis. The heights of Panix, Flims, and the Kunkels Pass were occupied, as well as the posts of Tamins, Vättis, and Mayenfeld.

Linken would have been able to maintain his position in front of Glarus, if, instead of assuming a passive attitude on the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th September, he had daily attacked the French, or if at least he had afforded them occupation sufficient to divert them from offensive operations; for the

consequences of inaction are always dangerous in mountainous countries. Linken had to co-operate in an offensive enterprise, and this object was not attained by the defensive attitude, which he assumed in front of Glarus. Although Jellachich's retreat left him no further hope from that quarter, and although he had no news of the Russians, he was nevertheless unauthorised to move to so great a distance from the object of his destination, and to resume a course of absolute inaction behind the Rhine, before he had obtained positive intelligence of the Russian advance. The French having refrained from pursuit after a combat, in which they had proved themselves superior, should have satisfied him, that it was not on account of the efforts displayed by him in action, that the French had abstained from pursuing him. Had he attributed another motive to their conduct, he would have found in it an additional argument against his injudicious abandonment of the valley of the Linth. A general officer intrusted with a separate manœuvre should never, unless constrained to do so by superior forces, pass from the offensive to the defensive, nor withdraw from an operation in which he has been ordered to take a part, so long as he entertains the slightest doubt about the entire abandonment of the projected enterprise.

Jellachich erred equally in this respect, when, on withdrawing to the Lake of Walenstadt to avoid being intercepted in his line of retreat, he crossed the Rhine unpursued by the enemy, and free from any apprehension of being anticipated by the French in the Vorarlberg.

To sum up : Korsakow, having been repulsed from Zürich, caused Petrasch's retreat, Petrasch Jellachich's, and Jellachich Linken's; and if other corps had taken in succession the place of these, they would all have been actuated by the same motive, and have done the same thing. All these retrograde movements occurred before the first could influence the rest, and extended further than it was possible its influence could affect them. It is quite true that, in the

majority of cases, it would be better to quit a position voluntarily than be forcibly compelled to abandon it, especially when everything is risked by an obstinate defence of the same; but it is neither wise nor becoming to abandon an important point before the enemy is in a condition to seize it, simply because he may be enabled to do so at some future time.

After the victory at Zürich, Mortier marched with the 4th division to Schwyz, with the view of supporting Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss. For the purpose of covering this manœuvre and of observing Korsakow, Masséna hurried forward the divisions Ménard, Lorges, and Klein, under Oudinot's orders, to Winterthur and Bülach. The third division remained in the valley of the Linth between Glarus and Schänis.

Lecourbe was nominated to the command of the Army of Observation of the Rhine, at the moment when he was contending with Suwarow for the St Gothard and the valley of the Reuss. His division was intrusted to Loison. Soult assumed the command of the right wing, Gazan replacing Soult in the command of the third division. Masséna repaired to Schwyz on the 27th, and concerted his plan of operations with Soult.

SUWAROW'S INVASION OF SWITZERLAND.

Suwarow did not commence his movement upon Switzerland till the 11th September. Instead of directing it by the Simplon or the St Bernard on Le Valais, which he could have reached with greater facility, and there crushed Tharreau's division, or by the Splügen against the Grisons, whither he might have arrived without striking a blow, he selected the St Gothard. True it was the shortest route, but also the most difficult, as has previously been remarked. On the 15th he reached Taverne with 18,000 infantry, 4000 Cossacks, and

11th Sept.

15th Sept.

25 two-pounder mountain-guns packed on mules. The Airolo road being neither free nor practicable for carriages, the artillery park was sent to Como, and the train to Verona, for the purpose of reaching Switzerland by the Grisons and the Tyrol. Strauch's brigade, appointed to act with the Russians, was about 6000 strong. It watched the approaches to the St Gothard and Le Valais at Giornico, and in the Val Maggia.

On the part of the French, Tharreau's division of fourteen battalions and eight squadrons covered Masséna's right flank against Italy. It was scattered in detached posts from the St Bernard to the St Gothard, a reserve of two or three battalions occupying the central point of Brieg.

The St Gothard was more efficiently defended. In rear of it were stationed the main body of Lecourbe's division, seventeen battalions and two regiments of cavalry, which occupied the valley of the Reuss between Altorf and Hospenthal. These troops could not be devoted exclusively to the defence of the post of the St Gothard, because the Russian attack directed from Italy led to the supposition, that the movement would be made in combination with the Austrians. It was to be expected that the columns of the divisions, which started from the Grisons, would advance directly into the valley of the Vorder Rhine and towards the sources of the Linth.

Suwarow was detained five days at Taverne, in consequence of defective arrangements for the supply of beasts of burden and the necessary provisions. As his army could not hope to be supplied from the Austrian magazines in the valley of the Rhine, and, after crossing the St Gothard, would have to take with it subsistence for ten days, it became necessary to employ the greater portion of the Cossacks' horses for the transport of food and supplies. Muskets were served out to the dismounted men, who were employed as light infantry.

19th Sept. Rosenberg left for Bellinzona on the 19th September, with eight battalions and two regiments of Cossacks, together upwards of 6000 men. Obtaining a supply of biscuits at

Bellinzona, he left that town on the 21st, entered the Val ^{21st Sept.} Blenio by Dongio, and crossed the Lukmanier Pass, arriving on the 22d at St Maria in the valley of the Middle Rhine, and on the 23d at Dissentis, where Auffenberg, starting from Ilanz with his brigade of 2000 men, was to join him. They were instructed to force their way into the valley of the Reuss, Auffenberg by the Maderaner-Thal to Am Stäg, Rosenberg by the Crispalt to Urseren, so as to take the St Gothard in reverse, whilst Suwarow attacked in front by the valley of the Ticino.

Suwarow transferred his headquarters on the 21st to Bellinzona; on the 22d to Giornico; and as soon as his ^{22d Sept.} army joined Strauch's brigade at Dazio, he had with him about 22,000 men.

On the 24th September he formed his army in three ^{24th Sept.} columns to attack the mountain.

The right, consisting of eight battalions under the orders of General Schweikowski, was to escalate, as it best could, the summit of the St Gothard by such paths, as might be met with to the right of Airolo.

The central and strongest, conducted by Suwarow in person, was directed upon Airolo and the Hospice of the Capuchins, to the right of Hospenthal.

The left, under Strauch, was destined to cover the march of the other two columns by a movement upon Le Valais, the effect of which was to compel Gudin to fall back with the French extreme right.

Airolo was quickly carried: 1000 French, who guarded this post, threw themselves into the Val Tremola, where they engaged in an obstinate defence against the efforts of the turning column to gain the summit. Gudin had only three battalions of the 38th of the line wherewith to defend the St Gothard: one battalion of the 87th occupied the Furka, and a mere detachment of the 67th guarded the Crispalt.

At the sight of these elevated and snow-capped heights, covered with eternal glaciers and rocks bristling with soldiers,

the Russians were terror-stricken. Deaf for a moment to the voice of their leaders, whom they usually regarded with almost servile respect, they refused to advance.

At this juncture Suwarow, hastening to the spot, reproached his soldiers for their cowardice and disobedience. His efforts were of no avail. Then causing a grave to be dug in the middle of the road, he laid himself in it, exclaiming, "Cover me with earth: you are no longer my children; I am no longer your father. There is nothing for me but to die; bury me here." The Russian grenadiers, ashamed and affected at witnessing the heroic despair of the old man, who had so frequently led them to victory, surrounded him in crowds, kissed his hands, and demanded with loud cries permission to escalate the St Gothard. The combat lasted twelve hours, during which the Russians suffered considerable loss at the hands of the 38th regiment. Schweikouski, however, succeeded in the evening in escalating the summits that command Hospenthal, in consequence of which Gudin was compelled to withdraw to the left bank of the Reuss by the bridge of that village, whence he marched to Realp, where he received directions from Lecourbe to rejoin Tharreau in Le Valais. Several hours later Suwarow reached Hospenthal and encamped on both banks of the Reuss.

Lecourbe had concentrated his troops in the valley of the Reuss, and led them in person against the Russians. He had no suspicion that Rosenberg would cross the Crispalt, already covered with snow; besides which, the approaches to this mountain were guarded by a detachment of the 67th regiment, posted between Somvix and Dissentis, in the valley of the Vorder Rhine. Lecourbe left his reserve at Urseren; Gudin was at Realp; and he marched to Hospenthal with the intention of offering battle on the morrow.

Rosenberg and Auffenberg reached Dissentis in safety, after having dispersed and captured the detachment of the 67th, and on the 24th continued their march in the direction respectively assigned to them. At 3 P.M. the same day,

Rosenberg reached the edge of the Ober-Alp-See, but not having as yet heard any news of Suwarow's approach with the principal column, he did not venture on a descent into the valley. This delay, coupled with that experienced by Suwarow, prevented the junction of these columns when within a pace of effecting it.

Lecourbe, unaware of his position between two of the enemy's corps, and intending to offer battle the next day, posted himself as near as possible to Suwarow in front of Hospenthal. At length, about 9 P.M., Rosenberg descended upon Urseren, where he fell unexpectedly on Lecourbe's reserve. This body of troops retreated across the Devil's Bridge, blowing up the arch behind it. If Rosenberg had pushed forward at once to the source of the Reuss, and joined Suwarow, Lecourbe would have been caught between two fires, and compelled to lay down his arms, or cut his way through sword-in-hand. Rosenberg, however, passed the night quietly between Urseren and the Devil's Bridge.

In the interval, Lecourbe fully realised the danger of his position. Rosenberg's corps, posted in his rear, did not admit of his attacking Suwarow with any chance of success; still less could he hope to defeat Rosenberg, because Suwarow would have been close on his heels; the destruction of the Devil's Bridge, moreover, would have rendered this desperate plan quite impracticable. In this critical juncture, if ever there was one, he discharged his artillery against the Russians, who were carelessly encamped near Hospenthal, threw his guns into the Reuss, and withdrew under cover of night to the left bank of the Reuss by the pastures of Geschenen.

Lecourbe's movement upon Hospenthal, whilst the enemy's columns were threatening the valley of the Reuss at Urseren and Am Stäg, was one error resulting from another, in having ignored and failed to provide against the enemy's movements; for everything tended to the belief, that such an important enterprise as Suwarow's would be certainly

combined with the co-operation of other columns, especially along the valley of the Vorder Rhine. If Lecourbe was actually aware of Rosenberg's and Auffenberg's march, he deserves the reproach of excessive temerity in advancing so far, whilst Rosenberg was approaching him on his sole line of retreat. If, on the other hand, he was in ignorance of their movements, his march was a further error, almost insulting to the enemy, who, according to this supposition, would have neglected the most ordinary precautions. In either case, he was guilty of an error.

25th Sept. The Russians re-united their forces at Urseren on the morning of the 25th September. They had crossed the barrier of the St Gothard, and carried the salient angle of the French position, the point of contact between the two divisions of their right wing, by which they lost the means of communicating with and assisting each other. Lecourbe could no longer oppose Suwarow's march; all that was left for him to do was, by taking advantage of the obstacles of the ground, to retard the enemy's progress, and enable his own commander-in-chief to adopt the measures suitable to the exigency.

Suwarow left in the neighbourhood of the St Gothard Strauch's brigade, which had flanked his march on the side of Le Valais, and detached two battalions to Realp at the foot of the Furka. Continuing his advance down the valley, Suwarow reached the Urner-Loch (Trou d'Uri), a tunnel eighty paces in length, bored through the rock, by which he must debouche along a steep incline to reach the Devil's Bridge. The arch of the bridge was destroyed, and the French were in occupation of the mountains opposite, whence they prevented by their fire the re-establishment of the bridge, and swept not only the debouche, but the very entrance of the Urner-Loch.

The first Russian battalion, which courageously entered the gallery, was entirely destroyed. The column followed; received by a storm of musketry, it sought precipitate shelter

under this natural cavern ; the pressure increased as the passage became filled ; the rearmost troops pushed forward those in front, and the latter, when deprived of shelter, perished from the effects of the French fire, or fell into the gorge. It then occurred to the Russians to attempt a turning movement. A ford having been discovered above the bridge, they plunged into the torrent, crossed in spite of the rapid current, with the water up to their armpits, climbed the rocks on the opposite bank, and drove the French from their posts. Suwarow had the bridge repaired with trunks of trees and planks, and reached Wasen on the evening of the 25th. He left again during the night, but his progress was slow, and impeded by obstacles ; several broken bridges and some difficult passages separated the column ; however, on its head arriving, a short time before daybreak, within half a league of Am Stäg, it halted on observing in the valley and on the heights, in rear of the village, bivouac fires, which it mistook for those of the enemy, but which in reality were Auffenberg's.

Lecourbe had left but few troops to defend the Devil's Bridge, because Auffenberg having debouched with four battalions from the Maderaner-Thal into the valley of the Reuss, threatened his line of retreat too seriously to justify him remaining at the head of the valley.

Auffenberg had left Dissentis on the 24th, and on the same day reached the Maderaner-Thal by the Kreuzli Pass, when night overtook him. The extraordinary fatigues endured by the troops during the passage obliged him to give them some hours' rest. On the morning of the 25th he fell in with the French half a league from Am Stäg, defeated them, and entered the village. The French, who had received a reinforcement of 2000 men from Altorf, returned to the charge, and were a second time repulsed. The combat had scarcely ended, when Lecourbe with the whole of his column, from 5000 to 6000 men retreating before Suwarow, reached Wasen. He put himself at the head of his grenadiers, and attacked the Austrians in the most vigorous manner. Auffenberg, unable

to defend the bridge and the village against such superior forces, withdrew to the heights contiguous to the outlet of the Maderaner-Thal. From thence the French were unable to dislodge them, and Lecourbe was forced to satisfy himself with having cleared the road to Altorf, whither he retreated during the night, after having burned the bridge in advance of Am Stäg. In the above-mentioned position Auffenberg awaited the arrival of the Russians, and they were his watch-fires that arrested Suwarow's column.

The Russian advanced guard pushed forward to Am Stäg at 7 A.M. on the 26th, and effected its junction with Auffenberg.

The army continued to advance. Several hundred French made pretence of defending the passage across the rivulet of Schächen in advance of Bürglen; some others that of Attinghausen; but both these detachments soon fell back towards the bridge of Seedorf, on their main body reaching the left bank of the Reuss.

Rosenberg and Auffenberg marched to Altorf; the remainder of the Russian army encamped on either bank of the Schächenbach, where they were joined in the evening by some battalions that had remained behind at Hospenthal and Urseren.

Lecourbe had moved with all his troops to the mountains on the opposite bank of the Reuss, and on the western side of the Lake of the Four Cantons. The free navigation of the lake, sufficient means of transport, and the communication with Unterwalden, assured his retreat; added to which, the position of his rear-guard at Seedorf enabled him to resume a threatening attitude.

The Russians attached no importance to the total evacuation of the right bank of the Reuss, nor to the occupation of the bridge of Seedorf. They left the enemy in quiet possession of a post whence he could watch and disconcert all their movements.

Suwarow took possession of Altorf and Flüelen, but was

unable to make a further advance. He calculated on finding at Flüelen transports wherewith to cross the lake; but as its boats had been for several months in the possession of the French, he was compelled to abandon all idea of an advance in that direction, and resolved to march by the Schächen-Thal along the path that leads to Schwyz, across the terrible rocks of the Kinzig-Kulm and the Muotta-Thal, a frightful passage, to which even the daring Lecourbe was apprehensive of committing himself.

On the 27th September, Suwarow continued his advance 27th Sept. by a road, which troops had never before traversed. The whole army, forming a single column together with the beasts of burden, defiled at a measured pace, generally in single file, and scaled the terrible rocks with infinite labour. At 5 o'clock in the evening several hundred Cossacks reached Muotta, where they surprised two French companies, which had been sent from Schwyz to reconnoitre in the direction of Glarus: these companies were taken or dispersed.

Suwarow arrived before dawn of day on the 28th with the 8th Sept. head of the column, whilst the remainder, scattered here and there amongst the rocks, struggled till nightfall of the 29th against the obstacles that nature in her savage mood presented to the advance of the troops. The beasts of burden and the Cossacks' horses wore out their shoes on the sharp points of granite, and were unable to follow with the provisions: a great number fell and rolled down the precipices. Lecourbe appeared on the scene, and made confusion doubly confounded. The instant he perceived the advance of the Russians, he fell on their rear-guard under Rosenberg. The latter, compelled to combat all day, did not reach Muotta 29-30th
Sept. till the night of the 29th-30th, having suffered considerable loss in men and horses.

The difficulties and horrors of this passage prove how faulty Suwarow's operations were. Desirous of debouching on the flank and rear of the Albis, without commanding the navigation of the Lake of Luzern, he had to rely on a

wretched path leading to Schwyz, across a lofty range of mountains. Such a passage, fit only for chamois-hunters, was certainly ill suited to the advance of 20,000 men to a point of attack, where it was probable they would find the enemy ready to receive them, with his artillery in position, and his means of defence prepared. This sort of path is only fit for small detachments, carrying all their provisions with them, such as are used for reconnoitring and for the support of attacks in the valleys. Large bodies become scattered in difficult passages of this kind, exhaust their power fruitlessly, and can neither supply their own requirements, nor take with them the transport which is indispensable for active operations.

Conceive the difficulties of Suwarow's position on reaching Muotta : he was as yet unaware of Korsakow's disaster at Zürich, or of Hotze's defeat on the Linth. He had no news either of Jellachich or Linken, whom he believed to be in possession of Glarus. Instead, he found Mortier at one end of the valley, Molitor at the other, and in his rear the foot-path of the Kinzig-Kulm, which he had traversed with unheard-of difficulty.

Whilst Suwarow was toiling up the slopes of the Kinzig-Kulm, Masséna, who had heard of the arrival of the Russian corps at Altorf, felt the necessity of arresting his progress. Having nothing more to apprehend from Korsakow, on whose traces he had left Ménard, Klein, and Lorges, under the orders of Oudinot, he had, as already mentioned, directed Mortier upon Schwyz. He left a reserve of grenadiers at Schindellegi, and hastened to Lecourbe. Having made a joint reconnaissance in the Schächen-Thal, they followed the terrible traces of the Russian march, marked with the remains of men, who had perished from fatigue and suffering. Masséna forthwith directed Loison's division upon Brunnen, so as to join Mortier's troops near Schwyz. Schwyz was thus occupied in force.

At the other extremity of the Muotta valley, General

Molitor had abandoned, as has been seen, on the 29th, the pursuit of Linken, and had moved the whole of his force into the Klön-Thal.

Suwarow learned from the peasants on the way that Linken had defeated the French on the 26th, and had advanced to Glarus. Not in the least doubting that this success was the result of victories gained by Hotze on the Linth and Korsakow on the Limmat, he sent a party of Cossacks to Glarus, with directions to summon Molitor to lay down his arms, as he was surrounded on all sides. In reply, Molitor drove away the Cossacks and occupied the Prigel Pass. The officer, on his return from this strange mission, brought back the first news of Korsakow's disaster and Hotze's death. The old warrior, who imagined he was on the point of effecting a junction with Hotze, would not credit the statement. He violently repudiated such a calumny, rejected with scorn the advice of his officers to move upon Glarus with the view of assisting Linken, who, it was imagined, was still victorious, and resolved to march forthwith upon Schwyz, for the purpose of relieving Korsakow, whom he persisted in believing to be still in his position at Zürich. However, as the greater portion of his army was in rear, and was laboriously defiling by the mountains, and the soldiers were arriving only by detachments, and were overwhelmed with fatigue, he was obliged to bow to imperious necessity, and to withdraw the order for advance both on that and the following day.

Meanwhile the news of the disasters at Zurich and on the Linth were confirmed by way of Schwyz, and the reality of these rumours being no longer doubtful, Suwarow, in a state of consternation, assembled a council of war on the 29th.

The movement upon Schwyz presented the appearance of very great danger, inasmuch as it would increase the distance between the Russians and the Austrian left wing, while the losses of the army were already considerable, Korsakow's fate as yet uncertain, and no assistance at hand. The council was unanimous in advising a movement upon Glarus, where

a junction might be effected with Linken, the offensive continued in concert with him, and a retreat, in case of a reverse, made by the valley of the Sernf, which, though difficult, was the only free and practicable one.

The absolute necessity of this measure is a further proof of the faultiness of the entire manœuvre of Suwarow, which neither started from an assured base, nor covered that base on the line of retreat, the latter depending mainly on the very uncertain junction of isolated columns, or the no less doubtful success of repeated combats.

29th Sept. Suwarow refused for a long time to listen to the counsel of his officers, which he looked upon as dishonouring to his arms, because it indicated a retrograde movement, whilst the advance upon Schwyz, in other words, an offensive movement on the rear of the French army, offered to him a measure attended with greater glory. Finally, the question was decided in accordance with the general opinion, and Auffenberg's brigade received orders to start on the morning of the 29th to occupy the Pragel, and form the advanced guard on the Glarus road. This advanced guard shortly met a French detachment, which Molitor, at that time still engaged with Linken, had sent to reconnoitre in the direction of Schwyz. The French detachment was repulsed beyond the Pragel, and Auffenberg reached the edge of the Klön-Thal Lake, when night put an end to the combat.

30th Sept. Suwarow left Rosenberg at Muotta to collect the numerous stragglers of the recent march, and on the 30th passed the Pragel in the track of Auffenberg.

Masséna had repaired to Schwyz to await Suwarow's debouche from the Muotta-Thal. On the 30th he made a reconnaissance in force on Muotta, and having thrust back or carried the Russian posts in front of that village, arrived in front of the position, where Rosenberg arrested his advance. A sanguinary struggle ensued, which lasted till nightfall, when the French withdrew, having captured two of the enemy's guns and a hundred prisoners.

Mortier's division and a portion of Lecourbe's army having reached Schwyz in the night, Masséna decided to attack Rosenberg. He marched against the Russian rear-guard in the Muotta-Thal, supporting his advance with flanking parties, who climbed the slopes of this narrow valley, and observed the enemy's movements. The advanced posts were successively carried, after a very animated resistance, and the Russians were forced back on Muotta, where the main body of Rosenberg's force was bivouacked. On coming within range, the French directed their artillery on the masses heaped together in the bottom of the valley. Rosenberg lost no time in arranging his columns. Three battalions in line across the breadth of the valley, supported by five others and two regiments of Cossacks, attacked with the bayonet. The 108th sustained the shock with firmness, having been shortly supported by the 67th, which entered the line somewhat later, having been delayed by the irregularities of the ground. Both these demi-brigades pressed the enemy vigorously, but neither side could claim the victory. Molitor, at the other end of the valley, since the evening of the 29th, had collected all his force on the eastern shores of the Klön-See. Having attacked Auffenberg on the morning of the 30th without result, he occupied the path which winds between the northern mountains and the lake. In the evening, Molitor reconnoitred the enemy's position, just as the head of the Russian column had arrived. Auffenberg made his advanced posts fall back, and induced the French to follow them along the western shore of the lake; then falling upon them from the surrounding heights, he pushed them back with such vigour along the lake, that he reached the opposite shore simultaneously with the enemy, and succeeded in maintaining his ground.

With dawn of day on the 1st October the combat was ^{1st Oct.} renewed. The 84th sustained the attack; but Molitor observing a strong column filing by the mountains, so as to get round his right and interpose between him and the valley of Glarus, he felt that his position was no longer tenable, and effected

his retreat according to the following arrangements, which he had previously prepared. One demi-battalion observed Engi and Linken's retreat; another watched Kerenzen and Jellachich's retreat. One battalion was posted on the Linth at the bridge of Näfels; the bridge of Nettstall was mined; one and a half battalions crossed to the right bank in rear of the bridge; two and a half battalions were formed in echelons, in order of battle, on the left bank, in rear of Nettstall.

The bridge of Näfels had been carefully preserved, as assuring the communication between both banks of the river. The position was admirably chosen. By covering the passage of Näfels, Suwarow's junction with Jellachich on the shores of the Lake of Walenstadt was prevented, as well as with Korsakow, in case he should appear again on the banks of the Thur. The combined action of the corps on either bank of the Linth, as well as the importance assigned to the bridges of Nettstall and Näfels, formed the base of the plan of defence, so honourable to Molitor.

On the appointed signal, the retreat was effected in an orderly manner, but not without difficulty, for the Russians were close on the heels of the rear-guard. On debouching on the Linth, they made a rush for the bridge of Nettstall, and crossed it, mixed up with the tail of the rear-guard, when it fell in, placing the foremost at the mercy of the Republicans, who hurled them into the torrent. The mutilated column remained exposed to the musketry fire of the French posted on the opposite bank, and to the direct attack of echelons formed on the left bank.

Animated by the presence of their general, and impressed with the importance of the point they were anxious to carry, the Russians threw themselves furiously on the bayonets of the French. Twice did fresh columns replace those that had been repulsed. At the third charge they succeeded in reaching the bridge of Näfels, which they had begun crossing, when Molitor sounded the charge, and delivered the attack of his

column, which repassed the narrow and tottering bridge, and again drove the Russians out of Näfels.

The day wore on ; the reinforcements did not appear, and the position became more and more critical. The French were already showing symptoms of exhaustion, and their artillery was exposed to great risk, when finally a detachment of the 10th mounted chasseurs appeared on the field of battle, and enabled them to rally. The Russians, however, succeeded in compelling the French to recross the bridge, when the Helvetian 3d demi-brigade came up in double-time. Molitor harangued them, reminding them of the glory acquired by their ancestors on the same field. The Helvetians, electrified by his words, crossed the bridge under the Russian fire, overthrew their columns, and, supported by two French battalions, thrust them back upon Nettstall. A Russian battalion, which had succeeded in crossing the river on a trestle-bridge, and made a lodgement in Mollis, was in like manner driven out, and compelled to recross the Linth.

Such an obstinate struggle proved how important both sides considered the position. A column of fresh troops soon returned to the charge, and once more repulsed the French in the direction of the bridge of Näfels, when Gazan at length appeared on the scene with a battalion of grenadiers.

On perceiving this reinforcement, Molitor reformed both his columns, and placing two four-pounder guns in front, led them afresh against the enemy. The grenadiers were in reserve. A volley of small shot made a hole in the Russian column, whereupon the 84th charged with the bayonet to widen it. The Russians gave way and fell back in disorder, but their reserve was on the point of re-establishing the equilibrium, when Lochet arrived with the 94th regiment. Repulsed for the sixth time, the Russians finally desisted from their endeavours to force a passage defended with such obstinate valour. The French maintained their position, the right in advance of Näfels, the left in advance of Mollis.

The Russians had 400 killed, 1700 wounded, and lost 200 prisoners. The French had 140 killed and 200 wounded.

^{2d Oct.} The Russians occupied Glarus, where they found provisions. Suwarow remained in this position the 2d, 3d, and 4th October, irresolute as to the course he should pursue. The obstinacy so natural to him, when it was a question of overcoming an obstacle, deserted him on this occasion. He hesitated when in a situation, in which his ordinary determination might have saved him, and when to halt was a matter of excessive danger. He was in a defile, all the outlets of which, with the exception of the paths leading to the valley of the Vorder Rhine, were in possession of the enemy. A rapid march from Glarus to the Lake of Walenstadt, at the sacrifice of his stragglers and bat-animals, would have given Suwarow a good line of retreat, and the shortest communication with the Rhine. In case of a reverse, there was still open to him, as the last resource, the Sernf-Thal. It was, moreover, possible for Jellachich, Petrasch, and Linken to co-operate in this movement as soon as they were informed of it.

On these grounds the Archduke condemns Suwarow, who, in his judgment, should have made a supreme effort against Wesen. But Jomini is of opinion that this criticism is more specious than solid. How could Suwarow hope that Jellachich and Linken, who had failed at the appointed rendezvous, would voluntarily retrace their steps? And if, instead of meeting them, he had been defeated at Wesen, what a horrible retreat his would have been by Engi, pursued and harassed by a conqueror, who by his very activity doubled the actual amount of the victorious force! Would it not have been better for him to have preserved an attitude of defence of some sort, so as to have rallied his troops, already exhausted by such fatigues and privations, than to have looked for success at Wesen, which was not a point of sufficient importance to warrant a continuance of the offensive?

However this may be, Jellachich advanced to Sargans on the first rumour of Suwarow's arrival in the basin of the Linth, and occupied Walenstadt in the belief that the Russians would debouche on this point. He moreover sent a detachment to Kerenzen, to meet some troops, which had recently arrived from Molitor's division, but which fell back on the Linth. Jellachich, however, hearing no more news, abandoned the approaches to the Lake of Walenstadt, and contented himself with the occupation of the pastures of Tills, of Flums, and the valley of Weisstannen. On the 3d ^{3d} Oct. October the French entered Mühlehorn, Kerenzen, and Murg.

Petrasch, who had been directed by the Archduke to co-operate with Suwarow's movements, assembled his troops on the 4th between Fläsch and Mayenfeld, in readiness to ^{4th} Oct. support Jellachich; but Suwarow by his indecision paralysed these movements, and produced a general inaction. On the Austrians learning that Suwarow had abandoned the intention of moving from Glarus to Sargans, they evacuated this district, crossed the lower toll-bridge, and took up a position behind the Rhine. Ragatz and the valley of the Tamina, nevertheless, were still occupied, in order to preserve the communication by the Kunkels Pass.

After considerable indecision, Suwarow, who was in entire ignorance of what was happening in the lower end of the valley and in the direction of Walenstadt and Sargans, and did not know that these last-mentioned points were still in possession of the Austrians, determined finally his line of retreat by the valley of the Sernf. Rosenberg, who had rejoined him on the 4th, after abandoning his wounded to the mercy of the French, was intrusted with the command of the rear-guard.

The Cossacks and the bat-animals moved off on the evening of the same day (the 4th). The army followed at ^{5th} Oct. 3 A.M. the next day, and took the route by Engi Matt and Elm. The rear-guard, who were to watch the enemy at Mollis and Näfels, as well as to cover the march of the army,

left at the same time, without even thinking of making up the bivouac fires.

Molitor was shortly informed by the inhabitants of Glarus of the direction taken by the Russians. He pushed forward a battalion of the 44th across the mountains on the right bank of the Linth, with orders to lie in wait between Schwanden and Engi, and harass the retreat of the Russians, whilst he followed in their track. He came up with their rear-guard at Schwanden, where he was reinforced by a battalion of Loison's brigade, which had descended by the Linth-Thal.

The Russian grenadiers, being sharply attacked, defended themselves with desperation as far as Engi. The French artillery, discharging volleys at their masses heaped up in this narrow path, caused indescribable disorder amongst them. Moreover, not a musket was discharged from the ambuscade of the battalion of the 44th without hitting the Russians, who, being pressed in their rear, defiled without being able to reply. The pursuit continued as far as Elm, where the Russians took up a position, and were kept all night on the alert tormented by the skirmishers. At length, by their firm demeanour, they rendered the pursuit of the French less troublesome, and were enabled to escape total annihilation. The Russians had suffered considerable loss; all their wounded, the sick, the stragglers, and the greater portion of their warlike stores, were in possession of the French; but all their sufferings would have been still more aggravated from that moment—indeed, their army would have been entirely destroyed—if the French, duly profiting by their successes, had sent more troops in pursuit.

6th Oct. Suwarow left Elm on the 6th, and crossed the frontiers of the Grisons by the Panixer Pass (according to Masséna by the Rinkenköpf). Soft snow had recently fallen to the depth of two feet, and covered the dangerous ascents leading to the mountain crests. The snow had effaced all the roads and paths on the southern slope; a piercing wind had frozen the snow, and rendered it so slippery, that the falling of the

horses and men at the head of the columns was the only signal of danger to those in rear, who, in their anxiety to avoid one dangerous spot, frequently lit on a much worse one. The advanced guard and the headquarters reached with difficulty the village of Panix in the evening. The remainder of the column passed the night exposed on the summit and the slope of the mountain, and were unable to find any brushwood wherewith to kindle a fire. Thus upwards of 200 men and a great number of bat-animals perished in these savage regions. The guns were thrown down the precipices through the inability to transport them, and on the 8th the rear of the column had not yet reached Panix.

The headquarters were at Ilanz on the 8th, but it was ^{8th Oct.} not till the 10th that the army, diminished in numbers, as may easily be imagined, was finally enabled to rally in the valley of the Vorder Rhine. Suwarow transferred his headquarters to Chur. Jellachich and Linken fell back simultaneously on Sargans and Ragatz.

As soon as the Russians were removed from the line of operation, Masséna lost no time in expelling the Austrians from the St Gothard. It was important to him to be assured of the point of junction of his right wing with the troops, which he had in Le Valais. In possession of the St Gothard he was in a position to arrest the operations of his adversaries on the Italian side, as well as the Grisons, so long as he was obliged to direct against them troops from the north of Switzerland, where it was necessary the main body of the army should be constantly concentrated.

It is impossible to occupy a line of lofty mountains on account of the difficulty of provisions. Thus Strauch, who had been left at the St Gothard, had only some advanced posts at the Hospice of the Capuchins, at Airolo, and in the Val Bedretto; two battalions posted at Dazio acted as their support, and the remainder of the brigade was in cantonments at Bellinzona. The communication with Ilanz and Chur by

the valley of the Middle Rhine was protected by some detachments, which watched Tavetsch and Dissentis in the valley of the Vorder Rhine.

Loison's division, formerly Lecourbe's, reascended the valley of the Reuss, thrust back without difficulty the Austrian troops from the crest of the St Gothard into the valley of the Ticino, drove their detachments, scattered about the valley of the Vorder Rhine, back upon Ilanz, and again obtained possession of the main block of the mountain whence the several valleys spring.

Whilst Tharreau and Loison were guarding the line from Le Valais, by the St Gothard, to the Linth, Mortier took up his position, the right at Mels, covering in force the valley of Weistannen, with his left at Sargans. Soult marched with six demi-brigades in two columns; one, under the orders of Brunet, upon Rheineck, to observe Petrasch, who had withdrawn to Feldkirch; the other, under the command of Gazan, to Constance. The latter was supported by Klein's cavalry. Lorges' division advanced upon Stein and Diessenhofen, Ménard upon Paradies and the bridge-head of Büsingen. The grenadier reserve moved upon Winterthur and Andelfingen, to which place Masséna transferred his headquarters.

Suwarow had taken a direction which reduced him to absolute inaction. To reassume the offensive he would have had either to move by Chur and Sargans towards the Lake of Walenstadt, or to march by Dissentis to the St Gothard.

It was wellnigh an impossibility for him to adopt the latter plan, owing to the length of time requisite for the preparations, and because of the absence of the indispensable equipment. Tharreau from Le Valais, and Loison from the valley of the Reuss, would easily have dislodged Strauch from the St Gothard, before the Russians could possibly have reached that point.

As regards operations in the direction of the Lake of Walenstadt, the French were in a position to anticipate them; for they were within reach of the point of attack, whilst

Suwarow could not reach that point except by Chur and Sargans, which latter post was in possession of the French. Such is the inferiority of adjacent positions to central ones.

Considering how trifling was the distance that separated the allied columns when, on the 26th, Jellachich was at Mollis, Linken at Schwanden, and the latter at Glarus on the 29th, while Suwarow was in possession of Muotta, it would seem that their junction would have been a matter of certainty. Nevertheless it could not take place, because the French, though numerically weaker, were posted between Glarus and Wesen, and Glarus and Muotta, and so completely prevented all communication between the commanders of the enemy's columns, that they were unable to inform each other of the success or failure of their respective enterprises. Difficulties wellnigh insurmountable present themselves when it is desired to make columns, starting from points at a great distance from each other, converge on one spot, which is not in possession of the commander, by whom the movement is ordered, and who is himself at a distance from the points of departure. In the interval between the conception of the manœuvre, or the commencement of its execution, and the moment of the possible attainment of the object, many incidents may occur of a nature to modify the manœuvre, and frequently to cause its failure, because the requisite modifications cannot be made in time. In these hazardous undertakings, the chances are less favourable on account of the great distances that have to be traversed, and because the nature of the ground affords the probability of many unforeseen occurrences, of isolated action, and of resistance at the points, on which it is desired to move. Not only do primary reverses stand in the way of the attainment of the object, but partial successes likewise, for both one and the other disarrange the harmony of the movements, without which the concentration cannot be effected.

Suwarow's enterprise betokened on the part of that leader

more energy than foresight and calculation, as it depended on the result of so many other expeditions based on simultaneous movements. The Archduke Charles, after reminding his readers, that in the short space of eighteen years twelve great battles were lost, in consequence of erroneous calculations, founded, as Suwarow's were, on complicated manœuvres and the simultaneous attack of several distant columns, makes the following remarks :—

“We see that the same fault again and again reproduces the same disasters ; we see it invariably punished in some striking way ; and yet it frequently recurs in military annals, and even the same generals allow themselves more than once to fall into the same error. It is because one is fond of illusions. Reverses are attributed to other, than the real, causes ; consolation is derived from the enumeration of the great results, which dispositions so cleverly combined should have brought about without fail, had the execution responded to the wisdom of the plan ; and there is a general indisposition to admit, that it is precisely in the execution that lies the difficulty, which it is scarcely possible to overcome on the field of battle.

“The more complicated a plan is, the more columns there are employed, and the greater the number of separate points whence they start, the more preparations there are to be made, and the greater the necessity for anticipating the dispositions of the troops. Now, as fresh incidents are constantly presenting themselves, and many will have occurred in the interval preceding the operation, these same dispositions are no longer applicable to the requirements of the moment. The profound connoisseur, the able practician, whose experience is seasoned by reflection, will assuredly be convinced that in the science of war, as in all others, the simplest means are the best, the safest, and the most convenient. They approach the object by the shortest and most decisive path, and when even fortune proves unfavourable, they entail less disastrous consequences.”

THE ALLIES EVACUATE SWITZERLAND.

Confusion reigned supreme amongst Korsakow's troops after the battle of Zürich, and continued until their arrival on the banks of the Rhine, which they crossed in two columns, one at Eglisau on the 27th September, the other at Schaffhausen on the 28th. The bridges of Stein and Eglisau were destroyed; that at Diessenhofen and the bridge-head of Büsingen remained undefended. General Titow established his quarters at Constance; but on the approach of a French detachment on the 29th, he left this post, broke the bridge, and even evacuated Petershausen, which contained the magazines and the laboratory of the Russian artillery. The French lost no time in repairing the bridge, and commenced the passage to the opposite bank on the 30th, just as a detachment of Austrian dragoons came up from Stockach in time to repulse the French, and enter Constance at their heels.

General Nauendorf, in occupation of the line between Schaffhausen and Basel, assembled his troops in support of the Russians, and was joined by 2000 cavalry who were on the march to follow the Archduke. Korsakow received a reinforcement of three battalions of troops from the Palatinate, and moved midway between Schaffhausen and Ramsen. On the bare sight of some French patrols approaching the Rhine, he determined to send back again to the left bank two regiments of infantry, two of cuirassiers, and one of Cossacks, to cover the bridge of Diessenhofen. He posted 1800 men with fourteen guns in the bridge-head of Büsingen. It was at this juncture that Condé's corps, which had been transferred to the Russian service, reached Schaffhausen—about 2700 horse and a small body of infantry.

As soon as Masséna had ceased to have any anxiety in the direction of the minor cantons, and but little to apprehend from the Austrians on the Upper Rhine, he conceived the idea of reinforcing and advancing his left wing, so as to push

the Allies beyond the Rhine, with the view of augmenting the number of their positions, of rendering their communications more difficult, by compelling them to make the circuit of the Lake of Constance, and of impeding any offensive enterprise, on their part, by the barrier of the Rhine. Masséna selected for the execution of this project, as has already been mentioned, the divisions Ménard, Lorges, and Klein, which, up to this time, under the orders of Oudinot, had been watching Korsakow on the banks of the Thur. Soult likewise received orders to co-operate in the same object. Masséna then advanced his divisions to complete this manœuvre, and to constitute himself master of the whole of Northern Switzerland. Mortier remained with the chief portion of his division near Walenstadt and Sargans.

6th Oct. Ménard appeared before Paradies on the 6th October with two strong columns, nearly 2000 men, and drove back the Russian advanced guard from the bridge-head of Büsingen; but on the garrison making a sortie, which it followed up with great vigour, he evacuated Schaaren Wald, and abandoned the heights of Paradies.

7th Oct. On the 7th, Korsakow debouched from the bridge-head of Büsingen with ten battalions and twenty-two squadrons, and marched by the forest, though undecided as to his action; for his desire of avoiding an engagement was balanced by a feeling of the responsibility he would incur, should he not attempt something in aid of Suwarow. This hesitating movement was therefore termed a reconnaissance. Korsakow marched with his infantry, without waiting for his cavalry to cross the river, to the heights of Schlatt and Trüllikon, to meet Ménard, who was making preparations to attack Paradies, whilst Lorges was doing the same to attack Diessenhofen.

The Russian infantry threw themselves on the French with such impetuosity, that the latter were forced back to Andelfingen, but on Humbert coming up with the grenadiers of the reserve, the fight was re-established. The Russians were compelled to repass the Schaaren Wald, and to shut themselves

up in the bridge-head of Büsingen. The French made a lodgement in the wood, and waited till 7 P.M. to try and carry the works. Their attack was twice bravely repulsed, and the French withdrew to Trüllikon, abandoning the wood, which the Russians at once occupied.

Simultaneously with Korsakow's debouche from Büsingen, Woinow advanced from Diessenhofen, with two battalions and one squadron. Fortune at first favoured his march. He took a gun and made several prisoners, but he was shortly compelled to abandon these advantages by the presence of Lorges' division, which forced him to repass the Rhine and break the bridge, with a loss of 600 men. Lorges took possession of Diessenhofen at 11 P.M.

Gazan's attack on Constance was equally successful. Leaving Wyl at 6 A.M., he fell in with the enemy's advanced posts in the afternoon at Schwaderloch, and threw them back upon Egelshofen. The Allies had very few infantry and about 3000 horse, Austrians, Russians, and Condéans, who occupied the approaches to Constance, which were intersected with vineyards, woods, and ravines, with their right wing resting on Egelshofen and their left on Kreuzlingen. Gazan formed two columns, one of which, under Drouet, took the road from St Gallen to Constance; the other moved by the Zürich road. Egelshofen and Kreuzlingen were simultaneously attacked and carried, notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the emigrants. On the left, the pursuit was so rapid, that the French entered Constance helter-skelter with the enemy; whilst, on the right, the gate of Kreuzlingen was blown in with artillery. The French sent a battalion as soon as possible to Petershausen. Had not the French been distressed by a forced march, it is probable that Condé's corps would have been compelled to lay down its arms. The former, however, entered Constance in a thin and extended formation; and the men became so scattered about the town, that it was impossible to get them together again. The emigrants, observing this disorder, re-entered the town under cover of night,

opened a passage through a tempest of shot, and reached the bridge, across which they forced a passage. The allied infantry, which at the outset of the affair was weak, and had suffered considerable losses, was incapable of arresting the enemy, in spite of the disorder into which the latter had fallen. The Austrian dragoons dismounted, barricaded the bridge, threw themselves into the adjacent houses, and defended the passage until the darkness of night enabled some resolute volunteers to saw through, or displace, by means of ropes attached under the French fire, the piles of the bridge.

27th Sept. The Archduke, who on the 27th had heard of Korsakow's disaster, advanced with due speed to the sources of the Danube with 25,000 men. Apprehensive lest the bridge-head of Busingen should fall into the hands of the French, he authorised Korsakow to withdraw his troops from thence, and gave directions for the removal of the pontoons and artillery, with a view to their being stored in safety at Stoc-kach. Thenceforth the entire left bank of the Rhine fell into the power of the French. Korsakow undertook the defence of the right bank from Petershausen to Diessenhofen, and the Austrians the remainder of the line, which at that juncture they were enabled to do, because between the 1st and 7th October, 27 battalions and 26 squadrons of their troops had reached Villingen from the neighbourhood of Marcheim, and on the 6th the Archduke had established his headquarters at Donaueschingen.

The French likewise placed their posts along the Rhine, and concentrated the greater portion of their forces in the excellent central positions to be found behind the Thur.

But let us return to Suwarow.

At the moment when the Austrians, on their return from the banks of the Neckar, were turning the sources of the Danube, and were approaching Schaffhausen, Suwarow was descending the lofty mountains of the Grisons. As his divisions successively debouched upon Ilanz, between the 8th and 10th October, he continued his march to Chur, covered

8-10th
Oct.

by the troops of Linken, who to this end had advanced towards the sources of the Rhine, but had been unable to maintain his position at Dissentis, when Loison moved against him, after driving Strauch from the St Gothard. Linken then followed the Russian column to Chur, and occupied Kunkels, Tamins, Reichenau, and the Domleschg valley, as far as Tuis on the Lower Rhine. Several detached posts watched the approaches to these districts at Flims and Ruis.

On the 11th Suwarow marched to Balzers. Linken opened out in the direction of Mayenfeld; Auffenberg remained at Chur. On the 12th the Russians reached Feldkirch.

11th Oct.

12th Oct.

The Allies, thus pouring in from the north and south, were surrounding the French in the north of Switzerland, and it seemed probable that they would shortly make their reappearance on the Limmat. Their forces, however, belonged to two armies, under commanders who were independent one of the other, and who, though their object was a common one, were desirous of attaining it by different means, and who through their inability to agree lost much precious time in fruitless negotiations.

Suwarow communicated his plan to the Archduke on the 13th October. He wished to abandon the Grisons, to burn the lower-toll bridge over the Rhine, and to blow up the fort of the Luziensteig. He proposed to cross the Rhine in person on the 17th at Höchst and Meiningen, with all the Vorarlberg troops, to concentrate them on the 18th at St Gallen, and to effect a junction at Winterthur with Korsakow, who was to move in two columns, one from Constance by Bischofzell, the other from Stein by Pfyn and Frauenfeld. Until his junction with Korsakow's corps, 6000 Austrians and the whole of the country militia were to remain in the position of Feldkirch, to cover the left flank of Suwarow's army during its passage of the Rhine.

The Archduke, however, was apprehensive lest the junction of both the Russian corps in the centre of the enemy's

positions should be attended with some difficulties. In order to guard the Russians from the defeats, to which they might be subjected in detail, he believed that it was necessary to effect the junction in another way, and with greater rapidity. With this view he proposed that Korsakow's corps should be directed to move to Stockach on the 15th and 16th, so as to march thence and rejoin the Marshal by turning the Lake of Constance. The Archduke at the same time promised to throw into Switzerland a strong Austrian column, which should cross the Rhine between Schaffhausen and Constance.

Suwarow replied, on the 14th, that his troops were not adapted for mountain warfare; that he would himself turn the Lake of Constance, and go and join Korsakow, in order to undertake in conjunction with him the projected operation in Switzerland. He forthwith put his army in movement,

15th Oct. and reached Dornbirn on the 15th, and Lindau on the 16th.

17th Oct. On the 17th he declared that his troops were not in a condition to act, and that they required reorganisation in cantonments in the rear. All the Archduke's representations to induce him to change his resolution were fruitless. He even haughtily rejected the proposal of an interview, and it was not without considerable difficulty that he consented to leave Rosenberg's division at Bregenz, but only till the 4th November. The remainder of the Russian army proceeded, on the 30th October, to take up its quarters between the Lech and the Iller, where the heavy artillery that had been sent from Italy into the Tyrol rejoined it by Kempten.

Suwarow, dazzled by his victories on the shores of the Black Sea, the Vistula, and the Po, believed himself to be invincible, but was naturally anxious to find some excuse for his recent defeats. This he discovered, not, however, in his own defective arrangements, nor in the faults of Korsakow, but in the treason of the Austrians. The commander-in-chief's sentiment was promptly adopted by the whole of the Russian army, and this feeling was shared by the Court of

St Petersburg, the instant it was made public. The Emperor Paul, under the influence of this impression, was no longer desirous of being concerned in a war for the prosecution of which he furnished an auxiliary corps. The Russians quitted their quarters in Suabia towards the middle of December, and commenced their march homewards.

MASSÉNA'S FINAL OPERATIONS IN THE GRISONS.

Masséna quietly awaited the ulterior operations of the Allies, and made preparations to receive them between the Lake of Walenstadt and the Aare, whilst the fortifications of Zürich, that had been strengthened, insured his retreat in any contingency. But at last, as the movement of the Russians behind the Lake of Constance did not indicate an immediate attack, and as the Austrians had weakened their forces in the Grisons by detaching troops into the Vorarlberg, he resolved to dislodge them from the Kunkelsberg and the valley of the Vorder Rhine, in order to secure the entire position of the St Gothard, and to gain the shortest communication between Sargans, Ilanz, and Dissentis.

A portion of Mortier's division left Sargans on the 31st 31st Oct. October, entered the valley of the Tamina by Ragatz, and attacked the Kunkelsberg in front, whilst some small detachments turned the mountain by Elm and Flims, and Loison with 3000 men advanced from Dissentis by Ilanz. The Austrians, compelled to fall back in every direction, crossed the Rhine at Reichenau and burnt the bridge. The French moved on the 7th by Bonaduz into the Domleschg valley, occupied the Heinzenberg, and drove the enemy's posts from Realta and Präz to Katzis and Thusis. The advanced season, the bad weather, and the want of provisions, checked the course of these operations. Other circumstances increased these natural impediments. The parties sent by Strauch from Airolo by the St Gothard and the valley of the Middle Rhine (Lukmanier) to Dissentis, and

the detachments pushed by the Austrians from the Hinter Rhine and Splügen by the valleys of Safier and St Peter, harassed the French continually in their rear, and at last obliged them to recall their advanced troops into the valley of the Vorder Rhine. This movement was executed on the 9th Nov. 9th, and the retreat continued to Urseren.

The sole advantage gained by the French from this trying operation on the approach of winter was the possession of the Kunkels Pass and of the Tamina valley, which they carefully barricaded and covered with abatis. From the Kunkelsberg they commanded the debouche from the valley of the Vorder Rhine, and so confined the Austrians to the right bank of the river.

This was the concluding military event of the campaign of 1799 in Switzerland. Nature herself made repose necessary. The snow, the ice, and the inclemency of the season, soon rendered the approaches to the St Gothard and the mountains contiguous to it impracticable for both parties. The Rhine formed the line of demarcation, as at the commencement of the campaign, and the troops of the two belligerents went into their respective winter quarters.

The absolute deliverance of Helvetia was the primary result of the celebrated battle of Zürich, which, next to that of Rivoli, may unquestionably be regarded as the most remarkable of the two first wars of the Revolution, as much on account of the heavy blow then struck, as the great importance of its results. It may be asserted without any exaggeration that this victory saved France.

In fact France externally was threatened on all sides, and was on the point of being invaded on several of her frontiers. The Army of Italy, forced in its positions, had withdrawn under the pressure of the Austro-Russian combination to the Riviera of Genoa, and defended the capital of Liguria with considerable difficulty. The Army of the Alps was maintaining a defensive attitude still more toilsome and difficult on that great chain of mountains, after having failed completely in

the diversion it had attempted on Piedmont. The Army of the Rhine was compelled to raise the siege of Philipsburg, and to fall back on the eastern frontier, in consequence of its inability, after the loss of Mannheim, to cover the Rhine between Strasburg and Mainz. In the north, the Anglo-Russian force, under the command of the Duke of York and Hermann, had not yet been defeated by Brune, and was threatening the Belgian provinces with invasion. Sztarray, by means of proclamations calling on it to arm for independence, and by promises of the powerful assistance of Austria, had roused the population of Brabant to such a degree that, to keep it down, it became necessary to draw from the adjacent departments 7000 or 8000 men, and by so doing to diminish the means of defending France. Finally, Prussia, always ready to profit by the success of the coalition, reasserted her former pretensions to the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been ceded to France by the Treaty of Basel, and assembled at Wesel a corps of 15,000 men.

In the interior, the position was equally critical. The men borne to power by the revolution of Prairial had rapidly worn themselves out; the country had no longer any confidence in the authority of those whose strength had become completely enfeebled. A victory alone was capable of instilling a little life into the chaos which then existed.

Thus the news of the victory of Zürich was received with acclamations throughout France. The Directors received the intelligence on the 18th Vendémiaire (10th October), and lost no time in communicating it to the Chambers. Masséna was looked upon as a saviour by the population as well as by the official world. A decree in honour of the Army of the Danube, which "had merited well of its country," was promulgated. Dances and fêtes, improvised in honour of Masséna and his army, alike evidenced the depth of the public joy.

Switzerland, though relieved of the presence of the Russians, nevertheless remained crushed by the charges imposed upon

her by the victorious army ; for, far from affording any relief, Masséna, whose necessities were constantly increasing in consequence of the culpable negligence of the French Government, did not scruple to impose a heavy contribution upon Basel and Zürich, disguised under the title of a forced loan. He levied 800,000 francs on the towns of Basel and Zürich respectively, 300,000 on St Gallen, and 150,000 on Constance. The Helvetian Government, resenting this imposition, forbade its agents to comply with Masséna's demands, less perhaps on account of its unheard-of sacrifices, to which it was already resigned, than from a feeling of just indignation at such an infringement on its rights and independence. The commander-in-chief, actuated, it is said, by the desire not to disappoint his Government, as well as to meet the pressing necessity of pay for his troops, threatened a military execution, which conduct did not meet with the disapproval of the Cabinet of the Luxembourg. Laharpe, the Director accused of having urged his patriotic opposition too far, met with speedy punishment : at least it may be imagined that the reaction, which succeeded in excluding him from the Directory, was instigated by the French.

Why did not Masséna take advantage of the abrupt retreat of the Russians to assume the offensive and repass the Rhine ? We may well believe that Masséna, on hearing of Bonaparte's return, felt assured that the plan of operations would soon be characterised with a greater amount of art and harmony. Besides, he felt that it would not be conducive to his own interests to precipitate himself into the snow of the Vorarlberg in the month of November, and that an attempt on Suabia and the Danube would be no easy matter in the presence of the Archduke, who had now reassembled about 80,000 men between Feldkirch and Offenburg. Doubtless Masséna would have had quite as large a force if he had had at his disposal the Army of the Rhine, but the Directory had recently given the command of it to Lecourbe ; and he knew

full well that two independent armies, pitted against a third of equal strength, rarely obtain a durable advantage.

The Archduke could no longer think of entering Switzerland in the presence of the victorious army of Zürich, which had sold him so dearly the possession of a few leagues of ground, and the conquest of which would have been of no great use to him on the approach of winter.

Moreover, the coup-d'état of the 18th Brumaire, and the nomination of Bonaparte to the post of First Consul, changed all these military schemes.

Masséna, appointed to succeed Championnet in Italy, left in the first instance for Paris, after having directed the best demi-brigades of his army by Berne and Geneva upon Lyons. Thenceforth there was no longer a question of entering Suabia, and the troops on both sides took up their winter quarters.

NOTES
ON THE
CAMPAIGN IN THE VALTELLINE
IN 1635.

NOTES

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CAMPAIGN IN THE VALTELLINE

IN 1635.*

THE Duke de Rohan's campaign in the Valtelline is interesting in more than one respect to Swiss military men, especially to the Genevese.

1. It took place on one of our frontiers, and in a country very similar to our own.

2. It presents signal applications of the rules of mountain warfare.

3. It was conducted by an able commander, whom Geneva can, in a certain sense, claim as one of her children, since at the commencement of the seventeenth century he was one of the principal leaders of the Protestant party, and because his ashes repose in the cathedral of this town.

DESCRIPTION OF THE LOCALITY.

The Valtelline is a valley of considerable size, nearly parallel with the Engadine, from which it is separated by a lofty chain of mountains. It is watered by the Adda, which runs from

* By General H. Dufour. Geneva, 10th February 1853. Published in the 10th number of the *Swiss Military Review*, 4th October 1856.

To study this campaign properly, a good map of Switzerland should be used, or the 15th and 20th sheets of the General Atlas of the Confederation.

east to west to empty itself in the Lake of Como, whilst the Inn flows in an opposite direction, and takes a northerly course to meet the Danube, which it joins at Passau. The towns of Bormio mark the upper part of the valley, Morbegno the lower, and Tirano the centre. The valley does not describe a straight line, but a kind of girdle round a salient point of our frontier, to such an extent, that Bormio is nearer the Upper Engadine than Tirano.

Three passes form the principal communications between the respective valleys. The first, in the most easterly direction, starts from Zernetz, passes into the Val Fuorn, ascends the Val del Gallo, and descends by the Val da Fraele upon Bormio. It bifurcates, and descends to the left upon Cierfs in the Münster-Thal, which is another salient point of our territory. The first passage, therefore, leads from Zernetz to Bormio. The second is between Samaden and Tirano by the Col Bernina and the Val di Puschiavo. The third is at the eastern extremity, and along the highroad of the Splügen to the shores of the Lake of Como. This road bifurcates to Chiavenna, and ascending the Val Bregaglia and the Maloggia, enters the Upper Engadine by Silvaplana and St Moritz.

Besides these, there are several less important passes, more or less accessible, amongst which may be mentioned that by the Col Casana, which is a communication between Zutz and Livigno, in the secondary valley of the same name, situated between Bormio and the Engadine, and by which there is a passage, in one direction by the Col just mentioned, and in another by the Val di Trepalle or by the Alpisella to the sources of the Adda.

The Valtelline forms the most direct connection between the Austrian States and the Milanese: this alone demonstrates its importance in a military point of view. A good road along the Adda has always existed between the Lake of Como, at the head of which was the fort of Fuentes, and Bormio. It was only by indifferent mountain roads that the passage between Sta



Maria in the Münster-Thal and the Tyrol could be effected. In recent years, however, the Austrian Government has constructed on the Stelvio or Stilfser-Joch a magnificent military road, which, turning our frontier, leads from Nauders and Glurns to Bormio, so that armies can now pass from Germany into Italy by the Valtelline, and reciprocally from Italy to Germany, without violating our neutrality. We have only to occupy the post of Sta Maria to escape any risk in this respect.

At the close of 1634, Louis XIII., or rather his minister Richelieu, had formed the project of sending an army into the Valtelline, with the object of interrupting the communication between Germany and Italy. In the meantime, to carry out this plan, and for the purpose of masking the design, the Duke de Rohan, who had been appointed to command this army, received orders to repair to Alsace at the head of 13,000 to 14,000 men.

THE DUKE ENTERS THE VALTELLINE.

In March 1635 he received orders to march to the Valtelline to bar the passage of the troops which the Emperor was desirous of sending into the Milanese, where the Spaniards were at war with France.

He crossed Switzerland, availing himself of the favourable attitude of the Protestant cantons towards himself. True he requested authority to do so from the Governments of Berne and Zürich; but without waiting for their reply, he crossed the Aare at the ferry of Stilli, below the confluence of the Reuss, and avoiding in this manner the Catholic town of Mellingen, he reached Chur in eight days by the indirect road of Winterthur, St Gallen, Altstädten, and Ragatz. The direct route would have been by Zürich to Uznach, Walenstadt, and Ragatz, but if he had approached too nearly the Catholic cantons, which did not regard the operation in the same light as the Protestant cantons, he would have incurred a risk in following the latter direction. Rohan preferred the

safest though the longest road. He asked for nothing but provisions whilst on the way, and these were furnished him without any difficulty.

The first part of the campaign offers little matter for observation. The passage of the troops was so rapid that the French army was in the Grisons before its movement had, so to say, become known. In fact, it was the only method of insuring success. The army was advancing whilst the Swiss Councils were deliberating. The neutrality of the territory was violated, the importance of maintaining which, it is true, was at that time less felt than at present, and although this weakness in the principal cantons appeared to be justified by momentary interests, it was no less a blunder, and subsequently a cause of regret. Our prestige once destroyed, nothing could restrain the belligerent armies, whenever it suited their interests, from making use of our territory, whether as a means of passage or as a field of battle. Ulterior events have proved this. Neutrality is the condition of Switzerland's existence. Nothing, under any circumstances, nor for any motive, should permit us to allow its violation. On the contrary, we should sacrifice everything to preserve it. It is our duty to repel even by force of arms any one who sets foot on our territory under the pretext of protecting us. To Switzerland alone attaches the right of warring for her independence, whatever may be the issue of the struggle. By the help of others we may escape a defeat, but not a humiliating confession of our own weakness. We are still feeling the effects of the blow in 1815, whatever we may say or do to obliterate its recollection, and present to the nations of Europe a more favourable opinion of our institutions, and our means of realising them.

However this may be, the Duke of Rohan, having placed garrisons in the forts of Luziensteig and Malans,* and having

* The latter is called the Fort de France. Its vestiges are still visible. It is situated at the confluence of the Landquart and the Rhine. The Fort of Luziensteig has been reconstructed by us in 1831, on the existing walls.

occupied the Lower Engadine by a detachment, for the purpose of closing the approach to the Grisons through the valleys of the Rhine and the Inn, marched to the Valtelline by the *via* Mala, the Splügen, and Chiavenna. His rear being assured by the detachment just mentioned, he entered it on the 20th April 1635. His approach was heralded by two advanced guards, one of which followed the same route taken by himself, and occupied the post of Riva, at the head of the Lake of Mezzola, which he fortified; the other crossed the mountains, and threw itself into Bormio. The former post commanded the Lower Valtelline, the latter the Upper Valtelline. Rohan with the remainder of his forces occupied a central position at Tirano, ready to advance by a road practicable for all arms, and to support that one of his advanced guards which should be attacked the first, or the most seriously threatened. By his diligence in anticipating his adversaries, the Duke succeeded in placing himself between the Imperialists in the Tyrol, and the Spaniards in the Milanese. It was now imperative upon him to take advantage of this central position, so as, by his activity, the precision of his movements, and the vigour of his attacks, to prevent the junction of the two hostile armies, which might have crushed him by the superiority of their numbers. It will be seen how he succeeded.

He had under his command 8000 infantry and 400 cavalry. A portion of these forces being employed in garrisons and posts of observation, he applied for and obtained some additional assistance. He drew his subsistence from the Venetian States, which favoured his enterprise; and the Grisons were always ready to help him, in the hopes of recovering the important valley of the Adda, which had belonged to them.

The Duke de Rohan commenced by fortifying the bridge of Mantello in the Lower Valtelline, not far from the Spanish fort of Fuentes, and by which the enemy would have been enabled to enter the Valtelline. He did the same by the post of Riva on the Splügen road, and repaired the castle of Chia-

R

venna, which commands that route, and which leads into the Engadine by the Val Bregaglia. Thus he protected himself as much as he could from the danger of being turned on his right wing. He worked incessantly at these fortifications. In the direction of Bormio, that is to say, in the Upper Valtelline, Rohan confined his efforts to watching the mountain passes, which, though easily defended, are nevertheless so numerous, as to make the defence of them all an inexpedient measure. He had them reconnoitred, and they were found to be innumerable. "Then it was," the Duke says in his Memoirs, "he recognised the truth that mountains resemble plains, and that they not only contain well-established and frequented roads, but many others besides, which, though unknown to strangers, are known to the inhabitants, by means of whom the desired spot can be reached in spite of any opposition to the contrary. Consequently a discreet commander will never be anxious to guard these passes, but will rather resolve to await and fight his enemy in the open country. To such as have not experienced its success, this measure may appear strange. Thus on the present occasion," he adds, "where it was imagined the position was rendered secure by the mountains representing so many fortresses, it was discovered that it was exposed in every direction, and ten holes found to every one that was stopped; so that it became necessary to employ not one, but several armies to guard this country."

The Duke de Rohan therefore felt it his duty to post the bulk of his forces at Bormio, and in the neighbouring valleys, to observe the passes, and to defend by attacks in the lower ground the approaches to the country. Lieutenant-General du Landé was appointed to command this wing: the Marquis de Canisi the right wing, the headquarters of which were at Traona. Rohan himself took post at Tirano with the reserve, which formed the centre.

Events rapidly developed themselves. The Imperialists, under the orders of General Fernamond, numbering 8000 men,

took possession of the post of Sta Maria, which they fortified, and advanced through the mountains to attack the French in their positions around Bormio. Du Landé offered a slight resistance and fell back upon Tirano, leaving one regiment in the Val Livigno. Instead, however, of joining Rohan, who from anxiety regarding the lower part of the valley had been obliged to approach Sondrio, he turned to the right up the valley of Puschiamo, crossed the Bernina, and entered the Engadine by Pontresina and Samaden—a false manœuvre, the object of which was inconceivable. If he was actuated by a desire of rallying the regiment left by him in the Val Livigno, he sacrificed the essential to an accessory object. Besides, as there was a communication between the Val Livigno and Puschiamo by a mountain pass, he could without hindrance from the Imperialists have recalled to his main body this regiment, which might have rejoined him at Tirano. Had he no instructions? that is improbable. Having them, did he act in defiance of them? In that case his conduct was inexcusable.

However that may be, it is evident that Du Landé did not share the lofty conceptions of his chief. The latter, finding his left uncovered, and being of opinion that he could not remain between the two hostile armies with the rest of his troops, withdrew to Chiavenna, after having destroyed his bridge at Mantello. To such extremities are the greatest captains reduced by the incapacity or ill-will of their lieutenants.

The two hostile armies then were about to effect their junction for the purpose of forcing the Duke de Rohan's position of Chiavenna. This general thus saw all his plans disconcerted. His embarrassment was great, and it was augmented by the news he received, that another corps had forced an entry into the Grisons by the valley of the Rhine, and was advancing against him by Chur and the Julier or Splügen passes. It is on such occasions that the wisdom, the prudence, and the courage of a general find occasion for their display. The Duke, with entire self-possession, resolved

not to abandon Chiavenna, and took the necessary measures to guarantee himself from all the risks he was incurring.

Happily Fernamond abandoned the prey for its shadow, and instead of pursuing the French in the principal valley, turned against the detached corps on his right in the Val Livigno, from which, however, he had nothing to fear. This body, unable to hold its ground by reason of its numerical inferiority, retired into the Engadine by the Casana Mountain and rejoined Du Landé.

Fernamond, always under the erroneous idea of surrounding the Duke de Rohan, proposed to wait for reinforcements in the Val Livigno, where he had taken up a position, and to march upon Chiavenna by the Valtelline and the Val Bregaglia, when he learned that the Spanish general Serbelloni was marching thither by Riva, and was ascending the valley.

Under such circumstances it became necessary to defeat the enemy's projects, to anticipate him, and to attack him before he could assemble his forces under the walls of Chiavenna. This the Duke de Rohan, being a courageous man, resolved to do in spite of the advice of Du Landé, who was in favour of waiting for reinforcements, and of adopting a temporising policy quite unsuited to the occasion. Skilfully availing himself of the fact that the Spaniards had not appeared in the Lower Valtelline, he nobly resolved to march against the Imperialists and attack them in the Val Livigno, notwithstanding their numerical superiority. He also left in the castle of Chiavenna a garrison of sufficient strength to offer a temporary resistance. With the remainder of his forces he ascended the Val Bregaglia, crossed the Maloggia, and by forced marches descended into the Engadine as far as Zutz, where he rallied Du Landé's corps.

This resolution is worthy of approval in all respects. It raised the *morale* of the force, silenced the false reports that were being spread through the country, and effaced the disastrous impressions of a retreat. Politically the Grisons

were confirmed in their friendly attitude towards the French, whom they regarded as liberators. It was necessary to cherish this feeling.

COMBAT OF LIVIGNO.

On the 26th June the Duke's small army, about 5000 strong exclusive of 400 cavalry, bivouacked on the Alps of the Col Casana. The following day (the 27th) it debouched into the Val Federia, a branch of the Val Livigno. A detachment of 700 men, led by Frézelière, a gentleman of great courage, had started overnight to climb the heights separating the two valleys, at the junction of which the Imperialists were posted. This manœuvre is a good one, indeed indispensable in a mountain attack, but it is requisite that it should be so conducted as to admit of the detachment being always in communication with the principal corps, and thus be enabled to rally in case of failure.

When the Duke de Rohan judged by the time that had elapsed, or by concerted signals, that Frézelière's detachment had reached the heights commanding the Imperialist camp, he descended into the Val Federia, and turning to the left, advanced to the attack. The Imperialists made but a semblance of resistance when they saw themselves taken in flank, and that too from the heights, and retreated by Trepalle to Bormio. Their loss was small, but success was none the less complete for the French, who were victorious by reason of their moral superiority. Public opinion was tranquillised in the Grisons. There were no longer any rumours of treating with the Imperialists.

General Fernamond committed a great error in not having occupied the heights commanding the left of his camp in the Val Livigno. He committed a much greater one in halting at Bormio, instead of prosecuting his march by the Valtelline in order to join the Spanish army. Thereby he showed that he understood nothing of mountain warfare.

As for Rohan, satisfied with the success he had obtained,

he did not waste time in the pursuit of his enemy into the mountains, as some of his officers wished ; but profiting by the Austrian general's inaction, he speedily re-entered the Valtelline, and occupied afresh the central position of Tirano, thus reverting to his original plan. He took only two days to accomplish this march, viz., on the 28th and 29th June. He passed from the Val Livigno into the Val Puschiaivo by the Col Piscadella, sending his cavalry in advance, which reached Tirano in the night of the 28th-29th June, thus accomplishing in one day a mountain march of from twelve to fourteen leagues. This example proves that cavalry can be usefully employed in this kind of warfare. It should, however, be always provided with firearms, as Rohan's was, to be able to defend a post in case of need. Dragoons have on more than one occasion rendered similar service to the French army during the last war in Spain.

COMBAT OF MAZZO.

In the meantime the Austrians commenced their movement, but, as usual, too late. They descended as far as Mazzo, a village two leagues above Tirano, where there are two bridges by which the Adda can be crossed, the road passing at this place from the right to the left bank of the river. A body of French troops, however, arrived there simultaneously, and seized one of these bridges. Several skirmishes ensued, the result being that the Austrians remained in possession of the debouche. Rohan marched with the whole of his reserve upon Mazzo, eager to deliver battle before the arrival of the Spaniards. He rested his right on the mountains and his left on the river, after having detached 700 men to attack on the other bank of the Adda. In this he was wrong, for there were no bridges, by which the army could communicate with the detachment, and, in case of defeat, Rohan would have been deprived of this reinforcement.

The Austrians were in position in front of Mazzo, behind walls which served as entrenchments. Nevertheless they were driven from thence, because the French troops gained the heights and took them in flank. The attack on the right bank also caused them annoyance. They were apprehensive of losing the bridges, their sole line of retreat, or rather the only one that existed, the French, who had previously occupied it, having destroyed the other. They fled in disorder, and were so closely pursued, notwithstanding the protection afforded them by the corps they had left on the other side of the river to repulse the French detachment, that only a very limited number succeeded in crossing the river. The remainder were taken prisoners, killed, or drowned. Of the 6000 men who fought on that day, barely 600 re-entered Bormio. The French army consisted of not more than 4000 infantry and 400 cavalry.

Fernamond committed the unpardonable mistake of fighting in front of the village of Mazzo with only one bridge in his rear, or, what is still worse, on his flank, by which he could retreat. He payed dearly for it. He ought, on the contrary, to have remained with his force concentrated on the right bank, have covered his position by the Adda, and thus awaited the French attack. The latter, under the impression that the bridge could not be forced in the face of an army, would have been obliged to ascend the right bank of the river, along which were such bad roads that they would have arrived more or less in disorder, and their cavalry would have been paralysed. But Fernamond was not a man to comprehend these advantages. He seems to have been a poor specimen of a general.

The Duke de Rohan could have marched to Bormio and taken possession of that post, but he was more sagacious, and would not lose sight of his principal object through the temptation of destroying and sweeping away the remnant of the Austrians in the Valtelline. He was aware, that whilst marching in that direction, General Serbelloni might be able to

take up some favourable position in the valley. He therefore marched with all speed towards Sondrio.

RETREAT OF THE SPANIARDS.

There the Duke de Rohan received the intelligence that the Spanish army was at Fusine, on the left bank of the Adda, three leagues below Sondrio. It guarded the bridge of St Pietro, which the French must cross to reach it, unless they chose to reascend the valley as far as Boffetto, where there was another bridge. Serbelloni did not, however, consider it his duty to await a victorious army, just reinforced by 1200 Swiss. He profited by the night to retreat to Morbegno, whence he re-entered the Milanese.

CAPTURE OF BORMIO AND STA MARIA.

The Duke de Rohan, for the moment rid of this enemy, reascended the Valtelline and marched upon Bormio, which he captured, as well as the Fort of the Baths in its vicinity, the garrison of which offered a vigorous resistance. Upwards of 200 were killed—some precipitated themselves from the fort rather than surrender: the remainder took refuge in the Tyrol. This occurred on the 19th July.

During this time Du Landé, who had been directed to obtain possession of Sta Maria in the Münster-Thal, had moved by the Val Puschiavo into the Engadine at the head of 3500 infantry and 200 cavalry. He crossed the Col des Fours (Passo del Fuorn), and descended from Cierfs upon Sta Maria without encountering any resistance. He took possession of the post, whither Rohan repaired after the capture of Bormio and the Baths.

At this juncture the Duke was much embarrassed, having but few supplies, which he was drawing from Switzerland, without money, and threatened afresh by a considerable assembly of troops at Landeck. He applied for reinforce-

ments and money. He obtained both, though in small instalments, and his forces were always inferior to those which at any moment might fall upon him.

NEW DEFENSIVE DISPOSITIONS.

The Duke was anxious regarding the road from Chur to the Upper Engadine, by which he could be turned. The bridge over the Rhine near Ragatz was covered by the Fort of the Rhine. He gave directions for the completion of the fortifications, and sent two regiments into the valley of Parpan, which communicates directly with Chur, and closed its passes with entrenchments. In this campaign he often had recourse to fortifications, although he occupied no positions that were not naturally strong. The disposition of his troops between the Luziensteig and Bormio were so arranged that all the important passes were guarded, whilst he himself took post with his reserves at Tirano, so as to be able to march to the point, where the enemy might make his principal effort. This is the real method of defending a wide extent of mountainous territory. The location of his reserve on the extreme right would have been faulty, if it had not been necessary to watch the Spanish army in the direction of the Lower Valtelline. In that case he ought to have posted himself in the Upper Engadine, so as to be more within reach of his left, but he was compelled by the proximity of the Spaniards to make this disposition. Happily the tardiness of the Germans and the hesitation of the Spaniards afforded him time to make these arrangements. He made no change in them, notwithstanding the intelligence that reached him. He was informed that the Imperialists were preparing to pass the Rhine at Constance, and to march from thence through Switzerland by the St Gothard to Bellinzona, where they could easily effect a junction with the Spaniards, and turn the Valtelline, which they had been unable to force. This intelligence, which demonstrates the importance at that time

attached to Swiss neutrality, did not affect his determination. He persisted in it like a man of prudence and firmness, and was unwilling, on a mere report, to alter the plan he had so wisely conceived. Besides, he was in a condition to place a further impediment upon the junction of the two armies by means of an offensive march across the chain of mountains, which separate the valley of the Adda from that of the Ticino, or Chiavenna from Bellinzona, since he was nearer this latter town than the Austrians were.

THE AUSTRIANS RE-ENTER THE VALTELLINE.

These were false reports: Fernamond, after three months inaction, re-entered the Valtelline, and on the 24th October he occupied the portion of the Val Fraele, which debouches on the Baths above Bormio. This fort was occupied by a French garrison, but all the mountain passes had been abandoned without resistance at the approach of the enemy, who showed himself in considerable force. Nevertheless, Fernamond, instead of carrying the fort and Bormio, limited himself to the despatch of some troops by the Monte delle Scale into the valley of Pedenosso, another abuttal on Bormio, and concentrated his main body in the Val Fraele: with what object it is difficult to say: perhaps Fernamond himself did not know.

COMBAT OF FRAELE.

In the meanwhile the Duke de Rohan, who could be taken in rear by the Val Puschio, as well as attacked in front in his position at Tirano (for all the valleys communicate with each other by mountain passes), sent two regiments to occupy Puschio, after he had rallied the troops that had fallen back on Bormio on the enemy's approach.

Seeing that the Austrians, instead of advancing, had established themselves in the Val Fraele, the Duke de Rohan took the vigorous step of attacking them. His dispositions

were as follows. He sent orders to Du Landé, who was occupying with some troops the post of Zernetz in the Engadine, to move to the Gallo Mountain, by which the descent into the Val Fraele is made. He was desirous of totally intercepting the retreat of the Germans at that point. This was an error. The detachment became separated from the rest of the army, and had to make a considerable detour to reach its destination. He would have acted more prudently had he called in this detachment to his main body, so as to be in greater strength at the decisive point.

The greatest commanders have often committed this mistake from a desire to surround the enemy completely. The bait is indeed tempting, but it is attended with danger.

At the same time the Duke, who had repaired to Bormio, had organised three attacks. The first in the valley of Pedenosso. The second and principal, which the Duke headed with all his cavalry, in the Val Fraele. The third was nothing more than a diversion against the troops that were blockading the Fort of the Baths. The latter inconsiderately made a night attack, and drew upon it a considerable portion of the enemy's forces. It was necessarily the victim of its temerity and isolation. It should have limited its efforts to containing the enemy at this point. It is what generally occurs with these diversions.

The first of the other two columns, commanded by the brave Canisi, obtained possession of Pedenosso and the adjacent heights. The second was then enabled to climb the Scale, and descend from thence by the mountain spurs into the Val Fraele, its lower entrance being barred by the troops, against whom the third column had been directed under the command of Vandy.

The passage of the Scale was laborious, especially for the cavalry, who had to dismount. Nevertheless the troops formed in the bottom, and advanced confidently against their enemies, attacked them in front and in flank by the heights, drove them back into their entrenchments, and threw

them into the greatest disorder. They lost more than 2000 men, but the remainder escaped, because Du Landé was not at the post of Monte Gallo, which had been assigned to him. This mishap might have been foreseen. Nevertheless the Germans, who were completely defeated, withdrew into the Tyrol never to reappear. This occurrence took place on the 31st October.

COMBAT OF MORBEGNO.

On the following day the French troops resumed their march to Tirano. They had but just arrived there, when they learned that the Spaniards were at Morbegno, and that a fresh assembly of troops was taking place simultaneously in the Tyrol. The Duke seeing that he was again threatened to be enclosed between two armies, marched with the greatest rapidity against the Spaniards, who at length were entering into line, being still unaware of the issue of the combat of Fraelé, and imagining that the Austrians would attack their adversary in rear, at the same time that they resisted him in front—a fatal illusion which proves of the highest advantage to him who happens to be in the middle.

The Spaniards were posted in front of Morbegno, their right resting on the mountains, their left on the small wood on the banks of the Adda. Their front was covered by a rivulet, and by some walls which were used as entrenchments. They were attacked in front with strong columns, whilst some musketeers or skirmishers simultaneously won the heights and the little wood, in order to take the enemy in flank, and drive him out of the entrenchments. The resistance in front was considerable, and the success varied. The Duke was obliged to expose himself to danger; but the reserve, engaging the enemy at the opportune moment, the position was carried, and the Spaniards withdrew to Morbegno, from whence they could not be expelled except by a hand-to-hand street fight. They left more than 1500 dead on the field, and, but for night supervening, their loss would have been more considerable.

The French also suffered much, the forces being nearly equal. The Duke de Rohan, under these circumstances, showed himself to be no less a brave soldier than a great commander, by reason of his prudent arrangements and the promptitude of his strategical manœuvres. The French captured the whole of the Spanish baggage, as well as their military chest, the plate belonging to the general officers, and all their papers. Serbelloni's defeat was complete. He withdrew as well as he could under the protection of Fort Fuentes the night following the battle, that is to say, the 10th–11th November.

The Duke de Rohan would willingly have pursued the Spaniards the following day, but the intelligence he received of the Imperialists' advance for the third time to Bormio, induced him to return to Tirano, to give them a reception. Always the same manœuvre, it will be seen, and always a good one.

This time, however, neither Germans nor Spaniards ventured to show themselves any more. Winter set in, and Rohan reaped all the honours of the campaign. The Valtelline was saved. Rohan manœuvred well, fought well, and justly earned the reputation of a great commander. But it is right to acknowledge that he had to deal with adversaries his inferiors in the art of war, very irresolute, and men who gave him a more than common chance of success. He engaged in four combats—viz., Livigno, Mazzo, Fraele, and Morbegno—from which he issued victorious, because he understood the art of taking up a central position, which enabled him to attack in either direction, and because in him, with excellent strategical dispositions, there were combined great determination, considerable rapidity of execution, as well as vigour and a correct eye, when engaged.

The Duke de Rohan was mortally wounded at the siege of Rheinfelden, in another campaign, in 1638. His remains were transported to Geneva, and laid in the cathedral, in which his monument is still to be seen.

APPENDIX.

I.

LECOURBE'S right wing, commanded by Colonel Gudin, was in the first instance distributed in the valley of the Aare at Brienz and Meiringen. Accounts differ as to its exact strength. According to some authorities it amounted to 5000 men ; others state it as not exceeding 3000 men. Lobhauer says in his narrative that he could obtain no precise information. A shepherd, an eyewitness of what had occurred, informed him that he estimated the numbers at 5000 men. Historical accounts, however, put them down at 4000 men. All he could ascertain on the spot was that "a great many people were there."

The greater portion of these troops were infantry, including a detachment of chasseurs, armed with short rifles, together with a few mountain guns, which old Lüthold, steward of the Grimsel Hospice, saw taken up the valley on mules ; but whether they were actually used is not known. The cavalry consisted of merely the necessary orderlies.

The French appear to have been supported by an effective commissariat, the result of which was that their physical condition was excellent, and that, as no necessity existed for oppressing the inhabitants of Hasli, few if any acts of violence were committed by the invaders.

According to Lobhauer, the political feelings of the peasantry were based solely on selfish motives, and they were French or Austrian, according to the treatment they received from either in matters relating to the "kitchen," the "stable," and the "pocket." The inclinations of only a small number could be traced to a higher source. Amongst these few were probably Lüthold, who was

thoroughly French in feeling, and Zybach, the father of the steward in 1837, when Lobhauer made his inquiries, who was as friendly to the Austrian cause. Zybach was a Bernese, devoted in heart and soul to the patrician government. It is not difficult to understand that in the Hasli-Thal the French counted more friends than the Austrians.

Fahner, the landlord of the inn at Guttannen, seems to have received especial consideration from the officers at Gudin's headquarters, who had reached that village on the 13th August.

It has been seen in the narrative that the Austrian troops appointed to guard the Grimsel Pass, leading from the valley of the Aare to that of the Rhone, and by the Furka to that of the Reuss, consisted of two battalions under Colonel Prince de Rohan, and formed a portion of Colonel Strauch's brigade, which was watching the Upper Valais. These two battalions, to which were attached forty Swiss riflemen from the Upper Valais, communicated with Simbschen, who occupied the entire line of the Reuss between Andermatt and Flüelen. Thus the immediate task of de Rohan's detachment was to cover the St Gothard by the two roads, or rather paths, which unite between the Grimsel and the Rhone Glacier. The French had met with no opposition in occupying the valley of Hasli, leading from Meiringen to the Grimsel, while the Austrians had established their camp nearly four weeks previously above the Todten-See, upon the barren but very strong summit of the Grimsel. This pass, 7103 feet above the sea, is situated between the rocky walls of the Nägeli-Grätli, which separates the middle plateau of the Rhone Glacier from the valley of the Aare, and the Sidelhorn, 9449 feet, a projecting point in the range of mountains which here divides the cantons of Berne and Valais.

The Austrians had constructed huts amongst the huge blocks of gneiss that are here strewn over the face of the ground. Even after a lapse of thirty-seven years, when Lobhauer examined the pass, he traced marks of some of these hovels, which consisted of two side-walls of stones piled up against the rocks, and covered with a few planks or old tent-cloths.

It would appear that the Austrian detachment at the Grimsel possessed no commissariat dépôt of its own; at any rate, not until eight days preceding the forcing of the pass. Only on two



occasions had they sent patrols or small foraging-parties into Guttannen ; and this, added to the difficulty of supplying Strauch's brigade from its rear in Italy, and from the valley of the Upper Rhine over the formidable mountain passes that lay between, accounts for the great deficiency of the Austrian supplies. There is no doubt that, towards the close of the occupation of the Grimsel, the troops suffered from want of food, and that they slew and ate half raw any stray goats, which were discovered after the cattle had been driven by the shepherds away from the district. There being no supply of wood at or near this barren spot, the Austrians procured their wood for cooking and firing from the "Hospice," the result being that the building was gutted, and in a short time there remained nothing of it but the outer walls.

The position of the Austrians on the Grimsel was a double one. It comprised a post behind the right bank of the Aare, and one upon the slope of the mountain on which the pass is situated. (See Plan 1.)

Below, by the little stone bridge that crosses the Aare, and at the spot where the path sinks between the perpendicular rocks and the river, were posted the forty Valaisan riflemen.

Half-way up the slope, in the direction of the Grimsel Hospice, one of the Austrian battalions was extended in the form of a semi-circle, supported by the other battalion in reserve, on the crest of the mountain, further in rear.

The Austrians, confident in the strength of this position, which enabled them to discern the movements of the enemy at a considerable distance, flattered themselves that it could not be approached, except by the path leading from Räterichsboden over the little bridge of the Aare, below the Hospice, where the river is crossed, and the ascent of the Grimsel commences.

The approach to the bridge was rendered difficult, if not impossible, by the possession of the Spital Nollen, or "Mound of the Hospice," opposite the bridge, from which a heavy fire could be directed against even a considerable force that might attempt to reach, or pass over it along a narrow footpath barely wide enough for two men to walk abreast.

Moreover, the defenders had the advantage of excellent cover from the blocks of rock strewn over the surface of the ground ;

so that from the bridge to the summit of the pass it was easy to maintain a vigorous defence, from the commanding nature of their position.

The French, on the contrary, would have to expose themselves during their advance, which, for the first part at least, would be by a pathway completely open to the fire of their adversaries; again, if they fired, they would have to do so from below, and in this respect would have been at a disadvantage with their opponents. The Austrians might therefore reasonably believe that the fire of the French would be thrown away, that they would expend their ammunition to no purpose, and that, if after this they should attempt to scale the steep ascent, they would soon become victims of their foolhardiness.

It was anticipated by the Austrians that not a man of the French force would reach the Grimsel alive, it being taken for granted that they were limited to the one narrow and exposed route over the bridge, and thence up the mountain path leading to the summit.

Gudin had been instructed to carry the Grimsel Pass on the 14th August, in conformity with the combined attack on the St Gothard before mentioned in the narrative.

A strong patrol, which he had sent forward on the 12th or 13th towards the bridge at the foot of the Grimsel Pass, had returned discomfited; and having learned from this and other sources the strength of the Austrian position, he felt very much embarrassed, being persuaded that it was not possible to carry it by a front attack.

In this frame of mind he assembled his staff officers during the night of the 13th in the quarters they were occupying in Fahner's inn. There the conversation became animated, and was sufficiently loud to be overheard by Fahner and his friends, who were sitting in the public room adjoining. The innkeeper, overhearing the conversation of the French officers, told his companions that he knew a path, by which the Austrians could be taken in reverse without loss to the assailants. These remarks were repeated to Gudin, who called on Fahner for an explanation. Fahner at first equivocated, and wanted to retract his words; but at last, yielding to alternate threats and promises, he agreed to act as guide. Once in for it, he determined to derive all the profit he could from the

transaction, and demanded from Gudin the grant of Räterichsboden as his reward.

It is needless to say the request was granted.

The orders were then issued for the French to be in readiness to move at 3 A.M. on the following day.

As day broke on the 14th August, the Austrian sentries on the mound of the Hospice and to the right of it, who from their commanding position could overlook Räterichsboden, observed a dark mass advancing towards the small plain bearing that name. The Austrians accordingly got under arms, and occupied the position described above.

Their two battalions were about 1430 strong. The French, who filled nearly the whole level space on the left bank of the Aare, numbered about 3600 men.

The Valaisan chasseurs, distributed over the mound of the Hospice, watched attentively the path over the bridge near the steep foot of the Juchli Stock. One-half of the Austrians, *i.e.*, a battalion, was extended over a long line from the Kehrenthürnli, a projecting rock on the left above the Hospice, to the other side of the pass and brook, so that their right wing stood about level with the middle of the Spital Tarn. The extent of ground covered was about 1500 paces, allowing about four or five paces between each file. The remaining battalion was posted upon the crest of the Grimsel, in reserve. Hours elapsed without any movement on the part of the French. At length, at 9 A.M., the vanguard, composed of grenadiers, advanced in single file against the bridge. The two leading men fell, shot by the Valaisan chasseurs. The column halted again, and a pause ensued. There existed no other means of crossing the river, and it was already 10 o'clock. Suddenly there appeared, on the heights to the right, some objects crawling along the glacier under the crest of the Nägelis-Grätli; next a shot or two were heard issuing from amongst these precipitous crags, and then more and more, especially from the heights on the right of the Austrian position. The Valaisans, in their astonishment at the unexpected fire from above, looked around in alarm, lost their heads, and fired wildly. Then, with a wild shout of triumph, the French column made a dash forward, and charged across the bridge. They were met with a brisk but unsteady fire, which enveloped

the combatants in smoke, during which the French cleared the bridge. The Valaisans quickly gave way, while, the hostile fire on the slope of the mountain still increasing, the right wing of the Austrians fell back. The left and centre, however, stood fast for a moment, but their *morale* was gone. In the meantime the French had gained the plateau of the Hospice. Then, with incredible rapidity, and to the astonishment of the Austrians, who were strangers to such tactics, they deployed into a line several hundred paces in length, whilst detached bodies ranged themselves in loose clusters in front, and the whole force clambered, as they best might, up the mountain-side. During the ascent not a shot was fired. Many of the soldiers even slung their arms so as to have the free use of their limbs during the ascent, others used their muskets as alpenstocks ; and in this formation they swarmed up the face of the Grimsel, as men who could not be resisted, much less stopped. The progress of their ascent was marked by the roll of their drums and the notes of their bugles, intermingled with that well-known cry, "*En avant, camarades, avancez avancez !*" which had so long rung in the ears of Europe.

Now it was that the turning movement of the French brought them upon the right flank of the Austrian battalion in reserve. Several companies showed front in this direction, but it was no longer possible to dislodge the French by simple musketry fire from their excellent and commanding position, which was covered by the rocky and steep slope of the Nägelis-Grätli. Besides, the broken and rugged ground on the Col, where every step was met by some impediment, and where two men could barely walk abreast, did not admit of a steady bayonet charge. The Austrian advanced line was broken, its left wing thrown back upon the Kehrenthürnli, and the right wing forced back on the centre, whilst the French continued their fire in extended order, and pushed on, so as to get as much as possible in rear of the Austrians.

The field-officers and adjutants of the Austrian battalions, who were dismounted, could do little on such ground to keep their troops in hand. The companies separated into clusters, and, as it would appear, were left pretty much to their own devices. Colonel de Rohan, however, endeavoured to reform his column as

far as he could, with the view of retreating by the Maienwand along the foot of the Rhone Glacier, and from thence over the Furka Pass, and by Realp to the St Gothard, conformably to the contingent orders which he had received.

This movement had commenced, but after proceeding several hundred paces the column came to a halt, as the men in front were falling quickly under the fire of the French sharpshooters, who, concealing themselves behind the rocks, had reached the rear of the Austrian position. The rumour that the retreat was intercepted spread like wildfire, and increased the alarm. The van fell back upon the centre, and as the enemy's fire grew hotter, the greatest confusion ensued. A portion of the force was now engaged in the narrow defile between the Todten-See, to the south of the crest of the Grimsel, and the wall of the Nägelis-Grätli. At this juncture all order ceased. Some small bodies, conducted by resolute officers, and a great number of disbanded men, effected their retreat, as they best might, surrounded as they were by a circle of fire.

The French detachment, which was to turn the Austrian flank, had descended from a spur of the Nägelis-Grätli and separated itself into small groups; whilst another body, following the course of the stream, had surrounded the lake, so that they were close to the mule-path leading to Obergestelen; while upon the other side of the Col, the main body of the French were not far from the Hohenrand. The circle was rapidly closing in, and shortly both the head and tail of the serpent began to move. Then were heard the shouts of the staff officers, who, true to their orders, desired even then to gain, at any sacrifice, the Maienwand and Furka path. The Austrians, who were now threatened to be surrounded by three times their own numbers, surged in confused masses to and fro, but the predominant inclination was towards the Obergestelen path. In this condition they were overtaken by the main body of the French, who had ascended from the Hospice in less than half an hour. A few troops, with a courageous and obstinate resistance, fired at their assailants. Many Austrians fell at this spot. Many were pressed towards the edge of the Todten-See, and slipped down the steep and frozen slope into its waters, which once more asserted their right to the name accorded to

them by the Bernese and Valaisans in their contests of old. The affair was quickly concluded, and in less than an hour from the arrival of the main body of the French on the summit, the sound of the last shots died away. The fugitives took the Obergestelen road, but were quickly intercepted by the detachment, which had descended from the Nägelis-Grätli, and driven back along this same path to the foot of the Sidelhorn, which some of them ascended. Many of these, about 300, were taken prisoners. Accounts differ as to the number of killed and wounded, but they may be reckoned between 150 and 200. The wounded were left to die where they fell. The French did not lose above 20 men. Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration and the great disparity of numbers, the defeat of the Austrians cannot be regarded as dishonourable. Clausewitz would appear to err in his estimation of the numbers engaged, especially when he states that Strauch came up from Le Valais with some companies to reinforce Rohan's detachment. One has only to consider the locality and the time occupied in the combat to see the impossibility of this. The combat commenced at 10 A.M., and ended about noon. Strauch, who was at Münster with his reserve, must have taken at least four hours to reach the summit of the Grimsel. Moreover the Archduke Charles in his work distinctly states that Strauch, with a portion of the reserve, did not ascend the valley farther than Obergestelen.

FAHNER, AND THE FLANKING COLUMN ON THE LEFT.

(See both Plans.)

Here it may not be uninteresting to our readers to retrace our steps in this narrative, and attach ourselves to the turning column, which, by its sudden appearance on the right of the Austrian position, caused such a panic amongst the defenders of the Grimsel, and by intercepting their retreat, assured the victory of the French.

About half a battalion, from 300 to 400 men, were told off for this manœuvre.

Having reached the Upper Vögeleinsbrücke, Gudin halted his column; and the light detachment, with Fahner at its head, turned off to the left as day broke on the 14th August. The remainder of

the column continued its march by the mule-path along the left bank of the Aare.

Fahner's route at first lay along the right bank of the Aare, over moss-grown rocks, then through some low underwood, and by a rocky headland, and then again descended into a gorge, through which flows a stream.*

For the first quarter of the way the detachment experienced hard climbing, partly over snow slopes, or on the outskirts of these upwards towards the overhanging glaciers, and finally, across the glacier itself, when Fahner turned to the right. (See both Plans.) From this point the path followed many crooked windings, sometimes avoiding an icy peak or a precipice of rock. Then again it took nearly a level course, until it struck upwards to the heights above, and in rear of the Austrian position upon the Col de Grimsel, at a point about 4000 paces above it.

Thrice during this march the courage of the French all but yielded to the wild aspect of the scenery and the fatigue of the ascent. Thrice they halted and refused to proceed, and thrice they threatened to shoot Fahner, whom they declared to be treacherously conducting them to their destruction. He besought them on his knees to spare his life,† and begged them to follow him, assuring them that not a man should come to harm.

It required all the influence of their officers to pacify and convince the soldiers. At last they resumed their march, and found that the higher they ascended into the invigorating air, the toil of the ascent became less, until, after a five-hours' march, the column reached the little lake almost above the heads of the Austrians. Then they diverged from their path in two, and later again in three, different directions. The central division may have numbered about 200, and each of the others 100 men. It was owing to Fahner's skill in conducting them by so high a route that they avoided being seen by the Austrians; for had he taken a lower one, the turning column would probably have been perceived

* Not the stream from the Gelmer-See, which forms the next great gorge lower down. Ebel is here in error.

† The words in which Fahner is reported by tradition to have addressed the French were "Liebe Gnädige Herren Franzosen," &c., and sound very comical, considering that they were used towards the "Citoyen-soldats" of the French Republic, who probably did not understand a word of German.

by the people on the Spital Nollen. But the keen sight of the Valaisans was exclusively directed to the front ; and even had they cast a glance towards the slopes of the Grimsel, it would not have been easy to detect a thin line of men appearing on the crest.*

In Plan 1 will be seen the track of a second flanking column, which, on the authority of the elder Lüthold, was formed of the tail of Gudin's column. This detachment is supposed to have proceeded, after passing the bridge guarded by the Valaisans, a little way along the left bank of the Aare, and to have crossed over the last stone bridge to the right bank ; yet a little farther, and then up the course of the torrent which

* Being at Guttannen in the autumn of 1867, I climbed over the Nägelis-Grätli, with the double object of examining the route taken by Fahner, and of descending upon the Rhone Glacier by the plateau of the Saasberg. The following is an extract from my journal :—

"Left Guttannen at 9.18 A.M., with Melchior v. Weissenfluh ; reached the Handeck at 10.30, and Räterichsboden at 11.40 : very misty, and somewhat wet. At Räterichsboden engaged a peasant at the chalet, Arnold Sulse, who knew the ground. At 11.50 we commenced the ascent, crossed the plank bridge immediately under the chalet, when we turned a little to the right, and commenced a steep scramble by the side of a waterfall. Finding, as we ascended, that we could be seen by any one on the Grimsel, I insisted upon Arnold Sulse taking us over a rocky ridge to the left or northward. After making for the snow slopes at the foot of the glacier, we evidently got into the track taken by the French, and thence we took a southerly direction towards the crest of the Nägelis-Grätli. After a very steep climb over masses of granite tumbled about in a confused manner, we descended on the Saasberg, finding it difficult to cross either to the north or south of the crest ; and after glissading down several snow slopes, we made for the Rhone Glacier, flushing on the way six ptarmigan, and hitting on the fresh track of a chamois. We had a glorious view of the Rhone Glacier ; after which we turned southward, and passing above and to our right the tarn which feeds the waterfall that descends into the Spital See, at the Grimsel, eventually descended on to the edge of the Maienwand, close to the Todten-See, which we reached at 4.50 P.M.

"The descent from the Saasberg was very steep. Though the route was difficult in some places, and though the soldiers, no doubt, like myself, were obliged to make use of their hands and feet ; yet in the main, as any one may satisfy himself who tries it, it did not present the dangers with which people unaccustomed to mountaineering have invested it. The result of my climb, however, was to increase my admiration of this great military feat ; for it must be remembered that every man employed in the turning column had to carry his firelock and his ammunition, to say nothing of his other equipment. Well did the French troops deserve success, and above all, their leader must have been a man who was not afraid of responsibility !"—L. S.

descends from the Trübten-See, from whence it skirted the Sidelhorn, and so descended upon the Col de Grimsel. Lobhauer heard of this from no one but the elder Lüthold; others ignored the fact, though they all admitted it to have been possible. No mention of it is made in the Swiss narrative, from which it may be inferred that it has not been generally credited.

After routing the Austrian posts at the Grimsel, and pursuing them as far as their camp in the valley of the Rhone, Gudin marched by the Maïenwand to the foot of the Furka, where he passed the night. On the following morning, the 15th, he entered the valley of Urseren. It was his column that attacked Simbschen's reserve battalion at Andermatt. (*Vide Narrative.*)

II.

NARRATIVE OF SUWAROW'S MARCH FROM ITALY INTO SWITZERLAND.*

CHUR, 10th October 1799.

TOWARDS the end of August (1799) Suwarow received orders from his court to join, with the entire force under his command in Italy, the army of his nation, which had replaced at Zürich that of the Archduke Charles.

The Russians, who knew as little of the Alps as the Austrians did of the Caucasus, were naturally compelled to commit the direction of this expedition to the Austrians, who for a long time previously had been waging war in the mountainous region about to be traversed.

From Asti three principal lines of operation presented themselves. The first, on the right by Novara, Como, Chiavenna, the Splügen, Chur, and Walenstadt, led to Wesen at the extreme left of the Russian army before Zürich. The second or central line, by Novara, Bellinzona, the St Gothard, Altorf, and the canton of Schwyz, led to the rear of Masséna's army. The third, by Ivrea, Aosta, the great St Bernard, and St Maurice, led to the Canton of Vaud, forty leagues in rear of Masséna's position.

The Austrians induced the marshal to select the Altorf road. His corps consisted of 16,000 effective infantry, 3000 Cossacks,

* "Memoir of Suwarow's March from Italy into Switzerland, by the Russian officer who led the column of the right attack against the St Gothard." The author is presumed to have been General Schweikouski. The autograph fell into the possession of General Dufour, by whom it was read some years ago to the military society of the canton of Geneva.—*Vide* Supplement to the 24th number of the *Swiss Military Review*, 26th December 1857.

&c., and, including the non-combatants, numbered about 22,000 or 23,000 men.

On the morning of the 13th September the army commenced its movement from Novara.

Had Suwarow adopted the line of operation by the right, he would have reached Gallarate on the 14th, and Como on the 15th. At the outset of the projected movement, all the stores might have been sent to Como and Lecco, at both of which points boats might have been collected for the transport of a portion by water, whilst the remainder might have been conveyed on mules to Chiavenna.

The army would have reached Chiavenna on the 16th, 17th, and 18th—by indifferent roads, it is true, but through a friendly country, and would have crossed, in the middle of September, under an Italian sky, mountains much less lofty and numerous than those, over which it had to force a passage, or advance with the enemy in front, in the month of October and in the climate of Switzerland. The army would have rested on the 19th; the advanced guard and a portion of the convoy would have reached Chur on the 22d, and the remainder of the army on the 23d, by a good mountain road free from any obstacle.

Not a shot need have been fired to open the passage, nor a man required, either on the flank or in rear, to cover the convoys. The light artillery might have been transported by the lake as far as Chiavenna, and not on the backs of mules for sixteen or seventeen days. The Splügen route would have admitted of six-pounders being taken, instead of one-and-a-half-pounders by the St Gothard; finally, on reaching Chur, provisions would have been found, and the high road entered upon again. The army in the former case would not have encountered between Como and Chur more than six days' hard work, with an intervening day of rest, and need only have taken seven days' supplies, of which sufficient for four days could have been carried up the lake. From Chur to Sargans and Wesen is only a two-days' march. The advanced guard could have joined Hotze on the 24th, and the whole army could have come up on the next day, the 25th. Not until the 15th (at Gallarate, between Novara and Como) was the direction of the army determined. Now there are but nine

days between the 15th and 25th, and the enemy, uncertain of Suwarow's direction, would not have had time to combine his attack. Had Suwarow been successful in the execution of this plan, his army would have arrived fresh and entire to support Hotze's army, and the latter general, not being required to detach Linken's and Auffenberg's corps to meet Marshal Suwarow, would have had 6000 additional men to support his position between Utnach and Wesen. In this case, too, there would have been no necessity to withdraw from Korsakow's position 5000 Russians, for the purpose of reinforcing Hotze, a manœuvre which assisted the enemy in forcing the Russian position, and caused the loss of Zürich.

According to this plan Suwarow's arrival could by no supposition have been delayed for an hour, nor his army nor his glory in any way compromised. On the 25th September* Suwarow and Hotze would have united their forces, amounting to 40,000 men, whilst Korsakow held the position of Zürich with 30,000.

By the adoption of the St Gothard and Altorf road, it became necessary to proceed from Varese to Altorf along a continuous mountain route. From Varese to Bellinzona the distance is two marches, with the Monte Ceneri to cross; from Bellinzona to Quinto two more marches; from Quinto to Hospenthal a heavy march, including the assault of the St Gothard, which commenced half a league in advance of Airolo, and did not terminate till the army reached Hospenthal at 2 A.M. At Bellinzona a column of 6000 men, commanded by General Rosenberg, made a movement to the right, and marched by the Val Blenio, the Vogelberg, Sta Maria and Dissentis, so as to turn the St Gothard, and attack Urseren in rear.

This march over formidable mountains, where there was no practicable road, required an additional day, so that Rosenberg left Taverne a day sooner. His reunion with the main body depended on the issue of an attack between Tavetsch and Urseren; and in case of its failure, this corps would have been obliged to descend to Chur by Dissentis and Ilanz, thereby renouncing all ulterior

* The day on which the battle of Zürich was fought, and Hotze attacked behind the Linth.—G. H. D.

connection with the army, which, diminished by 6000 chosen troops, would in the meantime have had the same difficulties to overcome, the same enemies to repulse, and the same defiles to mask.

It was not till the 23d* that the St Gothard and Urseren respectively were forced. The cause of this delay was the deficiency of mules intended for the convoy, in waiting for which a fruitless delay of four days was incurred between Varese and Bellinzona ; finally this defect was made good, to a great extent, by the use of the Cossacks' horses.

The Russians, unaccustomed to the mountains, incurred a useless loss of men by making a front attack, along the main road, upon the St Gothard. Their advanced guard, appointed to turn this mountain by the right, and by heights of a greater altitude than the Hospice, incurred delay in making up their minds to escalate them, and accomplished the movement in a very leisurely manner. I commanded this column, and was unsuccessful in inducing the Russians to gain the mountain-crests immediately on leaving Airolo. They would descend again to the plateau, which is situated a short distance beyond Airolo, and where the great mountain of the St Gothard commences. From this point we were obliged to scale, with much labour and fearful risk, there being no road, the same heights that we ought to have won from Airolo, and the occupation of which compelled the French to beat a precipitate retreat.

General Rosenberg, who had reached a point above the village of Urseren, could and ought to have attacked the enemy before five in the afternoon, instead of waiting, as he did, till nightfall. By so doing he would have placed the French in the valley between two fires, would have enabled the main body of the army to avoid a second combat, in which, in order to reach Hospenthal, it was obliged to engage, and to have captured a large number of prisoners. With reference to this delay, it is but right to say that it originated more in the fatigue of the men, and their inexperience of this kind of warfare, than in ill-will or want of courage

* According to the Archduke Charles, the attack on the St Gothard took place on the 24th September.—G. H. D.

on the part of the troops, who fought on all occasions with great bravery.

On the junction of the army at Urseren, it found itself arrested by an obstacle which might have been naturally anticipated—one of the two arches which support the road immediately after the Devil's Bridge is crossed * had been broken down. Had the enemy broken down both the arches as well as the bridge, I am certain that we had no means of repairing them, and we should have had no other course to pursue, but either to recross the St Gothard, or descend by Dissentis and Ilanz to Chur. The enemy could have accomplished this with comparative facility; since he had the whole night, and part of the following morning, to effect this operation, and he could have retired partly by Le Valais, and partly by the mountain that turns the Devil's Bridge on the left. A considerable portion of his forces took both these roads, so that it would have been in the enemy's power to have caused at this juncture the miscarriage of the enterprise. This was an additional reason against the loss of two hours incurred by General Rosenberg in his attack on Urseren. Above all, he ought not to have passed the night without occupying the bridge, which is not more than a mile from that village.

When the broken arch had been repaired, albeit in a very indifferent manner, the army resumed its march at 5 P.M. on the 24th, and reached Wasen at an advanced hour of the night. The 25th was the seventh day's march of the main body in the mountains, and the eighth of Rosenberg's column. At nine next morning it reached Stäg, where it effected its junction with Auffenberg's column of 2000 Austrians, who had descended from Dissentis by the Maderaner-Thal, having crossed the Crispalt.

General Auffenberg, in conformity with the concerted plan, had debouched into the valley of the Reuss at an early hour on the 24th; but as the Russian army was unable to reach Stäg on the 24th, as had been agreed upon, Auffenberg's corps was exposed for twenty-four hours to the attack of the 2000 of the enemy, who had re-

* Nearly all the accounts state that the bridge was broken down. This, however, is incorrect. So large a bridge could not have been repaired. On inspecting the spot, I discovered that one of the arches supporting the road had been destroyed, not the bridge itself.—G. H. D.

turned from Altorf, and afterwards to that of the 4000 men, who had descended from Urseren. But for the resolution of this general and his brave troops, his whole corps would have been captured, and the enemy, by occupying the heights which commanded Stäg, would have been in a position to arrest the advance of the Russian army, which reached that point in an exhausted state, and in a column with a front of only two men. In that case it would have been obliged to retrace its route by Urseren, Dissentis, and Chur.

On the same day (the 25th) the army continued its advance upon Altorf, which it reached at noon, and the day went by without any reconnaissance of the enemy being made, though he was on the left bank of the Reuss, and occupied the bridge of Seedorf and Flüelen, the point of his re-embarkation. An error was committed in not driving the enemy out of the valley, or at least in not reconnoitring his force, so that a proper distribution might be made of the number of troops required to guard the convoy on which the subsistence, and the consequent existence, of the army depended. All the provisions in the valley of Uri, the St Gothard, and Altorf would not have sufficed for one day's subsistence of 6000 men. By neglecting the movement upon Flüelen, the Russians lost the opportunity of seizing all the supplies which the French had brought thither, for the purpose of loading them on board the boats that had been ordered from Luzern for this service, but which had been prevented arriving by the violence of an unfavourable wind. In all probability some provisions, of which the Russians were in great need, would have been found there, and some prisoners would have been taken. At this period (the evening of the 25th) the chain of the convoy extended from Airolo to Altorf, and was open to attack—(1) at Airolo by the Val Bedretto; (2) at Hospenthal and Urseren by the Furka; and (3) at Wasen by the Meien-Thal, leading from the Ober-Hasli-Thal, debouching from which the French, two months previously, had driven the Austrians from Wasen situated in the bottom of the valley of the Reuss, by that portion of their corps which had been left in the vicinity of Seedorf and Flüelen, and by the reinforcements which were enabled to reach them, both by the lake and from Unterwalden.

Strauch, in the upper Valais, scoured with 5000 men the neigh-

bourhood of the St Gothard, which he hastily abandoned, through fear of being intercepted. Two battalions masked the valley, that abuts upon Wasen, and five more covered the approaches to the Schächen-Thal, and to the Reuss above the Schächen-Thal, at none of which points was it possible to ascertain the precise strength of the enemy, who were separated from the Russians by formidable mountains, which forbade anything like a reconnaissance.

Considering that all the combats, that had been fought up to this time, had no other object but the opening of the passage, and that the points which had been won were lost again as soon as they had been passed, it will be felt that the advantages derivable from such a plan ought to have been of extreme importance, to compensate for so many risks and losses.

On the 26th (the eighth day of this mountain march) the army resumed its movement to Muotta by Bürglen, and the Schächen-Thal. It had been marching for seven days in the Alps, without the least conception of the difficulties that were in store for it. Thus far it had followed a steep and laborious route, but the road was paved and moderately broad. At this point the troops had to cross a mountain with neither road nor habitation upon it, which separates the Schächen-Thal from the Muotta-Thal, and which takes a single traveller * eight hours to traverse in a leisurely manner, though no portion of the army accomplished it in less than from twelve to fourteen hours. The army had to make this laborious effort suffering from continuous fatigue, with all but naked feet, and a very scanty supply of provisions. Thus only an insignificant portion of the advanced guard reached Muotta on the 26th, the remainder of it bivouacking on the reverse slope of the mountain, whilst the rest of the army took two days to cross it, in which interval many horses perished or were disabled; and it was not till the morning of the 28th, or even the 29th, that the entire army, with a portion of the convoy, reached the above-mentioned village.

It should be mentioned, that in addition to these difficulties the road nearly the whole way was so narrow as to compel the troops to advance in single file.

* It took us nine and a half hours to accomplish this expedition at a reconnoitring pace, along a very fatiguing road. In 1827 we found still extant the skeletons of three horses of the Russian army.—G. H. D.

The depth of half the army, including men and horses, extended from Altorf to Muotta, so that its head was reaching Muotta as the centre of the army was leaving Altorf. The same inconvenience was experienced along nearly the whole of the road between Altorf and Ilanz, in consequence of the route which had been forced by circumstances upon the army.

The plan was to have attacked the French along their entire line on the Limmat on the 26th, whilst Suwarow, reaching Schwyz on the 26th, was to attack the French in the direction of Einsiedeln, after being reinforced by General Linken, who was to join him from Ilanz by the Sernf-Thal, Glarus, the Klön-Thal and the Prigel at Muotta. It has been seen, that in consequence of bad roads, and the enemy's accidental resistance, Suwarow was not in a position to attack the enemy in the direction of Einsiedeln till the 29th, which consideration alone reveals the defect in so complicated a scheme.* But one event, unexpected, though natural, and consequently easy to have been foreseen, had interposed an obstacle of a far more alarming character to the execution of the ulterior project. This was nothing less than the complete defeat of the combined forces under Korsakow and Hotze, which occurred on the 25th and 26th, by which the former had been thrown back beyond the Rhine, the latter to St Gallen and the Lake of Constance.

Information to this effect was obtained from the peasants on the morning of the 27th, and it was confirmed by a letter from General Linken, who had been stopped on the receipt of these disastrous tidings at Schwanden, one league from Glarus.

To turn back was out of the question. With an army enfeebled by hunger and fatigue, spread over a great extent of country, without shoes, without cavalry, artillery, or ammunition, it was impossible to incur any risk in the direction of Schwyz; the more so because the enemy's victorious troops were now interposed between Suwarow, and the army, with which he was desirous of effecting a junction. There was but one course open to him, viz., to proceed to Glarus by the shortest road, and join Linken and the remnant

* It would appear that the Austrian defeats on the shores of the Lago di Garda in 1796, had not disabused them of their mania for surrounding the enemy by corps manœuvring at great distances from each other.—G. H. D.

of Hotze's army, which had naturally been obliged to move in the direction of Walenstadt. But this resolution required immediate effect to be given to it. An advanced guard should have been sent to occupy the Pragel Pass at noon of the 27th, and the troops, as they came up and rested, should have followed on the morning of the 28th, and have been pushed on to Glarus, which the advanced guard would have reached on the morning of the 28th, in order to join Linken there, and according to circumstances, to force a passage by Mollis and Wesen in the Toggenburg. Here, together with the corps of Petrasch and Jellachich, an army of 30,000 men might have been formed wherewith to take the enemy's entire force in flank, and possibly re-establish matters. The delay of the Russians at this critical moment is inexplicable, their only reason being the non-arrival of the provisions; but by carrying two days supply to Muotta, it would have been possible for them to have reached Glarus in one day, and at that place they would have found ten times greater means of subsistence than at Muotta. However, it appears that the Russian generals did not realise all the dangers of their position. Instead of acting in the manner stated above, they sent forward only 300 Cossacks, of which not more than 100 were mounted. These passed the Pragel, but were quickly repulsed by about 900 French, who had just occupied the Klön-Thal. At last, on the evening of the 28th, Auffenberg's brigade, reduced to 1700 men, marched by itself, and found the enemy in possession of the Pragel. It was not till the morning of the 29th that Auffenberg was able to drive them away, and pursue them into the defile between the Klön-Thal Lake and the mountain. The French held their ground till the arrival of the Russian advanced guard, about 2000 strong, who did not come up till two o'clock P.M. on the 30th, when they were pushed back towards nightfall upon a small, but very strong, height at the far end of the lake. While this was going on, the remainder of the first Russian column came up in the evening in support. The following morning (the 1st October) this height had to be carried at the cost of many lives, though it might have been won the previous evening had the Russians followed up their success.*

* This position in rear of the defile is really an excellent one for three or four battalions. The defile is narrow, and three-quarters of a league in length.—G. H. D.

During these occurrences, General Linken, who had ascertained nothing positive regarding Suwarow's army, nor his arrival in the Muotta-Thal (which, nevertheless, he might have considered certain, since Suwarow had informed him, in a letter written from Altorf on the evening of the 25th, that he would be at Muotta the next day), had abandoned not only Glarus, but Schwanden at nine A.M. the 29th September, and had retreated precipitately to Ilanz and Chur, over the Panix mountain. By this culpable and motiveless retreat, caused, as he pretended, by his fear that the enemy might surprise him, either from Altorf, by the Schächen-Thal, which was unlikely so long as he held Schwanden; or from Walenstadt, by the Weisstannen-Thal, though he ought to have known that Jellachich occupied Walenstadt, he afforded the enemy an opportunity of advancing in force to the Klön-Thal, of enclosing Suwarow's entire army in defiles a hundred times worse than the Caudine Forks, and of compelling him to surrender, in consequence of hunger, to inferior forces. Happily, however, the French were not in force, having at Glarus and Nettstall, as well as in the Klön-Thal, not more than two demi-brigades, amounting at the most to 3000 or 3500 men. On the 1st October the first division repulsed them beyond Nettstall and the Linth, the bridge of which place they burned. Notwithstanding this, the Russians pursued the enemy to Mollis, which they took, but abandoned it on the night of the 1st-2d October.

The difficulty of crossing the Linth without a bridge, Linken's abandonment of Glarus, the uncertainty of his whereabouts, and whether Walenstadt and Sargans were still occupied by the Austrians, added to the apprehension of being attacked simultaneously in the direction of Wesen and the Toggenburg, caused the abandonment of the projected march on Walenstadt, either by Wesen and the Toggenburg, or by Kerenzen, along the left bank of the lake, and the determination to retreat by Glarus, Schwanden, Elm, the Panix mountain, Ilanz, and Chur.

The road was frightful, the mountain more formidable than those that already had been traversed, and the difficulties augmented by a three-days' snowstorm: moreover, the troops were exhausted with fatigue. Auffenberg's troops commenced the

march at noon of the 2d: on the 3d they crossed the mountain and reached Chur on the 5th. Marshal Suwarow did not arrive there till the 8th with the first division. He had been obliged to wait at Glarus for Rosenberg's division, which he had left behind at Muotta to receive the convoy and the battalions that covered it. This division, attacked by 6000 or 8000 men, who had come from Schwyz, and a portion of them more recently from Zürich, had completely defeated the enemy on the 1st October, had captured 1050 prisoners, and killed or wounded as many. It sustained no further check at the close of its march, than the loss of the greater portion of its sick, some wounded men, a few stragglers, and the tail-end of the convoy. The total loss was inconsiderable, and did not exceed in all these affairs 2000 men, inclusive of 450 men belonging to Auffenberg's brigade. More than 1200 horses were lost; but the army reached Chur in a cruel state of exhaustion and in rags. The enemy lost in the same affairs nearly 3000 men, exclusive of 1100 prisoners taken by Linken, and between 500 and 600 men killed and wounded at Glarus and Schwanden.

With due regard to the difficulties inseparable from the route that had been selected; to the uncertainty of military events on which the project depended; to the impossibility of retreat in case of disaster, or of forcing the passes leading to Glarus, had the French had the time to occupy them in strength, a juster appreciation may be formed of the real merits of this plan, which so evidently exposed the safety of Suwarow's army, as compared with the slender advantage, in case all went right, as was hoped, of attacking the enemy's right flank with an exhausted and indifferently-supplied army, instead of attacking him in front and in strength, in combination with Hotze, by following the Chur route. In forming a careful estimate of this project, which resulted in such indifferent success, it is worthy of remark that the Russian infantry, brave and excellent in bayonet charges in the plain, was not skilled in the use of firearms, and was utterly without experience of mountain warfare, that neither pontonniers nor pioneers existed in the army, that there was a great quantity of horses with the army, and that these facts were well known to those who planned the march.

I will not discuss the advantages of the third plan, which was based on the movement of Suwarow's army by the great St Bernard into the canton of Vaud, as whatever I might say on the subject would only tend to the expression of useless regrets concerning the past. I shall preserve silence on a point of theory totally distinct from the actual state of affairs.

I am persuaded that the authors of this ridiculous plan believed in the existence of a road from Altorf to Brunnen along the lake,* for otherwise they would not voluntarily and knowingly have engaged an entire army, strong in cavalry, in a *cul-de-sac*, with no exit except along mountain paths so easy to be disputed. All this, too, in order to execute a combined attack in front and rear upon a point occupied by the mass of the enemy's forces! What an ignorance of principles!

This narrative, ably argued, though containing some topographical errors, is by an engineer officer who took an active part in the expedition.†—G. H. Dufour.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER OF SUWAROW, DATED 9TH
NOVEMBER 1799.

I left Italy sooner than I should have done; but I did so in conformity with a plan which I had adopted in good faith rather than from conviction. I arranged the combinations for my march into Switzerland.‡ I enclose the route. I crossed the St Gothard, and surmounted the obstacles that opposed my passage. On the appointed

* This supposition was confirmed in 1833 by Monsieur Schoke, who happened to be the Helvetian Commissary at Altorf when Suwarow's army arrived. He told me that the marshal had already assembled his battalions between the lake and Altorf, in order to take the road which he believed existed along the lake and led to Schwyz, and that he was greatly surprised on learning that there was not even a footpath.—G. H. D.

† In "Masséna's Memoirs," page 378, vol. iii., it is stated that it was General Schweikowski who led the right column, consisting of eight battalions. It must have been this general who wrote this narrative on reaching Chur.—G. H. D.

‡ It was precisely the combinations of the march which were faulty. To pass difficult mountains in order to reach a rendezvous occupied by the enemy! Behold the summary of this famous combination! It resulted in disasters that were wellnigh inevitable.—G. H. D.

day I reached the spot where a junction was to be effected with me,* when I found myself simultaneously deficient of everything. Instead of finding an army in good order and in an advantageous position, I found no army whatever. The position of Zürich, which should have been defended by 60,000 Austrians, had been abandoned by 20,000 Russians. This army was allowed to wait for supplies. Hotze allowed himself to be surprised. Korsakow was vanquished. The French remained masters of Switzerland, and I found myself isolated with my corps, without artillery, provisions, or ammunition, and obliged to withdraw into the Grisons, to rejoin the troops that had been routed. The promises made to me had been unfulfilled.—*Situation Militaire de l'Europe au Débarquement du Général Bonaparte, vol. ii. chap. vi. de l'Europe sous le Consulat et l'Empire, par Capesigue.*

* It will be seen by the foregoing narrative how inexact this statement is.—G. H. D.

THE END.

FEBRUARY, 1875.

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
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